Re: "rise of china" and wst

Richard,

It seems that part of your confusion is ascribing peripheral status to China.  
This is not the case.  They are semi-peripheral, and are in the process of 
trying to industrialize and develop to a point at which they could be 
considered 'core'.  Whether or not they contend for hegemony is a different 
matter.  Many countries are part of the core without contending for systemic 
hegemony, and many semi-peripheral countries can exert regional dominance and 
even contend militarily with core powers (or even systemic hegemons) within 
that regional purview.

The particular example of which I am thinking is the United States.  We entered 
the system as a semi-peripheral state, and fought and won two limited wars with 
the dominant hegemonic power of that time (Great Britain).  Caveats to make:  
we had help, Britain had other issues.  

I guess a main source of confusion here is the conflation of different bodies 
of theory, mainly theories of hegemonic ascendency (e.g. 'hegemonic transition 
theory') or maintenance (e.g. 'hegemonic stability theory', whichever 
particular variant) and the body of theory that makes up world(-)systems 
theory.  Certainly, hegemony plays a role in the structuring of the current 
international system.  The question for the Chinese 'challenge' (assuming they 
can remain an integrated, developing whole in the near to medium-range future), 
is whether or not it will involve regional aspirations or global restructuring 
of systemic rules.  If no systemic restructuring occurs, then the United States 
maintains the hegemonic payoff that it established in the years after WWII (via 
the UN, IMF, & other institutions through which we maintain our global agenda 
for free trade [which most benefits hegemonic powers], control over 
international finance [also benefits us, Britain another good historical 
example], and the promotion of democracy [benefits us as long as protections 
against the 'tyranny of the majority' are built in, e.g. Security Council veto 
power]).

Another source of confusion for you seems to be in considering "China" as a 
whole in w-s terms.  Certainly, it is one country.  However, in considering 
application to WST, it is most reminiscent of Russia in the Eighteenth 
Century:  a semi-peripheral power (the European portions of the country), with 
regions that are either plainly peripheral or not yet even developed (largely 
due to infrastructure problems or population limitations).  By looking at gross 
averages (per person GDP), we conflate a similar situation in China.  

To sum up an answer to your questions:

1.  No, because 'China' is not peripheral.
2.  China will (and is) be a regional power.  The struggle remains to be seen 
re: systemic change.
3.  Certainly China can become powerful without being part of the 'core', 
especially in a regional context.

But then, I could just be whistling into the wind.

Seriously, hope this clears up some of your questions (sorry it's so long).

Jon Carlson
 

Quoting Richard N Hutchinson <rhutchin@U.Arizona.EDU>:

> Today in my Contemporary Sociological Theory course I led a discussion
> of
> world-system theory.  I/we did not do justice to the topic, of course,
> as
> part of a whirlwind tour of theories.
> 
> But an issue came up that made me wonder about the theory, and that is
> the
> so-called "rise of China."  Perhaps I'm a bit slow and this is what
> Gunder
> has been trying to say for the past few years, but I found myself
> wondering if it doesn't challenge the theory at a basic level.
> 
> Here are some possibilities:
> 
> A) Is a peripheral country actually set to become a contender for
> hegemonic power?  If so, doesn't that knock a big hole in the theory?  
> 
> B) Is it actually the case that China, being a peripheral country, is
> not really going to be a contender for hegemon/core power any time
> soon?  (Perhaps, like the old USSR, it's really just moving up to
> semi-peripheral status?)
> 
> C) Perhaps the truth is some combination of the two (as in Kantor's
> recent
> study) and China can become quite powerful without becoming part of the
> "core" in terms of GDPPC?  What are the implications of that for the
> theory?
> 
> Are there other positions I've missed?  What is the evidence for each?
> 
> Hoping to trigger a productive debate,
> 
> Richard Hutchinson
> Weber State University
> remote Ogden, Utah
> 
> 
>