4/30/96, Harutiun Kassakhian wrote:
>The two tendencies: long term-planning by policy makers in national
>governments, international financial institutions, etc, and short-term
>planning in US corporate borad-rooms are fundamentally unrelated.
Harutiun's comment is certainly consistent with observed behavior
-- a broad class of corporate operations continue to be decided by
short-term profit considerations, while elite planning (so to call it)
listens to a more distant drummer.
But is this a case of complete disconnect? Are elite planners out
of touch with corporate reality? Do they listen too much to ivory-tower
think tanks? Or, conversely, are corporate operatives out of touch with
their longer-range opportunities, are their noses too close to the
stock-valuation grindstone?
Allow me to suggest that there is a very intimate connection indeed
between these seemingly disparate mindsets. It seems to me that what the
elite planners are endeavoring to create is a global development
environment (as opposed to global marketplace) which will be attractive to
short-term-oriented operators. Thus while it may be true that no single
corporation would take the trouble to champion a NAFTA or GATT (given the
long horizon), nonetheless: "Once it is built they will come". In other
words: when GATT (with its capital portability), and the IMF (with its
mandated structural "reforms") make global economies attractive as venues
for short-term capital investments, then those investments will indeed be
forthcoming.
Thus I would argue that the elite planners are working at a higher
level of conciousness -- they are taking into account the behaviour of
corporate operatives, and are working more at the "god level" re/ creating
future corporate playing fields.
One might then ask -- Who are these elites really? Who is it that
has the incentive to devote resources to the long-range growth
opportunities for capital _in general_?
Others on this list are probably more capable of answering this
question than myself, but let me at least submit that the big banks and
financial institutions have every reason to maximize the future demand for
development loans. Rather than devoting all their marketing dollars to
competing for pie-share with other banks, an international bank would
rationally apportion considerable marketing dollars to insuring a bigger
pie next time around. Especially if the bank had a client base which it
could expect to retain as the pie grows.
The recruitment of national governments as allies in this
long-range endeavor is a consequence of the "special relationship" national
governments have with international banks -- out of proportion revenue-wise
compared to other economic sectors. This special relationship is evidenced
by the existence of Central Banks (including the Federal Reserve), and has
been cemented over the decades (centuries?) by the dependence governments
periodically experience toward these banks (during wartime and times of
monetary crisis).
Thoughts?
-rkm