On world-systems a la Al & Gunder

Sat, 26 Oct 1996 22:06:37 -0500 (EST)
Thomas D. [Tom] Hall, THALL@DEPAUW.EDU (THALL@DEPAUW.EDU")

TO: WSN
FROM: Thomas D. Hall, THALL@DEPAUW.EDU
RE: WST
DATE: October 26, 1996

Here are my first reactions to the recent posts by Al [Bergesen]
& Gunder [Frank].

As is typical for Al, he has pithly summarized a series of
complex debates, and got the issues laid out pretty cleanly. His
post is a good intro to the issues. Gunder, as is his wont, has
many insights, and some important rethinking of the history of
afroeurasia. However, he overstates his case.

For those not in the debates Chris [Chase-Dunn] and I have been
arguing with Gunder for some time now that there, indeed, have
been significant transformations of in world-systems [for us,
with the hyphen and with a plural s]. The two biggees are the
appearance of tributary, state-based world-systems (which
occurred several times in world history, independently) and one
appearance of a capitalist-based world-system, which occurred
only once, in the 17th century in western Europe. [This said
with an appreciative nod to Sanderson's clever argument about
capitalism in Japan]. Before going on about the disagreement
regarding transitions, it is useful to sum up what we agree
about.

1. That there has been an Afroeurasian world-system for at least
2000 years, possibly 3000 years. [In our view the evidence is
shakey before about 2200 years ago[.

2. That the European 'peninsula of peninsulas' was a
rump/tail/peripheral region in this larger system.

3. That the Afroeurasian world-system was multicentered, but
with the heaviest center, or its center of gravity, in China for
most of its history. [Again, the evidence gets shakey before
about 2200 years ago].

4. That Europeans/peninsulars expanded outward, beginning in the
late 1400s, to transform, and "underdevelop" [precisely in
Gunder's sense of the development of underdevelopment"] much of
the rest of the world.

5. That this process became truly global only after 1800, or
possibly not until the beginning of the 20th century. [Just when
it became global hinges on a number of definitional and
measurement problems.] That is, clearly well after the long 16th
century [1450-1640].

6. That beginning in late 18th or early 19th centuries, in
England and spreading rapidly, new sorts of technology were
developed and spread rapidly.

There are probably a number of other agreements.

Now to the differences, some of which are of the same order as
that old song, about: "I say Toe-MAY-toe, I say Toh-maah-toh"...
rather than say the differences between any world-
system/dependency/marxian view and say that of Rostow:

1. There was a major reorganization of the world-system
beginning the late 15th century as Europeans/peninsulars began to
expand outward "discovering" the 'new world' and rounding the
cape of Africa. [I must recall here a joke very popular in
'Indian Country': What did one Indian say to the other when
Columbus landed? Well, there goes the neighborhood!]

2. This expansion unleashed vast and major transformations
around the globe, especially in heretofore nonstate societies.
An important point here, relative to Al's summary is that these
transformations ramified far beyond the frontiers where Europeans
encountered 'natives.' Thus, when many explorers first
encountered other groups beyond the frontier they were NOT
encountering ancestors, or ancestor-like peoples, but peoples
vastly changed by the very processes that brought those observers
to the place of observation WELL AFTER significant changes. This
led to many distortions in our notions of social change. It has
been a long term project of anthropologists and others to
disentangle this observational morass [the best introductions to
this are Eric Wolf's _Europe and the People without History_ and
R. Brian Ferguson & Neil Whitehead's _War in the Tribal Zone_].

3. I [or better we, since Chris & I have collaborated so long on
this] argue this expansion is a major change in the Afroeurasian
world-system. Though not a transformation of the mode of
accumulation, it is a significant change.

4. Only in the 17th century when the Dutch townmen (merchants
and others) gain control of the state, do we have a situation in
which capitalists control the state, and give birth to a
capitalist world-system. This is not to deny the point argued at
length by Sanderson (Social Transformations 1995) and Gunder that
pockets of capitalism, capitalist enclaves, existed earlier, and
widely--as far back as 5000 years ago as Gunder has argued.
RATHER, our point is that these were precisely what we said,
enclaves within tributary systems, not entire systems. Thus, the
first capitalist SYSTEM occurs only in the 17th century.

5. Again, this is not to deny, that Japan [as Sanderson argues]
might not have undergone a similar transformation within a
century or two had not Europeans undergone it first. Our
argument, which overlaps somewhat with Sanderson's, is that it
was PRECISELY the noncore position of Europe (and similarly of
Japan) that allowed this transformation.

6. Though there is disagreement about transformation here, a--to
my mind--larger AGREEMENT should be underscored. This
transformation [or in Gunder's argument intensification & change
of center] can ONLY BE EXPLAINED by recognizing Europe's position
within a much larger system. Not that all the internal (Weber,
Brenner etc) arguments are wrong, but incomplete.

7. Out of this transformation emerged the industrial revolution
and the vastly accelerated rate of social change that has
engulfed the planet in the last 200 years or so. Again, the
transformation/change/intensification can only be explained by
recourse to the systemic position of Europe in the large world-
system, now a truly global system.

>From this, it is entirely plausible to argue/suggest as Gunder
does that the center of this system may return to China in the
not too distant future.

Finally, I agree with Al & Gunder that an overly tight focus on
Europe has led to a radical misunderstanding of how Europe rose
to [temporary?] dominance. This misunderstanding has infected
virtually all social science thinking and much of its research.
Much needs to be rethought, remeasured, and reanalyzed. However,
I disagree with Gunder that the findings Terry [Boswell] alludes
to are not valid. The findings of world-sytem theory give us
useful insights and understandings into how, and often why, the
capitalist world-system functions as it has over the last two
centuries or so. What the larger context does, is cause us to
rethink what these findings might imply about the future.

Much of what I have said here draws from _Rise & Demise:
Comparing World-Systems_ (Chase-Dunn & Hall 1997) which should be
published early next year. In that book we lay out our arguments
in considerable detail, and spend much more time specifying
definitions and theories.

I hope this clarifies some of the issues, or at least makes clear
which ones are not clear.
tom hall