Re: global class analysis/ uneuqal exchange

Sounds la little like a rehash of IW's arguments in MWS 1:

> A. GLOBAL CLASSES
> there are two global classes:
> (1) First Class: individuals whose economic human rights are realized
> (2) Second Class: individuals whose economic human rights are violated

    Which is IW's world bourgeois and world workers (a problematic
reduction).

> B. GLOBAL MANAGEMENT
> the goal of responsible global management is to implement the economic
human
> rights of those whose economic human rights are violated (Second Class)

    IW's soicalist world government (an idea he seems to have discarded in
the early 1980s,
    because it doesn't appear in his writings after he discovered chaos
theory, which in his
    view means that the next system may be worse, but it hinges on the
strenght of the anti-systemic
    movements)

> C. GLOBAL CLASS STRUGGLE
> global class struggle is the struggle of the GLOBAL SECOND CLASS to get
> their economic human rights implemented

    Same thing as above.

    Not to dismiss this perspective out of hand, but it appears (I could be
wrong not having
    seen the thesis) to omit the importance of states as the structure that
divides workers
    and, in relation to this, the issue that core workers are not quite the
same "class" as peripheral
    workers.  In other words, we need to note the world similarities of
class caused by
    intrastate exploitation (surplus value extraction) and the divisions of
class created by
    states/unequal exchange.

    Taking this as starting point for a problem I'm interested in, I've
always found Wallerstein's
    statement of two classes  too general, and his explanation of unequal
exchange vague.
    Regarding the latter, he seems to oversimplify Emmanual's thesis.  Sure,
high wage
    and low wage areas, but this seems to beg the question.  Why high wages
in the core?

    This seems to be answered by the fact of core monopolization of the most
profitable-
    productive activities (resulting from states and the truncated labor
markets/fixed investments
    in core areas which limit labor supply and drives up wages).  Lets also
accept the argument
    that this division of labor assumes the history of its creation and the
different forms of labor
    control in the different areas, such as discussed in IW's MSW 1 (and
lets put aside the issue
    of exchange rates for now).  With these caveats, it may be argued that
unequal  exchange results
    from the operation of the world-market primariy.   The competition
among firms and workers is
    obviously  far greater in the periphery given the sectors of division of
labor that they are stuck with.
    Intense labor competition drives down wages, relatively intense
competition among firms
    drives down relative profits rates.

    Unequal exchange is derived from the relative market  competition among
the
    sectors of the division of labor.  This is reflected in exchange rates.
    Since the goods from, say Japan (including labor),  are relatively
monopolized, scarcity
    drives up their prices (creating a middle class).  The core getting more
out
    of the  exchange with the periphery does not drive up core workers'
wages. Again, it is caused
    by world demand relatively exceeding world supply for core goods
relative to peripheral goods,
    which in turn is caused by the division of labor.  Hence, the demand for
Yen to buy Japanese
    goods is greater,  which drives up its purchasing power relative to
peripheral currencies.
    The converse is true for peripheral currencies.

    Consequently, when the periphery and core exchange goods (and they must
or there would
    not be a single division of labor), the core gets more labor-value in
exchange for  less.  This
    would be true even if core labor was not more productive.  That it is
more productive simply
    exacerbates the inequality of the exchange, but it doesn't require it.
UE always hinges on
    the monopolization of certain activities within certain states/truncated
labor markets.