Re: "rise of china" and wst

        My earlier answer, to the effect that theory has little or no
predictive power, was mostly wry and ironic, in view of my own misfortunes
with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the first edition of A SHORT
HISTORY OF THE FUTURE (1989, gasp!).  But such chastening experiences do
serve to underscore the immense difficulty of forecasting, even with the
best and most powerful of theories.

        It is also difficult, even with world-system theory in fullest
fettle, to determine just what is a semiperipheral and what is a
peripheral country.  The North American colonies entered the system as
peripheral areas, not semiperipheral, in my judgment.  But Jon is right
that much of China today, like much of the Soviet Union in its time
and some of Russia today, is peripheral, although the rest (was) is
semiperipheral.  Cf. Brazil, which has sometimes been described as "a
Belgium tacked on to an India."  It is also true, as Jon says, that the
ability to offer serious contention for hegemony and possession of core
status are not necessarily synonymous.  Certainly the Soviet Union in the
1970s was offering serious contention for hegemony in the world-system,
thanks to its size and technological prowess, whereas Denmark was entirely
out of the running, although Denmark belonged to the core and the Soviet
Union--I would argue--did not.  The same Denmark, I might add, conquered
most of Great Britain in the days of King Canute.

        But sheer size or mere wealth or clear opportunity do not
determine what a country will do.  The Japan of 1941 was not the Japan of
2001.  The China in 1912 was not the China of 1950 or 1975 or 2000.
Everything from policies to perceptions to relative strengths to national
will keeps changing, because of internal and external changes and
relationships.  That is why theory is so much better with hindsight.

        Warren

On Wed, 28 Feb 2001 jdc@asu.edu wrote:

> Richard,
> 
> It seems that part of your confusion is ascribing peripheral status to China. 
> 
> This is not the case.  They are semi-peripheral, and are in the process of 
> trying to industrialize and develop to a point at which they could be 
> considered 'core'.  Whether or not they contend for hegemony is a different 
> matter.  Many countries are part of the core without contending for systemic 
> hegemony, and many semi-peripheral countries can exert regional dominance and 
> even contend militarily with core powers (or even systemic hegemons) within 
> that regional purview.
> 
> The particular example of which I am thinking is the United States.  We 
>entered 
> the system as a semi-peripheral state, and fought and won two limited wars 
>with 
> the dominant hegemonic power of that time (Great Britain).  Caveats to make:  
> we had help, Britain had other issues.  
> 
> I guess a main source of confusion here is the conflation of different bodies 
> of theory, mainly theories of hegemonic ascendency (e.g. 'hegemonic 
>transition 
> theory') or maintenance (e.g. 'hegemonic stability theory', whichever 
> particular variant) and the body of theory that makes up world(-)systems 
> theory.  Certainly, hegemony plays a role in the structuring of the current 
> international system.  The question for the Chinese 'challenge' (assuming 
>they 
> can remain an integrated, developing whole in the near to medium-range 
>future), 
> is whether or not it will involve regional aspirations or global 
>restructuring 
> of systemic rules.  If no systemic restructuring occurs, then the United 
>States 
> maintains the hegemonic payoff that it established in the years after WWII 
>(via 
> the UN, IMF, & other institutions through which we maintain our global agenda 
> for free trade [which most benefits hegemonic powers], control over 
> international finance [also benefits us, Britain another good historical 
> example], and the promotion of democracy [benefits us as long as protections 
> against the 'tyranny of the majority' are built in, e.g. Security Council 
>veto 
> power]).
> 
> Another source of confusion for you seems to be in considering "China" as a 
> whole in w-s terms.  Certainly, it is one country.  However, in considering 
> application to WST, it is most reminiscent of Russia in the Eighteenth 
> Century:  a semi-peripheral power (the European portions of the country), 
>with 
> regions that are either plainly peripheral or not yet even developed (largely 
> due to infrastructure problems or population limitations).  By looking at 
>gross 
> averages (per person GDP), we conflate a similar situation in China.  
> 
> To sum up an answer to your questions:
> 
> 1.  No, because 'China' is not peripheral.
> 2.  China will (and is) be a regional power.  The struggle remains to be seen 
> re: systemic change.
> 3.  Certainly China can become powerful without being part of the 'core', 
> especially in a regional context.
> 
> But then, I could just be whistling into the wind.
> 
> Seriously, hope this clears up some of your questions (sorry it's so long).
> 
> Jon Carlson
>  
> 
> Quoting Richard N Hutchinson <rhutchin@U.Arizona.EDU>:
> 
> > Today in my Contemporary Sociological Theory course I led a discussion
> > of
> > world-system theory.  I/we did not do justice to the topic, of course,
> > as
> > part of a whirlwind tour of theories.
> > 
> > But an issue came up that made me wonder about the theory, and that is
> > the
> > so-called "rise of China."  Perhaps I'm a bit slow and this is what
> > Gunder
> > has been trying to say for the past few years, but I found myself
> > wondering if it doesn't challenge the theory at a basic level.
> > 
> > Here are some possibilities:
> > 
> > A) Is a peripheral country actually set to become a contender for
> > hegemonic power?  If so, doesn't that knock a big hole in the theory?  
> > 
> > B) Is it actually the case that China, being a peripheral country, is
> > not really going to be a contender for hegemon/core power any time
> > soon?  (Perhaps, like the old USSR, it's really just moving up to
> > semi-peripheral status?)
> > 
> > C) Perhaps the truth is some combination of the two (as in Kantor's
> > recent
> > study) and China can become quite powerful without becoming part of the
> > "core" in terms of GDPPC?  What are the implications of that for the
> > theory?
> > 
> > Are there other positions I've missed?  What is the evidence for each?
> > 
> > Hoping to trigger a productive debate,
> > 
> > Richard Hutchinson
> > Weber State University
> > remote Ogden, Utah
> > 
> > 
> > 
>