Re: Future of Europe (Arno Tausch and Paul Kennedy)

As a followup to Steven Sherman's quotes from Wallerstein, notice the following 
about Kennedy's argument:

>(2) Kennedy writes:


> My problem with the Derrida-Habermas proclamation is that their thesis is not 
>practical. The way to a powerful Europe is not even sketched out.

Powerful how?  ... As Kennedy makes clear, his thesis rests on the assumption 
that the United States is the dominant power because of the strategy it is 
pursuing, rather than pursuing the strategy it is to stave off a decline in its 
dominant position.

Specifically:

> Constitutional decisions, like creating the office of a single foreign 
>minister, go part of the way, but that is just the icing on the cake if Europe 
>itself is not made stronger.

BTW, we will already have been sensitised to a turn of phrase in which:
> to give Europe credibility in the eyes of the world

really means to give "X" credibility in the eyes of the hard right wing 
American administration.

> Europe must develop greater military capacity, scrap national conscript 
>armies and train for integrated multiservice fighting in many parts of the
world.

Of course, Europe must AVOID doing so.  All this means is that where Europe 
intervenes militarily outside of Europe, and not in collaboration with the US, 
it must do so in support of an existing force, and it must be careful in terms 
of the degree of local support that exists for the move.  This requires a high 
tech core that can be maintained perfectly well on a volunteer basis.  It does 
not have to be an overwhelming force, if Europe wishes to have a military force 
that can defend European soil and does not wish to grow its power by projecting 
overwhelming force outside the continent.

Of course, that makes Europe a more attractive partner to some around the 
world, and the US more attractive to others.  But the type of partner most 
attracted to a power that possesses overwhelming force leads to Vietnams and 
Congos, which in the end drain strenght rather than build it.

> If Europe really wants improved international structures that provide peace 
>and prosperity, it must push for serious reform of the United Nations, 
>especially in the composition of the permanent veto members of the security 
>council, so that countries such as India, Brazil and South Africa may also 
>achieve that status. Perhaps Europe should confront the fact that it is 
>over-represented on that body. There have been proposals from time to time for 
>a single, rotating "European" permanent seat, an idea France always threatens 
>to veto.

This is so obviously from a US administration wish list to reduce the influence 
of Europe, that it can be set aside immediately.

>Europe must make a massive push against protectionism, especially in 
>agricultural goods, and to assist poorer countries in Africa and the Caribbean 
>in the export of their produce.

This falls into the same camp.  The US would want Europe to make a massive 
reduction in agricultural protectionism, as this would both benefit US 
agriculture and reduce the weight of European offers of special concessions.  
And why should Europe be required to step in an provide Caribbean nations 
relief from problems they experience due to US agricultural policies? Well, 
because of old colonial ties which would be of no consideration whatsoever if 
Europe offered to provide military assistance to a Caribbean nation to help it 
maintain its independence.

>Is it any wonder that developing countries are cynical when Europe talks about 
>boosting world markets - when most trade experts believe that the single 
>biggest boost to African and Caribbean nations would be to scrap Europe's (and 
>America's, and Japan's) agricultural protectionism.

The single biggest immediate boost to their trade, obviously.  A boost that 
improves their capability for ongoing development, or one that helps lock them 
into the role of hewers of wood and drawers of water for the rest of the world? 
 Well, obviously, the latter.

>Europe must offer large increases in development assistance, again to help the 
>poorer countries of the globe, consisting not only of capital and 
>infrastructural investment but also technical assistance, scholarships ...

In other words, the same package of development assistance that has been such a 
clear benefit to so many countries ...

Now, I actually expect this to happen, but the question is whether Europe will 
do something else that will actually assist development in these nations to 
such an extent that they do not suffer inordinately from the traditional 
"development assistance", which often have as their primary effects increased 
sales by firms for the assisting country and an accelerated brain drain.

>and the waiver of intellectual property restrictions.

Of course, this implies an open fight in the WTO, but there may be something 
here.

>Europe should make a special commitment to Africa, not just because it is the 
>poorest of the poor, and not just because of European colonial history, but 
>also because of its geographical proximity and because in Africa it could be 
>an alternative model to US neglect or to the American concern chiefly for 
>military-security threats.

On this one, Kennedy is on the money ... but notice that there is absolutely no 
argument about how or why Europe is not capable of doing this.  And indeed this 
is a strategic move that would excite little opposition from the US 
administration.  Of course, this goes back to the above -- if it involves 
traditional "development assistance", it is doomed to failure.  But if it 
involved effective strategies, it would reshape the world order.

>Finally, it is vital for Europe to get its economy going again. If its overall 
>growth rates should lag behind those of the US and much of Asia over
the next decade or two, then the whole idea of being a counterbalance is off.

And then this ties in neatly to the prior point.  If Africa grows, Europe 
grows.  The missing piece to the puzzle, it turns out, is working out how to 
become an effective collaborator in African development.  From that, everything 
else falls into place.




--
Dr. Bruce R. McFarling
Lecturer in Economics & International Business
Newcastle Graduate School of Business
University of Newcastle
Callaghan NSW 2308
(02) 4921 7962 (W, voicemail)
(02) 4921 7398 (FAX)