Progressive Response: Bombs, Refugees, Militar

Date:          Mon, 03 May 1999 10:17:51 -0600
To:            PEN-L@galaxy.csuchico.edu
From:          Interhemispheric Resource Center <ircalb@swcp.com>
Subject:       [PEN-L:6340] Progressive Response: Bombs, Refugees, Military Spending
Reply-to:      pen-l@galaxy.csuchico.edu

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The Progressive Response   30 April 1999   Vol. 3, No. 16
Editor: Tom Barry
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The Progressive Response is a publication of Foreign Policy In Focus, a
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Policy Studies. The project produces Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF) briefs
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Table of Contents

*** BOMBS AWAY ***
By Tom Barry, Codirector, Foreign Policy in Focus Program

*** OPTIONS FOR REFUGEES ***
by Karen AbuZayd, representative of the U.N. High Commission on Refugees

*** CONGRESS MOVES TO BOOST MILITARY SPENDING ***
By Chris Hellman, Senior Analyst, chellman@cdi.org 
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*** BOMBS AWAY ***

(Ed. Note: The following is the latest FPIF policy brief, Vol. 4, No. 13.
It calls for a unilateral end to the NATO bombing campaign in Yugoslavia.
See the FPIF's Kosovo Crisis Page for more information and perspectives:
http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/media/releases/crisis_eu99.html)

*** Bombs Away ***
By Tom Barry, Codirector, Foreign Policy in Focus Program

Key Points

* The bombing of Yugoslavia was not authorized by the UN.

* The dynamics of conflict and intervention in the Balkans embody many of
the new peace and security challenges of the post-cold war era.

* The U.S.-led NATO command--caught up in its own credibility crisis and
lack of strategic mission-has made the Balkans a more volatile, dangerous
place.

By calling for air strikes against Serbian targets the Clinton
administration made good on its threat to Yugoslavia's president Slobodan
Milosevic: either accept NATO peacekeeping forces or face the wrath of the
West. On March 24, 1999, "smart" laser-guided bombs began falling over the
provinces of Serbia and Kosovo to demonstrate NATO's resolve to stabilize
the region.

Well into the second month of the bombing campaign, Serbian forces have
managed to continue their own campaign to assert ethnic control over Kosovo
by ridding the province of the insurgent Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and
hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians (who constitute 90% of the
province's population). Failing to achieve a quick fix, NATO has steadily
expanded the range of its bombing missions. The high-tech onslaught targets
not only military facilities and forces but also Serbia's entire public
infrastructure. In the face of unexpected Serbian resolve, NATO is
introducing Apache attack helicopters and has intensified the bombing
campaign. Increasingly, NATO strategists are considering the introduction
of ground troops. 

The launching of NATO's bombing campaign came on the eve the alliance's
50th anniversary. Functioning during the cold war as a U.S.-led defensive
alliance to protect Western Europe against Soviet aggression, NATO in the
post-cold war years has sought to recreate itself as the main guardian of
regional interests and stability. Rather than disbanding with the demise of
the Soviet Union, NATO has expanded its membership and mission at the
urging of Washington. As predicted by NATO critics, the revived NATO has
seriously undermined security relations with Russia and has further
degraded the UN's authority. 

Unlike the bombing campaign against Iraq in response to its occupation of
Kuwait, the bombing of Yugoslavia was not authorized by the UN. The Serbian
forces made no extraterritorial advances but were pursuing within their own
country a counterinsurgency campaign against an emerging guerrilla army.
Citing the need to preserve stability in Europe and to protect the Kosovar
Albanians against Serbian ethno-fascism, NATO--led by Washington--initiated
an offensive operation against a sovereign European state. It is the latest
and most aggressive of the U.S.-led "humanitarian interventions" of the
post-cold war period.

The dynamics of conflict and intervention in the Balkans embody many of the
new peace and security challenges of the post-cold war era. The
containment, revolutionary, and rollback strategies that characterized the
bipolar security environment of the cold war decades have given way to a
situation in which civil wars, ethnic and religious conflicts, humanitarian
crises, failed states, and looming environmental problems are the leading
challenges to maintaining global peace and stability. 

Strutting on the world stage with the arrogance of power (and liberal
rhetoric) so typical of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, the Clinton
administration decided to demonstrate the U.S. and NATO's determination to
rid Europe of its most persistent challenge to stability. Although world
opinion (with the prominent exceptions of China and Russia) largely
applauded this latest U.S.-led "humanitarian intervention" (earlier cases
include Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia), the bombing campaign raises an array
of troubling questions about the action's legal, moral, institutional,
military, and political implications. Clearly, the bombing circumvents the
authority of the United Nations and thereby violates international law. An
argument can be made that when international human rights norms are grossly
violated by sovereign nations, the necessity for swift intervention offsets
the need to respect international laws and institutions. Yet even accepting
this argument, questions remain about whether the severity of the
humanitarian crisis in Kosovo warranted this abrogation of international
law and the further degradation of the UN. 

Also of concern is Washington's increasing practice, reinforced by its new
stature as the world's single superpower, to regard itself as the final
arbiter of when and where intervention is needed to enforce international
norms. Having NATO--as the world's most powerful military
alliance--available to enforce the U.S. vision of international stability,
heightens this concern. 

Aside from these important questions of law and procedure are the more
immediate repercussions of the bombing campaign, including the humanitarian
crisis of refugees and internally displaced persons resulting from this
intervention, signs of regional political and economic destabilization, and
the heightening of NATO-Russia tensions. Despite declared humanitarian
intentions and a stated commitment to diplomatic solutions, the U.S.-led
NATO command--caught up in its own credibility crisis and lack of strategic
mission--has made the Balkans a more volatile, dangerous place.


Problems With Current U.S. Policy

Key Problems

* The U.S. has held itself above international law and appropriated the
right to define new rules of global engagement.

* Washington has demonstrated its unwillingness to abide by a global system
of checks and balances.

* The U.S-ordered departure of OSCE monitors and the bombing itself gave
Milosevic the opening and justification to pursue an ethnic cleansing
campaign.

The array of problems associated with NATO policy in Kosovo should not be
attributed solely to a misdirected U.S. foreign policy. At the core of this
crisis stand Slobodan Milosevic and his Serbian forces that have appealed
to ethnic identity to construct a sense of nationhood in the political and
economic disarray following the end of the cold war. This policy--which has
included campaigns of ethnic cleansing--secured Milosevic's political power
during the Bosnia conflict and appears to be working in Kosovo. 

Given their proximity to the unfolding civil wars and ethnic conflicts in
the former Yugoslavia, the European political leaders also bear a major
share of the responsibility for addressing the deepening humanitarian
crisis in their own backyard. Drawn late into the conflict in Bosnia, the
UN as an institution and as a forum for all the world's nations also must
share the blame for the continuing humanitarian crisis in the Balkans. It
failed to involve itself sooner in Bosnia, didn't develop the intelligence
and response capabilities necessary to address this type of internal
conflict, and it gave the U.S. and NATO too much latitude in acting
independently as its regional enforcement arm in Bosnia.

The conflict in the Balkans, despite its own particular history and
complexities, is emblematic of a worldwide problem of humanitarian crises
resulting from internal strife. Unconstrained by a security framework
shaped by the U.S-Soviet power balance and spheres of influence,
policymakers face the challenge of defining new rules of engagement: why,
where, and how to intervene to maintain global stability and uphold
international human rights norms. As the world's undisputed military and
economic power and as the dominant influence in such multilateral
institutions as NATO, the IMF, and the UN, the U.S. plays a key role in
shaping these new rules. For the most part--and certainly in the case of
the Balkans bombing campaign--the U.S. has not used its power responsibly. 

The U.S. has squandered the opportunity presented by the end of the cold
war to strengthen multilateral capacities for preventive diplomacy,
conflict resolution, and peace enforcement. Instead of working to reform
and empower the UN and to strengthen inclusive conflict-resolution entities
like the Organization of Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the U.S.
has chosen to establish itself as the "globocop" of the new world order.
When convenient, the U.S. will exercise its power through the UN, as it did
in the Persian Gulf War. But increasingly, as in the current bombing
campaigns against Serbia and Iraq, the U.S. has held itself above
international law and appropriated the right to define new rules of global
engagement. As part of its global policing strategy, the U.S. has decided
to relegate the UN to the sidelines and establish NATO as its primary
instrument for maintaining regional and perhaps international order.

The folly of this strategy and its adverse consequences are becoming
increasingly evident in the Balkans:

International Law: Although the U.S. system of governance is based on a
series of checks and balances, Washington has by its actions demonstrated
its unwillingness to abide by such a system of global governance. The main
legal check is Article 2 of the UN Charter, which prohibits nondefensive
military action without Security Council authorization. By failing to seek
UN authorization (fearing a Chinese and Russian veto) for the bombing
campaign and asserting the independence of NATO, the Clinton administration
has further undermined the credibility of its own global leadership while
seriously degrading the authority of the UN. Security Council deliberations
would have likely forced Washington to pursue a judicious strategy of
negotiations and international pressure (involving Russia) aimed at halting
gross human rights abuses in Kosovo. 

Humanitarian Crisis: The bombing campaign has resulted in the largest
refugee flow in Europe since World War II. The U.S-ordered departure of
OSCE monitors and the bombing itself gave Milosevic the opening and
justification to pursue an ethnic cleansing campaign that will set the
stage for the eventual inclusion of Serbian-held, ethnically cleansed areas
of Kosovo into the existing province of Serbia. By extending the bombing
campaign to nonmilitary targets, the bombing is terrorizing the entire
population of Yugoslavia, destroying the basic public infrastructure, and
undermining the advances of Serbia's democratic opposition.

Political/Military Repercussions: The bombing campaign has bolstered the
dubious credentials of the KLA (who only a year ago were regarded as
terrorists by the international community), defining it as the legitimate
representative of the Kosovar Albanians and has brought Albania into the
war. By escalating ethnic tensions and increasing refugee flows, the
bombing campaign threatens to destabilize neighboring Macedonia, and the
province of Montenegro fears that it too will be overcome by the widening
war. On the world stage, the NATO air campaign has heightened tensions with
Russia and angered China, thereby creating new security concerns for the
United States. Meanwhile, the war has also given rise in the U.S. to
increasing Republican pressure to pad the military war chest. 

As long as the bombing campaign continues, these and other problems (such
as the economic and environmental damage) will likely worsen, making a
negotiated solution ever more difficult and post-war reconstruction more
expensive. Especially worrisome is the belief of many U.S. policymakers and
military strategists that the U.S. and NATO must now persist and
prevail--whatever the cost and no matter how reckless the decision to
intervene was--because our credibility is at stake. Such sentiment echoes
that of U.S. officials in the 1960s while they unconscionably led the
country into the deepening Vietnam quagmire.


Toward a New Foreign Policy

Key Recommendations

* The NATO bombing should stop.

* The U.S. should support a truly international peacekeeping force in Kosovo.

* The U.S. bears a heavy responsibility to ensure the well-being and
resettlement of the refugees and internally displaced people in Kosovo.

The NATO bombing should stop. The campaign has failed to meet its strategic
objectives of preventing a humanitarian crisis, forcing Milosevic to
negotiate a settlement, and building a more stable security environment in
Europe. Instead, the bombing has proved counterproductive on all three
counts. The humanitarian crisis has deepened, the resolve of the Serbs to
resist NATO has increased, and the credibility of NATO as an instrument to
ensure European stability (without threatening Russia) has been irrevocably
dashed. Continuing the war against Serbia by other means--either through a
ground invasion or by support of the KLA as a U.S. surrogate--would likely
have the same counterproductive results and should not be considered as
viable options.

Continued NATO reliance on superior military might to resolve the Kosovo
crisis is certainly misguided. The air attacks contravene international law
and set a dangerous precedent of the alliance injecting itself militarily
into civil wars. Furthermore, NATO has failed to demonstrate that it has
the capability and commitment to implement a military solution that will
not destroy the country in order to save it. Similarly, the NATO command
and the U.S. have failed to articulate a vision of a military solution that
is just and equitable--the conditions necessary for an enduring peace.
There are, of course, no guarantees that diplomatic pressure and
negotiations would establish the conditions that would foster a permanent
peace. But such diplomatic activity, unencumbered by an ill-considered
bombing campaign, would likely enjoy broad international support and avoid
the considerable human, material, and economic cost of the military approach.

The halt to the bombing should be immediate and unconditional. Such an
opening would defuse tensions with Russia, increase the opportunities for
UN involvement, and likely open Serbia to the presence of foreign
journalists, relief agencies, and other nongovernmental organizations. It
would also increase the burden on the international diplomatic community to
intensify pressure on Serbia. Empowered by the Security Council and with
the concurrence of the U.S., Russia would be in a promising position to
engineer the terms under which Kosovo could be demilitarized and the
Albanian Kosovars could return home.

The end of the bombing and the resumption of negotiations would not untie
the Kosovo knot. However, several basic accords could restore a degree of
stability necessary for any enduring solution: 

* Serbia must agree to stop its campaign of ethnic cleansing and to
withdraw its forces from Kosovo.

* International peacekeepers (not NATO forces as the U.S. had insisted at
Rambouillet but an international team, including Russians, under joint
UN-OSCE supervision) should be stationed in Kosovo to monitor any
transgressions by either Serbian or KLA forces.

* Kosovar Albanians should be allowed to return to their homes.

* Upon completion of an initial settlement, international economic
sanctions against Yugoslavia should be terminated and a generous package of
reconstruction aid should be authorized by the UN, with NATO countries
providing most of the funding. 

International diplomacy under the auspices of the UN would maintain
pressure on Serbia to address the likely demands of Kosovar Albanians for
autonomy (rescinded by Milosevic in 1989), the establishment of a UN
protectorate, or eventual independence. In the event that Serbia failed to
halt its ethnic cleansing operations, the U.S. and other concerned
countries could seek UN authorization for a military solution.

As NATO's leading member, the U.S. bears a heavy moral and financial
responsibility to ensure the well-being and permanent resettlement of the
refugees and  internally displaced people in Kosovo. The administration and
Congress didn't let budgetary constraints limit the expense of their
"humanitarian intervention" against Serbia. They should be just as generous
in addressing the humanitarian crisis in its wake.

The Clinton administration is right that gross transgressions of
international norms should not be tolerated by the world community. But
Washington should not establish either itself or NATO as the arbiter and
enforcer of international law. The one positive development that may emerge
from Washington's misguided response to the Kosovo crisis is the
realization that the United Nations must be reformed (overhaul the voting
structure and composition of the Security Council and General Assembly),
sustained (with adequate financing), and empowered (with its own standing
volunteer army and rapid deployment and intelligence capabilities) to make
it a more credible and effective institution. Combined with a new
commitment on the part of the U.S. to preventive diplomacy and
peacekeeping, the world community could respond to humanitarian crises with
smart conflict-resolution strategies-not with smart bombs.
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*** OPTIONS FOR REFUGEES ***
by Karen AbuZayd, representative of the U.N. High Commission on Refugees

(Ed. Note: The following description of the situation of Kosovar Albanian
refugees by Karen AbuZayd came from her presentation at the FPIF
congressional briefing, "Kosovo: What are the Other Options?" on April 21,
1999.)

I came to this position last summer from being the High Commissioner's
Chief of Staff in Geneva at our headquarters, and before that I was the
chief of commission during the war in Sarajevo from 1993 to 1995.

>From the UNHCR point of view, the question might even be put more simply
than what are the other options: just what are the options? Since we find
ourselves doing simultaneous contingency planning quite unprecedentedly for
different options: return of at least half a million refugees, outflow of
an additional half million more, added to the 600,000 already out and
carrying on with the current numbers in location, minus those who were
temporarily evacuated from Macedonia to third countries totaling 17,000 so
far. This leads me to mention particular dilemmas which UNHCR is facing:
one, bending the principal of preserving first country of asylum, and two,
resorting to support for the military involved in the conflict. Both have
been deemed necessary measures to take, first, to save refugee lives and
second to protect, both politically and economically, Macedonia.

The arbitrary and somewhat inexplicable but certainly unsettling opening
and closing of the borders by the Serbs have prompted parallel policies.
After the first border closure, the Macedonian government, UNHCR, and other
aid agencies agreed to cooperate on consolidating camps and assisting the
refugees in Macedonia, while moving the refugees who volunteered, mostly
those with family ties, to nearby European countries. Systems were put in
place and ten thousand refugees have been moved to Germany, three thousand
seven hundred to Turkey, over a thousand to Norway, many of these medical
or otherwise vulnerable cases, as well as a few hundred to other countries
in Europe. And the border suddenly opened again last week; UNHCR and IOM
activated other European offers and several hundred refugees have already
moved this week to Austria, Belgium, France and Poland. This of course is
taking place in a worrying context of knowing there are still several
hundred thousand persons inside Kosovo, most of whom we understand are in
hiding, either in their homes, or, more frighteningly, in the forests and
mountains, probably most of them without shelter or food. Some thousands of
those we have seen lined up at the borders, then disappearing overnight,
shoved helter skelter at the whim of Serb security forces. Should hundreds
of thousands or even tens of thousands more cross the border, so that we
have to activate the more distant offers of evacuation from Canada,
Australia and the U.S., we would ask you to help us and the many
refugee-assisting NGOs to persuade the U.S. government that Guantanamo Bay
should not be an option for holding these much-traumatized refugees.

On working with the military, given the combination of high numbers, rapid
arrivals and poor infrastructure, there was little choice but to ask the
military for logistical support in building camps and moving supplies both
by road and air. Now that such an efficient job has been done by NATO in
setting up and running camps, it becomes even more difficult for the
humanitarian agencies under UNHCR and the NGOs to take over and keep up the
same standards, given their much more limited human and material resources.
And I might add that of the $101 million dollars that the U.N.
organizations have put out as a special appeal from the 5th of April, only
$45 million has been given so far, $8.5 million of that from the U.S. And I
think we've probably all seen on television the dozens of doctors in some
of the Italian military camps who prepare three hot meals a day for the
people in their hospitals. This is something that goes way beyond any
possible refugee standard.

However we are beginning the transfer process; we have already begun the
handover in the camps in Macedonia to the NGOs, and more transfers are
scheduled to take place later this week and next week in Albania as well. A
further concern of everyone, but most of all the refugees themselves, is
that of whether local government security can be trusted to protect the
camps--in some places because of local hostility towards the refugees and
in others because of the weakness of the structures themselves. Still in
both cases, that is, camp management and law and order, humanitarian
principles demand that humanitarian actors and local authorities assume
their responsibilities. The former, in providing assistance and ensuring
protection, and the latter to ensure security. The refugees fear that they
are being sacrificed to principle, although NATO will maintain a minimal
presence around the camps in Macedonia around their perimeters and OSCE
monitors will continue to work there, while the western European police
training efforts in Albania are ongoing. We must be careful not to further
blur the military and humanitarian mandates as this will bring nothing but
regrettable consequences for the future of both organizations.

On other issues and options, particularly for the longer term, many of you
may have seen the op-ed by the High Commissioner for Refugees in the
Financial Times in which she outlines several practical steps which she
insists must be taken to limit the suffering of the Kosovar people and
bring stability to the region. She enumerates the following steps: First,
scrupulous respect for the principles of international law allowing all
Kosovars to seek refuge in neighboring states if they so desire, not moving
refugees except voluntarily, and reinforcing their security but maintaining
the strictly humanitarian character in the camps. Second, ensuring
sufficient contributions to fulfill their basic needs; third, family
reunification; fourth, establishing the conditions for the only viable
solution, that is, the return of refugees to Kosovo, including the
withdrawal of the security forces who have been responsible for expelling
the Kosovars, and the deployment of an international monitoring mechanism.
Fifth, accelerated planning to begin already for reconstruction and
reconciliation based on the political settlement which includes full
support for the international criminal tribunal for Yugoslavia in its
attempts to bring to justice those guilty of crimes against humanity. And
finally, taking account of the regional dimensions, something neglected by
the Dayton Accords, focusing particularly on the help needed by Albania and
Macedonia to build their national institutions and civil society, can
provide for their future stability and economic growth. Montenegro, which I
must say has performed heroically in attending to 72,000 Kosovars in their
territory, and eventually even a democratic Serbia will be brought into
such a plan. As the High Commissioner notes, dealing with these options
requires vision, something which she contends has been lacking in previous
attempts to end the conflict.
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*** CONGRESS MOVES TO BOOST MILITARY SPENDING ***
By Chris Hellman, Senior Analyst, chellman@cdi.org 

(Ed. Note: The following piece by Chris Hellman, excerpted from the CDI
Defense Monitor, is representative of the presentation made by CDI's
Hellman at the congressional briefing sponsored by FPIF and the Progressive
Challenge on April 29.)

Just before heading out for the current Spring recess, both the House and
Senate adopted their respective versions of the Fiscal Year 2000 Budget
Resolution, which sets overall spending levels for each annual
appropriations bill. While the numbers in the two versions vary slightly,
both add $8 billion to the Administration's spending plan for the Pentagon,
and do so by cutting other federal programs. 

The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) set specific limits on annual
discretionary spending -- the money that the President and Congress must
decide on and act to spend each year. In addition, the BBA set caps on the
amount of total defense vs. non-defense discretionary spending, and created
"firewalls" between the two categories. Until this year, any reductions in
either the defense or non-defense accounts could only be used for deficit
reduction, and could not be transferred to the other account. Members of
Congress interested in increasing military spending could not do so by
cutting other federal discretionary programs. However, the firewalls expire
this year, and with them gone, the BBA only caps the total amount of
discretionary spending, making it possible to shift funds between defense
and non-defense programs. 

Last year, Congress and the Administration agreed to add $23 billion in
federal spending to the levels set for FY'99 by the BBA, including $8.3
billion for the military. They did this by declaring the additional
spending as "emergency," and thus exempt from BBA caps. The funds were then
taken from the FY'98 budget surplus. This year's budget resolution complies
with the BBA, and therefore, in order to increase military spending,
reductions had to be made in other federal programs. 

Both budget resolutions increase military spending by $16 billion over last
year's appropriated levels to about $289 billion. This is approximately $8
billion more than the Administration's request for FY'00, and $17 billion
more than was planned for FY'00 in the BBA. 

To help fund these increases, the House proposes a 19% reduction for
community and regional development programs, which provide local
governments with funds to promote economic development and job creation.
The Senate version makes even deeper cuts, reducing the program by 42%.
Both the House and Senate cut the commerce and housing credit accounts by
32%. These funds support small and minority businesses and the Federal
Housing Assistance (FHA) program. 

Most telling perhaps is the Senate's proposal to cut the International
Affairs budget (Function 150) by $4.9 billion, to $12.5 billion, a
reduction of 28%. The House goes even further, reducing funding by nearly
36% below the Administration's request. These cuts are even more draconian
when you consider that the International Affairs budget for FY'90 was $18.6
billion, which, if adjusted for inflation, would be $23.2 billion in
current dollars. 

The congressional leadership's spending priorities are clear -- weapons at
the expense of job creation and assisting low-income Americans,
war-fighting at the expense of international diplomacy. 

There are some practical ramifications of the proposed budget as well.
According to some estimates, the budget resolutions will require a 27%
reduction of non-defense discretionary programs by 2004, yet they do not
make decisions about how to achieve this. There is growing concern that
when members of Congress are actually called upon to vote for the specific
cuts needed to make this budget work, they will find the political choices
too tough. Unable to reach agreement and pass annual spending bills,
Congress would likely be faced with additional government shut-downs. In
fact, Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ), a member of the Appropriations