sociobiology thread, reply to Boris

Hello,
        As we hijack the WSN list with sociobiological discussion, I expect
many to wonder what we are getting at, or why this is related to WSN. All I
can say is I wonder myself. ;-) 

        We began the thread with considerations of malaria immunity which
got us into population genetics of particular groups and their relationships
to climatic factors as explanatory variables, contrary to the explanations
of  'race' we gave evidence of being a socially constructed category instead
of a biological category.  Then there was the aired opinion that the list
was uninterested in any form of biologism, then the counterviews, etc.

Boris:

>Fair enough.  Since we all agree that human behavior, including
>sociability, has a biological basis (as well as others), it would indeed
>be chauvinistic of us not to make room for methodologies that differ from
>our own. 

        I would like to interject something I feel is crucially important,
before we go on. The models you are proposing are undevelopmental, and
static. "human behavior has a biological basis (as well as others)." It's a
linguistic difficulty that I feel sets up poor modelling of the social (or
biological world) which, as even Wilson describes is 'natural HISTORY.' As
empirical subsections of historical studies--biology or sociology--we should
construct models that are emergent in their analysis, instead of
philosophically static. It's much closer to the empirical world observable
to discuss them in this way, and let's us avoid setting up 'the influence of
biology' as some sort of timeless experience or simply as a mental category.
Models matter in how we approach and gather data, so this is rather 
important.

        We go on. You are quoting Wilson:

>
> "Taxonomy and ecology,
>however, have been reshaped entirely during the past forty years by
>integration into neo-Darwinist evolutionary theory - the 'Modern
>Synthesis', as it is often called - in which each phenomenon is weighed
>for its adaptive significance and then related to the basic principles of
>population genetics.  It may not be too much to say that sociology and the
>other social sciences, as well as the humanities, are the last branches of
>biology waiting to be included in the 'Modern Synthesis'".
>

        Does he go into detail on why he packs sociology entirely into
biology? I find this proposition dubious. The last person to argue this
rather organic social sense of the social world was Comte (d. 1857), though
Durkeim wanted as separate social science he still was rather organic in his
conceptions of the social world. Still, the point is that biologizing
'society' was last seen in Comte. 
         Though I fully concur that we are biological creatures, we are more
than biological in the interactions outside of our biological bodies that
are socially constructed out of emergent interactions in which we are only a
reactive part, and which in part generate us. There are
interpenetrations--between the effects of social interaction of others upon
individuals that create the milieu they find themselves within (social
stratification, for instance; different economic positionalities in
societies, for instance). These are outside of biological affects because
they are specific to the relational aspects of the structures of the
interaction.  (though I have stated before, they are biologically reified
(biologically laced) social structural human networks. I'm unsure that
anyone could serious claim there is a 'gene' for bicameral legislatures, for
instance, or a gene for one party states.
         I am citing nothing here, though there is plenty of literature that
shows Wilson's causal model of biology causing sociology (in all senses) is
EMPIRICALLY unjustifiable.  Certainly there many be 'biological sparks' that
influenced the sociological reticulations of people into political
alliances, gift exchanges particularly interest me (Fox's 1970's work). That
is historical modelling.  I would like to see more thorough work done on
that personally that it was biological changes (insted of environmental
changes) that are the causal factor here.  
        Saying that biology 'is an actor' is a narrativization proposition,
a linguistic proposition of 'first movers'; when, if you take natural
selection seriously as a process, everything is reactive and nothing can be
considered as analytically separate as a 'cause.' 'Cause/effect' in my
opinion is a purely human social category, a a highly political one at that
since it poses objective information frames that have social effects on
mobilization of groups or externalization of groups, or even can FOUND
particularl groups if the narrativization is widely enough believed. Ideas
can generate social physical activity, and are social activities. Ideas as
social activities, instead of simply seen as 'empirical propositions'
(though they can be) is hard for many in the physcial scientists to 'see.' I
remember reading a comment from a review of Consilience that said that
"Wilson does address the deconstructionists," though it is unfortunate that
social construction is lumped into deconstruction, when the former is an
analytic method and research agenda, which typically is without an interest
in ANY POLITICAL activities, only researching the social constrction of
knowledge (LaTour, Hannigan), and the latter certainly drawing on literary
studies does have a political agenda ("Orientalism", Said) Wilson seems to
consider all social construction as deconstruction, and this is in my
opinion rather typical of the 'first immune response' of physical
scientists--hostility, when the social constructionist 'agenda' is
apolitical and interested in researching how scientists/social
movements/etc. construct meanings out of social interactions and decision
making.
        Back to the point:  This [biology as a philosohpical first mover] is
why I find Wilson's ideas difficult to take seriously. He's turning biology
into a philosophy--a philosophy that satisfies rather human and social
(instead of biological) desires for intellectual order and explanations,
rather than sticking to empirical phenomena. Here, notice I find myself
DEFENDING PHYSCIAL SCIENCE against Wilson's philosophizing.

>
>Now we are at the crux of the problem.  This approach, for which social
>scientists et al. want to leave room in the study of human sociability
>apparently bears no such illusions about them.  Like the natural
>historians of the past, the best among them can prepare for a future of
>being museum curators, journalists and producers of family programming on
>TV, and as for the rest, well... 

        I lost him here. I am missing the tacit argument he is making here.
What is it? What is the 'them' referred to, above? "Them" is mentioned
twice, in the same sense or is the referent switched?  To what does "this
approach" refer?


>
>"self knowledge is constrained and shaped by the emotional control centers
>in the hypothalamus and limbic system of the brain.  These centers flood
>our consciousness with all the emotions - hate, love, fear, and others -
>that are consulted by ethical philosophers who wish to intuit the
>standards of good and evil.  What, we are then compelled to ask, made the
>hypothalamus and the limbic system?  These evolved by natural selection.
>That simple biological statement must be pursued to explain ethics and
>ethical philosophers, if not epistemology and epistemologists, at all
>depths" (p.3)

        There is a large 'leap of faith' between that question mark and the
subsequent statement: "These evolved by natural selection." That is a
philosophical proposition, instead of (by his own stress on empirical work)
something easily demonstratable causally. 
        If by natural selection we mean strictly biological inputs, I would
disagree. If by natural selection we mean by interactions between social
situations, environmental situations, and biological situations, sure.
Natural selection would still operate here, with biology as the RECORDER of
environmental variations (through differential dieoffs, etc. of genes etc.)
instead of actively 'planning for the future.'  And I would say that genes
change rather slowly, particualry for human populations, when it is so much
easier and genetically safer to change the 'software' of culture and
attitudes, than the genetics. Society may insulate humanity from systematic
external changes in natural selection and make it more amenable to
'self-feedback' in streamlining a more and more social creature biologically
speaking. (Tudge's argument and other's about the brain case, about hands,
about the expansion of puberty, etc.)
         After all, there is more to natural selection than what Wilson
(tightly) packages it into being, as I quote, a  "simple biological
statement." (Sigh.) And I thought Darwin was arguing about interactions
between environment and biology. It seems Wilson has reduced this to biology
operating UPON the external world? If natural selection is seen as an
emergent historical process instead of a abstract philosophical 'first mover
principle' used to explain other factors, Wilson's argument becomes
untenable and simply becomes a philosophical position, since there is
nothing 'causal' about natural selection outside his discourse
narritivization. Natural selection  is a description of a process of
interactions, of correlations between forces, instead of a force in itself
(as Wilson seems to pose 'it' is). He is creating an a static philosophical
'it' from a process oriented  'verb'--in short, distancing himself from the
empirical world he claims to be studying.


>
>or:
>
>"scientists and humanists should consider together the possibility that
>the time has come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of
>the philosophers and biologized" (p.287)
>

        This is an interesting claim and rationalization for more 'autonomy'
regarding the expansion of the empirical basis of the science of
biology--into sociology.  Interesting, because Wilson's desire to create
'unideological' social science information based on presumably 'empirical
information' is very much at the core of the work of Elias--though Elias
claims the flag for sociology instead of biology (without denying the
interpenetrations).
         While I have some disagreement myself with Elias, I would be glad
to pass you a draft copy of a text summary of Elias's theory of the sciences
in general as well as his theory of the social sciences, their
legitimations, their justifications, etc. - if you are interested. I'm
thinking of polishing it for publication, since Elias is still very arcane
in Anglo-social science theory, though more well known in continental
Europe, particularly the Netherlands and Germany. [Giddens's work is
actually a rather cursory  mesh of some of Elias's ideas; Giddens's was
taught by Elias while Elias was in England.]


>
>I find it hard not to interpret these statements as anything other than
>patronizing to the inexact branches of knowledge and dismissive of their
>methodologies.  Wilson supports his claims by reference to the history of
>science, but his reading of it is highly tendentious. . . .

> Historically, it has been
>the disciplines outside the natural sciences which have had to fight
>for the privilege of constructing methodologies which constitute
>"alternative" perspectives, not the other way around, and they have had to
>do it under conditions where critiques of the natural sciences'
>exclusivist claims to the Truth have been purposely interpreted as 
>dismissals of all of the latter's research. 

        Yes, you would be interested in at least knowing of Elias's theory
of the sciences in general.  I was unaware that Wilson had offered one. Does
he write about it anywhere else except in Sociobiology? Is that was his
Consilience text does in more elaborate detail? Make a biologically and
natural science inclusion for the social sciences? I ask for information. 

> Of
>course, until racial and other genetic theories are conclusively proven
>they remain theories, but given the lack of positive theories in the
>social sciences

        I would consider J. Diamond's book _Guns, Germs, and Steel a
'positive' scientific work, with far reaching methodological implications
for all the separated sciences.   (Positive in the sense that it is
observation and empirical, and experiment based--relating to the
interpenetrations in human societies between physical empirical phenomena
and social empirical phenomena.) It basically dismantles separations between
the physical and the social sciences.
        Actually, I'm revealing my sense of what part of sociology can
usefully elaborate--the human/environmental relationships of societies,
particularly in environmental sociology. I'm finishing up a large
theoretical/empirical work in environmental sociology at present actually
dealing with this that is comparative and historical. It's similar to
Diamond's work on agricultural raw materials availability and and the
genetics of agriculture in how that effects geographical trade lines in seed
stocks, and how that is  related to differentials in human 'cargo'
worldwide--though my work deals with a more typical 'social science'
phenomenon: social stratification particularly related to urbanization
processes. The boundaries between the physcial sciences and the social
sciences are rather untenable and unjustifiable I would say. I offer a model
for how to integrate them, in an comparative/historical 'natural experiment'
example. Foucault's conception of power/knowledge is particularly apt in
describing the intentional separating of these. I mean the number of times
that biology has been mentioned in the Sociology department here I could
count on my closed fist. And there is only one person I know interested in
theorizing the interpenetrations of social science and physcial
sciences--Stephen Bunker (and me, making two; Diamond, making three; many in
the discipline of geography however deal with these issues though rarely in
a sense of modeling the relationships)
        Elias discusses human/environmental relatioships as well, though I
disagree with him on his characterization in my review paper,and posit a
more interactive basis of human and environmental phenomena.
         I'm very surprised (and depressed) that Wilson seems more and more
to be a representative of the 'vulgar biologism' that he is made out to be,
particularly based on the sense in which you have discussed _Consilience_.  
        However, where in Sociobiology is his quote about the importance of
environment AND what he calls 'genetics.?'  You have left that out. Has he
changed his mind by _Consilience_?

> While the goal of transcending the largely artificial
>divisions between disciplines and cultures is certainly a noble one,

        Actually, I feel confident in saying there is much superfluous
specialization in the sciences, I would avoid saying that all divisions are
artificial, or even largely. Some divisions are indeed empirically defined.
Some are simpler than others.
         Furthermore, there are some that are more positioned to explain the
interrelationships of 'it all' than others, particularly so are the social
sciences when it comes to explaining human socieites, which pull in a great
deal from biology and external environmental physical sciences as well.
However, much ideological philosophying and poor models of the interactions
along these lines in the social sciences leaves it in almost complete
epistemological 'cluelessness' and separation  from any of these
interlinkages with physical science disciplines. The social sciences  at
present have very poor models for how to assemble the pieces and knowledge
learned from the physical sciences into social scientific explanations.
Elias attempts to offer some clues for it. I have other ideas on how to
integrate social, biological and physcial science data into explaining human
societies. Elias models social science as a science of interlrelationships
of these. I'm glad I came across his work early in my career. [Saved ME a
lot of writing.] It's uncanny to see such close similarities though such
widely divergent outcomes or models of society. If you are interested I will
start a private post on this topic to you, if you have specific questions.
I'm heckled by various projects during this month however, though I will
respond at least within three weeks.


Regards,


Mark Whitaker
University of Wisconsin-Madison