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globalization and inequality - the wallerstein request answered by Tausch, Arno 17 January 2002 16:56 UTC |
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Dear friend, perhaps this might be of use to you: 1) The issue: Globalization in this volume is generally understood to be the growing transborder flow of goods, services, capital and labor. The following UNDP 2000 numbers might illustrate this: * World exports are more than 21% of world GNP * Foreign direct investments are above 400 thousand million $ * Daily currency exchanges are 1500 thousand million $, i.e. the annual world currency trade is 18.6 times the yearly world GNP * International bank credits are above 4200 thousand million $ There is now a never-ending flow of literature on the interrelation between globalization and poverty, with a very wide array of research results. Nobody in his minds would negate that we are confronted with the phenomenon of globalization - just to suffice to draw our attention here to the fact that foreign assets per world GDP fluctuated in the following fashion since 1870: Graph 1a: The waves of globalization since 1870 in the world economy <<...OLE_Obj...>> Legend: our own compilation from Crafts, 2000 At the same time, it has been established fairly well enough that there is continuing phenomenon of world poverty. But what beyond that? Is globalization really the cause of world poverty? Or is rather the absence of globalization and foreign investment to blame for the continued misery in countries, say, like Myanmar, while outward-looking policies dramatically increased the lot of wide strata of the population in countries like China and India over the last decades? This growing international controversy on globalization and social inequality - the main contributions were written amongst others, by the Australian Treasury, 2001; Crafts, 2000; Dollar and Kraay, 2001; Lindert and Williamson, 2001a, 2001b; Lundberg and Squire, 1999; Melchior, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000; and Schultz, 1998 can be summarized here as follows: * Initial attempts by pro-globalization scholars (Dollar and Kraay, 2001) to prove the positive effects of globalization by selecting the post-1980 globalizing countries Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Hungary, India, Jamaica, Jordan, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Nepal, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Philippines, Rwanda, Thailand, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe as the most successful development performers of the world are not convincing politically, especially in view of recent events in Argentina; and are not convincing methodologically either. * Results on a supposed growing international inequality depend on whether income at market exchange rates (growing world inequality) or real purchasing power (lessening world inequality) is used. The divergence between these two processes also opens up the question of unequal exchange, defined by some world systems theories as the difference between purchasing power and income at market exchange rates (see below). * While Dollar and Kraay must be considered the flagship pro-globalization study today, careful econometric globalization-skeptical evidence seems to suggest - see especially the pooled regression results from time series in 38 countries, reported in Lundberg and Squire - that globalization affects different social strata in a different manner. Without going into the econometric details here, it is sufficient to mention that Lundberg and Squire report a regression slope of -2.87840 (t-value 2.06, and thus significant at the 5 % level) for the variable 'world economic openness' on the income growth of the bottom 40 % of the respective population, while the top 40 % reap significant benefits from globalization (slope + 9.89084, significant even at the 1 % level). The divergent interpretations and evaluations of these two flagship studies were part and parcel of bitter controversies. Critically, it can be remarked that both flagship studies - contrasting evidence from 24 globalizers (simplistically called here the 'pro-globalizers', Dollar and Kraay) and regressions from 38 countries (simplistically called here the 'anti-globalizers', Lundberg and Squire), using highly inter-correlated predictor variables are most probably insufficient to draw any political conclusions, either way. * Results on human development indicators - like the 'Human Development Index', life expectancy or education data rather tend to confirm the hypothesis, that today, we have a flattening of international inequalities. Never before in history we have had so many people around the world with such high life expectancies, and the world distribution of lived life times around the world has dramatically improved (see especially Melchior, 2000 and Crafts, 2000). World average life expectancy has increased from 55.0 years in 1962 to 66.6 years in 1997; with the GINI Index of the intra-country world lived lifetimes decreasing during the same period from 0.237 to 0.114 (Melchior, 2000). * Drawing mainly on the published sociological and political science literature, published before it, the present author (Tausch, 1998; Tausch and Herrmann, 2002) reached the conclusion that stocks of achieved globalization - measured by the UNCTAD indicator transnational investment stocks per total GDP in 1985 - significantly and negatively affected 15 of the reported 19 development dimensions in 123 countries with fairly complete data - ranging from economic growth to human development, gender empowerment, life expectancy, human and civil rights performance, economic equality etc. Controlling variables were - in the sociological and political science tradition - government expenditures, trade dependency, social security expenditures, fertility, years of United Nations membership of a country and the non-linear trade-off between development levels and development performance, among others. Pro-globalization forces could argue here, however, that the UNCTAD indicator of MNC investment per GDP as well might express a mismanaged anti-liberal economy in the past that led to high capital imports, high customs barriers, and insufficient national savings. Suffice to mention here the high value of Brazil with its decades of import substitution after 1945, and the low value of countries like South Korea with its intelligent policy mix in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, on the UNCTAD indicator. A later and partial replication of these results came to the conclusion that in the 134 countries now under investigation with fairly complete data - including the world of former Communism - both the UNCTAD variable - stocks of MNC capital per total GDP - as well as a new indicator of unequal exchange (simply based on the reciprocal value of the exchange rate deviation index, i.e. 1/ERDI) negatively and significantly affected several development processes (see below). Model based on: R^2 for the 134 countries with fairly complete data F for the entire equation t-test for the dependency predictor and direction of the influence further positive, significant predictors further negative, significant predictors Explanation of growth 1/ERDI 57,20% 12,35 -1,33 mean years of education, population growth labor force participation rate, military expenditures UNCTAD indicator 56% 11,86 -1,57 mean years of education, population growth labor force participation rate, military expenditures Explanation of infant mortality 1/ERDI 91,30% 96,7 2,45 UN membership years, absolute GNP, years of Communism, military expenditures UNCTAD indicator 91,00% 95,04 2,08 UN membership years, absolute GNP, years of Communism, military expenditures Explanation of early death 1/ERDI 89,40% 93,14 2,87 agrarian share per GDP years of Communism, human development index UNCTAD indicator 89,00% 93,12 2,84 agrarian share per GDP years of Communism, human development index Explanation of political repression 1/ERDI 52,50% 10,2 0,68 educational level, labor force participation rate military expenditures UNCTAD indicator 52,00% 9,9 0,45 educational level, labor force participation rate military expenditures Explanation of income concentration for the top 20% 1/ERDI 41,00% 6,52 0,17 population growth absolute GNP UNCTAD indicator 41,00% 6,5 0,16 population growth absolute GNP Explanation of life expectancy 1/ERDI 95% 161,5 -1,14 state sector expenditures population growth UNCTAD indicator 95% 161,3 -1,16 state sector expenditures, military expenditures absolute GNP, agrarian share per GDP * However, it has to be recalled, that ongoing processes of globalization - see Tausch's contribution to a forthcoming NOVA volume on pension reform and global inequality, based on the UNDP indicator net foreign direct investment flows per GDP - do not significantly and negatively affect most indicators social development; hence the causality of the process needs further and even more rigorous research. As has been already argued by Schultz (1998), there is also a gender balance to be drawn in the overall picture of world inequality, since female education data positively affect child mortality, fertility, and population growth, while Tausch's finding in the present contribution suggest a positive trade-off between ongoing processes of globalization and female employment. However, reducing the samples to n = 95 countries (growth) and n = 71 countries (inequality) to better take care of the missing values in the data matrix, and introducing as predictors in the regression equations stocks of achieved education levels, EU membership, pension reform, population growth 1975-99, status as a former communist country, as well as the regional constants for Africa and the Pacific rim as further regional dummies, it is shown that the levels of net foreign direct investment flows per GDP impede economic growth (insignificantly at the 12.5 % error level) and contribute to higher inequality (significantly at the 12.5 % error level), while pension reform contributes to economic growth (significantly at the 12.5 % error level) and only slightly increases overall inequalities. Thus, in order to take their business seriously, the anti-globalizers should opt for a three-pillar pension reform in order to enhance technological development and savings. * Results differ widely whether we speak about absolute numbers of people living in poverty - say the 1 $ or 2 $ per capita and day threshold in real terms (these have risen according to some studies and during certain, but not all time periods since the 1960s) and the percentages of total population, falling under a given poverty line (decreasing in most studies, in most of the world regions). * According to Lindert and Williamson, the trans-atlantic migration of more than 60 million human beings in the 19th and 20th Century was an important additional link in the convergence process between the democracies of the North, while between the European South and the European North there was relatively little migration and relatively little economic convergence, while the migration from the European South to South America contributed towards a Latin convergence process. However, world system researchers have questioned such an approach: Starting in the 1970s, Amin and the dependency research tradition developed a viewpoint on migration, which focuses on the effects of migration on the world periphery. There is a considerable brain drain and human capital export from the periphery, which blocs long-term development; worker remittances are being used mainly for luxury consumption and imports, and migration has a long-term devastating effect on the gender equilibrium in peripheral and semi-peripheral societies (Kohler and Tausch, 2002). 3% of the scientists and 10% of the doctors in the United States are, in fact, imported from the pool of cheap, mostly free University education in the world periphery. If there are free riders in the world economy, certainly there are the customers, the big Universities, the hospitals and the communes in the United States, which employ the free human capital from Third and Second World countries. The world periphery lost between 1960 and 1980 human capital to the tune of 16 billion $ to the center. Critical, skilled and opposition elements leave the periphery, with the benefits of such a human capital import reaped by the center in the long run. Thus, selective migration is another pillar of the system of unequal exchange, and contributes to the perpetuation of the unequal structure of the world system. The market economies of western Europe first imported labor; now, with the transfer of production away from the European central zones, second generation foreigners become increasingly marginalized. In the inner cities of countries like France, Germany, and Britain, real 'ghettos' develop, a process that began in the United States of America three or two decades ago. Women also have to suffer from these tendencies, as their jobs are being exported away to the still much-lower paid labor power of the periphery and the semi-periphery. Migration, we recall, is even part of the five pillars of international inequality (Amin, 1997): i unequal exchange: the gaps in wages are much greater than the gaps in productivities ii capital flight from the peripheries to the centers iii selective migration from the peripheries into the centers iv the monopoly position of the centers in the international division of labor v the control of the centers over the earth's natural resources * The impact of migration on the sending countries under such conditions will be increasing the patterns of unequal exchange and the peripheral role in the world economy. It might be, that income distribution will become perhaps less unequal under the impact of the absence of millions of unskilled laborers from their home countries, but many other phenomena of peripheral development will be intensified; such as the deficient structures of agriculture, the environmental crisis (due to the intensification of traffic), and - in the end - the dependent character of accumulation, leading to slower economic growth and increased capital imports. However, historic time series data support the joint implicit assertion by both Lindert and Williamson an the world systems school, that income differences per se do not necessarily cause excessive migration flows, at least in Europe. Spain had pretty much the same position 1870 as it has today, i.e. 73% to 74% of the purchasing power of the European average; migration flows were low (-1.16 per 1000) in 1870, and they are negligible today. Portugal improved its position in terms of real purchasing power, less so in wages, but it is still miles away from the purchasing power of the European centers, and still, there is no large scale migration today, and in 1870 to 1910, migration rates were negligible. Spanish and Portuguese migration rates were high in the 1950s and 1960s, but this was during an extreme shortage of labor in Western Europe and much the result of deliberate government policy. Even in terms of relative real purchasing power development over time, not the entire European periphery caught up as rapidly as one would think with the centers over the last 125 years. A fair and balanced summary of the research results would now pre-suppose to state that the Australian Treasury (2001) has combined the existing estimates on the percentage of people with less than 1 $ a day real per capita income by region since 1987, and has arrived at the following result, which we compare with real economic growth in the world system since that date: Graph 1b: world poverty - percentage of people with less than 1 $ a day per capita income <<...OLE_Obj...>> Legend: our own compilations from Australian Treasury (2001) and Tausch/Herrmann (2001). On an aggregate basis, there is no real general clear trend of an absolute impoverishment since 1987. In the early 1990s, the transition crisis in the East and world economic stagnation brought about a rise in Second and Third World poverty, while world economic growth in the late 1990s - especially in India and China - reduced the percentage of people living with less than 1 $ a day per capita considerably, only to level off in the wake of the Asian and Russian crisis in 1998: Graph 2: aggregate poverty in the world east and south 1987 - 1998 <<...OLE_Obj...>> Legend: see Graph 1, above Without further rigorous theory development and quantitative testing, both pension reform theories as well as globalization theories (i.e. optimistic ones, i.e. theories that maintain that by pension reform or by globalization you increase growth and human development and that you reduce poverty and pessimistic ones, i.e. theories that maintain that by pension reform or by globalization you decrease growth and human development and that you increase poverty) run the risk of 'immunization'. As Lundberg and Milanovic have shown, there are at least three distinct concepts of inequality, which are linked with globalization. First is inequality within nations. Second, there is inter-national inequality, which refers to differences between countries' average per capita incomes (or GDPs). This is the inequality one has in mind when one speaks of how globalization affects different countries' growth rates; whether they converge or not. The third concept of inequality is world inequality, which combines the two previous concepts. World inequality refers to income inequality between all individuals in the world, irrespective of where they live (<http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/inequal/abstracts/milanov.htm>). Lundberg and Milanovic go on to say: In addition to the conceptual problems, there is a substantive issue. Whether inequality goes up or down while globalization proceeds is no proof of causality. One has to come up with a plausible explanation of the channels through which globalization or openness affects inequality, and test the theory empirically. The evidence recently cited (i.e. Financial Times, Martin Wolfe, 8 February 2000) purports to show that inequality in the world has decreased during the last two decades. Andrea Boltho and Gianni Toniolo in the December 1999 issue of Oxford Review of Economic Policy calculate that the world Gini coefficient fell from 54 in 1980 to 50 in 1998. (The Gini ranges between 0 for complete equality and 100 if all income is received by a single person.) Boltho and Toniolo's Gini is calculated by looking at cross-country differences in average per capita GDP (weighted by population size). It is a measure of inter-national, not world, inequality. But even as a measure of inter-national inequality the Boltho-Toniolo estimate is low. Three recent studies-by Schultz in the June 1998 issue of Journal of Population Economics, Firebaugh in the May 1999 issue of American Journal of Sociology, and most recently Milanovic in a World Bank working paper estimates that inter-national inequality is some 10 to 20 percent higher than the Gini reported by Boltho and Toniolo. Milanovic, moreover, shows that the inter-national Gini increased between 1988 and 1993 from 55 to 58. Most likely, the Boltho and Toniolo results can be explained by their relatively small sample of 49 countries. The other studies include at least 80 and some more than 100 countries. The more serious problem is the difference between inter-national and world inequality. The former assumes (e.g.) that all Chinese and all Americans have the mean income of their respective nations. Once we allow for within-country inequality, that is, for income differences among the Chinese, among the Americans, etc., as well as inequality between them, the Gini must go up. Including intra-national inequality, Milanovic finds that the world Gini coefficient increased from 63 in 1988 to 66 in 1993. If purchasing power differences are not taken into account, that is, if we simply look at differences in dollar incomes, the Gini increased from 78 to 80. Turning to the link between globalization and inequality, most economists would agree that while globalization is inevitable and most likely key to continued growth, the process of shifting resources to meet new opportunities is costly and takes time. Following the adjustment period, greater openness probably leads to greater manufacturing employment, at least in developed countries. But, even for developed countries, there is some evidence, as argued by Dani Rodrik of Harvard University, that globalization is responsible for a part of the increased wage gap between low- and high-skilled workers. How does openness affect the poor? In a recent World Bank paper, Lundberg and Squire find that greater openness to trade is correlated negatively with income growth among the poorest 40 percent of the population, but strongly and positively with income growth among remaining groups, in a sample of 38 countries between 1965 and 1992. The costs of adjusting to greater openness are borne exclusively by the poor, regardless of how long the adjustment takes. The poor are far more vulnerable to shifts in relative international prices, and this vulnerability is magnified by the country's openness to trade. Even those who have never heard of the WTO, such as poor farmers, are affected by changes in the prices of their inputs and products. Considering that the prices of non-oil commodities have uniformly declined since the beginning of the 20th century, this bodes ill for poverty and for aggregate distribution. It also suggests that much more needs to be done to restructure liberalization, so that a larger share of the population benefits from the process. The debate on the effects of globalization desperately needs greater conceptual clarity and more rigorous empirical testing. Apart from that, we think, that it is fair to assume the following tendencies: First, the introduction of capitalist development in East Central Europe and the former USSR brought about 9.7 million excess mortality cases in the region (UNDP, 1999, based on research by Giovanni Cornia from WIDER). Vulnerabilities go hand in hand with the openings of markets. Secondly, there was a real impoverishment in the world from 1988 to 1993, and from 1996 to 1998. The following Table is based on Branko Milanovic's calculation of the effects of changing income distribution patterns on real household per capita incomes in about 100 countries of the world: Table 6: absolute impoverishment, 1988 - 1993 world income group (percentile) income 1988 in $ PPP income 1993 in $ PPP Ratio 2:1 5 277,4 238,1 85,8 10 348,3 318,1 91,3 15 417,5 372,9 89,3 20 486,1 432,1 88,9 25 558,3 495,8 88,8 30 633,2 586 92,5 35 714,5 657,7 92,1 40 802,7 741,9 92,4 45 908,3 883,2 97,2 50 1047,5 1044,1 99,7 55 1314,4 1164,9 88,6 60 1522,7 1505 98,8 65 1898,9 1856,8 97,8 70 2698,5 2326,8 86,2 75 3597 3005,6 83,6 80 4370 4508,1 103,2 85 5998,9 6563,3 109,4 90 8044 9109,8 113,2 95 11518,4 13240,7 115 99 20773,2 24447,1 117,7 Source: Branko Milanovic, World Bank, 2000 Milanovic's data can also be presented in a graphical fashion: tendency number 2 means that only 1/5 of the world population had rising real incomes during the late 1980s and the early 1990s, while 1/2 impoverished and the rest struggled to get along or saw reductions in their absolute incomes: Graph 3: only 20% of the world population really gained from globalization 1988-1993 <<...OLE_Obj...>> Source: our own compilations from Branko Milanovic, 2000 Third, also the University of Texas Inequality Project for inequality in over 70 countries of the world since 1963 shows that the 1990s brought along a huge increase in inequality, as measured by the Theil Index of Inequality of Sectoral Incomes: Graph 4: globalization increases sectoral income inequality - the period 1976 - 1995 <<...OLE_Obj...>> Source: our own compilation from University of Texas Inequality Project, University of Texas at Austin, http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/ For further notes on the Theil measure of inequality: http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/inequal/methods/measure.htm http://www.economics.uni-linz.ac.at/Paper/papers/9614.htm Point number four, there is a tendency towards an increase in absolute numbers in poverty on a truly global scale - in every geographic region of the former 'Second' and 'Third' World absolute numbers of absolute poverty increased from 1996 to 1998: Table 7: World Poverty: the number of people living on less than 2 $ per day and capita increased sharply due to the crash economy of the 1990s E Asia + Pacific Eastern Europe +Central Asia Latin America Middle East and North Africa South Asia Sub Saharan Africa China 1996 236,3 92,7 179,8 60,6 1069,5 457,7 627,6 1998 260,1 92,9 182,9 62,4 1095,9 474,8 632,1 In the United States, real hourly wages for all employees fell by 12% between 1973 and 1990 and remained flat throughout the boom of the 1990s. Longer working years, a rising inequality between the skilled and the unskilled, and a higher labor market turnover rate characterized the Clinton 'miracle', that, in the end, means above all an increased wealth of the top 20% of the population (R. A. Walker, 1999). By 1999/2000/2001, the following geographical distributions of poverty and human misery could be observed in the world system (UNDP system of social indicators, as described in all detail in the UNDP website http://www.undp.org/hdr2001/indicator/): Graph 5: inequality on a global scale Legend: income ratio of top 20% to bottom 20% of society. Missing values for Argentina, much of Africa and West Central Asia Graph 6: changes in Human Development Index 1990-98 Country-to country time series evidence on inequality, compiled by the University of Texas Inequality Project, based on the Theil-index of inequality between more than 20 economic sectors over time show that in the pension reform countries, only in Argentina, Australia and in Chile there was a clear rising long-term inequality. Even more so, Graph 7 and 8 show that inequality rose much faster in non-reform than in reform countries: Graph 7: data series inequality in pension reform countries <<...OLE_Obj...>> <<...OLE_Obj...>> <<...OLE_Obj...>> <<...OLE_Obj...>> <<...OLE_Obj...>> <<...OLE_Obj...>> Graph 8: comparison of the evolution of inequality in pension and non-pension reform countries <<...OLE_Obj...>> Further resources on the issue in the Internet: Brooks S. and Estelle J. (1999), 'The Political Economy of Pension Reform' Paper, presented at the World Bank Conference New Ideas about Old-Age Security, September 14-15, Washington D.C., available at: http://www.worldbank.org/knowledge/chiefecon/conferen/papers/polecon.htm Cadette W. (1999), 'Social Security Privatization: A Bad Idea' Policy Notes, Jerome Levy Economics Institute, 10; available at: http://www.levy.org/docs/pn/99-10.html Caminada K. and Goudswaard K. (2000), 'International trends in income inequality and social policy' ISSA Conference, Helsinki 'Social Security in the global village' available at: http://www.issa.int/pdf/helsinki2000/topic4/2goudswaard.PDF Carroll E. (2000), 'Globalization and social policy: social insurance quality, institutions, trade exposure and deregulation in 18 OECD nations, 1965-1995' ISSA Conference, Helsinki 'Social Security in the global village' available at: http://www.issa.int/engl/reunion/2000/helsinki/2prog.htm Clark G. L. (2001), 'European pensions and global finance: continuity or convergence?' School of Geography and Environment, and the Said Business School, University of Oxford, available at: http://www.geog.ox.ac.uk/~jburke/wpapers/wpg01-02.html or http://www.pensions-research.org/papers/default.htm Clark G. L. (2001), 'Requiem for a national ideal? Social solidarity, the crisis of French social security, and the role of global financial markets' School of Geography and Environment, and the Said Business School, University of Oxford, available at: http://www.pensions-research.org/papers/default.htm Commonwealth of Australia, Office of the Status of Women (2000), 'Women and Poverty' available at: http://osw.dpmc.gov.au/content/publications/beijing/a_poverty.html Coppel J. et al. (2001), 'Trends in Immigration and Economic Consequences' OECD Economics Department Working Papers, 284, available at: http://ideas.uqam.ca/ideas/data/Papers/oedoecdec284.html Dahlmanns G. (2000), 'Mastering Germany's Pension Crisis' Frankfurter Institut Stiftung Marktwirtschaft & Politik, available at: http:// www.aicgs.org/econ/dahlmanns.html European Commission (2000) 'Modernising and Improving Social Protection in the European Union' available at: http://www.itcilo.it/english/actrav/telearn/global/ilo/seura/eumode.htm European Commission (2000) 'Progress report on the impact of ageing populations on public pension systems' Economic Policy Committee, available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/document/epc/epc_ecfin_581_00_en.p df European Roundtable of Industrialists, ERT (2001), 'European Pensions. An Appeal for Reform'. Pension Schemes that Europe Can Really Afford' Brussels: ERT Fox L. and Palmer E. (2000), 'New approaches to multi-pillar pension systems: What in the world is going on?' ISSA Conference, Helsinki 'Social Security in the global village' available at: http://www.issa.int/engl/reunion/2000/helsinki/2prog.htm Gray C. and Weig D. 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(1998) 'Social Democracy and market reform in Australia and New Zealand' Department of Economics, James Cook University, available at: http://ecocomm.anu.edu.au/quiggin/JournalArticles98/AustNZ98.html Rodas-Martini P. (2001), 'Has income distribution really worsened in the South? And has income distribution really worsened between the North and the South?' Background paper for the Human Development Report 2001, available at: http://www.undp.org/hdr2001/ Roos J. P. (2000), 'The Consequences of the Crisis of the 1990s to the Nordic Welfare State: Finland and Sweden ' University of Helsinki, Department of Social Policy, available at: http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/staff/jproos/Nordsocp.htm Rothenbacher F. (2000), 'The Changing Public Sector in Europe: Social Structure, Income and Social Security' Mannheim Center for European Social Research, University of Mannheim, available at: http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/eurodata/newsletter/no8/feature.html Rutkowski M. (1998), 'A New Generation of Pension Reforms Conquers the East - A Taxonomy in Transition Economies' World Bank Transition Newsletter, available at: http://www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/julaug98/rutkowsk.htm Rutkowski M. (1999), 'The Quest for Modern Solutions: Pension Reforms in Transition Economies' Presentation for the World Bank Conference 'Ten Years After: Transition and Growth in Pst-Communist Countries', Warsaw, poland, October 15-16; paper, available in two parts at http://www.wne.uw.edu.pl/~liberda/additional_materials/liberda/pan_pension2. html Scherman C. G. (2000), 'The Future of Social Security' Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, Finland, available at: http://www.vn.fi/stm/english/tao/publicat/financing/scherman.htm Schneider F. and Enste D. (1998), 'Increasing shadow Economies all over the world - fiction or reality? A survey of the global evidence of their size and of their impact from 1970 to 1995' Working Paper 9819, Department of Econocimcs, University of Linz, published on the Internet http://www.economics.uni-linz.ac.at/Members/Schneider/EnstSchn98.html Schwartz H. (2000), 'Social Democracy Going Down or Down Under: Institutions, Internationalized Capital and Indebted States' University of Virginia, Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, available at: http://www.people.virginia.edu/~hms2f/social.html Siebert H. (2000), 'Pay-as-you-go pensions face a bleak future' Financial Times, 23 August, available from: http://www.globalaging.org/pension/world/pay-as-you-go.htm St. John S. (1999), 'Retirement Policy Issues That We are Not Talking about' New Zealand Association of Economists Annual Conference, Rotorua, 30th June - 2nd July, available at: http://www.geocities.com/Wellesley/Garden/9441/SusanStJohn/RotoruaConf1999.h tml Stilwell F. (2000), 'Globalisation: How did we get to where we are? (and where can we go now?)' available at: http://www.phaa.net.au/conferences/stilwell.htm The Twelve theses of New Delhi are available at: http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/staff/jproos/delhi.htm The World Bank Group (2000) 'Flagship Course in Pension Reform' available at: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/pensionflagship/ Trezzini B. and Bornschier V. (2001), 'Social Stratification and Mobility in the World System: Different Approaches and Recent Research' Department of Sociology, University of Zurich, available at: http://www.suz.unizh.ch/bornschier/publikationen.pdf Turner J. (2000), 'Social security reform around the world' Public Policy Institute AARP, Washington DC, available at: http://www.pensions-research.org/attachments/march2001/Social%20Security%20a round%20the%20world.pdf Vedder R. K. and Gallaway L. E. (1999), 'Unemployment and Jobs in International Perspective' Joint Economic Committee Study, United States Congress, http://www.house.gov/jec/employ/intern.htm Walker R. A. (1999), 'Putting Capital in It's Place: Globalization and the Prospects for Labor'. Working Paper, Department of Geography, University of California at Berkeley, http://ww-geography.berkeley.edu/Publications/Global%20labor_2_5.html Wheelwright T. (2001), 'Developments in the Global Economy and their Effects on Australia' available at: http://www.angelfire.com/ma/rank/tedw.html Expert list: Ted Wheelwright is professor emeritus of Economics and Geography at Sydney University and director of the Transnational Corporations Research Project, Sydney, Australia Chris Williams [SMTP:cwilliams@staff.usyd.edu.au] Franz Rothenbacher is a sociologist at the EURODATA Research Archive at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES) Franz.Rothenbacher@mzes.uni-mannheim.de <mailto:Franz.Rothenbacher@mzes.uni-mannheim.de> Jeja Pekka Roos is professor of Social Policy at Helsinki University jproos@valt.helsinki.fi Walter Cadette is a senior researcher at the Jerome Levy Institute of Economics in new York, USA. He is a retired vice president of J.P. Morgan & Co. Cadette@levy.org Göran Normann is President Normann Econonomics International. He published widely for the Cato Institute, the Heritage foundation and other international fora on pension reform goran.normann@norecon.a.se Daniel J. Mitchell is researcher at the Heritage Foundation in Washington D.C., USA mitchelld@heritage.org Eva Belabed is researcher at the Chamber of Labor in Linz, Austria. She published widely on matters of international social policy Belabed Eva[SMTP:Belabed.E@ak-ooe.at] Stephen J. Kay is a researcher at the Federal Reserve Bank in Atlanta, Georgia, USA Stephen.Kay@atl.frb.org[SMTP:Stephen.Kay@atl.frb.org] pierce.nelson@atl.frb.org Gordon Laxer is professor of economics at the University of Alberta, Canada Gordon.laxer@ualberta.ca Frank Stilwell is Associate professor of Economics at Sydney University, Australia franks@bullwinkle.econ.usyd.edu.au Kunibert Raffer is Associate professor of Economics at Vienna University, Austria Kunibert.raffer@univie.ac.at
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