|
< < <
Date Index > > > |
Re: globalization and inequality - the wallerstein request answered by Quee-Young Kim 19 January 2002 18:16 UTC |
< < <
Thread Index > > > |
We must congratulate Arno Tausch for his excellent summary of recent
works on
Globalization and inequality. Not only his references are extensive but
also the web
resources he referred to are excellent. As for me, seeing the terrain
from a slightly
different perspective, I remember seeing a handful of articles that came
to my attention
in recent weeks. Thus, I might add just a few controversial pieces to
Arno's list.
1. Glenn Firebaugh, "Empirics of World Income Inequality." American
Journal of Sociology. May 1999.
2. Brian Goesling, "Changing Income Inequalities Within and Between
Nations: New Evidence." American
Sociological Review. October 2001.
3. Nancy Birdsall. "Life is Unfair: Inequality in the World." Foreign
Policy. Summer 1998.
4. David Dollar. "Is Globalization good for your health?" Bulletin of
the World Health Organization. September 2001.
Quee-Young Kim
Department of Sociology
University of Wyoming
kim@uwyo.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Tausch, Arno [mailto:Arno.Tausch@bmsg.gv.at]
Sent: Thursday, January 17, 2002 12:51 AM
To: 'wallerstein@nias.knaw.nl'
Cc: wsn@csf.colorado.edu
Subject: globalization and inequality - the wallerstein request
answered
Dear friend,
perhaps this might be of use to you:
1) The issue:
Globalization in this volume is generally understood to be the growing
transborder flow of goods, services, capital and labor. The following
UNDP
2000 numbers might illustrate this:
* World exports are more than 21% of world GNP
* Foreign direct investments are above 400 thousand million $
* Daily currency exchanges are 1500 thousand million $, i.e. the
annual world currency trade is 18.6 times the yearly world GNP
* International bank credits are above 4200 thousand million $
There is now a never-ending flow of literature on the interrelation
between
globalization and poverty, with a very wide array of research results.
Nobody in his minds would negate that we are confronted with the
phenomenon
of globalization - just to suffice to draw our attention here to the
fact
that foreign assets per world GDP fluctuated in the following fashion
since
1870:
Graph 1a: The waves of globalization since 1870 in the world economy
<<...OLE_Obj...>>
Legend: our own compilation from Crafts, 2000
At the same time, it has been established fairly well enough that there
is
continuing phenomenon of world poverty. But what beyond that? Is
globalization really the cause of world poverty? Or is rather the
absence of
globalization and foreign investment to blame for the continued misery
in
countries, say, like Myanmar, while outward-looking policies
dramatically
increased the lot of wide strata of the population in countries like
China
and India over the last decades?
This growing international controversy on globalization and social
inequality - the main contributions were written amongst others, by the
Australian Treasury, 2001; Crafts, 2000; Dollar and Kraay, 2001; Lindert
and
Williamson, 2001a, 2001b; Lundberg and Squire, 1999; Melchior, Royal
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000; and Schultz, 1998 can be
summarized here as follows:
* Initial attempts by pro-globalization scholars (Dollar
and
Kraay, 2001) to prove the positive effects of globalization by selecting
the
post-1980 globalizing countries Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, China,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Hungary,
India, Jamaica, Jordan, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Nepal, Nicaragua,
Paraguay,
Philippines, Rwanda, Thailand, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe as the most
successful
development performers of the world are not convincing politically,
especially in view of recent events in Argentina; and are not convincing
methodologically either.
* Results on a supposed growing international inequality
depend on whether income at market exchange rates (growing world
inequality)
or real purchasing power (lessening world inequality) is used. The
divergence between these two processes also opens up the question of
unequal
exchange, defined by some world systems theories as the difference
between
purchasing power and income at market exchange rates (see below).
* While Dollar and Kraay must be considered the flagship
pro-globalization study today, careful econometric
globalization-skeptical
evidence seems to suggest - see especially the pooled regression results
from time series in 38 countries, reported in Lundberg and Squire - that
globalization affects different social strata in a different manner.
Without
going into the econometric details here, it is sufficient to mention
that
Lundberg and Squire report a regression slope of -2.87840 (t-value 2.06,
and
thus significant at the 5 % level) for the variable 'world economic
openness' on the income growth of the bottom 40 % of the respective
population, while the top 40 % reap significant benefits from
globalization
(slope + 9.89084, significant even at the 1 % level). The divergent
interpretations and evaluations of these two flagship studies were part
and
parcel of bitter controversies. Critically, it can be remarked that both
flagship studies - contrasting evidence from 24 globalizers
(simplistically
called here the 'pro-globalizers', Dollar and Kraay) and regressions
from 38
countries (simplistically called here the 'anti-globalizers', Lundberg
and
Squire), using highly inter-correlated predictor variables are most
probably
insufficient to draw any political conclusions, either way.
* Results on human development indicators - like the
'Human
Development Index', life expectancy or education data rather tend to
confirm
the hypothesis, that today, we have a flattening of international
inequalities. Never before in history we have had so many people around
the
world with such high life expectancies, and the world distribution of
lived
life times around the world has dramatically improved (see especially
Melchior, 2000 and Crafts, 2000). World average life expectancy has
increased from 55.0 years in 1962 to 66.6 years in 1997; with the GINI
Index
of the intra-country world lived lifetimes decreasing during the same
period
from 0.237 to 0.114 (Melchior, 2000).
* Drawing mainly on the published sociological and
political
science literature, published before it, the present author (Tausch,
1998;
Tausch and Herrmann, 2002) reached the conclusion that stocks of
achieved
globalization - measured by the UNCTAD indicator transnational
investment
stocks per total GDP in 1985 - significantly and negatively affected 15
of
the reported 19 development dimensions in 123 countries with fairly
complete
data - ranging from economic growth to human development, gender
empowerment, life expectancy, human and civil rights performance,
economic
equality etc. Controlling variables were - in the sociological and
political
science tradition - government expenditures, trade dependency, social
security expenditures, fertility, years of United Nations membership of
a
country and the non-linear trade-off between development levels and
development performance, among others. Pro-globalization forces could
argue
here, however, that the UNCTAD indicator of MNC investment per GDP as
well
might express a mismanaged anti-liberal economy in the past that led to
high
capital imports, high customs barriers, and insufficient national
savings.
Suffice to mention here the high value of Brazil with its decades of
import
substitution after 1945, and the low value of countries like South Korea
with its intelligent policy mix in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, on the
UNCTAD
indicator. A later and partial replication of these results came to the
conclusion that in the 134 countries now under investigation with fairly
complete data - including the world of former Communism - both the
UNCTAD
variable - stocks of MNC capital per total GDP - as well as a new
indicator
of unequal exchange (simply based on the reciprocal value of the
exchange
rate deviation index, i.e. 1/ERDI) negatively and significantly affected
several development processes (see below).
Model based on: R^2 for the 134 countries with fairly complete
data
F for the entire equation t-test for the dependency predictor and
direction of the influence further positive, significant predictors
further negative, significant predictors
Explanation of growth 1/ERDI 57,20% 12,35 -1,33 mean years of
education, population growth labor force participation rate, military
expenditures
UNCTAD indicator 56% 11,86 -1,57 mean years of
education, population growth labor force participation rate, military
expenditures
Explanation of infant mortality 1/ERDI 91,30% 96,7 2,45
UN
membership years, absolute GNP, years of Communism, military
expenditures
UNCTAD indicator 91,00% 95,04 2,08 UN
membership years, absolute GNP, years of Communism, military
expenditures
Explanation of early death 1/ERDI 89,40% 93,14 2,87 agrarian
share per GDP years of Communism, human development index
UNCTAD indicator 89,00% 93,12 2,84 agrarian share
per
GDP years of Communism, human development index
Explanation of political repression 1/ERDI 52,50% 10,2 0,68
educational level, labor force participation rate military
expenditures
UNCTAD indicator 52,00% 9,9 0,45 educational
level,
labor force participation rate military expenditures
Explanation of income concentration for the top 20% 1/ERDI 41,00%
6,52
0,17 population growth absolute GNP
UNCTAD indicator 41,00% 6,5 0,16 population
growth
absolute GNP
Explanation of life expectancy 1/ERDI 95% 161,5 -1,14 state
sector
expenditures population growth
UNCTAD indicator 95% 161,3 -1,16 state sector
expenditures, military expenditures absolute GNP, agrarian share per
GDP
* However, it has to be recalled, that ongoing processes
of
globalization - see Tausch's contribution to a forthcoming NOVA volume
on
pension reform and global inequality, based on the UNDP indicator net
foreign direct investment flows per GDP - do not significantly and
negatively affect most indicators social development; hence the
causality of
the process needs further and even more rigorous research. As has been
already argued by Schultz (1998), there is also a gender balance to be
drawn
in the overall picture of world inequality, since female education data
positively affect child mortality, fertility, and population growth,
while
Tausch's finding in the present contribution suggest a positive
trade-off
between ongoing processes of globalization and female employment.
However,
reducing the samples to n = 95 countries (growth) and n = 71 countries
(inequality) to better take care of the missing values in the data
matrix,
and introducing as predictors in the regression equations stocks of
achieved
education levels, EU membership, pension reform, population growth
1975-99,
status as a former communist country, as well as the regional constants
for
Africa and the Pacific rim as further regional dummies, it is shown that
the
levels of net foreign direct investment flows per GDP impede economic
growth
(insignificantly at the 12.5 % error level) and contribute to higher
inequality (significantly at the 12.5 % error level), while pension
reform
contributes to economic growth (significantly at the 12.5 % error level)
and
only slightly increases overall inequalities. Thus, in order to take
their
business seriously, the anti-globalizers should opt for a three-pillar
pension reform in order to enhance technological development and
savings.
* Results differ widely whether we speak about absolute
numbers of people living in poverty - say the 1 $ or 2 $ per capita and
day
threshold in real terms (these have risen according to some studies and
during certain, but not all time periods since the 1960s) and the
percentages of total population, falling under a given poverty line
(decreasing in most studies, in most of the world regions).
* According to Lindert and Williamson, the trans-atlantic
migration of more than 60 million human beings in the 19th and 20th
Century
was an important additional link in the convergence process between the
democracies of the North, while between the European South and the
European
North there was relatively little migration and relatively little
economic
convergence, while the migration from the European South to South
America
contributed towards a Latin convergence process. However, world system
researchers have questioned such an approach: Starting in the 1970s,
Amin
and the dependency research tradition developed a viewpoint on
migration,
which focuses on the effects of migration on the world periphery. There
is a
considerable brain drain and human capital export from the periphery,
which
blocs long-term development; worker remittances are being used mainly
for
luxury consumption and imports, and migration has a long-term
devastating
effect on the gender equilibrium in peripheral and semi-peripheral
societies
(Kohler and Tausch, 2002). 3% of the scientists and 10% of the doctors
in
the United States are, in fact, imported from the pool of cheap, mostly
free
University education in the world periphery. If there are free riders in
the
world economy, certainly there are the customers, the big Universities,
the
hospitals and the communes in the United States, which employ the free
human
capital from Third and Second World countries. The world periphery lost
between 1960 and 1980 human capital to the tune of 16 billion $ to the
center. Critical, skilled and opposition elements leave the periphery,
with
the benefits of such a human capital import reaped by the center in the
long
run. Thus, selective migration is another pillar of the system of
unequal
exchange, and contributes to the perpetuation of the unequal structure
of
the world system. The market economies of western Europe first imported
labor; now, with the transfer of production away from the European
central
zones, second generation foreigners become increasingly marginalized. In
the
inner cities of countries like France, Germany, and Britain, real
'ghettos'
develop, a process that began in the United States of America three or
two
decades ago. Women also have to suffer from these tendencies, as their
jobs
are being exported away to the still much-lower paid labor power of the
periphery and the semi-periphery. Migration, we recall, is even part of
the
five pillars of international inequality (Amin, 1997):
i unequal exchange: the gaps in wages are much greater than the
gaps
in productivities
ii capital flight from the peripheries to the centers
iii selective migration from the peripheries into the centers
iv the monopoly position of the centers in the international
division
of labor
v the control of the centers over the earth's natural resources
* The impact of migration on the sending countries under
such
conditions will be increasing the patterns of unequal exchange and the
peripheral role in the world economy. It might be, that income
distribution
will become perhaps less unequal under the impact of the absence of
millions
of unskilled laborers from their home countries, but many other
phenomena of
peripheral development will be intensified; such as the deficient
structures
of agriculture, the environmental crisis (due to the intensification of
traffic), and - in the end - the dependent character of accumulation,
leading to slower economic growth and increased capital imports.
However,
historic time series data support the joint implicit assertion by both
Lindert and Williamson an the world systems school, that income
differences
per se do not necessarily cause excessive migration flows, at least in
Europe. Spain had pretty much the same position 1870 as it has today,
i.e.
73% to 74% of the purchasing power of the European average; migration
flows
were low (-1.16 per 1000) in 1870, and they are negligible today.
Portugal
improved its position in terms of real purchasing power, less so in
wages,
but it is still miles away from the purchasing power of the European
centers, and still, there is no large scale migration today, and in 1870
to
1910, migration rates were negligible. Spanish and Portuguese migration
rates were high in the 1950s and 1960s, but this was during an extreme
shortage of labor in Western Europe and much the result of deliberate
government policy. Even in terms of relative real purchasing power
development over time, not the entire European periphery caught up as
rapidly as one would think with the centers over the last 125 years.
A fair and balanced summary of the research results would now
pre-suppose to
state that the Australian Treasury (2001) has combined the existing
estimates on the percentage of people with less than 1 $ a day real per
capita income by region since 1987, and has arrived at the following
result,
which we compare with real economic growth in the world system since
that
date:
Graph 1b: world poverty - percentage of people with less than 1 $ a day
per
capita income
<<...OLE_Obj...>>
Legend: our own compilations from Australian Treasury (2001) and
Tausch/Herrmann (2001).
On an aggregate basis, there is no real general clear trend of an
absolute
impoverishment since 1987. In the early 1990s, the transition crisis in
the
East and world economic stagnation brought about a rise in Second and
Third
World poverty, while world economic growth in the late 1990s -
especially in
India and China - reduced the percentage of people living with less than
1 $
a day per capita considerably, only to level off in the wake of the
Asian
and Russian crisis in 1998:
Graph 2: aggregate poverty in the world east and south 1987 - 1998
<<...OLE_Obj...>>
Legend: see Graph 1, above
Without further rigorous theory development and quantitative testing,
both
pension reform theories as well as globalization theories (i.e.
optimistic
ones, i.e. theories that maintain that by pension reform or by
globalization
you increase growth and human development and that you reduce poverty
and
pessimistic ones, i.e. theories that maintain that by pension reform or
by
globalization you decrease growth and human development and that you
increase poverty) run the risk of 'immunization'.
As Lundberg and Milanovic have shown, there are at least three distinct
concepts of inequality, which are linked with globalization. First is
inequality within nations. Second, there is inter-national inequality,
which
refers to differences between countries' average per capita incomes (or
GDPs). This is the inequality one has in mind when one speaks of how
globalization affects different countries' growth rates; whether they
converge or not. The third concept of inequality is world inequality,
which
combines the two previous concepts. World inequality refers to income
inequality between all individuals in the world, irrespective of where
they
live (<http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/inequal/abstracts/milanov.htm>).
Lundberg and Milanovic go on to say:
In addition to the conceptual problems, there is a substantive issue.
Whether inequality goes up or down while globalization proceeds is no
proof
of causality. One has to come up with a plausible explanation of the
channels through which globalization or openness affects inequality, and
test the theory empirically.
The evidence recently cited (i.e. Financial Times, Martin Wolfe, 8
February
2000) purports to show that inequality in the world has decreased during
the
last two decades. Andrea Boltho and Gianni Toniolo in the December 1999
issue of Oxford Review of Economic Policy calculate that the world Gini
coefficient fell from 54 in 1980 to 50 in 1998. (The Gini ranges between
0
for complete equality and 100 if all income is received by a single
person.)
Boltho and Toniolo's Gini is calculated by looking at cross-country
differences in average per capita GDP (weighted by population size). It
is a
measure of inter-national, not world, inequality. But even as a measure
of
inter-national inequality the Boltho-Toniolo estimate is low. Three
recent
studies-by Schultz in the June 1998 issue of Journal of Population
Economics, Firebaugh in the May 1999 issue of American Journal of
Sociology,
and most recently Milanovic in a World Bank working paper estimates that
inter-national inequality is some 10 to 20 percent higher than the Gini
reported by Boltho and Toniolo. Milanovic, moreover, shows that the
inter-national Gini increased between 1988 and 1993 from 55 to 58. Most
likely, the Boltho and Toniolo results can be explained by their
relatively
small sample of 49 countries. The other studies include at least 80 and
some
more than 100 countries.
The more serious problem is the difference between inter-national and
world
inequality. The former assumes (e.g.) that all Chinese and all Americans
have the mean income of their respective nations. Once we allow for
within-country inequality, that is, for income differences among the
Chinese, among the Americans, etc., as well as inequality between them,
the
Gini must go up. Including intra-national inequality, Milanovic finds
that
the world Gini coefficient increased from 63 in 1988 to 66 in 1993. If
purchasing power differences are not taken into account, that is, if we
simply look at differences in dollar incomes, the Gini increased from 78
to
80.
Turning to the link between globalization and inequality, most
economists
would agree that while globalization is inevitable and most likely key
to
continued growth, the process of shifting resources to meet new
opportunities is costly and takes time. Following the adjustment period,
greater openness probably leads to greater manufacturing employment, at
least in developed countries. But, even for developed countries, there
is
some evidence, as argued by Dani Rodrik of Harvard University, that
globalization is responsible for a part of the increased wage gap
between
low- and high-skilled workers. How does openness affect the poor? In a
recent World Bank paper, Lundberg and Squire find that greater openness
to
trade is correlated negatively with income growth among the poorest 40
percent of the population, but strongly and positively with income
growth
among remaining groups, in a sample of 38 countries between 1965 and
1992.
The costs of adjusting to greater openness are borne exclusively by the
poor, regardless of how long the adjustment takes.
The poor are far more vulnerable to shifts in relative international
prices,
and this vulnerability is magnified by the country's openness to trade.
Even
those who have never heard of the WTO, such as poor farmers, are
affected by
changes in the prices of their inputs and products. Considering that the
prices of non-oil commodities have uniformly declined since the
beginning of
the 20th century, this bodes ill for poverty and for aggregate
distribution.
It also suggests that much more needs to be done to restructure
liberalization, so that a larger share of the population benefits from
the
process.
The debate on the effects of globalization desperately needs greater
conceptual clarity and more rigorous empirical testing.
Apart from that, we think, that it is fair to assume the following
tendencies: First, the introduction of capitalist development in East
Central Europe and the former USSR brought about 9.7 million excess
mortality cases in the region (UNDP, 1999, based on research by Giovanni
Cornia from WIDER). Vulnerabilities go hand in hand with the openings of
markets. Secondly, there was a real impoverishment in the world from
1988 to
1993, and from 1996 to 1998. The following Table is based on Branko
Milanovic's calculation of the effects of changing income distribution
patterns on real household per capita incomes in about 100 countries of
the
world:
Table 6: absolute impoverishment, 1988 - 1993
world income group (percentile) income 1988 in $ PPP income
1993
in $ PPP Ratio 2:1
5 277,4 238,1 85,8
10 348,3 318,1 91,3
15 417,5 372,9 89,3
20 486,1 432,1 88,9
25 558,3 495,8 88,8
30 633,2 586 92,5
35 714,5 657,7 92,1
40 802,7 741,9 92,4
45 908,3 883,2 97,2
50 1047,5 1044,1 99,7
55 1314,4 1164,9 88,6
60 1522,7 1505 98,8
65 1898,9 1856,8 97,8
70 2698,5 2326,8 86,2
75 3597 3005,6 83,6
80 4370 4508,1 103,2
85 5998,9 6563,3 109,4
90 8044 9109,8 113,2
95 11518,4 13240,7 115
99 20773,2 24447,1 117,7
Source: Branko Milanovic, World Bank, 2000
Milanovic's data can also be presented in a graphical fashion: tendency
number 2 means that only 1/5 of the world population had rising real
incomes
during the late 1980s and the early 1990s, while 1/2 impoverished and
the
rest struggled to get along or saw reductions in their absolute incomes:
Graph 3: only 20% of the world population really gained from
globalization
1988-1993
<<...OLE_Obj...>>
Source: our own compilations from Branko Milanovic, 2000
Third, also the University of Texas Inequality Project for inequality in
over 70 countries of the world since 1963 shows that the 1990s brought
along
a huge increase in inequality, as measured by the Theil Index of
Inequality
of Sectoral Incomes:
Graph 4: globalization increases sectoral income inequality - the period
1976 - 1995
<<...OLE_Obj...>>
Source: our own compilation from University of Texas Inequality Project,
University of Texas at Austin, http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/
For further notes on the Theil measure of inequality:
http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/inequal/methods/measure.htm
http://www.economics.uni-linz.ac.at/Paper/papers/9614.htm
Point number four, there is a tendency towards an increase in absolute
numbers in poverty on a truly global scale - in every geographic region
of
the former 'Second' and 'Third' World absolute numbers of absolute
poverty
increased from 1996 to 1998:
Table 7: World Poverty: the number of people living on less than 2 $ per
day
and capita increased sharply due to the crash economy of the 1990s
E Asia + Pacific Eastern Europe +Central Asia Latin
America Middle East and North Africa South Asia Sub Saharan
Africa
China
1996 236,3 92,7 179,8 60,6 1069,5 457,7 627,6
1998 260,1 92,9 182,9 62,4 1095,9 474,8 632,1
In the United States, real hourly wages for all employees fell by 12%
between 1973 and 1990 and remained flat throughout the boom of the
1990s.
Longer working years, a rising inequality between the skilled and the
unskilled, and a higher labor market turnover rate characterized the
Clinton
'miracle', that, in the end, means above all an increased wealth of the
top
20% of the population (R. A. Walker, 1999).
By 1999/2000/2001, the following geographical distributions of poverty
and
human misery could be observed in the world system (UNDP system of
social
indicators, as described in all detail in the UNDP website
http://www.undp.org/hdr2001/indicator/):
Graph 5: inequality on a global scale
Legend: income ratio of top 20% to bottom 20% of society. Missing values
for
Argentina, much of Africa and West Central Asia
Graph 6: changes in Human Development Index 1990-98
Country-to country time series evidence on inequality, compiled by the
University of Texas Inequality Project, based on the Theil-index of
inequality between more than 20 economic sectors over time show that in
the
pension reform countries, only in Argentina, Australia and in Chile
there
was a clear rising long-term inequality. Even more so, Graph 7 and 8
show
that inequality rose much faster in non-reform than in reform countries:
Graph 7: data series inequality in pension reform countries
<<...OLE_Obj...>>
<<...OLE_Obj...>>
<<...OLE_Obj...>>
<<...OLE_Obj...>>
<<...OLE_Obj...>>
<<...OLE_Obj...>>
Graph 8: comparison of the evolution of inequality in pension and
non-pension reform countries
<<...OLE_Obj...>>
Further resources on the issue in the Internet:
Brooks S. and Estelle J. (1999), 'The Political Economy of Pension
Reform'
Paper, presented at the World Bank Conference New Ideas about Old-Age
Security, September 14-15, Washington D.C., available at:
http://www.worldbank.org/knowledge/chiefecon/conferen/papers/polecon.htm
Cadette W. (1999), 'Social Security Privatization: A Bad Idea' Policy
Notes,
Jerome Levy Economics Institute, 10; available at:
http://www.levy.org/docs/pn/99-10.html
Caminada K. and Goudswaard K. (2000), 'International trends in income
inequality and social policy' ISSA Conference, Helsinki 'Social Security
in
the global village' available at:
http://www.issa.int/pdf/helsinki2000/topic4/2goudswaard.PDF
Carroll E. (2000), 'Globalization and social policy: social insurance
quality, institutions, trade exposure and deregulation in 18 OECD
nations,
1965-1995' ISSA Conference, Helsinki 'Social Security in the global
village'
available at: http://www.issa.int/engl/reunion/2000/helsinki/2prog.htm
Clark G. L. (2001), 'European pensions and global finance: continuity or
convergence?' School of Geography and Environment, and the Said Business
School, University of Oxford, available at:
http://www.geog.ox.ac.uk/~jburke/wpapers/wpg01-02.html or
http://www.pensions-research.org/papers/default.htm
Clark G. L. (2001), 'Requiem for a national ideal? Social solidarity,
the
crisis of French social security, and the role of global financial
markets'
School of Geography and Environment, and the Said Business School,
University of Oxford, available at:
http://www.pensions-research.org/papers/default.htm
Commonwealth of Australia, Office of the Status of Women (2000), 'Women
and
Poverty' available at:
http://osw.dpmc.gov.au/content/publications/beijing/a_poverty.html
Coppel J. et al. (2001), 'Trends in Immigration and Economic
Consequences'
OECD Economics Department Working Papers, 284, available at:
http://ideas.uqam.ca/ideas/data/Papers/oedoecdec284.html
Dahlmanns G. (2000), 'Mastering Germany's Pension Crisis' Frankfurter
Institut Stiftung Marktwirtschaft & Politik, available at: http://
www.aicgs.org/econ/dahlmanns.html
European Commission (2000) 'Modernising and Improving Social Protection
in
the European Union' available at:
http://www.itcilo.it/english/actrav/telearn/global/ilo/seura/eumode.htm
European Commission (2000) 'Progress report on the impact of ageing
populations on public pension systems' Economic Policy Committee,
available
at:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/document/epc/epc_ecfin_581_00_
en.p
df
European Roundtable of Industrialists, ERT (2001), 'European Pensions.
An
Appeal for Reform'. Pension Schemes that Europe Can Really Afford'
Brussels:
ERT
Fox L. and Palmer E. (2000), 'New approaches to multi-pillar pension
systems: What in the world is going on?' ISSA Conference, Helsinki
'Social
Security in the global village' available at:
http://www.issa.int/engl/reunion/2000/helsinki/2prog.htm
Gray C. and Weig D. (1999), 'Pension System Issues and Their Relation to
Economic Growth' CAER II Discussion paper No. 41, Harvard Institute for
International Development, available at:
http://www.hiid.harvard.edu/projects/caer/papers/paper41/paper41.html
Hagfors R. (2000), 'EMU convergence and the structure of social
protection
financing' ISSA Conference, Helsinki 'Social Security in the global
village'
available at: http://www.issa.int/engl/reunion/2000/helsinki/2prog.htm
Hausner J. (1999), 'Poland: Security Through Diversity' Deutsche
Stiftung
für Internationale Entwicklung, available at
http://www.dse.de/ef/kop5/hausner.htm
Holzmann R. (2000a), 'Financing the Transition: The Importance of Growth
Effects' Pension Workshop, Harvard University, 19-30 June.
Holzmann R. (2000b), 'The Challenge of Coverage' Pension Workshop,
Harvard
University, 19-30 June.
Holzmann R. et al. (1999), 'Extending Coverage in multi-Pillar Pension
Systems: Constraints and Hypotheses, Preliminary Evidence and Future
Research Agenda' . Paper, prepared for the World Bank Conference New
Ideas
about Old-Age Security, September 14-15, Washington D.C., available at:
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/HDNet/HDdocs.nsf/View+to+Link+WebPages/C84
F825
C6A3B40D485256840007A31ED?OpenDocument
ILO World Labor Report (current issues).
Kay St. J. Testimony Before the House Committee on Ways and Means
Hearing on
Social Security Reform Lessons Learned in Other Countries. Available at:
http://www.house.gov/ways_means/fullcomm/106cong/2-11-99/2-11kay.htm
Korpi W. and Palme J. (2000), 'Distributive Conflict, Political
Mobilization
and the Welfare State: Comparative Patterns of Emergence and
Retrenchment in
Westernized Countries' Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm
University, available at:
http://www.kub.nl/~fsw_2/home/worschot/rc19/papers/korpi.htm
Laxer G. (1993), 'Social Solidarity, Democracy and and Global
Capitalism'
The 1993 Porter Lecture, Canadian Sociology and Anthropology
Association,
available at: http://www.socsci.mcmaster.ca/soc/porterlectures/laxer.htm
Lindemann D. (2000), 'Incentives and Design Issues in Pension Reform'
The
World Bank China Country Office, available at:
http://www.worldbank.org.cn/English/content/pension6.shtml
Mackelar L. et al. (2000), 'Globalization and social security' Paper,
presented at the ISSA Conference 'Social security in the global
village',
Helsinki, 25-27 September 2000, available at:
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Publications/Documents/IR-99-056.pdf
Mayhew L. (2001), 'Disability - global trends and international
perspectives' Department of Geography and Centre for Pensions and Social
Insurance, Birbeck College, University of London, available at:
http://www.pensions-research.org/papers/default.htm
Norman G. and Mitchell D. J. (2000), 'Pension Reform in Sweden : Lessons
for
American Policymakers' The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder, 1381, June
29,
2000, available from http://www.heritage.org/
Orszag P. R. and Stiglitz J. E. (1999), 'Rethinking Pension Reform: Ten
Myths About Social Security Systems' Presented at the conference on 'New
Ideas About Old Age Security' The World Bank, Washington D.C., September
14
- 15:
http://www.worldbank.org/knowledge/chiefecon/conferen/papers/rethinking.
htm
Paul S. S. and Paul J. A. (1996), 'The World Bank and the Attack on
Pensions
in the Global South' Global Action on Aging, New York:
http://www.globalaging.org/
Pfaller A. (2000), 'Social Democracy in the Globalized Post-Industrial
Society' Politik und Gesellschaft Online, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2,
available at: http://www.fes.de/IPG/ipg2_2000/artpfaller.html
Quiggin J. (1998) 'Social Democracy and market reform in Australia and
New
Zealand' Department of Economics, James Cook University, available at:
http://ecocomm.anu.edu.au/quiggin/JournalArticles98/AustNZ98.html
Rodas-Martini P. (2001), 'Has income distribution really worsened in the
South? And has income distribution really worsened between the North and
the
South?' Background paper for the Human Development Report 2001,
available
at: http://www.undp.org/hdr2001/
Roos J. P. (2000), 'The Consequences of the Crisis of the 1990s to the
Nordic Welfare State: Finland and Sweden ' University of Helsinki,
Department of Social Policy, available at:
http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/staff/jproos/Nordsocp.htm
Rothenbacher F. (2000), 'The Changing Public Sector in Europe: Social
Structure, Income and Social Security' Mannheim Center for European
Social
Research, University of Mannheim, available at:
http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/eurodata/newsletter/no8/feature.html
Rutkowski M. (1998), 'A New Generation of Pension Reforms Conquers the
East
- A Taxonomy in Transition Economies' World Bank Transition Newsletter,
available at:
http://www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/julaug98/rutkowsk.htm
Rutkowski M. (1999), 'The Quest for Modern Solutions: Pension Reforms in
Transition Economies' Presentation for the World Bank Conference 'Ten
Years
After: Transition and Growth in Pst-Communist Countries', Warsaw,
poland,
October 15-16; paper, available in two parts at
http://www.wne.uw.edu.pl/~liberda/additional_materials/liberda/pan_pensi
on2.
html
Scherman C. G. (2000), 'The Future of Social Security' Ministry of
Social
Affairs and Health, Finland, available at:
http://www.vn.fi/stm/english/tao/publicat/financing/scherman.htm
Schneider F. and Enste D. (1998), 'Increasing shadow Economies all over
the
world - fiction or reality? A survey of the global evidence of their
size
and of their impact from 1970 to 1995' Working Paper 9819, Department of
Econocimcs, University of Linz, published on the Internet
http://www.economics.uni-linz.ac.at/Members/Schneider/EnstSchn98.html
Schwartz H. (2000), 'Social Democracy Going Down or Down Under:
Institutions, Internationalized Capital and Indebted States' University
of
Virginia, Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, available at:
http://www.people.virginia.edu/~hms2f/social.html
Siebert H. (2000), 'Pay-as-you-go pensions face a bleak future'
Financial
Times, 23 August, available from:
http://www.globalaging.org/pension/world/pay-as-you-go.htm
St. John S. (1999), 'Retirement Policy Issues That We are Not Talking
about'
New Zealand Association of Economists Annual Conference, Rotorua, 30th
June
- 2nd July, available at:
http://www.geocities.com/Wellesley/Garden/9441/SusanStJohn/RotoruaConf19
99.h
tml
Stilwell F. (2000), 'Globalisation: How did we get to where we are? (and
where can we go now?)' available at:
http://www.phaa.net.au/conferences/stilwell.htm
The Twelve theses of New Delhi are available at:
http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/staff/jproos/delhi.htm
The World Bank Group (2000) 'Flagship Course in Pension Reform'
available
at: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/pensionflagship/
Trezzini B. and Bornschier V. (2001), 'Social Stratification and
Mobility in
the World System: Different Approaches and Recent Research' Department
of
Sociology, University of Zurich, available at:
http://www.suz.unizh.ch/bornschier/publikationen.pdf
Turner J. (2000), 'Social security reform around the world' Public
Policy
Institute AARP, Washington DC, available at:
http://www.pensions-research.org/attachments/march2001/Social%20Security
%20a
round%20the%20world.pdf
Vedder R. K. and Gallaway L. E. (1999), 'Unemployment and Jobs in
International Perspective' Joint Economic Committee Study, United States
Congress, http://www.house.gov/jec/employ/intern.htm
Walker R. A. (1999), 'Putting Capital in It's Place: Globalization and
the
Prospects for Labor'. Working Paper, Department of Geography, University
of
California at Berkeley,
http://ww-geography.berkeley.edu/Publications/Global%20labor_2_5.html
Wheelwright T. (2001), 'Developments in the Global Economy and their
Effects
on Australia' available at: http://www.angelfire.com/ma/rank/tedw.html
Expert list:
Ted Wheelwright is professor emeritus of Economics and Geography at
Sydney
University and director of the Transnational Corporations Research
Project,
Sydney, Australia
Chris Williams [SMTP:cwilliams@staff.usyd.edu.au]
Franz Rothenbacher is a sociologist at the EURODATA Research Archive at
the
Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES)
Franz.Rothenbacher@mzes.uni-mannheim.de
<mailto:Franz.Rothenbacher@mzes.uni-mannheim.de>
Jeja Pekka Roos is professor of Social Policy at Helsinki University
jproos@valt.helsinki.fi
Walter Cadette is a senior researcher at the Jerome Levy Institute of
Economics in new York, USA. He is a retired vice president of J.P.
Morgan &
Co.
Cadette@levy.org
Göran Normann is President Normann Econonomics International. He
published
widely for the Cato Institute, the Heritage foundation and other
international fora on pension reform
goran.normann@norecon.a.se
Daniel J. Mitchell is researcher at the Heritage Foundation in
Washington
D.C., USA
mitchelld@heritage.org
Eva Belabed is researcher at the Chamber of Labor in Linz, Austria. She
published widely on matters of international social policy
Belabed Eva[SMTP:Belabed.E@ak-ooe.at]
Stephen J. Kay is a researcher at the Federal Reserve Bank in Atlanta,
Georgia, USA
Stephen.Kay@atl.frb.org[SMTP:Stephen.Kay@atl.frb.org]
pierce.nelson@atl.frb.org
Gordon Laxer is professor of economics at the University of Alberta,
Canada
Gordon.laxer@ualberta.ca
Frank Stilwell is Associate professor of Economics at Sydney University,
Australia
franks@bullwinkle.econ.usyd.edu.au
Kunibert Raffer is Associate professor of Economics at Vienna
University,
Austria
Kunibert.raffer@univie.ac.at
|
< < <
Date Index > > > |
World Systems Network List Archives at CSF | Subscribe to World Systems Network |
< < <
Thread Index > > > |