Fw: Weber, Weberians and rationality

In regard to Duchesne's postings I originally sent this one to the H-World
list but it was not placed there - probably since it contains - the horror
of it ! - a passage in a foreign language. I know Americans tend to be
pretty bad linguists - but that bad !


>I am sorry if I have to repeat something I wrote from Australia last year
>but maybe it's useful to reiterate what I wrote last year. Blaut and to an
>extent Duchesne are not really fighting for/against the long dead ghost of
>Weber but for/against Talcott Parsons (pretty much alive still at Chicago)
>and `modernisation-theory'. You have a `Chicago' Weber just like You have a
>Paris `1968' Marx who is very different from, say, the Pjongyang/1999,
>Moscow/1919 Marx.  I think criticism of `modernisation theory' is perfectly
>legitimate but that `modernisation theory' should not be equated with
Weber.
>
>Weber is, in fact, as perfect an example as the `Pyongyang Marx' of what
>gets lost when you translate somebody into a very different cultural idiom.
>For Weber does not belong to Chicago AD 1999, he was speaking to/belongs to
>the German scholarly world during the Gruenderjahre - he simply assumes a
>scholarly idiom and accepted state of knowledge which is alien to modern
>scholars in the US.
>
>I have always found Weber hard to understand until upon reading J.
>Schumpeter 'History of Economic Thought' (Schumpeter of course belonged to
>Weber's intellectual milieu) I grasped that Weber primarily considered
>himself an ECONOMIST. For not only was most of Weber's work published by
the
>Verein fuer Sozialpolitik (a kind of German parallel to the British Fabian
>Society or rather the London School of Economics in its early years) but
>also since much of his activities were centred on the Verein fuer
>Sozialpolitik of whose review Weber was long editor.
>
>Now, it's weird but while there are a myriad studies of the relations
>between Weber and figures to whom he had only a marginal relationship like
>Nietzsche or Marx (who were both interesting but outdated for Weber) there
>is very little on what was the formative influence on his work and on the
>figures he constantly mentions, namely Gustaf Schmoller and the German
>historical school in economics, which was in Weber's period involved in
what
>can - in retrospect - be termed a rearguard struggle with the Austrian
>`marginalist' school.
>
>The trouble with Weber is mainly that the `Historic School' has been
utterly
>defeated by the thought of the Austrians and been consigned to oblivion
>while Weber has been claimed by an American sociology which belongs to a
>very different tradition than that of Weber. In this controversy between
the
>two schools Weber not only sided with the historian school but he also
>wanted to build on the foundations of the historical school to include
>within a basically economic theory institutions of society, basic to
>economic life, such as religion and law.
>
>For the historical school had always been saying that the economy can not
be
>separated from the rest of the society and that the study of economics
>should, therefore, include legal or religious institutions too - these are
>unique, though, and can therefore no be studied on the basis of general
>laws. Whereas the Austrians were saying that economics should confine
itself
>to economically purposeful behaviour and abstract from the rest of the
>society. It may be meaningful but it does not belong to economics.
>
>Now, not only is that still a central controversy in economics (witness the
>recent rise of the `new institutional economics' which in many way is a
>resurgence of the historic school) but also much of what Weber writes makes
>perfect sense in economics but will (as Weber himself writes - witness
>Wirtschaft und Gesselschaft Ch. 1 &1 no.11 -) be hard to understand for
>historians. Thus the concept of the `ideal type' which is hard to grasp
>until you read that Weber compares it to the economists' concept of the
>model - which is still the backbone of economics. And as economists would
>never cease to remind you a model is meant as a ceteris paribus
>`hightlighted' description of some aspects of society (is n't that
precisely
>Weber's ideal type?).
>
>Likewise (to enter into this discussion) with the concept of `economic
>rationality' which is still basic to economics and which assumes that the
>individual makes choices on the basis of comparative calculations of cost
>and benefit without considering value judgements and/or customs. (That is
he
>behaves on the basis of rational choices to achieve a certain purpose or he
>is displaying  Zweckrationales Handeln - as Weber would call it - which in
>English is I think mistranslated as `instrumental rationality' but might
>rather be translated as 'purpose oriented rational behaviour').
>
>The Austrians contended that all societies should be studied as if
decisions
>were taken on the basis of costs/benefits calculations and that otherwise
>the economists were to assume that decisions could be reduced to
>cost/benefit calculations or were to assume that value judgements and/or
>customs could be seen as `ceteris paribus' conditions which escape analysis
>in terms of rationality.
>
>Weber on the other hand was arguing that not only is the concept of
economic
>rationality, or Zweckrationalitaet, as used by the economists only useful
>for modern capitalist society (and therefore much of the conceptual
>apparatus of economics can only be applied to modern society). But also
that
>the concept of rationality of purpose is itself derived from a value namely
>the Protestant `innerweltliche Askese' - in which work (remember the labour
>theory of value here ?) becomes abstracted from other values and be seen as
>a value to itself.
>
>This is still pretty much a `heretical position' in economics. And the
irony
>is (at least if I witness recent work by D.Mac Closkey) that - for historic
>reasons - the group the argument was directed to has chosen to totally
>ignore it - while the argument has been taken up by the historians it was
>not directed to in the first place. For, as Weber says historians have to
>work with `single, concrete, facts' rather than with recurrent phenomena
>from which can be deduced to general laws like economists do. (If they
would
>not economics would make no sense whatever).
>
>Now, if for once on this list it is permitted to quote Weber in the
original
>here:
>
>"Vom Stadpunkt der Zweckrationalitaet aus aber ist wertrationalitaet immer,
>und zwar mehr je mehr sie den Wert, an dem das Handeln orientiert wird, zum
>absoluten Wert steigert irrationel, weil sie ja um so weniger auf den
Folgen
>des handelns reflektiert, ja unbedingter allein dessen Eigenwert (reine
>Gesinnung, Schoenheit, Absolute Guete, absoluter Pflichtmaessigkeit) fuer
>sie in Betracht kommt. Absoluter Zweckrationalitaet des Handelns ist aber
>auch nur ein im wesentlichen konstruktiver Grenzfall. Sehr selten ist das
>handeln nur der in einen oder der anderen Art orientiert."
>
>Ponder this German well: Weber is NOT arguing that value-directed acting is
>irrational, he is arguing that it might seem irrational from the
>vantage-point of pure purpose oriented rationality, which, however, does
not
>really exist in pure form in the real word (and neither does pure value
>oriented rationality).
>
>Weber is therefore also not arguing that purpose-oriented rationality is
>`better' than value-oriented rationality, he is merely saying that
>capitalist western society can meaningfully be studied as if behaviour
there
>was based on rationality of purpose rather than on rational behaviour as
>based on values, as the economists do, while this is questionable for other
>societies.
>
>And that this in itself is something which needs explanation rather than
>simply being assumed away as economists do too. (Again, economic
>anthropologists like Maurice Godelier which argue this too are here merely
>reinvented the wheel, though mostly in a  convoluted Althusserian style
>French which belies even the not all that clear German of Weber).
>
>Weber is also not arguing that `the west' is totally rationality of purpose
>based and other  societies are not, he is saying that western institutions
>(in particular modern bureaucracies) and to some extent personal behaviour
>TEND to be purpose rather than value-oriented and that they therefore TEND
>to see other societies as `irrational'.
>
>This in itself is a problem worth explanation since other societies are not
>`irrational' or `less smart'. They are different but, within their own
>premises, their behaviour can perfectly rationally be explained - it merely
>tends to be more oriented towards given absolute values.
>
>Now, I really don't see much here Jim (or Gunder) would disagree with - I
>think both would agree that to treat all other societies as if they display
>the attitude of the modern calculating citizen or consumer is a form of
>Eurocentrism (and - as even the World Bank economists now recognize - a
very
>dangerous one at that). Or do they want to imply all societies are purely
>purpose-oriented or at least they should be studied and explained as being
>purpose-oriented ?.
>
>If so, that would be a very dangerous form of Eurocentrism indeed - let me
>clarify this with a favorite anecdote of mine. Some years ago there was a
>meeting here on `women and Islam' in which a group of western women who had
>been converted to Islam explained why they wanted to wear the veil (no men
>casting covetuous glances to You) why they liked it better if they prayed
>without men present (Islam does not permit sexual harassment) etc. etc.
upon
>which at the end of the meeting an old Sudanese man rose and said: `In
Islam
>it's not important what you want, but God wants'.
>
>The western women were here typically using a purpose - rational argument
>while the Sudanese man was typically using a value-oriented rationality.
>That is there are certain `given' absolute values towards the achievement
of
>which behaviour must be oriented and which do not bear further explanation.
>But who was being `Eurocentric' here ? The women for whom Islamic uses
ought
>to be `rationally explained as contributing to personal hapiness' or the
>Sudanese man for whom they are simply `there' and have to be obeyed without
>questioning ?
>
>Now I'm not arguing that this is the key to world history but I am saying
>that Weber is saying something very important here - it is indeed true that
>values in the west often tend to need an explanation as if they contributed
>to some `useful' purpose (that is mostly personal or the society's health)
>as opposed to many other societies where they are simply given (although
>health is nowadays also in many ways an absolute value in the West).
>
>And I would not tend to diminish the force of the argument that this can in
>many ways be attributed to the `desacralisation of the living world' in the
>West - basically live there tends to be less filled with sacral objects and
>practices, which are `given' than elsewhere and that this is related to
>capitalism in which objects are primarily seen as useful merchandise,
>behaviour valued as useful labour as expressed in a price.
>
>Thus, to give a concrete example of the deeply ingrained calculating
>attitude towards religion in the West: some time ago I saw a documentary on
>African Americans who have converted to Islam as `the black religion' and
>Muslim immigrants in the US. The relationship between the two groups tended
>to be pretty bad, since the African Americans accused the Middle Eastern
>Muslims of using drugs which ought to be condemned under Islam (but are n't
>according to the others) while the others were accusing the African
American
>Muslims of adopting Islam as far as it suited them personally (having
>several wives for example) and not adopting pactices they didn't like (like
>regular prayer) or didn't find `useful' (like learning Arabic - Muhammad
>wrote in English did n't he ?).
>
>Also, I'm not saying that it is the entire and whole truth and that it is
>anything there is to these societies but it is nevertheless unmistakably
the
>case that the `life-world' tends to be more filled with religious
practices,
>religious objects and indeed beliefs in magic in a village in Bangla Desh
or
>Zaire than is the case for the average middle class inhabitant of Chicago
or
>New York.
>
>Indeed, to many inhabitants of Luxor, Varanasi or Qom the most blatant form
>of Eurocentrism would be to deny precisely THAT absolute creeds are more
>important to them than to the average middle class American - or that they
>have the same attitude towards religious practices or sacral objects. And,
>indeed, that for them the attitude of the middle class American towards the
>sacral is something to be desired. (Though You may agree or disagree with
>whether that's not true, to be sure).
>
>While I much sympathize with the `anti-Eurocentric' case one should watch
>out for what might be called the `politically correct Trekky' attitude
where
>any alien in a distant Galaxy speaks fluently American English and behaves
>like the average small town American `nice' or `bad' guy. ("Our ears may
all
>look different but You can't be Galacto-centric can You ? So You shouldn't
>discriminate Aliens by making them behave very different from the average
>earthling")
>
>Happy New Year
>Dr. R.J.Barendse
>IIAS Leiden University
>The Netherlands
>r.barendse@worldonline.nl
>
>
>