guatemala

Los Angeles Times,       Wednesday, March 3, 1999

              Put Truth About the U.S. Role on the Agenda
                 Guatemala: An apology for longtime American backing of
the repressive
              army would help heal the wounds of war.
              By SUSANNE JONAS

                          When President Clinton visits Guatemala next
week, he will
                      have a historic opportunity to deliver a long
overdue message
                      to the Guatemalan people: He can acknowledge and
apologize
                      for the decades-long U.S. role in supporting the
repressive
                      Guatemalan army. By acknowledging the truth, the
U.S. government
                      can participate in Guatemala's process of healing
the wounds of war.
                           Guatemala's long-awaited truth commission
report was released
                      last week in an emotional ceremony attended by
thousands of
                      Guatemalans. It focuses primarily on the brutal,
at times genocidal,
                      state policies of the Guatemalan military and
civilian authorities that
                      were responsible for an overwhelming 93% of the
atrocities
                      committed during the 36-year war (as compared with
3% by the
                      guerrillas).
                           But the report also highlights U.S.
responsibility for directly and
                      indirectly supporting illegal operations of the
Guatemalan government
                      from the 1960s through the 1980s. Just after the
presentation of the
                      report, U.S. Ambassador Donald J. Planty responded
defensively,
                      referring to the bloodshed as simply an internal
matter among
                      Guatemalans, denying a central U.S. role and
characterizing the
                      report as a "wrong interpretation."
                           Indeed, Guatemala's was a civil war--Latin
America's longest and
                      bloodiest, leaving a toll of 200,000 unarmed
(primarily Mayan
                      indigenous) civilians dead or "disappeared."
However, it was a Cold
                      War civil war. It began largely as an outgrowth of
the CIA's 1954
                      intervention, at the height of the Cold War, to
overthrow the
                      progressive and nationalistic--democratically
elected--government of
                      Jacobo Arbenz. The intervention left no space for
political dissent
                      within Guatemala. As a result, opposition forces
concluded in the
                      early 1960s that the only available avenue to
political and social
                      justice was armed uprising. While Cuba supported
leftist insurgents
                      during the 1960s, even U.S. authorities have
acknowledged that since
                      the 1970s, Guatemalan guerrillas received
virtually no outside support.
                      By contrast, the U.S. played a significant role in
the war for several
                      decades.
                           During the 1960s, U.S. counterinsurgency
advisors became
                      deeply involved in training and equipping the
Guatemalan army,
                      transforming it from an inefficient force into a
brutal killing machine.
                      U.S. advisors were involved in reinforcing
Guatemala's intelligence
                      apparatus, as well as paramilitary forces and
death squads. They also
                      transmitted the polarizing national security
doctrine used by the
                      Guatemalan army to justify virtually any and all
acts of repression in
                      the name of anti-communism.
                           The second round of the war, in the late
1970s and early 1980s,
                      was fought in the indigenous highlands. During the
army's
                      scorched-earth counterinsurgency offensive of
1981-83, hundreds of
                      villages were wiped off the face of the map,
150,000 Guatemalans
                      were killed or "disappeared," and more than 1
million were displaced.
                      During these years, the U.S. Congress prohibited
direct U.S. military
                      aid to the Guatemalan army. But the Reagan
administration continued
                      to support its counterinsurgency allies covertly
and indirectly, through
                      the CIA end other government agencies.
                           Direct U.S. military aid was restored in the
mid-'80s, and then cut
                      off again in 1990 because of ongoing human rights
abuses. But even
                      then, the U.S. continued to regard the Guatemalan
army as its
                      strategic ally and secretly substituted CIA funds
for overt military aid.
                      Just four years ago, the U.S. press revealed that
the CIA had
                      maintained close ties with human rights criminals
in the Guatemalan
                      army through the mid-1990s, long after the Cold
War was over.
                      Given those 1995 revelations and the ensuing
scandal in Washington,
                      today's truth commission conclusions about U.S.
involvement should
                      not surprise anyone.
                           The U.S. government did begin changing its
relation to Guatemala
                      by supporting the peace talks of the mid-1990s. It
also provided funds
                      for postwar peace projects, including the truth
commission itself, and
                      it collaborated with the commission by
declassifying some documents.
                      However, the declassification process was partial.
The Defense
                      Department, for example, revealed nothing.
Guatemalans--and
                      Americans--deserve a fuller disclosure of U.S.
documents.
                           When Clinton visits Guatemala, he should
accept responsibility for
                      past U.S. actions. By doing so, the U.S. would not
be absolving the
                      various Guatemalan actors but setting an example,
above all, to the
                      still-resistant Guatemalan army. This would be
remembered as a
                      historic contribution to Guatemala's difficult
task of reconciliation and
                      healing. It also could help balance the great
weight of U.S.
                      interventions and signify Washington's
understanding that the Cold
                      War is truly over in Central America.
                                              - - -

                      Susanne Jonas, a Specialist on Guatemala and
U.s.-guatemalan
                      Relations, Teaches Latin American and Latino
Studies at Uc Santa
                      Cruz
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