The Kosovo 'incident' and Hegemony

A couple of lengthy comments on Peter Grimes' long posting, which I should
praise as an attempt to analyse rather than to judge the Kossovo-crisis (or
I would rather say `incident' in the terms of the 19 th century) and which,
I guess, was posted in the hope of getting feedback.

Let me emphasize again that I'm not (nor do I want to be) a specialist on
Kossovo, so what I write here is mainly based on my understanding on how
diplomacy normally works (and worked). For in my view Kossovo is - or was -
the typical kind of limited war, intended to improve the international
standing of several great power of which there have been so many in the
Balkans in the
last century.

    (Just read the Marx-Engels correspondence which always makes me ponder
that if Marx would not have spent so much time being angry about now long
forgotten wars in the Balkans - he might well have finished Kapital part II
and
III for prosperity would have been much more grateful. Which - I'm sorry to
say - I sometimes think also applies to some participants on this list ..)

    And of such limited wars we may well see more the next century for - and
this oddly seems to elude all other list-members - the Balkans was AND IS
the rival interest-sphere of TWO great powers namely Russia and Germany. I
would suggest US-policy in this region is purely a function of its relations
with Germany - and since the Washington-Bonn (Berlin) relationship is now
the critical axis of the NATO-alliance the Balkans is critical to the
US because it is critical to Germany.

To take a closer look at Grimes:

>     It seems to be in our nature as humans to divide the world
>into dualistic oppositions.  This yearning for clarity via
>dualism is most obvious during wars (and athletic events, which
>are merely wars as theater).

Well, that's of course the essence of war: it's a trial of strength between
two parties as the great Clausewitz put it. And since we're living in a
democratic age in which the electorate (and the elites and the middle class)
will not support increased
military taxation unless they are threatened by some unspeakable evil the
opponent has always to be painted as evil incarnate.

More interestingly, while I don't adhere to simple conspiracy theories ...
this war just HAPPENS to be a Godsend for the US-military - who wanted to
spend billions on improving nuclear weapons, a new and upgraded missile
defense-system, B-1 bombers, the new F-22 fighter and probably a lot more -
but against which enemy ... for God sake ...

Massive expenses, which were, I suspect, if I may engage in a bit of nice
conspiracy theory here, not all that enthusiastic received by William
Jefferson Clinton - how can you ever cut back on the budget-deficit if the
military always wants more ? Anybody noted that the whole Levinsky-case and
the impeachment procedure against mr. Clinton just HAPPENED to coincide with
the debate on the defense bill - and that a lame duck as president can not
oppose the military lobby ? - interesting coincidence here ...

Another interesting coincidence here ... in january the Russian parliament
voted for massive increases in the armament budget to install new
Intercontinental missile systems and upgrade the missile defense systems -
how are you going to defend that to a starving Russian population? Wouldn't
it just be opportune if some Slavic brother-nation was threatened by the
evil Americans ...

For armament-races (and great power politics) have their own logic which is
relatively independent from the social system - witness the US-BRITISH
nuclear race in the 1950's - yep - that's BRITAIN competing with the US (you
can hardly imagine two countries which had more in common) yet Britain
`needed' the H-bomb if the US had the H-bomb and was building against the US
and not against the USSR.

So, the logic of armament itself dictated that the US and Russia - its
conversion to `free market capitalism' notwithstanding - would
inevitably come at odds with each other over something this year - since
both sides needed to defend their increased expenditures on arms.

'The military industrial complex' in both countries is simply to powerful a
force to be opposed by either government - would n't be amazed if the recent
reshuffles in the Kremlin had a lot to do with that too...

Anyhow - the US-media needed a convincing enemy to justify these
expenditures - people get tired of reading of Khaddafi or Sadam Husain or
Bin Laden
after a while - so where do you search for a new enemy ...

>     At the same time, the media within each of the involved
>countries seeks to portray its OWN leadership as moral and
>peaceful, and that of the opposition as somehow greedy, evil, or
>even insane.  When I hear complaints about how the U.S. media
>"demonizes" the Serbs, or how the Chinese media "demonizes" the
>United States, I am amused by the naivete of those complaining:
>the media are only doing their job: it is the *FUNCTION* of the
>media in wars to glorify their own government and demonize the
>opposing government(s).  How could one expect anything else?
>
    As argued that's partly true - to some extent US - and Russian media are
tied-in to the armament-lobby, if only since shiny planes or warships, let
alone `splendid little wars' make for nice pictures. Albeit, this
catastrophically failed in Vietnam where the TV-public was daily being fed
by horrific war images and soon got fed up with this whole war. For this
reason, of course, NATO seeks to shelter the war in Yugoslavia from the
media - instead feeding them with images of refugees, Serb atrocities and
what have you

>Mr. Milosovich found himself in 1988-9 faced with an impossible
>situation: the (ethnically separate) provinces held together by
>Tito via both ideological persuasion and money carefully re-
>distributed from the center were becoming increasing
>uncomfortable with rule from Belgrade.  As others have explained
>elsewhere (see Johnestone and Choussodovsky at zmag.com), the
>International Monetary Fund had been willing to encourage
>commercial lending to the Yugoslav government throughout the
>1980's (when the global depression of the early 1980's was
>preventing Yugoslav exports from generating much revenue, and the
>Soviet state was unable to afford to lend money to make up the
>shortfall).

I didn't study that issue in detail, but I guess Yugoslavia was totally
different from the rest of Eastern European - except the GDR - in being
closely linked to the EEC's market rather than to the USSR's market, if only
because of the presence of 400.000 `guest labourers' from Yugoslavia in the
EU. Because of this Yugoslavia was - I think - hit harder by the slow growth
in the EEC in the 80's than the rest of Eastern Europe was.

In addition this tended to exacarbate the old problem in Yugoslav namely
that Yugoslavia was a classical case of regional unequal development;
`unequal development' and the formation of `internal peripheries' have
produced many a civil war and Yugoslavia was no exception.

While the GNP per capita of Slovenia approaches that of Austria that of
Kossovo is in the third world standards. That's mainly a problem of
transport-geography: Slovenia and Croatia border on the EEC and were thus
excellent `ofshore' bases for German and Italian companies - textiles etc. -
looking for (cheaper) labour. But who was going to invest in Kossovo ?
(which is a long way from anywhere) ... Thus, as Georgi rightly argued,
everybody who could moved out of this `internal periphery' with only poor
Albanian peasants - keeping to a peasant reproduction pattern of large
families in addition - were forced to stay. From about 60% of the population
in 1945 the number of Albanians thus increased to 90% in 1990.

Given its reliance (if not dependence) on the EEC, when Yugoslavia was faced
with slow growth in the EU from 1979 onward and with a contraction of its
export-markets because of import-restrictions by the EU, it was logical that
the richer republics would each start to look after their own interest. Why
should Slovenia use its contracting funds to still subsidize poorer Serbia;
why should Serbia in turn subsidize Albanians on the dole in Kossovo - or,as
they put it in the USSR, what has Islam ever done for US?

>As a "stick" to prevent
>provinces from defecting (declaring independence), he (Milosevic)--just as
>Georgi described--used ethnic "Serb" solidarity.  With the
>ideology of communism gone, and the ideology of "free"-market
>capitalism popularly discredited, he had few other choices but to
>play the ethnic "card" of Serbian nationalism.  However, it back-
>fired.
>
I'm not sure that's the case - in the 1980's most elites in Eastern Europe
believed that ONCE they would open their borders to international
investments they would witness the miracle-workings of the free market.
This, I would suggest, also applied to Slovenia and Croatia who supposed
that, with
Belgrade out of the way, they could expect massive investment from (let's
call a spade a spade) Germany. Either because of their geographical location
or since the Croatians dreamed of themselves as `central Europeans' -
Habsburgers -
rather than the `Eastern European' Serbs - so that they could count on
`Germanic solidarity' if they got the `Slavic Serbs' out of the way. It
would be fascinating to research to what extent all the talk about the unity
of
`central Europe' in the late eighties encouraged cultural and political
separatism in Croatia.

For - I think - the main problem in Yugolavia in the late eighties was not
the resurgence of Serb nationalism - that was but an answer to fissiparous
tendency in the rest of the union, mainly triggered by the idea that - with
Serbia out of the way - the rich republics might soon enter the land of milk
and honey: the EEC.

>     Within the old Yugoslavia under Tito there was a clear
>ethnic ranking--although it was officially suppressed: Serbs,
>Croats, Muslims, and Albanians (descending order).

I doubt it - Serbs, Croatians, Muslims etc. freely interrelated and
married - I think most URBAN people in the 1970's saw themselves as
Yugoslavians first, Europeans next, and only then as Croats, Muslims etc.,
much like US-citizens like to sentimentalize about `actually' being Irish,
Italian
etc. but don't forget for a moment they're American. Which is why older
people in Yugoslavia were - and are - still confused by what this entire war
is about.

Ethnicity was re-discovered (if it ever existed) - I think - for the simple
reason that with a contracting or slowly growing private, services and
industrial
sector more people expected more jobs in the state-apparatus. Where -
precisely to forestall ethnic discrimination - a quotient-system (so many
Slovenes, so many Croates, so many Serbs etc.) was used.

That is: it became useful in the 1980's to `reinvent' ethnicity to claim
jobs. Since, however, (because of financial problems of the Yugoslav state)
the state-apparatus could not expand to fulfill those increasing
expectations people began to claim they were being discriminated on ethnic
grounds.

That particularly applied, I think, in Kossovo where there was not much
other employment for Albanians so that the state-apparatus had swelled to
accomodate Albanian requests for more jobs.

By the late 1980's much of the `jobs for the boys' in the state-appartus in
Kossovo were being monopolized by Albanians. That was alright for the Serbs
as long as there was sufficient employment in Serbia - who wanted to stay in
that rural backwater anyway ? - but with contracting employment in Serbia
Serbs from Kossovo began to claim employment-opportunities in the state
should be reserved to them. On the opposite side Albanian resistance was
being fueled by restricted opportunity they were offered outside of
Kossovo - the UCK started among the discontented Albanian students at
Pristina who were offered education but no employment by the state in
Belgrade.

It was by exploiting the Serbian grievances about discrimination against
them in Kossovo - that is in their own state -that Milosevic first gained
prominence as a national figure rather than the run-of the mill-apparatchnik
he really is.

A U.S. analogy might be approximated
>by imagining a U.S. president making a speech at the Alamo
>asserting the goal of removing all persons of Mexican descent
>from the U.S. southwest.)
>
No - there's a much closer - and much more frightening - US-parallel here in
the agitation against the reservation of jobs (under the Equal Opportunity
Act) for African Americans, Asians etc. I could very well imagine the next
Republican candidate for the presidency trying to win votes by promising
WASP's they would no longer be `discriminated against' in their own country
and that he is voicing the opinions of `the silent majority' against people
on the dole, un-patriotic elements' etc (that rhetoric reminds you of a
certain US-president does n't it...)

>     Prior to the war, the weakness of the central governments of
>both Albania and Kosovo, combined with their joint poverty and
>their geographic location between the heroin production centers
>of Pakistan and Afghanistan and the major heroin markets of
>Europe, were both unable to stop and thus ultimately compelled to
>join those who survived (directly or indirectly) from a thriving
>business trans-shipping heroin from Afghanistan to Europe.  It
>was this money that helped finance the early KLA in the 1980's,
>when they lacked popular support among the Albanians (see State
>Department docs posted by Arno Tausch).
>
Might well be true - but I think the reason is much simpler, namely that
two years' ago - partly as a result of - at least to me - obscure internal
conflicts in Albania - every citizen in Albania was freely allowed by the
government to loot ammo- and arms-dumps in the whole country. The terrain on
the
Yugoslav-Albanian border being as it is - virtually unguardable - it is
logical that these arms would sooner or later find their way into
Yugoslavia. Combine these with loads of unemployed young men (I believe
unemployment among Albanians was 60% in Kossovo) and you're soon going to
have an armed resistance movement (once again there's an unpleasant parallel
to the
US-ghettos here)..

>     Wallerstein once asserted that all social theories not
>rooted in class analysis can ultimately be reduced to assumptions
>that are racist (=nationalist) (see his _The Capitalist World-
>Economy_).

Actually Milosevic' (or his wife's) party do have a class-position. They
are - of all things ! - extreme free-market evangelists who would put
Margaret Thatcher to shame and are mainly supported by the Belgrad
`businezz-men' (as is the Eastern European buzz-word nowadays). Exactly
because the class-base is so restricted the party needs to flee in extreme
nationalist rhetoric: "we are a party of the whole people - not just of
businezz-men".

Because Mr. Milosovich had built his power upon an
>inflammation of Serbian nationalism, his racist ideology
>generated a heightened ethnic defensive counter-consciousness
>among the non-Serbs.

As I argued elsewhere (on the H-world list) don't conflate `nationalism' and
`racism' - Milosevic or Tudjman are typical old school `Jingoes' - as we
used to call it - but the Serbs or the Albanians are obviously not a `race'.

  Despite their mutual hostility to one
>another, both Croatia and Bosnia agreed that the risk of reaching
>for independence was preferable to remaining suppressed by an
>increasingly pugnacious Serbia.

Put - as said differently - this is somewhat true for Slovenia and Croatia,
I doubt it for Bosnia and Macedonia though - for Bosnian independence was
really a measure of the last resort.


Historically Bosnia has - unlike Croatia and Slovenia - not been an
historically clearly defined region but was a kind of vage remainder of the
Ottoman Empire which really existed by the virtue of NOT being Serbia - or
Croatia but nobody was sure what it's identity was. - I think the Bosnians
separated because they did not want to be involved in a Serbian war with
Croatia anymore (just like Montenegro might well separate soon).

Consistent with this
>ideological tool, the Serbian state referred to the break-away
>Croations as "Ustashi"--the name given to German fascist
>collaborators inside Croatia during WWII.
>
Actually - I thought the Croatian war-bands used this term themselves - for
WWII was
to an important extent a civil war within Yugoslavia - with the Catholic
church actively supporting the `Uztaji' against both the Orthodoxy and
`Godless communism' - it is painful to remember but fascism (Italian fascism
! for Croatia was in the Italian and not in the German zone of occupation
and Italian fascism was good Catholic !!) had a great deal of support in
Eastern Europe.

>     The fighting in both provinces (Bosnia & Croatia) pitted a
>well trained and modernly equipped Yugoslav Federal Army against
>poorly equipped and essentially untrained civilians fighting for
>provincial independence.  Given this alignment of forces, it was
>inevitable that the Federal Army would easily achieve a rapid
>series of military victories.

That's true for Bosnia but not for Croatia which from the beginning disposed
of some equipment of the Yugoslav army - and which soon received massive
amounts of equipment from (let's call a spade a spade) Germany and in a
later phase from the US.

It was the heavy German and US-equipment which allowed Croatia to stamp-out
the separatist Serb republic in Krajina - on this moment the Croatian army
has probably more and better equipment than the Serbian army

For - the German (and in its footsteps USA's-) policy in Bosnia has been to
heavily arm the Croatians, which would obviate a dangerous and expensive
US - let
alone German - intervention, where NATO would supply some air-support since
Croatia did not have an airforce. Nor do I condemn this policy: Germany and
the US obviously could not allow a country they had just officially
recognized (first Croatia and then Bosnia) to be occupied by another country
so that both were best served by an armed stalemate. The whole issue of
Serbian war - crimes, I think, was purely secondary.

>     Inside Kosovo, the Serbian push to compulsorily evacuate the
>"ethnic Albanians" started just steps behind (literally)
>the withdrawal of the OSCE monitors, and well before the start of
>NATO bombing.  Further, the procedures employed clearly required
>considerable advance planning, insofar as they involved prior
>placement of trains, buses, evacuation centers, and
>troops/paramilitaries. Even the notorious "Arkan" was well-
>established in headquarters in Pristina weeks before the bombing.
>Finally, the actual evacuation process was remarkably similar to
>one undertaken by the (then fascist regime) in Serbia as long ago
>as 1938!!  Hence the Serb apologists who cling to the fantasy
>that the "Albanians" were leaving to escape NATO bombing are
>allowing their emotions to blind them to reality.
>
Quite true and it was part of an offensive by the Serb-government to
stamp-out the UCK-guerilla's before armed intervention from abroad could
take shape or before the UCK could have built up large stocks of heavy
equipment - from the Albanian army presumably. As they had learned in Bosnia
it was critical to stake out irrefutable claims to vital regions - that's
the mining region in the northwest - by `etnically cleansing' them before
the enemy could have built up his force.

Elementary strategy - dear dr. Watson and - the policy of the Serbian
government to `isolate' UCK-guerilla's by putting the civil population away
in `safe' villages or `evacuating' them, coupled with counter-insurgent -
terror -
terror is, of course, elementary standard repertoir of any `normal'
counter-insurgency strategy. "You have to destroy the village to safe it"
where did I hear that before ?

>Inside Serbia itself, the "policy" seems to be to turn the
>country into a sea of molten glass, in which civilians are the
>primary victims.  NATO "apologies" aside, this carpet bombing
>(let us call it by its right name) against civilians has even
>been admitted by one NATO general to be designed to weaken
>Serbian popular morale (Toronto Globe & Mail: 5/26/99), hence
>*INTENTIONAL*!!

Now - here we come to what I, personally, think is - or was - so strange
about this whole war. Let's be clear what is `carpet-bombing: - to refresh
memories
somewhat - if the US was really doing `carpet-bombing' (as they did
in Vietnam or Korea) the whole of Kossovo - which is after all a very small
place - should now be in flames from horizon to horizon, the whole country
should be a crater-field with barely any discernible features and not a
single building in say Belgrade or Novi Sad should be intact. To repeat NOT
a SINGLE building: remember what was left of Dresden after three days of
TRUE
carpet-bombing ? Yet, all pictures of Belgrade I see suggest life is pretty
much going on as normal and almost no building is damaged.

Also, I don't see any proof the US is making any use of its true symbol of
mass-destruction  - in brief, where are the B52-bombers?

Basically - and with all due regard for the anger many of the list members
feel for the US-bombing - I think the US-military saw - sees - this as a
limited war
with limited objectives and with commensurate use of limited violence - I
don't want to diminish the very real grief of the people killed or mamed by
NATO-bombs but we have to recognize that the amount of damage inflicted
stands in absolutely no relation to the amount of destruction one COULD
inflict on Serbia.

Now, WHY is that so?

That's the question we need to ask if we want to arrive at

> the "Shadow War"--which is, ironically, the REAL
>war.

>     The conventional explanation found in the sanctioned media
>is that this is Europe's "doorstep", ambiguously suggesting that
>NATO is involved because:
>     (a) they are somehow "white" people & hence more worthy of
>concern (implying that war between non-whites is OK), &/or
>     (b) that war in the Balkans somehow threatens the stability
>of European capital accumulation.

>     Regarding the danger to European Core capital accumulation:
>the risk to that process would only be high if those countries
>central to the core accumulation process were to be militarily
>threatened--Germany, Switzerland, France, and England.  Were the
>war to spread beyond Kosovo to include Macedonia, Albania, and
>perhaps even Greece, none of the essential core countries would
>be crippled--they could simply adjust their trade routes to skirt
>around the dangerous areas.
>
No - the problem was that the war was not on Europe's doorstep but that it
was on GERMANY's doorstep - elementary geography - Dr. Watson. And that, if
Serbia was not a military danger to Germany, 1.000.000+ Yugoslav refugees
would certainly be a major problem to Germany - remember the riots against
refugees in Germany in Rostock - and that concerned only a few hundred
refugees not one milion?

So, in these circumstances - if the US would not act to somehow clean up the
situation in Kossovo - this would certainly cause major problems with
Germany. For what would Germany do if the country was innundated by refugees
from Yugoslavia and the US stood idely by ? Wouldn't there be voices in
Germany, then, claiming that the European Union was somehow to act ? And if
the EU or the WEU could not - then Germany was to act on its own. What is
the use being member of NATO, the Bundestag might have asked, if NATO can't
even solve a problem in an adjacent country after all - shouldn't Germany
then not get out of NATO? And remember there was - and is - an isolationist
current in the SDP (the old
Ostpolitik-wing), the Gruene and even the CDU.

Now - I think that (for VERY sound historic reasons) this is the
nightmare-scenario
of US, British and French elites. For in 1990 - as Margaret Thatcher with
her
normal candour actually more or less admitted - geopolitics underwent the
deepest
change since 1945 (if not 1870.)

In 1990 Germany achieved more or less by
good fortune what its elites wanted to achieve by war as early as 1914:
Germany is
now the major power in a European 'economic union' (that's exactly what they
wanted to achieve in 1914) - France and Britain are much, much weaker and
Russia is - for the time being at least - out of the way in Germany's
Eastern European, Baltic and Balkan `interest-sphere' and the states in
Eastern Europe have fallen apart in a large number of contending small
states - none of which offers any serious obstacle to Germany anymore.
(Again, that was precisely Germany's strategy in 1914).

With Germany now more or less by good chance being the supreme power in
Europe it is critical that this potential super-power be contained in two
ways: by its
subjugation to supra-national organs of the EU and - much more importantly -
by being militarily tied to NATO. For an independent Germany leading a
European Union - the second largest world-economic power with the fifth
largest army of the World leading Europe- that would be a REALLY major
thread to the US ! Compared to
that China or Russia are peanuts (and relatively speaking China certainly
still is a peanut-thread - I don't think Chinese nuclear missiles can
destroy the USA many over- while Russian missiles certainly can) !

And - although no government in Europe would ever admit that - it is
therefore vital Germany has to have US-armed forces on its own
territory, so that Germany would not be tempted to build up its own forces.
The US - or Germany in the frame of NATO - has more or less to carry out
Germany's dirty work so that Germany will not be
tempted to do it itself.

Nor do I think the US would greed the prospect of a European army or
European armed intervention - it is symptomatic this European army - a thing
always much advocated by the Hague to tie the Bundeswehr into the European
frame - was being discussed in october last year and has immediately been
shelved because of Kossovo, which `proved' once again that the `European'
army is the US (and British) army.

Thus, the US-intervention served to and was intended to serve to re-reafirm
that the US would continue to be militarily involved in Europe and that the
EU did not have to build up a military wing. Here, again, Kossovo came
precisely at the good moment.

For in spite of saying the opposite the US, rightly, fears that a European
army will in due time turn into a German army. This being so - it is
critical that the US has to assert the necessity of a US armed presence in
Europe by perodic exercise of armed force to solve European problems. For
otherwise Germany might (on the long run) well be tempted to start solving
problems on its own - it is
critical Germany is tied into NATO under US-paramountcy and the EU not be
expanded with a military component.

>Put differently, in order for US military hegemony to be
>sustained, it is occasionally necessary to actually *USE IT,* so
>that those on the receiving end may be made examples of in order
>to intimidate others.

Yes - and that not only applies to Milosevic but it also applies much, much
more important to Germany.

Did Milosevic openly challenge US-hegemony and did, therefore, both
>sides became backed into corners where war was inevitable.  Once
>again, in both cases one corner was occupied by a leader
>compelled to public challenge U.S. Hegemony over the world.  Such
>challenges *CANNOT* be ignored...

as Peter argues ?

No - Saddam Husain was a direct thread to the US vital oil interests and
intended to be so - which was why the US did built up a 300.000 men army to
fight Saddam Husain - but Milosevic was not and did not intend to be, which
is why the US only wanted to fight a limited air-war.

So, I don't think the situation was ever as dramatic as Peter thinks - the
reason Serbia did not want to sign the Rambouilet -agreement was because of
the attached military
clausules of the agreement which stated that NATO was to have free rights of
passage, use of Serbian air-space etc. to supply its force in Kossovo. Such
a clause giving extra-territorial rights to an alliance in which it is not
represented would have been unacceptable to any sovereign state. Serbia was
always willing to work towards an agreement but in the UN-frame and not as a
NATO-Diktat. For Serbia is represented in the UN and can count in Russian
support in the security council but is NOT represented in NATO.

It is for THIS reason - NOT for the reasons mentioned by Grimes that Russia
would have vetoed military actions in the UN-frame to implicate the
Rambouilet-agreement as well. For the Russians - rightly - saw it as a
NATO-diktat too - and, indeed, the whole procedure followed was to present
Serbia
with an ultimatum: "either accept these conditions or face bombing", with
Russia not being consulted - which, of course, was precisely the intention.
The US wanted to humiliate Russia by showing it did not even needed to be
consulted in its own interest-sphere, which is why all parties in Russia
vehemently opposed the US.

Basically both Russia and China (and India) feared unilateral actions of the
US in the
NATO or possibly SEATO frame, since they have no right to decide in these
organizations and since all three - rightly - fear the US tries to make the
UN
into an instrument of its national policy.  That would be a major loss of
face to these countries - not more than that - prospects of US-intervention
in, say, Tibet, Kashmir or Checnia are very, very remote - but `face' is a
very important consideration in diplomacy.

>     2    Viewed even more broadly, Russia, China, India and misc
>other members of the semiperiphery (each of whom probably harbor
>dreams of THEMSELVES becoming the next hegemonic core) are
>TERRIFIED of a unipolar world with the United States as the sole
>hegemonic power.  This is ALSO a reasonable fear, because such a
>situation could easily evolve into a GLOBAL EMPIRE: GLOBAL
>CAPITALISM INC, where the UN security council would devolve into
>a board of directors with the US as CEO.

This worst scenario of Global capitalism Inc., already exists - it is not an
economic difference. Just like arms-races, diplomacy has its own laws and
own impetus - the main point being that a country's diplomats can not permit
major loss of face - as at Rambouilet - to a great power. That motive has
always existed - and exists completely independently from whatever
ideological stance the governments take.
>
>     Within this current political atmosphere, both Russia AND
>China would eagerly fight for their autonomy (or at least a
>sovereign piece of the global capitalist surplus), up to and
>including warfare and a nuclear exchange.


That is not so: and that is my point: wars for keeping up face are not that
important as to warrant the use of unlimited violence. The aim here is to
keep the violence
contained within reasonable limits, such as not to provoke another major
power.
Basically if the US would really have started to carpet-bomb Serbia Russia
would have had no choice but to intervene. It's precisely to forestall this
too, that the US also (and for sound reasons) did not even want to discuss
fighting a ground-war.

Thus, this whole war was/is a limited war with all sides involved being
extremely cautious not to provoke the other party into hightening the level
of violence. For example, why did Serbia not use its modern and very lethal
SA-9 SAM
missiles - where is the Yugoslav air-force?

They are not being used because Serbia very well recognizes that if it would
use them this would lead to an escalation of violence, which would impede a
diplomatic solution (hunderds of thousands of casualties normally lead to
escalating demands on both
sides.) For example, if the US had had even a few hunderd casualties in a
ground-war the press would have started to demand Milosevic's head should be
presented on a stick - the Clinton-administration would have had to give in
and that
would have made any diplomatic solution impossible.

Instead both sides have been working in secret towards a compromis from the
outset of hostilities, involving no loss of face to all parties involved.
Thus with yesterday's draft agreement:

A.)The US can now reasonably claim it has forced Milosevic into concessions
by military means - thus vindicating its armed presence in Europe (and
preserving NATO - which was the main US-aim).

B.)Serbia can claim it has heroically resisted US-power, all ranks are now
closed behind the leader - and any opposition has been silenced - while it
has retained control over Kossovo's northwest. Furthermore, the UN is now
involved, meaning is not going to cede sovereignity to NATO. To that extent
Serbia is a clear winner (and it's going to receive economic aid in
addition) - a few thousands people killed during bombings are a small price
to pay for this personal victory - Milosevic will likely think. For this is
a personal victory of Milosevic - as NATO well recognizes and tries to
conceal by fierce rhetoric and terming him a war-criminal.

Note that contrary to what Georgi thinks this, well relative, victory of
extreme nationalism over Western European and US social democrats does not
necessarily have to have global repercussions. Some other jingo leaders may
well now consider it is possible to make a long nose at the US and then
simply sit it out under US-bombs until the US loses interest - as Saddam
Husain, general Aidid and Slobodan Milosevic all did - but there's little
prospect for this in a direct US-sphere of vital interest. Manuel Noriega
might well have liked to pose as a champion of Panamanian sovereignty and
sit the US-intervention out in the Vatican embassy but he was captured - and
would have been - all the same.

C.)Germany can now claim the `west' did not idely stand by during he
`Kossovo-genocide' and can now seek for some solution to the refugee-problem
it has already - and more will come soon - in good conciousness - that's
particularly important to preserve the Schroeder coalition since the Gruene
are always suffering from a `nagging conciousness'.

D.)The UCK can claim it has `almost' achieved a military victory and has
been pressed into accepting a solution by NATO which would otherwise have
been utterly unacceptable to its rank and file - for most UCK-guerillas
fought for an independent, not merely for an autonomous Kossovo.

And:

D.)Russia can claim it has once again reasserted its world-standing and
proved that no solutions to global problems are obtainable without Russia.

Does everybody win then? In diplomacy you generally sacrifice one or two
pawns to save your important pieces. So, no - of course not - the Albanians
having their
farm-houses burnt, their wives raped, or merely having Serbians living in
their former houses have been the losers -

For, since Serbia is never going to permit them to return to the now-Serb
controled areas, there is NO solutions to their problems, except by having
them migrate to western Europe. (They can't sit in refugee-camps forever,
can't return to Kossovo and Albania or Macedonia don't want them.)

Now, since the West European economy obviously does not need  hunderds of
thousands of barely schooled peasants, without any capital, these people are
going to live on the dole forever. This means that the other loser is going
to be the Western European taxpayer. And the US-taxplayer as well, since the
`war-dividend' is going to
be increased military expenditures in the USA; my proverbial black mother of
four childeren in the Bronx is going to see her benefits cut to finance all
these shiny new F22-planes. But, then, what do US-elites care about the
poor - as they don't vote anyway

>     For those who truly care about peace--spread education about
>international affairs, Afflict the Comfortable, while Comforting
>the Afflicted,

I would fully support that pious demand - and that as much concerns the
US-poor as those in the Third World
..
> Peace & Love to all

(which I would certainly endorse whatever it may mean - "Peace, Love and
Unity" as Rastafaris say)

R.J. Barendse