IRC Potpourri of Opinions on Yugoslavia (fwd)

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 1999 12:51:44 -0600
From: Interhemispheric Resource Center <ircalb@swcp.com>
Reply-To: isafp@csf.colorado.edu
To: ISA -- FOREIGN POLICY <isafp@csf.colorado.edu>
Subject: Progressive Response: Kosovo Options


----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------
The Progressive Response   23 April 1999   Vol. 3, No. 15
Editor: Tom Barry
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------
The Progressive Response is a publication of Foreign Policy In Focus, a
joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for
Policy Studies. The project produces Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF) briefs
on various areas of current foreign policy debate. Electronic mail versions
are available free of charge for subscribers. The Progressive Response is
designed to keep the writers, contributors, and readers of the FPIF series
informed about new issues and debates concerning U.S. foreign policy issues. 

The purpose of the "Comments" section of PR is to serve as a forum to
discuss issues of controversy within the progressive community--not to
express the institutional position of either the IRC or IPS. We encourage
comments to the FPIF briefs and to opinions expressed in PR. We're working
to make the Progressive Response informative and useful, so let us know how
we're doing, via email to irc1@zianet.com (that's irc, then the number one
NOT the letter L.) Please put "Progressive Response" in the subject line.

Please feel free to cross-post The Progressive Response elsewhere.

We apologize for any duplicate copies of The Progressive Response you may
receive.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------

Table of Contents

I. Updates and Out-Takes

*** KOSOVO OPTIONS ***
By Julianne Smith, Michael Ratner, Phyllis Bennis, Adm. Eugene Carroll, Jim
Hooper, 

II. Comments

*** KOSOVO FARCE AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER ***
By Ruizhuang Zhang
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------

I. Updates and Out-Takes

*** KOSOVO OPTIONS ***

(Ed. Note: Rep. Dennis J. Kucinich (D-OH) together with the Progressive
Challenge and Foreign Policy In Focus sponsored on April 21 a congressional
briefing entitled "Kosovo: What are the Other Options?" The opinions
expressed by five of these panelists are excerpted below. Other speakers
were Karen AbuZayd, Regional Representative, UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and Paul Rowland, Field Representative for Serbia,
National Democratic Institute (NDI). Rep. Kucinich's opinion about the
Kosovo bombing is found in an op-ed he authored that is posted on the
FPIF's Kosovo Crisis Page at
http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/media/opeds/kosovo04.html. Looking
beyond the legality, morality, and strategy of the current crisis, Kai Bird
in an article in The Nation, April 26, points out that the UN needs to be
reformed if it is to function as a credible, effective institution. "We
need a standing UN army available to smother ethnic violence and serve as
neutral, truly international peacekeepers. We need to empower the UN,
reform it, democratize it and recognize that, like democracy at home, a
democratic UN will be a messy beast, but it will belong to us all.")

*** Julianne Smith, Senior Analyst, BASIC ***
 (Excerpted from a longer essay available on FPIF's Kosovo Crisis Page at
http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/media/opeds/kosovo06.html)

While public opinion regarding Kosovo changes as rapidly as the spring
weather in Washington, one fact remains constant:  the current crisis has
most of the population in the Western world scratching their heads and
asking themselves, "Just how did we get into this mess anyway?"  Is NATO
that short-sighted? Was Clinton's domestic battle with impeachment so
distracting? Is the post-Cold War security environment so boring that we
can no longer hire decent intelligence gatherers? If one simply connects
the dots, the answer becomes apparent. Almost a decade after the end of the
Cold War, the West has yet to invest in the preventive tools it needs for
standard maintenance of a security system plagued by leaks. This capability
gap has, in turn, left NATO with the current flood of disaster, which is
now threatening the entire region with long-term damage. 

At present, NATO has two options:  it can use the summit to announce a
quick fix for Kosovo (unrelenting military might either through ground
troops or the continuation of the air strikes) and hope that it'll be able
to paint over the leaks that such a quick fix would inevitably produce.
Alternatively, NATO can use the summit to take an inventory of its current
toolbox, admit that such tools have not yet been effective in Kosovo (and
probably won't be effective for future Kosovos), and work to outline a
long-term regional approach to security in the Balkans. Such an approach
would:

* establish formal relations between NATO and other security organizations
such as the OSCE and the EU, thereby enhancing the civilian-military
component of security; 

* assign one of those bodies the task of coordinating the civilian
implementation of a post-conflict reconstruction strategy (i.e., policing,
judicial and parliamentary reform); 

* outline a strategy for indicting Milosevic and others as war criminals
with specifics on who is responsible for carrying out such a strategy;

* call for increased funding for the OSCE to facilitate the creation of a
civilian intervention unit to be used in future ethnic conflicts (one
should simply move the decimal point of their $112 million budget to the
right); 

* outline an economic assistance program that would demonstrate the rewards
of democratic reform to the Serb population; 

* enhance US financial support for SECI (the Southeastern Cooperative
Initiative) and EU financial support for the Royaumont Process, two
programs that provide much needed technical support in the region.

NATO may very well come up with a watered down version of one or more of
the above listed options under the heading of a "Doctrine on Southeastern
Europe." Remembering NATO's last reference to the crisis in Yugoslavia in
its 1991 Strategic Concept, though, one should be cautioned against
believing that this summit's rhetoric on the Balkans will be any different.
Kosovo will indeed be mentioned at some point. Whether or not reference to
the crisis will produce a constructive policy for the region as a whole
remains to be seen. With NATO's pride on the line, Clinton and NATO will do
their best to convince themselves and the public that their approach to
Kosovo was the right one. 

And eventually, even with a short-sighted, quick fix from NATO, the smoke
will clear, CNN will halt its 24 hour coverage of Kosovo, and we'll all
stop scratching our heads and asking what went wrong. NATO will return to
Brussels still blinded by the glint of its high-tech tools, and Clinton
will start scripting the closing chapter of his term in office.
Organizations working towards enhancing conflict prevention and crisis
management will begin again their calls for more funding and support.
Without the glitzy marketing appeal of shiny jets, a looming crisis to
bring their cause to light, or admission by NATO that such softer security
tools are needed, however, those calls will likely fall on deaf ears. And
we'll stop connecting the dots...until the next crisis. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------

*** Michael Ratner, Attorney, Center for Constitutional Rights ***
(author of "The Pinochet Precedent," FPIF, Vol. 4, No. 6, available at
http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol4/v4n06pin.html)

This historical background should make us very skeptical regarding current
U.S. and NATO claims that the war against Serbia is to stop "ethnic
cleansing" or even "genocide." President Clinton says the bombings were
necessary to prevent a "humanitarian catastrophe," to end "instability in
the Balkans," and to prevent a wider war.

But the evidence is otherwise. The NATO countries, as the historical record
predicts, appear to be acting primarily in their own self-interests. To
date the bombings have created the very evils President Clinton claims he
is trying to prevent: over 500,000 refugees have fled Kosovo. Montenegro,
Macedonia, Albania, and even Bosnia are being destabilized; and Russia is
threatening a wider war.

The administration claims that Serbia was planning this ethnic cleansing
and it would have occurred even without the NATO attacks. But even if this
were the case, it was the NATO attacks that gave Serbia the opportunity to
carry out its alleged plans, particularly in a circumstance when all of the
unarmed monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) were withdrawn. Nor should it be overlooked that the bombing
itself probably caused many of the refugee to flee their homes. NATO had to
have realized that its massive bombing campaign had the potential to create
a serious humanitarian crisis, yet incredibly it had made no preparations
for housing, feeding or caring for the refugees. Had humanitarian concerns
been at the forefront of NATO policy, or even a serious concern, such plans
would have been a priority.

If the U.S. and NATO really believed that Serbia was planning "ethnic
cleansing," then the bombing was the absolute worst strategy; it was almost
guaranteed to bring about that result. If the goal was to really prevent
expulsions of people from Kosovo, there were other peaceful alternatives
that should have been undertaken. A sticking point in the negotiations with
Yugoslavia was the deployment of 28,000 NATO troops in Kosovo; a compromise
could have been worked out by making that force an international force of
the United Nations or one that at least included Russian troops. In fact,
just before the bombing the Serbian parliament supported the idea of a
United Nations force to monitor a political settlement. Had this and other
peaceful means been employed, there is a fair chance that the human tragedy
unfolding in the Balkans could have been avoided.

Once again it appears that the claim of humanitarian intervention is a
pretext for countries acting in their own self-interest and for their own
geo-political reasons. Western countries are insuring that it is they, not
Serbia and Russia, who will be the dominant force in the Balkans; NATO is
pushing Europe's borders into the edge of Asia. A NATO military base in the
region cannot be far behind. Also at play here is the broader underlying
interest of the United States to mold the world to its will through a
policy of coercive diplomacy. Under this doctrine, when the United States
tells another country to do something, it must buckle under or suffer the
consequences. That is what the U.S. told Yugoslavia: sign the Rambouillet
agreement or get bombed. It is not a way to negotiate and certainly not a
way to create a safer world. That is why after World War II, the nations of
the world through the Charter of the United Nations mandated that only the
Security Council could authorize the non-defensive use of force: unlike the
current U.S./NATO bombing, force was to be used in the interest of the
international community and not individual states.

(Taken from Jules Lobel and Michael Ratner, "Humanitarian Intervention in
Kosovo: A Highly Suspect Pretext for War," Center for Constitutional
Rights, April 1999.)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------

*** Phyllis Bennis, Fellow, Institute for Policy Studies ***
(author of several FPIF policy briefs, including U.S.-Iraq Conflict, Vol.
2, No. 51)

I think there may well have been (and still is) a moral imperative to
intervene--but NOT for NATO! The U.S. sidelining of the UN in international
affairs--replacing UN primacy either with unapologetic unilateralism as we
saw during the last several years in Iraq, or with NATO as the bestower of
international legitimacy as we are seeing in Kosovo--represents a major
catastrophe for U.S. foreign policy.

So while there may be a moral imperative, that doesn't make this U.S./NATO
mission a moral response. Certainly one must be skeptical about morality
having anything to do with U.S. policy. The continuing humanitarian crisis
in Iraq--where far more people are still dying, today, as a direct result
of U.S. policy, than are dying even now in Kosovo--should provide enough
evidence to anyone for whom the delayed and disastrously handled attention
to Somalia, the deliberate decision to allow genocide in Rwanda to go
forward, the disasters of Bosnia, Sierra Leone, etc., still leave questions.

But we cannot challenge Washington's double standards by claming that
because they refused to move in the past, they should not move now. While
we must continue to identify and condemn past failures to prevent or halt
genocide, we must continue to demand appropriate action to prevent or stop
such humanitarian crises now.

The question for us should be whether there were other options beside this
use of force by this agency--and the answer to that I think is yes. The UN
Charter is unequivocal that the use of force is justified only in the
context of two scenarios: either a Security Council authorization (despite,
all of the problems inherent in that because of U.S. domination of the
Council), or immediate self-defense response to armed aggression, and then
only until the first opportunity for the Council to meet. What took place
here was neither--it was a clear refusal by the U.S. (with the Brits
trotting along behind) to allow the Council to debate the issue, as France
had proposed. Even under the terms of the Genocide Convention, the
obligation to act to prevent genocide does not supercede the primacy of the
UN in responding to an international crisis. And whether or not one accepts
the applicability of that term (based on the part of the definition of
genocide that speaks of creating conditions that render the group's
survival impossible--something that may well be approaching if the ethnic
cleansing efforts result in a near-complete expulsion and forced dispersion
of Albanian Kosovars from Kosovo) it is significant that the U.S. has NOT
claimed it as a justification of its actions. And of course, U.S. awareness
of the possibility (not probability, given Russia's continued dependence on
Western aid) of a Russian veto does not provide a legal "out" for avoiding
a Council decision.

What might the Council have decided on, even if a full-scale UN Blue Helmet
deployment was not a likely outcome? One very reasonable possibility as
early as months ago could have involved UN authorization for an OSCE
force--certainly not NATO-protection force, not the limited unarmed OSCE
monitoring force that were pulled out at the moment they were most vitally
needed. The UN Charter speaks of looking first to regional solutions to
regional problems, but certainly OSCE, including eastern Europe and Russia
as well as the western European powers, is a far better example of regional
diplomatic actors than a U.S.-dominated NATO military alliance.

What could the UN look towards now? One possibility would be to rely
(however ironically) on the precedent set by the Korean War-era Uniting for
Peace resolution. Under its terms, the General Assembly can, when the
Council is judged to be deadlocked or otherwise unable to work, meet in
special session to make decisions regarding war and peace, issues generally
left to the providence of the Council. The Russians have recently proposed
such an Assembly meeting. Its first task would be to call a halt to NATO's
bombing and Serb expulsions, release of all detainees, and massive refugee
assistance. While bringing NATO to heel, let alone the Milosevic-led
military, would by no means be guaranteed by such a UN resolution, a
specific Assembly demand for an end to the bombing would go far towards
delegitimizing NATO's role, challenging the U.S. and reasserting the
centrality of the UN in dealing with the ethnic cleansing, thus providing a
much better chance of a policy that would, in the Hippocratic sense, "first
do no harm."

Further, the Assembly should not only call for a resumption of serious
diplomacy, but delegate representatives to act in the name of the most
democratic part of the UN, the General Assembly, to carry out such
diplomacy on behalf of the international community. Such a diplomatic
effort, I would propose, might best be carried out by Nelson Mandela and
Kofi Annan--two African statesmen without personal vested interests in the
region or conflict, but most importantly combining the international
legitimacy of the UN with the internationally recognized personal
credibility of the South African leader.

(Statement taken from "Kosovo Roundtable: NATO Intervention, Ethnic
Cleansing, and the US," Sponsored by Mother Jones Magazine.)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------

*** Adm. Eugene Carroll, USN (Ret), Deputy Director, Center for Defense
Information (CDI) ***
(author of FPIF essay, "Peace and Security," in Global Focus: A New Foreign
Policy Agenda 1997-98)

Can the crisis in Kosovo be solved by military action? Definitely not. In
fact, there is no solution by any means within the foreseeable future. 

In a land where the battle of Kosovo fought between Serbs and Muslims 610
years ago is still considered a current event, there is no simple, certain
solution or it would have been achieved decades or even centuries ago.

Does that mean nothing can be done today to improve the tragic situation
and reduce the suffering of innocent victims in Kosovo? Of course not.
Conditions can be improved, but not if both sides continue to seek a
permanent and complete solution. The best that can be hoped for initially
is to reduce the violence and make the political-military confrontation
manageable. 

The first misbegotten idea to abandon is that either side can hope to
impose a military solution that will be equitable and just, two essential
criteria to establish stable, enduring and peaceful conditions in Kosovo.
There is no military solution.

When military power is used exclusively in the form of air attacks, the
problem is exacerbated. For all of its destructive capacity, air power
alone cannot fundamentally change the military and political situation on
the ground. Thus, the NATO decision to limit its actions to air attacks in
order to protect Kosovar Albanians was doomed to failure. Far from
protecting them, the attacks accelerated their victimization, and NATO will
soon be presented with an ethnically-cleansed Kosovo by Slobodan Milosevic,
who will then be pleased to propose a cease-fire. 

This is the time for NATO, led by the United States, to carefully examine
its ultimate objective and how best to achieve it. The temptation to insert
ground troops must be resisted because it would be an even more disastrous
effort to "solve" the Kosovo problem by escalating military action.

What, then, should the objective be? It should be a negotiated settlement
that contains adequate incentives for both sides to end the violence, as
well as sanctions to redress significant violations in the future. It
should provide for removal of all Serbian military and police forces from
Kosovo in return for an end to NATO air attacks. Finally, it should
establish international supervision within Kosovo of the peaceful
repatriation and resettlement of returning Serbs and Kosovars.

Implementation would be funded through the United Nations with major
contributions from developed nations, principally NATO members. For a
fraction of the billions of dollars that are being wasted in warfare now,
the devastated Kosovo area could be restored to livable conditions and
economic and medical aid provide through international agencies.

At the same time, all sanctions against Yugoslavia should be lifted and
normal relations resumed to assist in the rebuilding of a nation ravaged by
airstrikes. Obviously, significant violations of the peace agreement by
either side would result in the withdrawal of external assistance and the
imposition of stringent sanctions against the offending party.

This all seems reasonable and logical, but bringing it about would require
powerful and effective mediation between NATO and the Serbian government.

The obvious party to serve as the intermediary is Russia, acting at the
request of the UN Security Council. The premature and futile effort more
than a week ago by Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov could not
succeed for two reasons.

First, Mr. Milosevic knew full well that Russia could not unilaterally gain
acceptance of any proposal to NATO. Second, the level of destruction had
not yet begun to threaten the economic viability of Serbia but was only
solidifying popular support there for Mr. Milosevic's defiance.

Empowered by the UN Security Council and with the concurrence of NATO, the
Russians could mount urgent and forceful pressure on Mr. Milosevic. It
could provide a face-saving way for him to agree to a neutral body
administering conditions in Kosovo as the price for an end to the air war
and assistance in bringing about an economic recovery in Serbia. It is even
more certain that the Kosovars would cooperate in order to end the violence
and resume peaceful lives in their homeland.

This approach would not "solve" the Kosovo problem It would restore a
degree of stability and order in which all concerned parties could
cooperate to manage the situation and employ nonviolent means to settle
inevitable differences. This whole approach lacks the finality of military
victory and unconditional surrender, but it has one great virtue--it is
feasible and would save lives while continued pursuit of the impossible
goal of a military solution will only perpetuate another Balkan tragedy.

(Statement taken from "Can We Solve the Kosovo Problem?" Dallas Morning
News, April 11, 1999.)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------

*** Jim Hooper, Executive Director, Balkan Action Center ***

The war over Kosovo is about more than the fare of the people in the
Balkans. What is at stake is the belief in American power, purpose and
resolve in determining the values that post-Cold War Europe will abide by.
If Serbia achieves its war objectives, the ethnic cleansers will set new
ground rules for Europe.

We can resolve the Kosovo conflict, but it is illusory to think that we can
do it by diplomacy. The Serbs regard Kosovo as the birthplace of their
culture and the touchstone of their national identity. The Serbian national
myth commemorates the defeat of the Serbian army by the Ottoman Turks at
the battle of Kosovo in 1389, which ushered in centuries of Ottoman rule
over Serbia. Defeat is far preferable--and more honorable--to Serbian
dictator Slobodan Milosevic and his people than dishonorable surrender or
compromise. The only agreement over Kosovo that Mr. Milosevic might sign is
a thinly disguised NATO capitulation.

While the Serbs cherish the myth of Kosovo's importance, they refuse to
reside there. More than 90 percent of the province's 2 million people are
ethnic Albanians. Even a system of harsh repression instituted my Mr.
Milosevic when he illegally ended Kosovo's autonomy in 1989 has failed to
inspire sufficient confidence among Serbs to persuade them to move to
Kosovo. Thus the political calculus behind ethnically cleansing the
province: Kill or deport the Albanians as the prelude to repopulating
Kosovo with Serbs.

Mr. Milosevic has deliberately chosen the battlefield, rather than the
negotiating table, as his arena of choice for resolving the Kosovo problem.
If NATO is to prevail--and now that it is engaged, NATO can and must
win--that is where the work must be done. The United States and its allies
must be prepared to use whatever means are necessary to defeat the Serbs,
including ground troops. NATO airstrikes alone can inflict significant
damage. Only a combined air/ground campaign, however, can drive all Serbian
forces from Kosovo and provide the security that will enable all Kosovar
refugees to return to their homes and begin rebuilding their lives.

But turning the tide of battle is going to require presidential leadership.
All eyes are on the White House, waiting to see when President Clinton will
begin to capitalize on growing national support for using ground troops to
defeat Serbian forces.

Much of Washington's political establishment, including a growing number of
senators who are concerned about the implications of a NATO defeat, has
rallied behind the ground-troop option. Recent opinion polls show that more
than 50 percent of the American people back the deployment of ground troops
to end the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe caused by Serbian ethnic
cleansing and genocide. This support would increase with the president's help.

It would take about 100,000 troops, including perhaps two U.S divisions, to
drive Serbian forces from Kosovo. During a buildup phase lasting several
weeks, these troops would assemble in neighboring states, especially
Macedonia and perhaps Albania. NATO might also sound out Montenegro, which
is federated with Serbia but under threat of Serbian attack, about
stationing troops there.

Such a deployment of troops would ease local concerns about Serbian
threats. It would also stabilize the refugee situation, giving these
fragile societies the confidence to provide temporary shelter to refugees
who would soon be returning home.

Cooperation from Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro in providing bases for
troops should be supplemented with a program to begin training and
equipping the Kosovars. Kosovo Liberation Army insurgents armed with little
more than Kalashnikov rifles have fought bravely against Serbian armor and
artillery. Properly armed and trained outside Kosovo, they could play a
useful battlefield role as NATO auxiliaries. While the ground-force buildup
was underway, NATO air power would continue to pound Serbian targets.

Following the removal of all Serbian forces from Kosovo and the return of
the refugees, NATO's political objective should be the establishment of
self-government in Kosovo for a transition period of three years, with the
option of seeking independence if democracy and stability take hold. NATO
should avoid the pitfalls of attacking and occupying Serbia proper, where
the population, unlike in Kosovo, would not welcome NATO troops.
Establishing a de facto alliance with Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and
Kosovo itself would give the United States and NATO the foundation for a
strategy against Mr. Milosevic that would isolate Serbia until the fires of
ultranationalism burn low.

The Balkans have become the new front line for NATO in post-Cold War
Europe. NATO troops will be stationed in Kosovo and elsewhere in a
containment belt around Serbia for years, but most of the combat troops
needed to defeat the Serbs in Kosovo could depart once the conflict ends.
NATO will have new burdens and responsibilities, post-Cold War American
leadership will have passed a crucial credibility test, and the Serbian
threat in the region will be over.

(Statement taken from "Can We Solve the Kosovo Problem?" Dallas Morning
News, April 11, 1999.)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------

II. Comments

*** KOSOVO FARCE AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER ***
By Ruizhuang Zhang

(Ed. Note: The comments below are excerpted from an essay submitted to FPIF
and posted on our Kosovo Crisis Page at
http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/media/opeds/kosovo05.html)

Several weeks into the U.S.-NATO all-out air strike against the small and
weak Yugoslavia, many Americans are still wondering what the mess is all
about. Is U.S.-NATO at war with Yugoslavia? In the first several days the
NATO spokesman kept saying daily and categorically that "We are not at war
with Yugoslavia" until one day three American soldiers were captured by the
Yugoslav military, when all of a sudden NATO termed them as prisoners of
war and never mentioned that line. This is only one example of Western
governments' manipulation of words--and facts. As long as it serves their
interest, terrorists become freedom fighters, spying becomes a normal part
of journalism, and barbaric bombing of civilian targets becomes
humanitarian mission, and so on. During the famous Prague Spring three
decades ago a prominent Czechoslovak intellectual pointed out, when
condemning the Communist propaganda, that the murder of words came only one
step ahead of murdering the people. Those dissidents fought so hard for the
right to know the truth for so many years and eventually brought down the
Communist rule only to find  their country is now part of this colossal war
machine that is no less Orwellian in mass mind manipulation. How ironic.

In the good old days of the Cold War, there were two superpowers whose
formidable powers offset each other, which somewhat spared other nations
from feeling their menacing heat one way or another and the world as a
whole from tyranny. With the mere presence of the Soviet Union, no matter
how evil an empire it might be otherwise, the United States had to act
prudently and refrained from letting its foreign policy be carried away by
crusading zeal. Gone are the days of bipolarity and the balance of power.
What we are left in is a unipolar world where the United States enjoys a
"universal dominion" (C. Krauthammer) and a free hand to fulfil its
"neo-Manifest Destiny" (B. Watternberg). Isn't it nice? Most if not all
Americans tend to rejoice. As long as the uni-pole, or the dominion center,
is U.S., everything is supposed to be fine since "we are the good guys"--a
given to almost all Americans. Yet it may not be that simple even from an
American standpoint. A most precious American contribution to the political
wisdom of human government is the theory and practice of "checks and
balances" of power based on the presumption that humans are no angels and
that absolute power corrupts absolutely. The wisdom of such assumptions is
as robust in international settings as in domestic ones. Unchecked or
unbalanced American power not only subjects the rest of the world to
arbitrary American  intervention but also subjects America to the
temptation of imperial overextension, driven not by the traditional greed
for land and treasure, but by its self-styled worldwide mission.

While the overwhelming if not absolute power the U.S. possesses vis-a-vis
other nations gives American foreign policy makers an unprecedented freedom
of action, it also poses  for them a serious challenge with grave
responsibility. Now is one of the rare moments of history where the
international system is undergoing a fundamental change in structure and
humankind faces a brand new era of international relations whose features
are yet to be defined. Are we going to have a world of "hegemonic
stability," something like the "Western World" during the Cold War, led by
a benign hegemony whose leadership is based on consensus rather than
coercion, on legitimacy rather than strongarming? Or are we going to have a
chaotic anarchy where unqualified law of the jungle reigns, dominated by a
Big Brother who bullies other nations into obedience, making force the
everyday currency of international politics? To a significant extent it is
up to the United States, the sole superpower of the world, to determine
what kind of world order we are going to live under in the coming decades,
by choosing what kind of role it is to play in world affairs, a prudent
stabilizer or a reckless crusader, a responsible leader or a bullying
hegemony. 

Legitimacy is the key that sets a responsible leader apart from a bullying
hegemony. A responsible leader does not abuse its power but only uses it
for legitimate purposes. It is legitimate to use force for self-defense or
collective security, as sanctioned by the United Nations Charter and as
epitomized in the Gulf War which repelled the Iraqi aggression; it is not
legitimate, however, for the strong to use force to impose its will on the
weak and to interfere with other nations' internal affairs in the name of
ideological causes, be it democracy, human rights, self-determination or
whatever, as in the case of Kosovo, unless there is a clear-cut case of
genocide and an international consensus to act against it. A responsible
leader respects and upholds international law and order--the crux of which
is the inviolability of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of
all nations, rather than violates it by its own example and for its own
convenience. The violation of this principle not only is illegitimate, but
also sets a dangerous precedent for other perpetrators. The major
justification for the Gulf War was that Iraq violated Kuwait's sovereignty
and territorial integrity, yet only 8 months prior to the Iraqi invasion,
the U.S. committed the same offense with its invasion of Panama. 

The legitimacy of responsible leadership is based on the consent of its
followers out of respect and acceptance, whereas a bully can only extract
obedience by sheer intimidation and blunt force. To earn such respect and
acceptance, a responsible leader must be truthful to and consistent with
the moral principles it advocates, and shun double standards or expediency,
as hypocrisy only makes "the natural resentments against our power on the
part of the weaker nations ... be compounded with resentments against our
pretensions of superior virtue" (R. Niebuhr); it must be sensitive and
inclusive to the values of other nations and cultures, and not be
self-centered and self-righteous; it must treat other nations, small and
weak as they may be, with due respect and not boss them around with the
arrogance of power; it must resort to persuasion, compromise, and
coalition-building, no matter how painstaking these may be, rather than
arm-twisting and dictation in order to lead the nations; and finally it
must be willing and prepared to "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any
hardship" as a leader is obliged to, and as the U.S. once did for the
Western World during the Cold War by providing all the public goods
necessary to sustain the regime and to hold the community together. 

The United States is unlikely to earn from the rest of the world the
respect and acceptance necessary for a legitimate leader if this country
remains what it has been for years now: the stingiest of the developed
countries in terms of providing development aid to the Third World, the
biggest debtor owing billions in overdue membership to the United Nations,
the increasingly tightened market now demanding an "equal footing" in trade
competition with those supposed to benefit from its leadership, and a
country so apt to use force against other nations yet disallowing the loss
of American life as a taboo that must be avoided at any price--even at the
expense of the lives of innocent civilians in other countries, such as
those lost in the indiscriminant air strike so favored by the U.S. just
because its soldiers can hide under the skirt of American high-tech
weaponry. While the world does not want a fanatic crusader or a reckless
cowboy, it does need a leader that has the courage to take whatever it
takes to fulfil its duty, including the casualty of its own people.
 
The U.S.-NATO aggression against Yugoslavia has alerted  many lesser powers
who are not American satellite to the possibility that any one of them may
fall victim to the next Operation American Justice, and may push some, most
notably Russia and China, closer to each other toward a sort of
counterbalancing alliance. Yet such a prospect is greatly obscured by the
instability and uncertainties in the domestic politics of both countries,
not to mention the lingering mutual suspicion rooted in the long history of
hostility between the two nations. Without an outside balancing power (of
one state or an alliance of states) in sight, any possible checks to
America's  monopolistic power can only come from within, that is, from the
self-restraint exercised by an enlightened public. 

Unfortunately, American public sentiment on foreign affairs is by no means
moderate. Elated and emboldened by its triumph over the Soviet Union and
relieved from the necessity of the Cold War, economic nationalism,
political unilateralism and self-righteousness are taking hold while
internationalism, multilateralism and discretion are out of fashion.
Jingoism flies high when the U.S. goes abroad for confrontation, with or
without legitimate cause. Most alarming, however, is the disappearance of
the independent media, as can be seen most clearly during the Kosovo
crisis. Unbalanced, unobjective, heavily tinted with ideological and
national bias, the war coverage by American mainstream news media has been
so consensual and orchestrated that it amounts to nothing but  propaganda.
Perhaps it is not because all American journalists have become ideologues
but because of the bottom line of the infotainment industry: Patriotism if
not Chauvinism sells. As such, the checks and balances from  within are
something one may pray for but not count on, at least in the near future.
Americans may need another Vietnam to refresh the lessons they learned from
that war and to bring them back to senses. But until then, the world may
just have to live in the shadow of the Big Brother, or rather the Big
Uncle, Uncle Sam.

(Ruizhuang Zhang <jczhang@socrates.berkeley.edu> is a senior associate
fellow at the Modern Management Center in Shanghai, China)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------

To subscribe or unsubscribe to the Progressive Response, go to:
http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/progresp/progresp.html
and follow the instructions. 

For those readers without access to the www send an email message to: 
newusfp-manager@zianet.com
with the words "join newusfp" in the body of the message. 

To unsubscribe, send an email message to:
newusfp-manager@zianet.com
with the words "leave newusfp" in the body of the message.

Visit the Foreign Policy In Focus website,
http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/iflist.html, for a complete listing of
In Focus briefs and text versions of the briefs. To order policy briefs,
our book Global Focus: A New Foreign Policy Agenda 1997-98, or for more
information contact the Interhemispheric Resource Center or the Institute
for Policy Studies.

IRC
Tom Barry
Co-director, Foreign Policy Project
Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC)
Box 2178
Silver City, NM 88062-2178
Voice: (505) 388-0208
Fax: (505) 388-0619
Email: irc_tom@zianet.com

IPS
Martha Honey
Co-director, Foreign Policy Project
Director, Peace and Security
733 15th Street NW, 10th Floor
Washington, DC  20005
Voice: (202) 234-9382
Fax: (202) 387-7915
Email: ipsps@igc.apc.org