Kosovo: A Response to the Critics

(Apologies for multiple postings).


The present hostilities in Kosovo are arguably the Internet's "first
war", much as Vietnam was television's "first war" and the Gulf War was
the war that saw CNN come of age as a major mass media outlet.  Perhaps
predictably, information about the conflict has become confusing and
contradictory.  Much of the information has to be viewed through jaded
eyes as the propaganda machinery on both sides of the conflict has gone
into high gear.


Having said all that, I want to offer (risk?) a reply to some of the
criticisms of NATO policy that have been offered on the lists I post to
and elsewhere over the last months.  The general lines of criticism
appear to be crystallizing.



Criticism No. 1:  NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia is illegal under
international law.


The critics of the NATO bombing have made a powerful argument that NATO's
action is illegal because the action was undertaken without the approval
of the UN Security Council.  They've also argued that the bombing
constitutes illegal aggression against a sovereign country.


It is clearly difficult to argue that NATO's bombing constitutes the
operation of a collective security system as envisioned in the United
Nations Charter.  It may even be aggression under international law.=20
Nevertheless, the legal absolutism of some of NATO's critics seems
misguided, especially considering that the treatment of the Kosovars by
the Serbian authorities violates norms of human rights enshrined in the
Geneva Convention, the UN Charter; the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights; the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and
the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
to name only a few.  Legal proscriptions against war are by no means to
be casually thrown aside.  Nevertheless, it is well to remember the
spirit, if not exactly the letter, of Abraham Lincoln's response to those
who criticized him for suspending the right of _habeas corpus_ during the
Civil War:  "[A]re all the laws _but one_ to go unexecuted, and the
government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?" (Lincoln,
1953, p. 430). =20



Criticism No. 2:  The Serbs have been unfairly demonized.


It's been argued on these lists in the last few weeks that Serbian
violations of the human rights of the Kosovars have been greatly
exaggerated.  It's even been suggested that there's no evidence that the
Serbs are mounting a systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.=20
Regardless of the exact number of persons killed and displaced by ethnic
cleansing might be, and "hard" data on the subject is naturally difficult
to obtain, it remains true that respected non-governmental organizations
in Kosovo, including the American Red Cross, World Vision, Human Rights
Watch, and Amnesty International, have all reported interviews with
refugees that present a credible and consistent story of refugees being
forcibly removed from their homes by the Serbian authorities. =20

Accounts from these organizations are available at the various Web sites,
listed below.


It's also been argued that within the former Yugoslavia, the Serbs are
not alone in their chauvinism and use of ethnic cleansing.  The Croats
and Bosnians have both embraced similar chauvinistic ideologies, as
illustrated by the writings of Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic.  The
Croats, at least, have been accused of ethnic cleansing.  Unfortunately,
this "plague of both your houses" argument, whatever basis in fact it may
have, doesn't legitimize Serbian ethnic cleansing.  To claim otherwise
would be to commit a "so's-your-old-man fallacy."  Nor does it defeat the
argument for intervention by NATO, any more than pointing out the nature
of the combatants in a turf war among mobsters or street gangs is an
argument against intervention by the police.



Criticism No. 3:  The plight of the refugees from Kosovo has been
worsened by the NATO bombing.


It's been argued on these lists that NATO's bombing has had the effect of
simply turning more Kosovars into refugees.  According to one version of
this argument, the bombing has caused the Serbs to step up their campaign
of ethnic cleansing.  According to a second version, the refugees are not
fleeing from ethnic cleansing, but from the NATO bombardment itself.


The first version of this argument is the stronger one, in my view.=20
Nevertheless, it contains the counterfactual assumption that ethnic
cleansing would have proceeded at a slower pace or not taken place at all
in the absence of NATO bombing.  In view of Mr. Milosevic's record over
the last ten years, it is difficult for me to believe that it would have
not taken place at all.  So for at least some of the Kosovars, it's not
unreasonable to believe that the NATO bombing represents basically the
difference between becoming a refugee now and becoming a refugee later.


The second version of this argument, according to which the refugees are
fleeing the bombing itself rather than the Serbs, is more easily disposed
of.  If the refugees are indeed fleeing the bombs, the various NGOs I
referred to above have not been convinced of the fact.  The public
statements of the NGOs I have been able to consult universally attribute
refugee movements to Serbian ethnic cleansing.  Moreover, earlier this
week, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) also blamed the
Serbs, saying,


>           Driven from their homes, stripped of their possessions and
deprived >           of their identity documents, the Kosovars are the
victims of a

>           shameful and systematic campaign of persecution and abuse.
Using=20

>           the most brutal methods imaginable to erase a population from
the             >           map, the Yugoslav authorities have acted in a
way that is morally            >           repugnant and in direct
violation of international law (_Financial          =20

            Times_, April 20, 1999).

                                        =20

Note that these pronouncements come from the UN, normally circumspect in
criticizing governments.  In short, the only observers convinced that the
refugees are fleeing NATO bombing seem to be the Serbs and their
apologists.


Moreover, consider the composition of the influxes of refugees.  Amnesty
International has repeatedly noted that a disproportionate number of
women, children, and elderly men have arrived among the refugees (cf. its
statements of April 1 and 7).  This is consistent with refugee reports
that Serbian authorities are separating men of military age from the rest
of the refugees.  If one assumes that the refugees are fleeing bombing,
rather than ethnic cleansing, the absence of male refugees requires
explanation, since bombs don't discriminate between women and children
and men.


Finally, note the pattern of refugee movements.  UNHCR has provided a map
detailing current refugee influxes; it is updated daily and available
online at http://www.unhcr.ch/news/media/sitmap.htm  Compare this map
with the daily maps of the bombing available at NATO's Web page,
http://www.nato.int/  Note that the bombing, while seemingly concentrated
within Kosovo itself, has occurred throughout Serbia.  If we assume the
refugees are fleeing from the bombing, it seems strange that the refugees
appear mainly to be migrating from Kosovo.  If there are similar
migrations of people further north, e.g., from Serbia to Montenegro, they
don't appear to have been noticed either by UNHCR or the Yugoslav
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the latter of which has provided ample
information about other sorts of consequences for civilians and damage to
the country's infrastructure on its Web site at=20
http://www.mfa.gov.yu/).



Criticism No. 4:  NATO is hypocritical in claiming it is motivated by
humanitarian considerations.  It has ulterior motives for its actions.=20


It is undoubtedly true that NATO members, including the United States,
have been considerably more willing to ignore some humanitarian
catastrophes than others.  Like others on these lists, I find repugnant
the disregard of the West for the implosion of political order now taking
place in Africa.  Nevertheless, moral lapses of the Western alliance in
the past do not defeat the ethical claim that attempting to pacify the
former Yugoslavia and return the refugees and victims of ethnic cleansing
to their homes is the right thing to do now.  Nor does any real or
imagined "ulterior motive" of the NATO intervention constitute an
argument that the intervention may not be humanitarian in its
consequences.


While I'm on the subject, let me comment on a couple of alleged "ulterior
motives" for the NATO intervention.  Various posts to these lists over
the last few weeks have suggested the possibility that NATO is motivated
by a desire to control the Trepca mining complex.  As I've argued in a
previous post to the International Political Economy list, it isn't clear
to me why the West should require _military_ control of the mining
complex.  Assuming the Western countries do care about Trepca, wouldn't
it make more tactical sense to simply acquiesce in Mr. Milosevic's ethnic
cleansing, thereby letting the Serbs do the work of pacifying Kosovo, and
trade with Yugoslavia afterward?  The argument for Trepca as NATO's
motivation depends upon an unsophisticated Leninist notion  of
imperialism, according to which the requirements of capitalist economies
produce attempts at military expansion in pursuit of markets, investment
opportunities, and sources of raw materials.  After decades of talk on
the left about "neoimperialism" conducted through multinational
corporations or international capital mobility, why the reversion to
older theories of imperialism?  Moreover, the economistic explanation
requires one to accept that in order to control the former Yugoslavia's
economy, NATO would be willing to blow up much of it.  Note, e.g., the
targeting of bridges over the Danube River, a key Eastern European
economic artery (I'm indebted to my friend Gregory Howe for bringing the
bombing of these bridges to my attention).


The other alleged "ulterior motive" is a strategic motive.  NATO, it is
claimed by at least one poster, wishes to guard against the possibility
of resurgent Communism in Eastern Europe.  Like the economistic
explanation, the strategic explanation fails because it makes little
tactical sense.  If NATO wished to secure a strategic position, it would
clearly be less costly in materiel and lives to simply allow Milosevic to
pacify the rump Yugoslavia and thereafter establish the sort of
relationship with his regime that have brought the Hungary, the Czech
Republic, and Poland into NATO.    =20


I might note in passing that the degree to which NATO has justified
itself with humanitarian arguments is being exaggerated by the critics.=20
In his press conference of March 19 and in repeated public statements,
President Clinton has explicitly acknowledged that NATO is also motivated
by a wish to prevent a wider war:

=20

>This is a humanitarian crisis, but it is much more.  This is a

>conflict with no natural boundaries.  It threatens our national

>interests.  If it continues, it will push refugees across borders, and

>draw in neighboring countries.  It will undermine the credibility of

>NATO, on which stability in Europe and our own credibility depend.  It

>will likely reignite the historical animosities, including those that

>can embrace Albania, Macedonia, Greece, even Turkey (Clinton 1999).


We have only to recall the sad history of Lebanon after Jordan's
expulsion of the Palestineans in the early 1970s to realize how dangerous
ethnic cleansing is to countries outside the former Yugoslavia.  The
danger of a wider war and spreading instability implies that the conflict
in Kosovo is not simply a Yugoslavian matter.  To the extent that NATO is
motivated by this non-humanitarian motive of preventing a wider war,
intervention seems justifiable.



Criticism No. 5:  The bombing campaign has been militarily ineffectual,
and could succeed only through a ground offensive likely to be extremely
costly in people and materiel. =20


The bombing clearly has not persuaded Mr. Milosevic to accept NATO's
terms as I write these words.  Furthermore, military analysts believe the
German experience during World War II indicates that the Serbs would make
any invasion a costly endeavor (cf. Bandow 1999).  Any ground offensive
would require the support of states neighboring Yugoslavia; such support
might be difficult to come by, because of the danger of reprisals from
Yugoslavia.  Furthermore, one ally that would be key to an invasion,
Greece, opposes the use of the port of Thessalonika against its fellow
Eastern Orthodox in Serbia (_Business Week_, May 3, 1999, 66).  Finally,
former Clinton advisor Dick Morris has publicly expressed doubts about
whether or not the U.S. public would support an invasion involving
substantial casualties (_New York Post_, April 13, 1999).


Of course, the choice of military strategy depends upon the political
goals to be achieved in Kosovo.  Personally, I agree with the position
taken by the Center for Security Policy, a Washington-based think-tank
studying foreign policy and defense issues.  In its _Decision Brief_ of
April 12, 1999, the Center declared that NATO must cease legitimating and
perpetuating the Milosevic regime by making deals with it.  Any
meaningful victory, it says, must include "the end of Slobodan
Milosevic's reign of terror" through the elimination of his regime, the
removal of the Serbian army from Kosovo, and the return of Kosovar
refugees to their homes (Center for Security Policy Publication No. 99-D
42).  Any political goal short of the removal of Mr. Milosevic is
unlikely to resolve the conflict effectively, and could exacerbate it.=20
Attempting to use the military to carve out an enclave for the Kosovars,
whether disguised as "humanitarian assistance" to the internally
displaced or not (cf. Cohen 1999; O'Hanlon 1999), is likely to create a
Balkan version of Israel that would become the subject of regional
animosity and future wars.  Attempting to arm the Kosovars themselves to
allow them to continue struggling for themselves (cf. Anderson and
Phillips 1999) would only turn the conflict into a festering guerilla war
like Angola or Kampuchea.


Accepting that the political goal should be the removal of Mr. Milosevic
clearly rules out any diplomatic solution.  Three basic military options
remain:  (a) continuation of the current bombing; (b) removal of current
limitations on bombing targets; and (c) the introduction of NATO ground
troops.

The present military strategy, as noted above, is now widely viewed as
having failed.  Removal of current "Vietnam-like" restrictions on the
targets of bombing might destroy Serbian military capability and limit
ethnic cleansing, but will not drive the Serbs from Kosovo or bring
ethnic cleansing to a halt (cf. Hooper 1999).  That leaves the option of
ground troops.  For whatever it's worth, at least one former U.S.
commander in Bosnia has argued publicly against overestimating Serb
military capabilities (_New York Times_, March 30, 1999).  Not even
critics of U.S. military intervention doubt the ability of NATO to win a
ground offensive possibly involving the conquest of all of Yugoslavia,
although they say such an offensive would be difficult.  For example,
Doug Bandow comments, "Of course, NATO would win," although "victory
would come at a high price" (Bandow 1999). =20


Under these circumstances, therefore, it appears the main barriers to
victory are political, not military.  NATO's leaders fear that the public
would be unwilling to support a ground offensive involving heavy
casualties.  In my view, their fear is misguided.  Dick Morris claims
history indicates Americans are unwilling to bear casualties in warfare.=20
I think history proves no such thing.  Essentially one case, Vietnam,
bears out Morris' claim.  When convinced of the rightness of a cause or
the importance of a conflict to vital national interests, as in the case
of the two world wars, Americans are more than willing to fight.  It is
the responsibility of our leaders to persuade them to support an
unconditional victory in Yugoslavia.  Yes, the political ineffectual
"Peace at Any Price" crowd left over from the 1960s will moan and groan
and beat drums at the White House.  Yes, the incipient isolationists of
Newt Gingrich's Republican Party will question the administration's
military judgement.  But the conflict and the suffering of the people of
Yugoslavia, Serb and Albanian alike, will end more quickly and decisively
if the end of the Milosevic regime becomes our goal.



CRITICISM NO. 6:  The bombing in Kosovo has damaged our relationship with
the Russians, and could lead to serious conflict with them.


It's been argued on at least one of these lists that the bombing has
increased anti-Western feeling in Russia, and may even increase the
likelihood of a Communist victory in the next presidential election
there.  These concerns are by no means trifling.  Nevertheless, imagine a
worst-case scenario:  the Russians become convinced that the West has
hostile intentions.  How would their foreign and defense policies change?
 An attempt at a substantial Russian military buildup seems unlikely--how
could it be financed?  The Russians still have nuclear weapons, but,
regardless of whether the Russian president is named Yeltsin or Zyuganov,
both the U.S. and the Russians retain, as far as I can tell, the "second
strike capability" that arguably deterred nuclear conflict through the
Cold War.  The Russians could make trouble for the West in regional
conflicts, e.g., by supporting Saddam Hussein or Mr. Milosevic or both.
That prospect, however, is less an argument for non-intervention than for
quickly and decisively resolving the Balkan conflict as I've already
suggested. The Russians could assist other countries in becoming nuclear
weapons states, but historically they've had little interest in
encouraging proliferation.  In short, potential dangers to the
U.S.-Russian relationship seem manageable.   =20


I've gone on at some length; I do apologize for the length of this post.=20
I hope that the arguments I've presented offer an alternative to leftist
criticism of NATO.  If nothing else, I hope they inform and induce
thought.  As one of my former professors said, in academic life, what
matters is not whether or not people agree with you, but whether or not
you provoke discussion.

=20


<center>REFERENCES=20

</center> =20

American Red Cross.  _News_.  Available online at
http://www.redcross.org/news/index.html


Amnesty International.  "Kosovo:  The Plight of Refugees Must Not Be
Ignored."  April 7, 1999.  Available online at

http://www.amnesty.org/news/1999/47002699.htm


Amnesty International.  "Public Statement:  Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia--Kosovo Province."  April 1, 1999.  Available online at

http://www.amnesty.org/news/1999/47002399.htm


Amnesty International. "The Road to Kosovo."  Available online at
http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/kosovo/indx_lat.htm


Anderson, James H., and James Phillips.  "Helping Kosovo Help Itself."=20
_Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum_No. 588 (April 5, 1999).

Available online at http://www.heritage.org/library/execmemo/em588.html


Bandow, Doug.  "Reinforcing Failure."  Cato Institute, _Today's
Commentary_, April 13, 1999.  Available online at
http://www.cato.org/dailys/04-13-99.html


Clinton, Bill.  "Press Conference by the President, March 19, 1999."=20
Available online at
http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1999/3/22=
/4.text.1


Center for Security Policy.  "What Are We Fighting For in Serbia?"=20
Center for Security Policy Publication No. 99-D 42.  Available online at
http://www.security-policy.org/papers/1999/99-D42.html


Cohen, Roberta.  "Uprooted Inside Kosovo Need Aid."  _Newsday_, April 9,
1999.

Available online at=20
http://www.brook.edu/views/op-ed/cohenr/19990409.htm


"Crisis in the Balkans:  The Infantry Option; Could a Small Ground Force
Carve Out Safe Havens?"  _New York Times_, March 30, 1999, p. A10.


Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.  "NATO Aggression Against FR of Yugoslavia."  Available
online at http://www.mfa.gov.yu/


"Ground Troops:  NATO is Damned If It Does, Damned If It Doesn't."=20
_Business Week_, May 3, 1999.


Hooper, James F.  "Winning the War in Kosovo." _Foreign Policy in Focus_,
March 30, 1999.  Available online at
http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/media/opeds/kosovo02.html


Human Rights Watch.  "Kosovo: Focus on Human Rights."  Available online
at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/kosovo98/index.htm


Lincoln, Abraham.  "Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4,
1861."  Reprinted in _The Collected works of Abraham Lincoln_, ed. Roy P.
Basler, Marion Dolores Pratt, and Lloyd A. Dunlap.  Vol. 4, 1860-61.  New
Brunswick, NJ:  Rutgers University Press, 1953.


Morris, Dick.  "Don't Let Liberals Start a War."  _New York Post_, April
13, 1999.  Available online at
http://www.nypostonline.com/commentary/5828.htm


North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.  Official Home Page at
http://www.nato.int/


O'Hanlon, Michael.  "Invade Kosovo But Let Serbs Keep a Slice."  _Wall
Street Journal_, April 1, 1999.  Available online at
http://www.brook.edu/views/op-ed/ohanlon/19990406.htm


Ogata, Sadako.  "Returning the Refugees."  _Financial Times_, April 20,
1999.

Available online on the Web site of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees at http://www.unhcr.ch/news/pr/ft990420.htm


United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.  _News:  Kosovo Crisis
Update_, April 23, 1999.  Available online at
http://www.unhcr.ch/news/media/kosovo.htm


World Vision.  "Crisis in Kosovo."  Available online at
http://www.worldvision.org/worldvision/pr.nsf/217a1c6d85845c0085256475000cc4=
b9/6357fa0ed0a98d6b882566b000039a57?OpenDocument