Re: NATO,Kosovo,Russia

I want to chime in with a dissent from some of what has been said so far.  

Peter Grimes wrote:

>1    The Serbians will not--CANNOT--accept the separation of
>Kosovo.  Milosovic built his power on that rejection, but it's
>also a common & popular Serb conviction.  Hence failure of the
>imposed "solution" in France and Holbrooke trips.
>

Has anyone been _asking_ the Serbs to accept the separation of Kosovo from
Serbia?  I believe the U.S. and its allies have simply been asking for a
return to the _status quo ante_, namely, restoration of Kosovo's autonomy,
revoked by Mr. Milosevic. 

Professor Grimes goes on:

>2    Air strikes successful in demolishing Serb army,
>consolidating Serbian national solidarity and Russian concern. 
>But elimination of Serbian high-tech toys will not stop or even
>diminish Serbian nationalist convictions, which may devolve into
>lower-tech quasi-guerrila fighters.
>

The difficulty of military operations in the former Yugoslavia has, I
think, been frequently overestimated.  The military strategy that brought
the warring parties to Dayton, OH, was, as I recall, the one Gen. Colin
Powell believed would not work.

I am certainly sympathetic to Professor Grimes' view that the U.S. has
mismanaged its relationship with the Russians in recent months.  Much of
this mismanagement (e.g., the resuscitation of "Star Wars") has come about
because of the need of Republicans in the U.S. to find some issue--_any_
issue--upon which to campaign in 2000.  I certainly would advocate
diplomatic efforts to provide the Russians with some sort of reassurance.
Perhaps negotiations over IMF financing could be a means of doing this.  

Nevertheless, Professor Grimes' fears about a direct clash between Western
and Russian forces as a result of the ascension of Mr. Zyuganov to the
Russian presidency are overdrawn.  Would the Russians really be willing to
send their much-degraded armed forces on a military excursion that would
almost certainly result in their humiliation?  Recall that the Russians,
with their memory of the unhappy fate of Nicholas II and the Kerensky
government, are only too well aware of the potential domestic political
consequences of disastrous foreign military adventures.

I'm more concerned about other changes in the military situation in the
former Yugoslavia and elsewhere.  For example, I'm concerned that the
Russians might respond by relocating missiles to Belarus (a possibility
mentioned in the press in recent days) or by increased efforts to arm the
Serbs.

>PS--Non-involvement will certainly lead to Albanian genocide or
>at least continued MASSIVE displacement from Kosovo. 

The consequences of non-intervention could be much greater than simply the
liquidation of the Kosovars, horrible as that is by itself.  Albania and
Macedonia could become involved, which could bring Greece and Turkey into
the conflict on opposing sides.  In any event, Germany, Italy and other
European states will have to absorb thousands of refugees, with
consequences for the politics of those countries.  

Non-intervention could have repercussions far beyond eastern Europe.  If
Milosevic is permitted to resolve his "Kosovar problem" through genocide,
what encouragement might this give to other leaders, say, in Africa, who
might be inclined to beat the drums of communal rivalry.
 

 Were it not
>for the Russian factor, I would approve the proposed US policy,
>and wished that it had been applied in Rwanda & Cambodia as well!
>

I wish genocides elsewhere could be prevented as well.  Simply because the
international community has not used military force in other cases in the
past doesn't defeat the argument in favor of using force in a good cause in
the present, however.

The concerns about "imperialism" that others in this thread have expressed
raise for me the question of what alternative policy others are
recommending.  It may be the case that some in the international community
have reasons for resenting the presence of countries that attempt to serve
as the "world's policeman."  Nevertheless, one's dislike for a particular
cop does not defeat the argument that society _needs_ cops.

That's all for now.


--
Jeffrey L. Beatty
Doctoral Student
Department of Political Science
The Ohio State University
2140 Derby Hall
154 North Oval Mall
Columbus, Ohio 43210

(o) 614/292-2880
(h) 614/688-0567
Email:  Beatty.4@osu.edu
___________________________________________________
I have come to the conclusion that politics are too
serious a matter to be left to the politicians--
Charles DeGaulle