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globalization and inequality - the wallerstein request answered
by Tausch, Arno
17 January 2002 16:56 UTC
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Dear friend,

perhaps this might be of use to you:

1) The issue:

Globalization in this volume is generally understood to be the growing
transborder flow of goods, services, capital and labor. The following UNDP
2000 numbers might illustrate this:

*       World exports are more than 21% of world GNP
*       Foreign direct investments are above 400 thousand million $
*       Daily currency exchanges are 1500 thousand million $, i.e. the
annual world currency trade is 18.6 times the yearly world GNP
*       International bank credits are above 4200 thousand million $

There is now a never-ending flow of literature on the interrelation between
globalization and poverty, with a very wide array of research results.
Nobody in his minds would negate that we are confronted with the phenomenon
of globalization - just to suffice to draw our attention here to the fact
that foreign assets per world GDP fluctuated in the following fashion since

Graph 1a: The waves of globalization since 1870 in the world economy


Legend: our own compilation from Crafts, 2000

At the same time, it has been established fairly well enough that there is
continuing phenomenon of world poverty. But what beyond that? Is
globalization really the cause of world poverty? Or is rather the absence of
globalization and foreign investment to blame for the continued misery in
countries, say, like Myanmar, while outward-looking policies dramatically
increased the lot of wide strata of the population in countries like China
and India over the last decades?

This growing international controversy on globalization and social
inequality - the main contributions were written amongst others, by the
Australian Treasury, 2001; Crafts, 2000; Dollar and Kraay, 2001; Lindert and
Williamson, 2001a, 2001b; Lundberg and Squire, 1999; Melchior, Royal
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000; and Schultz, 1998 can be
summarized here as follows:

        *       Initial attempts by pro-globalization scholars (Dollar and
Kraay, 2001) to prove the positive effects of globalization by selecting the
post-1980 globalizing countries Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, China,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Hungary,
India, Jamaica, Jordan, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Nepal, Nicaragua, Paraguay,
Philippines, Rwanda, Thailand, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe as the most successful
development performers of the world are not convincing politically,
especially in view of recent events in Argentina; and are not convincing
methodologically either.

        *       Results on a supposed growing international inequality
depend on whether income at market exchange rates (growing world inequality)
or real purchasing power (lessening world inequality) is used. The
divergence between these two processes also opens up the question of unequal
exchange, defined by some world systems theories as the difference between
purchasing power and income at market exchange rates (see below).

        *       While Dollar and Kraay must be considered the flagship
pro-globalization study today, careful econometric globalization-skeptical
evidence seems to suggest - see especially the pooled regression results
from time series in 38 countries, reported in Lundberg and Squire - that
globalization affects different social strata in a different manner. Without
going into the econometric details here, it is sufficient to mention that
Lundberg and Squire report a regression slope of -2.87840 (t-value 2.06, and
thus significant at the 5 % level) for the variable 'world economic
openness' on the income growth of the bottom 40 % of the respective
population, while the top 40 % reap significant benefits from globalization
(slope + 9.89084, significant even at the 1 % level). The divergent
interpretations and evaluations of these two flagship studies were part and
parcel of bitter controversies. Critically, it can be remarked that both
flagship studies - contrasting evidence from 24 globalizers (simplistically
called here the 'pro-globalizers', Dollar and Kraay) and regressions from 38
countries (simplistically called here the 'anti-globalizers', Lundberg and
Squire), using highly inter-correlated predictor variables are most probably
insufficient to draw any political conclusions, either way.

        *       Results on human development indicators - like the 'Human
Development Index', life expectancy or education data rather tend to confirm
the hypothesis, that today, we have a flattening of international
inequalities. Never before in history we have had so many people around the
world with such high life expectancies, and the world distribution of lived
life times around the world has dramatically improved (see especially
Melchior, 2000 and Crafts, 2000). World average life expectancy has
increased from 55.0 years in 1962 to 66.6 years in 1997; with the GINI Index
of the intra-country world lived lifetimes decreasing during the same period
from 0.237 to 0.114 (Melchior, 2000). 

        *       Drawing mainly on the published sociological and political
science literature, published before it, the present author (Tausch, 1998;
Tausch and Herrmann, 2002) reached the conclusion that stocks of achieved
globalization - measured by the UNCTAD indicator transnational investment
stocks per total GDP in 1985 - significantly and negatively affected 15 of
the reported 19 development dimensions in 123 countries with fairly complete
data - ranging from economic growth to human development, gender
empowerment, life expectancy, human and civil rights performance, economic
equality etc. Controlling variables were - in the sociological and political
science tradition - government expenditures, trade dependency, social
security expenditures, fertility, years of United Nations membership of a
country and the non-linear trade-off between development levels and
development performance, among others. Pro-globalization forces could argue
here, however, that the UNCTAD indicator of MNC investment per GDP as well
might express a mismanaged anti-liberal economy in the past that led to high
capital imports, high customs barriers, and insufficient national savings.
Suffice to mention here the high value of Brazil with its decades of import
substitution after 1945, and the low value of countries like South Korea
with its intelligent policy mix in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, on the UNCTAD
indicator. A later and partial replication of these results came to the
conclusion that in the 134 countries now under investigation with fairly
complete data - including the world of former Communism - both the UNCTAD
variable - stocks of MNC capital per total GDP - as well as a new indicator
of unequal exchange (simply based on the reciprocal value of the exchange
rate deviation index, i.e. 1/ERDI) negatively and significantly affected
several development processes (see below). 

        Model based on: R^2 for the 134 countries with fairly complete data
F for the entire equation       t-test for the dependency predictor and
direction of the influence      further positive, significant predictors
further negative, significant predictors        
Explanation of growth   1/ERDI  57,20%  12,35   -1,33   mean years of
education, population growth    labor force participation rate, military
        UNCTAD indicator        56%     11,86   -1,57   mean years of
education, population growth    labor force participation rate, military
Explanation of infant mortality 1/ERDI  91,30%  96,7    2,45            UN
membership years, absolute GNP, years of Communism, military expenditures

        UNCTAD indicator        91,00%  95,04   2,08            UN
membership years, absolute GNP, years of Communism, military expenditures

Explanation of early death      1/ERDI  89,40%  93,14   2,87    agrarian
share per GDP   years of Communism, human development index     
        UNCTAD indicator        89,00%  93,12   2,84    agrarian share per
GDP     years of Communism, human development index     
Explanation of political repression     1/ERDI  52,50%  10,2    0,68
educational level, labor force participation rate       military
        UNCTAD indicator        52,00%  9,9     0,45    educational level,
labor force participation rate  military expenditures   
Explanation of income concentration for the top 20%     1/ERDI  41,00%  6,52
0,17    population growth       absolute GNP    
        UNCTAD indicator        41,00%  6,5     0,16    population growth
absolute GNP    
Explanation of life expectancy  1/ERDI  95%     161,5   -1,14   state sector
expenditures    population growth       
        UNCTAD indicator        95%     161,3   -1,16   state sector
expenditures, military expenditures     absolute GNP, agrarian share per GDP

        *       However, it has to be recalled, that ongoing processes of
globalization - see Tausch's contribution to a forthcoming NOVA volume on
pension reform and global inequality, based on the UNDP indicator net
foreign direct investment flows per GDP - do not significantly and
negatively affect most indicators social development; hence the causality of
the process needs further and even more rigorous research. As has been
already argued by Schultz (1998), there is also a gender balance to be drawn
in the overall picture of world inequality, since female education data
positively affect child mortality, fertility, and population growth, while
Tausch's finding in the present contribution suggest a positive trade-off
between ongoing processes of globalization and female employment. However,
reducing the samples to n = 95 countries (growth) and n = 71 countries
(inequality) to better take care of the missing values in the data matrix,
and introducing as predictors in the regression equations stocks of achieved
education levels, EU membership, pension reform, population growth 1975-99,
status as a former communist country, as well as the regional constants for
Africa and the Pacific rim as further regional dummies, it is shown that the
levels of net foreign direct investment flows per GDP impede economic growth
(insignificantly at the 12.5 % error level) and contribute to higher
inequality (significantly at the 12.5 % error level), while pension reform
contributes to economic growth (significantly at the 12.5 % error level) and
only slightly increases overall inequalities. Thus, in order to take their
business seriously, the anti-globalizers should opt for a three-pillar
pension reform in order to enhance technological development and savings.

        *       Results differ widely whether we speak about absolute
numbers of people living in poverty - say the 1 $ or 2 $ per capita and day
threshold in real terms (these have risen according to some studies and
during certain, but not all time periods since the 1960s) and the
percentages of total population, falling under a given poverty line
(decreasing in most studies, in most of the world regions).

        *       According to Lindert and Williamson, the trans-atlantic
migration of more than 60 million human beings in the 19th and 20th Century
was an important additional link in the convergence process between the
democracies of the North, while between the European South and the European
North there was relatively little migration and relatively little economic
convergence, while the migration from the European South to South America
contributed towards a Latin convergence process. However, world system
researchers have questioned such an approach: Starting in the 1970s, Amin
and the dependency research tradition developed a viewpoint on migration,
which focuses on the effects of migration on the world periphery. There is a
considerable brain drain and human capital export from the periphery, which
blocs long-term development; worker remittances are being used mainly for
luxury consumption and imports, and migration has a long-term devastating
effect on the gender equilibrium in peripheral and semi-peripheral societies
(Kohler and Tausch, 2002). 3% of the scientists and 10% of the doctors in
the United States are, in fact, imported from the pool of cheap, mostly free
University education in the world periphery. If there are free riders in the
world economy, certainly there are the customers, the big Universities, the
hospitals and the communes in the United States, which employ the free human
capital from Third and Second World countries. The world periphery lost
between 1960 and 1980 human capital to the tune of 16 billion $ to the
center. Critical, skilled and opposition elements leave the periphery, with
the benefits of such a human capital import reaped by the center in the long
run. Thus, selective migration is another pillar of the system of unequal
exchange, and contributes to the perpetuation of the unequal structure of
the world system. The market economies of western Europe first imported
labor; now, with the transfer of production away from the European central
zones, second generation foreigners become increasingly marginalized. In the
inner cities of countries like France, Germany, and Britain, real 'ghettos'
develop, a process that began in the United States of America three or two
decades ago. Women also have to suffer from these tendencies, as their jobs
are being exported away to the still much-lower paid labor power of the
periphery and the semi-periphery. Migration, we recall, is even part of the
five pillars of international inequality (Amin, 1997):

i       unequal exchange: the gaps in wages are much greater than the gaps
in productivities 
ii      capital flight from the peripheries to the centers
iii     selective migration from the peripheries into the centers
iv      the monopoly position of the centers in the international division
of labor
v       the control of the centers over the earth's natural resources

        *       The impact of migration on the sending countries under such
conditions will be increasing the patterns of unequal exchange and the
peripheral role in the world economy. It might be, that income distribution
will become perhaps less unequal under the impact of the absence of millions
of unskilled laborers from their home countries, but many other phenomena of
peripheral development will be intensified; such as the deficient structures
of agriculture, the environmental crisis (due to the intensification of
traffic), and - in the end - the dependent character of accumulation,
leading to slower economic growth and increased capital imports. However,
historic time series data support the joint implicit assertion by both
Lindert and Williamson an the world systems school, that income differences
per se do not necessarily cause excessive migration flows, at least in
Europe. Spain had pretty much the same position 1870 as it has today, i.e.
73% to 74% of the purchasing power of the European average; migration flows
were low (-1.16 per 1000) in 1870, and they are negligible today. Portugal
improved its position in terms of real purchasing power, less so in wages,
but it is still miles away from the purchasing power of the European
centers, and still, there is no large scale migration today, and in 1870 to
1910, migration rates were negligible. Spanish and Portuguese migration
rates were high in the 1950s and 1960s, but this was during an extreme
shortage of labor in Western Europe and much the result of deliberate
government policy. Even in terms of relative real purchasing power
development over time, not the entire European periphery caught up as
rapidly as one would think with the centers over the last 125 years.

A fair and balanced summary of the research results would now pre-suppose to
state that the Australian Treasury (2001) has combined the existing
estimates on the percentage of people with less than 1 $ a day real per
capita income by region since 1987, and has arrived at the following result,
which we compare with real economic growth in the world system since that

Graph 1b: world poverty - percentage of people with less than 1 $ a day per
capita income


Legend: our own compilations from Australian Treasury (2001) and
Tausch/Herrmann (2001).

On an aggregate basis, there is no real general clear trend of an absolute
impoverishment since 1987. In the early 1990s, the transition crisis in the
East and world economic stagnation brought about a rise in Second and Third
World poverty, while world economic growth in the late 1990s - especially in
India and China - reduced the percentage of people living with less than 1 $
a day per capita considerably, only to level off in the wake of the Asian
and Russian crisis in 1998:

Graph 2: aggregate poverty in the world east and south 1987 - 1998


Legend: see Graph 1, above

Without further rigorous theory development and quantitative testing, both
pension reform theories as well as globalization theories (i.e. optimistic
ones, i.e. theories that maintain that by pension reform or by globalization
you increase growth and human development and that you reduce poverty and
pessimistic ones, i.e. theories that maintain that by pension reform or by
globalization you decrease growth and human development and that you
increase poverty) run the risk of 'immunization'. 

As Lundberg and Milanovic have shown, there are at least three distinct
concepts of inequality, which are linked with globalization. First is
inequality within nations. Second, there is inter-national inequality, which
refers to differences between countries' average per capita incomes (or
GDPs). This is the inequality one has in mind when one speaks of how
globalization affects different countries' growth rates; whether they
converge or not. The third concept of inequality is world inequality, which
combines the two previous concepts. World inequality refers to income
inequality between all individuals in the world, irrespective of where they
live (<http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/inequal/abstracts/milanov.htm>). 
Lundberg and Milanovic go on to say:
In addition to the conceptual problems, there is a substantive issue.
Whether inequality goes up or down while globalization proceeds is no proof
of causality. One has to come up with a plausible explanation of the
channels through which globalization or openness affects inequality, and
test the theory empirically.
The evidence recently cited (i.e. Financial Times, Martin Wolfe, 8 February
2000) purports to show that inequality in the world has decreased during the
last two decades. Andrea Boltho and Gianni Toniolo in the December 1999
issue of Oxford Review of Economic Policy calculate that the world Gini
coefficient fell from 54 in 1980 to 50 in 1998. (The Gini ranges between 0
for complete equality and 100 if all income is received by a single person.)
Boltho and Toniolo's Gini is calculated by looking at cross-country
differences in average per capita GDP (weighted by population size). It is a
measure of inter-national, not world, inequality. But even as a measure of
inter-national inequality the Boltho-Toniolo estimate is low. Three recent
studies-by Schultz in the June 1998 issue of Journal of Population
Economics, Firebaugh in the May 1999 issue of American Journal of Sociology,
and most recently Milanovic in a World Bank working paper estimates that
inter-national inequality is some 10 to 20 percent higher than the Gini
reported by Boltho and Toniolo. Milanovic, moreover, shows that the
inter-national Gini increased between 1988 and 1993 from 55 to 58. Most
likely, the Boltho and Toniolo results can be explained by their relatively
small sample of 49 countries. The other studies include at least 80 and some
more than 100 countries.
The more serious problem is the difference between inter-national and world
inequality. The former assumes (e.g.) that all Chinese and all Americans
have the mean income of their respective nations. Once we allow for
within-country inequality, that is, for income differences among the
Chinese, among the Americans, etc., as well as inequality between them, the
Gini must go up. Including intra-national inequality, Milanovic finds that
the world Gini coefficient increased from 63 in 1988 to 66 in 1993. If
purchasing power differences are not taken into account, that is, if we
simply look at differences in dollar incomes, the Gini increased from 78 to
Turning to the link between globalization and inequality, most economists
would agree that while globalization is inevitable and most likely key to
continued growth, the process of shifting resources to meet new
opportunities is costly and takes time. Following the adjustment period,
greater openness probably leads to greater manufacturing employment, at
least in developed countries. But, even for developed countries, there is
some evidence, as argued by Dani Rodrik of Harvard University, that
globalization is responsible for a part of the increased wage gap between
low- and high-skilled workers. How does openness affect the poor? In a
recent World Bank paper, Lundberg and Squire find that greater openness to
trade is correlated negatively with income growth among the poorest 40
percent of the population, but strongly and positively with income growth
among remaining groups, in a sample of 38 countries between 1965 and 1992.
The costs of adjusting to greater openness are borne exclusively by the
poor, regardless of how long the adjustment takes.
The poor are far more vulnerable to shifts in relative international prices,
and this vulnerability is magnified by the country's openness to trade. Even
those who have never heard of the WTO, such as poor farmers, are affected by
changes in the prices of their inputs and products. Considering that the
prices of non-oil commodities have uniformly declined since the beginning of
the 20th century, this bodes ill for poverty and for aggregate distribution.
It also suggests that much more needs to be done to restructure
liberalization, so that a larger share of the population benefits from the
The debate on the effects of globalization desperately needs greater
conceptual clarity and more rigorous empirical testing. 

Apart from that, we think, that it is fair to assume the following
tendencies: First, the introduction of capitalist development in East
Central Europe and the former USSR brought about 9.7 million excess
mortality cases in the region (UNDP, 1999, based on research by Giovanni
Cornia from WIDER). Vulnerabilities go hand in hand with the openings of
markets. Secondly, there was a real impoverishment in the world from 1988 to
1993, and from 1996 to 1998. The following Table is based on Branko
Milanovic's calculation of the effects of changing income distribution
patterns on real household per capita incomes in about 100 countries of the

Table 6: absolute impoverishment, 1988 - 1993

world income group (percentile)         income 1988 in $ PPP    income 1993
in $ PPP        Ratio 2:1       
5       277,4   238,1   85,8    
10      348,3   318,1   91,3    
15      417,5   372,9   89,3    
20      486,1   432,1   88,9    
25      558,3   495,8   88,8    
30      633,2   586     92,5    
35      714,5   657,7   92,1    
40      802,7   741,9   92,4    
45      908,3   883,2   97,2    
50      1047,5  1044,1  99,7    
55      1314,4  1164,9  88,6    
60      1522,7  1505    98,8    
65      1898,9  1856,8  97,8    
70      2698,5  2326,8  86,2    
75      3597    3005,6  83,6    
80      4370    4508,1  103,2   
85      5998,9  6563,3  109,4   
90      8044    9109,8  113,2   
95      11518,4 13240,7 115     
99      20773,2 24447,1 117,7   

Source: Branko Milanovic, World Bank, 2000

Milanovic's data can also be presented in a graphical fashion: tendency
number 2 means that only 1/5 of the world population had rising real incomes
during the late 1980s and the early 1990s, while 1/2 impoverished and the
rest struggled to get along or saw reductions in their absolute incomes:

Graph 3: only 20% of the world population really gained from globalization


Source: our own compilations from Branko Milanovic, 2000

Third, also the University of Texas Inequality Project for inequality in
over 70 countries of the world since 1963 shows that the 1990s brought along
a huge increase in inequality, as measured by the Theil Index of Inequality
of Sectoral Incomes:

Graph 4: globalization increases sectoral income inequality - the period
1976 - 1995


Source: our own compilation from University of Texas Inequality Project,
University of Texas at Austin, http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/
For further notes on the Theil measure of inequality:

Point number four, there is a tendency towards an increase in absolute
numbers in poverty on a truly global scale - in every geographic region of
the former 'Second' and 'Third' World absolute numbers of absolute poverty
increased from 1996 to 1998:

Table 7: World Poverty: the number of people living on less than 2 $ per day
and capita increased sharply due to the crash economy of the 1990s

        E Asia + Pacific        Eastern Europe +Central Asia    Latin
America Middle East and North Africa    South Asia      Sub Saharan Africa
1996    236,3   92,7    179,8   60,6    1069,5  457,7   627,6   
1998    260,1   92,9    182,9   62,4    1095,9  474,8   632,1   

In the United States, real hourly wages for all employees fell by 12%
between 1973 and 1990 and remained flat throughout the boom of the 1990s.
Longer working years, a rising inequality between the skilled and the
unskilled, and a higher labor market turnover rate characterized the Clinton
'miracle', that, in the end, means above all an increased wealth of the top
20% of the population (R. A. Walker, 1999). 

By 1999/2000/2001, the following geographical distributions of poverty and
human misery could be observed in the world system (UNDP system of social
indicators, as described in all detail in the UNDP website

Graph 5: inequality on a global scale

Legend: income ratio of top 20% to bottom 20% of society. Missing values for
Argentina, much of Africa and West Central Asia

Graph 6: changes in Human Development Index 1990-98

Country-to country time series evidence on inequality, compiled by the
University of Texas Inequality Project, based on the Theil-index of
inequality between more than 20 economic sectors over time show that in the
pension reform countries, only in Argentina, Australia and in Chile there
was a clear rising long-term inequality. Even more so, Graph 7 and 8 show
that inequality rose much faster in non-reform than in reform countries:

Graph 7: data series inequality in pension reform countries







Graph 8: comparison of the evolution of inequality in pension and
non-pension reform countries


Further resources on the issue in the Internet:

Brooks S. and Estelle J. (1999), 'The Political Economy of Pension Reform'
Paper, presented at the World Bank Conference New Ideas about Old-Age
Security, September 14-15, Washington D.C., available at:
Cadette W. (1999), 'Social Security Privatization: A Bad Idea' Policy Notes,
Jerome Levy Economics Institute, 10; available at:
Caminada K. and Goudswaard K. (2000), 'International trends in income
inequality and social policy' ISSA Conference, Helsinki 'Social Security in
the global village' available at:
Carroll E. (2000), 'Globalization and social policy: social insurance
quality, institutions, trade exposure and deregulation in 18 OECD nations,
1965-1995' ISSA Conference, Helsinki 'Social Security in the global village'
available at: http://www.issa.int/engl/reunion/2000/helsinki/2prog.htm
Clark G. L. (2001), 'European pensions and global finance: continuity or
convergence?' School of Geography and Environment, and the Said Business
School, University of Oxford, available at:
http://www.geog.ox.ac.uk/~jburke/wpapers/wpg01-02.html or
Clark G. L. (2001), 'Requiem for a national ideal? Social solidarity, the
crisis of French social security, and the role of global financial markets'
School of Geography and Environment, and the Said Business School,
University of Oxford, available at:
Commonwealth of Australia, Office of the Status of Women (2000), 'Women and
Poverty' available at:
Coppel J. et al. (2001), 'Trends in Immigration and Economic Consequences'
OECD Economics Department Working Papers, 284, available at:
Dahlmanns G. (2000), 'Mastering Germany's Pension Crisis' Frankfurter
Institut Stiftung Marktwirtschaft & Politik, available at: http://
European Commission (2000) 'Modernising and Improving Social Protection in
the European Union' available at:
European Commission (2000) 'Progress report on the impact of ageing
populations on public pension systems' Economic Policy Committee, available
European Roundtable of Industrialists, ERT (2001), 'European Pensions. An
Appeal for Reform'. Pension Schemes that Europe Can Really Afford' Brussels:
Fox L. and Palmer E. (2000), 'New approaches to multi-pillar pension
systems: What in the world is going on?' ISSA Conference, Helsinki 'Social
Security in the global village' available at:
Gray C. and Weig D. (1999), 'Pension System Issues and Their Relation to
Economic Growth' CAER II Discussion paper No. 41, Harvard Institute for
International Development, available at:
Hagfors R. (2000), 'EMU convergence and the structure of social protection
financing' ISSA Conference, Helsinki 'Social Security in the global village'
available at: http://www.issa.int/engl/reunion/2000/helsinki/2prog.htm
Hausner J. (1999), 'Poland: Security Through Diversity' Deutsche Stiftung
für Internationale Entwicklung, available at
Holzmann R. (2000a), 'Financing the Transition: The Importance of Growth
Effects' Pension Workshop, Harvard University, 19-30 June.
Holzmann R. (2000b), 'The Challenge of Coverage' Pension Workshop, Harvard
University, 19-30 June.
Holzmann R. et al. (1999), 'Extending Coverage in multi-Pillar Pension
Systems: Constraints and Hypotheses, Preliminary Evidence and Future
Research Agenda' . Paper, prepared for the World Bank Conference New Ideas
about Old-Age Security, September 14-15, Washington D.C., available at:
ILO World Labor Report (current issues).
Kay St. J. Testimony Before the House Committee on Ways and Means Hearing on
Social Security Reform Lessons Learned in Other Countries. Available at:
Korpi W. and Palme J. (2000), 'Distributive Conflict, Political Mobilization
and the Welfare State: Comparative Patterns of Emergence and Retrenchment in
Westernized Countries' Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm
University, available at:
Laxer G. (1993), 'Social Solidarity, Democracy and and Global Capitalism'
The 1993 Porter Lecture, Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association,
available at: http://www.socsci.mcmaster.ca/soc/porterlectures/laxer.htm
Lindemann D. (2000), 'Incentives and Design Issues in Pension Reform' The
World Bank China Country Office, available at:
Mackelar L. et al. (2000), 'Globalization and social security' Paper,
presented at the ISSA Conference 'Social security in the global village',
Helsinki, 25-27 September 2000, available at:
Mayhew L. (2001), 'Disability - global trends and international
perspectives' Department of Geography and Centre for Pensions and Social
Insurance, Birbeck College, University of London, available at:
Norman G. and Mitchell D. J. (2000), 'Pension Reform in Sweden : Lessons for
American Policymakers' The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder, 1381, June 29,
2000, available from http://www.heritage.org/
Orszag P. R. and Stiglitz J. E. (1999), 'Rethinking Pension Reform: Ten
Myths About Social Security Systems' Presented at the conference on 'New
Ideas About Old Age Security' The World Bank, Washington D.C., September 14
- 15:
Paul S. S. and Paul J. A. (1996), 'The World Bank and the Attack on Pensions
in the Global South' Global Action on Aging, New York:
Pfaller A. (2000), 'Social Democracy in the Globalized Post-Industrial
Society' Politik und Gesellschaft Online, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2,
available at: http://www.fes.de/IPG/ipg2_2000/artpfaller.html
Quiggin J. (1998) 'Social Democracy and market reform in Australia and New
Zealand' Department of Economics, James Cook University, available at:
Rodas-Martini P. (2001), 'Has income distribution really worsened in the
South? And has income distribution really worsened between the North and the
South?' Background paper for the Human Development Report 2001, available
at: http://www.undp.org/hdr2001/
Roos J. P. (2000), 'The Consequences of the Crisis of the 1990s to the
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Expert list:

Ted Wheelwright is professor emeritus of Economics and Geography at Sydney
University and director of the Transnational Corporations Research Project,
Sydney, Australia

Chris Williams [SMTP:cwilliams@staff.usyd.edu.au]

Franz Rothenbacher is a sociologist at the EURODATA Research Archive at the
Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES)


Jeja Pekka Roos is professor of Social Policy at Helsinki University


Walter Cadette is a senior researcher at the Jerome Levy Institute of
Economics in new York, USA. He is a retired vice president of J.P. Morgan &


Göran Normann is President Normann Econonomics International. He published
widely for the Cato Institute, the Heritage foundation and other
international fora on pension reform


Daniel J. Mitchell is researcher at the Heritage Foundation in Washington


Eva Belabed is researcher at the Chamber of Labor in Linz, Austria. She
published widely on matters of international social policy

Belabed Eva[SMTP:Belabed.E@ak-ooe.at]

Stephen J. Kay is a researcher at the Federal Reserve Bank in Atlanta,
Georgia, USA



Gordon Laxer is professor of economics at the University of Alberta, Canada


Frank Stilwell is Associate professor of Economics at Sydney University,


Kunibert Raffer is Associate professor of Economics at Vienna University,


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