This East Timor-affair seems to me to be a
relatively simple affair, unlike the Yugoslavian quagmire - let alone the
labyrinthine politics of Central Asia or Cental Africa - which is, obviously,
why our media are far more interested in East Timor than in Congo, Kashmir or
Tajikistan. Congo is simply too complicated to be explained in a three
minute-SoundBit - let alone Tajikistan or Afghanistan. - (Weird, really, since
the stakes are so much higher - Kashmir could lead to a nuclear war,
Tajikistan/northern Afghanistan have vast reserves of natural gas and it's hard
to think of some natural reserve NOT present around the Congo basin)
Yet these convoluted conflicts are left for
regional powers to solve: South Africa/Uganda/Angola/Zimbabwe, India/Pakistan
and Russia/China/Uzbekistan - where some of these, of course, are strictly
regional `powers'. The US is not involved in any of this, which is why our media
here - and I guess in the US too - are totally uninterested. So - looking at
these conflicts, and perhaps influenced by my recent experiences in West Africa,
where the US, too, doesn't have much of a stake, in spite of the presence of
vast mineral reserves - I would contra Pennefather, who sees the US as
omnipotent, rather tend to emphasize the extent to which the US is not or
no longer (as in Central Africa) involved in many conflicts.
In fact, one of the main trends in this
post-cold war period is not that the US has become omnipotent but rather
that, now that the US has not to defend the `free world', it is disengaging from
many regional conflicts in which it has no vital stake. It's simply too
expensive. This has made some conflicts easier to solve (e.g. Mozambique or
Afghanistan, maybe, on the long run, the Middle East) has also, of course,
produced new conflicts. With the US withdrawing and the USSR gone some smaller
powers have leeway to pursue their own `power politics' now - could anybody in
1963 imagine Zimbabwe more or less taking over Katanga, without anybody - even
in Belgium - noticing ?
So, the world has become both a more stable and
a more unstable place - unstable, since `history' is so to say surfacing (or
taking its revenge) after the cold war freeze - whether in Central Asia, the
Caucasus, or the Balkan. Yet... it may also be useful to remember that many of
these conflicts are small compared to Cold War conflicts. It may, for example,
be useful to remember that compared to the devastation inflicted on Vietnam,
Kossovo and Serbia apparently incurred only a few bruises (I can only judge from
television but 95% of the buildings in Kossovo still seem to stand, compare that
to Korea, for example, where US-pilots were complaining to HQ that everything in
Korea had been this heavily bombed that they had no targets anymore). And,
anyway, I wouldn't like to exchange our present `instability' with the constant
threat of nuclear holocaust within eight minutes warning-time during the
`stability' of fifteen years ago ...
Back to Timor ... in fact, I think the US is mightily
embarrassed by this whole conflict. On the one hand Washington has been backing
the Indonesian military for decades and it can't give the appearance of
withdrawing support from the Indonesian military now. Also the US wants a strong
central government in Jakarta to protect US-investments in Java, Sumatra and
Kalimantan, perhaps Australian investments in, for example, Irian Jaya. And,
finally, it is very likely that regional elections will lead to a victory of
Islamic parties and the last thing Washington would like to have in this region
is an 'Islamic Republic Indonesia'. So, Washington has every reason to back the
central government and the military. On the other hand, Washington also doesn't
want to lose face by being accused of backing gross violation of human rights -
if human rights activist in the US would n't do so, Portugal surely would - on
what is, after all, a totally unimportant topic to the US. (What vital interest
do the US have in Eastern Indonesia?).
Best policy then is not to take any clear position and that's
exactly what the US has been trying to do - I don't think relations with China
have much to do with it. Note, by the way, that this has also been the politics
of the Netherlands - the Dutch government has studiously avoided taking any
position on Indonesia. Interestingly enough since Indonesia is the one third
world-country in which `we' (with tens of billions of investments) have a vital
stake and on which you therefore would expect the Dutch government to have a
clear outspoken policy. Well ... they don't have any. After lecturing the rest
of the world on human rights for decades they can't ostentatiously back the
Indonesian military. But, on the other hand, they do need to safeguard the vast
Dutch investments in Indonesia and that can only be done by the
military.
The line of conduct of the Indonesian military is fairly clear
too (note that on the moment Indonesia does not really have a single
`government' ; it seems to have fallen apart into a host of contending factions,
with the old Suharto military the one stabilizing factor as balance between
these factions) Since Indonesia needs international financial backing badly they
couldn't give the appearance Indonesia is not heading towards democracy and
stability, so they had to permit elections under UN-supervision if Western
Europe and the US ask so. Because, as said, Indonesia needs credit badly, it
can't really follow its own policy - as Pennefather seems to think. - Or do you
think China has the funds to get the Indonesian economy out of the shambles it's
in? - Until China has these funds Indonesia has to do what the World Bank wants
- and, as we could read a few days ago - the World Bank now has the policy it
wants to further democracy. Nowadays: "all dem say, dem democratic// but
some are wolves and some are sheep// and that is problematic". All those
fake democrats sometimes makes you long for the good old, simple, days of brutal
military dictatorships does n't it?
But (and that's the main problem, which I didn't find in any
comment on this list) a regional election on separation from Indonesia is a
veritable Pandora box. Because once you grant that other parts of Indonesia are
also going to claim independence. Atjeh already wants to be independent for
example and Iran Jaya is undoubtedly going to follow. Now, not only are these
areas absolutely vital for the Indonesian economy but there are also millions of
Javanese there, who will certainly be evicted. What are you going to do with
them? Or should Java follow the road of Russia?
For precisely this reason Megawati's party is also against
independence for East Timor and, I think, most Javanese are against independence
too. There's a lot of popular `greater Java' chauvinism on that island, roughly
comparable to great Russia-chauvinism in Russia or the `America love it or leave
it' sentiment in the US - yes, also, and especially among workers. (It's easy to
forget - as I wrote before in my `infamous' Ivory Tower posting in march - but
the US is also a very chauvinistic, God-fearing place, so why should the
Javanese masses be any different ?) Any government giving the impression of
permitting the `amputation of the fatherland' is going to meet wide popular
opposition in Java, no matter what it's other deeds. And, no matter what the
misdeeds of the Suharto-regime on East Timor and no matter what UN-resolution,
the annexation of East Timor was genuinely popular on Java. That was Indonesia's
revenge for 400 years colonial separatism, most Javanese thought. Also, remember
that FRETILIN is especially supported by the catholic church and need I remind
you that Java is 98% Islamic?
In these circumstances the Indonesian army has been
following a perfectly logical line of conduct: it first grants elections, but
then encourages militias (and probably its own forces) to start with
mass-killings to show other parts of Indonesia that if they want independence
they are going to have a civil war on their hands with up to half their
population killed. This is intended to scare even the most fervent nationalist
elsewhere. Then they leave the island, erasing all traces, leaving a foreign
army to clean up the mess, since they have made their point. So far, I think,
the Indonesian military has admirably succeeded in this policy - giving the
impression in addition (whether or not rightly) that if the situation would get
out of hand in Java some western power would intervene and stamp out unrest,
which is an additional reason why demonstrators in Jakarta Friday attacked
westerners. The main thing though is that the Javanese now think that foreign
power want to dismember Indonesia, putting a new colonial regime in
power.
Canberra's policy seems fairly obvious too - in fact, by
moving much of its airforce and navy from Sydney to Townsville, Darwin and Mt.
Isa, Australia was indicating it was expecting some contingency in Indonesia
some ten years ago. Canberra obviously has two nightmares. First, what would
happen if Indonesia fell apart in dozens of warring states? US-readers
think about it: would you in the USA like to have Mexico fall apart in a dozen
different states, all at war with each other? wouldn't the US not do something
then? most likely send troops to Mexico to show that if Mexico can not stamp out
these wars the US can. That's exactly Australia's policy. Two: it's not that
difficult to navigate Torres Strait and there are boats aplenty in Indonesia -
with a civil war in Indonesia, Australia is going to have a very serious
refugee-problem - remember the Conservative Party already lost the elections in
Queensland on the Asian migration issue|? Further tens of thousands are going to
pose a really serious problem to Australia. Thus, Australia has to do everything
in its power to stem such a wave of refugees before it even begins.
I don't - unlike other people on this list - dispose of a
crystal ball so I can't make predictions. Personally, I think, Australia will be
able to `pacify' East Timor quite soon. For one thing Timor is a very small
island, for another the militias can not `swim like a fish in the water' for
they have little popular support. And finally most Australians see this as a
good cause, so even if there will be a few body-bags the Australian population
will not immediately withdraw support - and, in fact, soldiers are a lot more
prepared to take casualties when they are among a sympathizing population, then
if the local population is hostile. Timor is in these respects emphatically
not Vietnam and may rather be compared to the US-intervention in Haiti,
which, whatever the sinister ulterior motives, was on the brink of it still a
good deed ... So, to quote Pennefather:
|