Sanderson argues that Europe did have advantages - the combination of
economic development and geographical location. But there is still justice
in Blaut's claim that the pursuit of colonialism itself was the operative
agent in transforming potential into actual dominance.
But in what way was European colonialism a unique or novel event?
Elsewhere in the world, quite obviously, there were many previous episodes
of expansion, expatriation of wealth, establishment of core-favorable
trading relationships, etc.
Even if we accept that colonialism was the essential developmental factor
in European global dominance, we yet need to characterize what was uniquely
successful about the European colonial experience. The answer here, I
suggest, is quite simply timing. Europe's "turn" at expansionism just
happened to occur at that point when conditions were such - ocean-capable
ships, cannon, capitalism, available new continent - that the expansionism
could be leveraged into global dominance. If conditions had been that
advanced in Muhammad's day, for example, the Arab rise could well have led
to global dominance. He who laughs last laughs best, you might say.
Similarly, one might examine the later dominance of the USA over the rest
of the Euro community - hence making the US the first-ever globally
hegemonic state, potentially if not in fact. In this case one must
acknowledge, I think it is clear, that the US did have inherent advantages,
including absolute size of industrial base and wealth, and lack of
competitor neighbors (The US is perhaps the world's last defensible
fortress.) But again timing is perhaps the unique critical factor. The US
just happened to have its "turn" at Euro leadership when technological
developments were at the stage - eg: nuclear weapons, jets, rockets,
extensive global trade - to leverage that leadership into global dominance.
Again, if technology had been that advanced when the British Empire was on
the rise, London might have been the imperial seat of globalism instead of
Washington.
What I'm describing is a two-part thesis. (1) Nations/cultures experience
phases of power expansion relative to their competitors; (2) the reach of
such an expansion-phase is amplified by the technology/conditions available
at the time. Whenever a qualitative breakthrough in conditions (esp.
military technology) occurs, that nation/culture is competitively favored
which happens to be in an expansionist phase at that time. Being in such a
phase is independent of the technology/conditions - it reflects rather the
internal state of the cultural/economic dynamics of the nation/culture
itself.
Sanderson suggests that Japan's inherent advantages were comparable to
Europe's in 1492. He didn't, as I recall, offer an explanation as to why
Japan didn't get into the colonial game at that time - exploiting fully the
available technology. It seems clear that Japan's cultural dynamics were
simply not expansionist at that time. When they later became so, in the
industrial age, Sanderson's observations of inherent parity are borne out:
Japan became a very credible threat indeed to Euro global dominance.
We've accepted, in this discussion, the premise that dominance can be
excercised collaboratively. Even though European nations competed
violently, we can speak of a collective European dominance, vis a vis the
rest of the world. In China, for example, European powers cooperated
militarily to maintain their several economic interests when faced with
Chinese resistance (eg: Boxer Rebellion) - it was Europe vs. China.
Which nations/cultures are in expansioninst phases today? I'd say we've
got two such entities, one a nation and the other a culture. The nation is
China, and the culture is the traditional Euro brotherhood plus Japan.
Huntington's definition of culture is not relevant here, in the sense that
Japan's unique societal elements are not of significant functional
relevanance to its global relationships. The "culture" which is the basis
of G7-led collaborative expansionism is simply the culture of global
capitalism. The "shared beliefs and values" of this culture have to do
with comradarie in the pursuit of capital investment, with competition to
be carried out peacefully among corporations rather than among nations.
>From the G7 perspective, military activity would be in support of the
globalist infrastructure - not as a means of securing relative national
advantage. The US, for example, would claim its high-profile role in the
oil-producing Arab states is aimed at maintaining stable oil supplies, not
motivated by a desire for territorial advantage.
You may not have thought of the G7 as expansionist, but globalization, I
suggest, is nothing less than economic expansionism: it is the systematic
and coercive development of investment and trading opportunities, set up so
as to favor G7-based corporations at the expense of the Third World. It is
functionally comparable to traditional Euro imperialist expansion.
China is not yet part of this culture, because its national aspirations,
apparently, are not sufficiently gentlemenly. According to credible
reports and analysis, China is not content to simply compete economically
from its existing territorial base, but feels itself entitled to a special
dominant relationship in the Asian region - much in the spirit of the US's
Monroe Doctrine.
Thus, at a time when military technology is incredibly advanced - and when
rapid breakthroughs can be highly destabilizing - we have two expansionist
entities with conflicting agendas. Then scene can be described as
dramatically potent.
rkm