Ugh, war, what is it good for?

>
> My understanding of Chase-Dunn's prediction of core war in around 2025 is
> precisely that it would correspond to the tail end of an A phase.  Someone
> correct me if I'm wrong.  So saying we are entering an A phase does not
> contradict the prospect of a future inter-imperialist war at all.  Of
> course the timing is all-important, and so we need to know whether we're
> entering an A phase in order to prepare for the onset of the B phase.
> This is an empirical question that needs to be addressed, obviously.

I'm afraid that I missed the prediction of an inter-imperialist war around
2025 but I can't see the reason why.  As Arrighi argues in the Geometry (and
has also made the same point in person on some panels) the "imperialist"
forces today, namely corporations, which are driving, to use the jargon of
the last few years,  "globalization" would be severely injured by an
international war and are therefore opposed to such a war.

Obviously, the question of the likelihood of an inter-imperialist war is
inseparable from the question of the future of the state.  War is the most
extreme form of competition between states so any prediction about a future
inter-imperialist war is simultaneously a prediction about the continued
power and viability of states.  On the other hand, if the balance of power
shifts toward enterprises, war would be unlikely because enterprises are far
too "prudent" to engage in such a wasteful and pointless activity (No one,
as we know, ever wins a war - the "winners" are merely the nations that have
managed to inflict more damage and suffering on their opponents than their
opponents have inflicted on them).

Carl Dassbach