Re: "rise of china" and wst

I would disagree to the following extent:

1) surely some degree of short-term predictability is possible, however
short that may be;

2) different phenomenal regimes of  varying predictability may exist,
corresponding to the distinction between "weather" (short [~72 hours]-term )
and "climate" (longer-term predictability);

3) it is worth investigating to try to quantify or otherwise clarify the
actual degree and feasible time-horizons of predictability /
forecastability, to understand the underlying mechanisms (nonlinear
dynamics, etc.) which determine all the above, and even to predict or
"forecast" (i.e. give probabilities) to whatever modest extent turns out to
be possible.

All the resources of physical science and social inquiries, in combination,
would rightfully be focused on such important goals.

Paul Williamson
Global Vision, Inc.

----- Original Message -----
From: <wwagar@binghamton.edu>
To: "Richard N Hutchinson" <rhutchin@U.Arizona.EDU>
Cc: "world system network" <wsn@csf.colorado.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, February 28, 2001 6:04 PM
Subject: Re: "rise of china" and wst


>
> World-system theory, like all others, is applicable only to the
> past.  Anyone who sees it as more than a vague, fuzzy, and exceedingly
> general guide to future events is, like the undersigned, foolhardy.
>
> Warren
>
>
> On Wed, 28 Feb 2001, Richard N Hutchinson wrote:
>
> > Today in my Contemporary Sociological Theory course I led a discussion
of
> > world-system theory.  I/we did not do justice to the topic, of course,
as
> > part of a whirlwind tour of theories.
> >
> > But an issue came up that made me wonder about the theory, and that is
the
> > so-called "rise of China."  Perhaps I'm a bit slow and this is what
Gunder
> > has been trying to say for the past few years, but I found myself
> > wondering if it doesn't challenge the theory at a basic level.
> >
> > Here are some possibilities:
> >
> > A) Is a peripheral country actually set to become a contender for
> > hegemonic power?  If so, doesn't that knock a big hole in the theory?
> >
> > B) Is it actually the case that China, being a peripheral country, is
> > not really going to be a contender for hegemon/core power any time
> > soon?  (Perhaps, like the old USSR, it's really just moving up to
> > semi-peripheral status?)
> >
> > C) Perhaps the truth is some combination of the two (as in Kantor's
recent
> > study) and China can become quite powerful without becoming part of the
> > "core" in terms of GDPPC?  What are the implications of that for the
> > theory?
> >
> > Are there other positions I've missed?  What is the evidence for each?
> >
> > Hoping to trigger a productive debate,
> >
> > Richard Hutchinson
> > Weber State University
> > remote Ogden, Utah
> >
> >
> >
>
>