Re: your mail

Bob:   It might be a good idea to specify more closely the nature of the
Modelski-Thompson prediction (i.a. in a forthcoming issue of
"International Studies Review").

	Our prediction is not so so much of war-proness as of the
macrodecision phase of the long cycle of global politics roughly in the
years 2026-2050.   The term macrodecision refers to two characteristics of
that phase:  that it concerns the selection (or re-selection) of global
leadership and related forms of global organization; and the fact that in
the previous four cycles the phase of macrodecision was one not just of
war-proness but of global warfare.   That is, major warfare served as the
selection mechanism for global leadership.

	The key question now is:   will the approaching macrodecision
phase assume the form of global war, or might other, more democratic forms
of decision-making prevail.

	The evolutionary framework within which our prediction is embedded
(and that includes also global economic evolution, democratization, and
rise of world opinion)suggests that the second alternative is the more
probable one;   but even if the second alternative prevails, some warfare
(but not global warfare) is still likely.

	That is the extent of indeterminacy in our analysis.

					GM

On Fri, 26 Feb 1999, Robert Allen Denemark wrote:

> 
> 
> Dear Colleagues;  
> 
>      I am currently working of a 'revise and resubmit' of a paper that
> contrasts traditional international politics with world system (broadly
> defined, both with and without the hyphen) treatments.  I trash
> traditional studies in favor of those that are historically informed, non
> State-centric, non-Eurocentric, and transdisciplinary.  I then turn to the
> question of criticisms of world system work, which include charges of
> determinism and indeterminance.  I find little support for charges of
> determinism, but real concern over indeterminance.
> 
>      Indeterminance exists when different theories predict the same
> outcome for different reasons.  I highlight predictions of war-pronness
> during the period from 2030 to 2050 by Modelski and Thompson, Arrighi,
> Wallerstein, and Joshua Goldstein.  Each has different reasons for making
> this prediction, and some of them are contradictory.
> 
>      The editor wants me to address ways in which to solve this problem.
> More traditional social science treatments that would have us search for
> microfoundations are not particularly helpful.  First, they counsel that
> we start from individual preferences and incentives when I argue we want
> to start from system level attributes. Second, in that these are complex
> phonemona they contain some of the attributes of chaos - making it quite
> difficult to trace outcomes back to individual incentives or events.
> 
>      I have a few ideas, but none are particularly satisfying.  How might
> we go about designing studies to decide which of a set of different
> analyses that come to the same conclusion is best?
> 
>      Any and all help will be appreciated.
> 
>       Best,  Bob Denemark  
>              Political Science
>              University of Delaware  
> 
>