> On Thu, 13 Jul 1995, chris chase-dunn wrote:
>
> > I think Giovanni Arrighi was saying that the significance of a single
> > very large colonial empire was great in the 19th century and that the
> > British hegemony was a political structure that was in some ways comparable
> > to a world state. But remember he is comparing the British hegemony to
> > earlier and later systemic regimes of accumulation in the modern
> > world-system. I doubt that he would go so far as to argue that the British
> > hegemony was a true world state in the full sense. Thus I dont think
> > his point is meant to challenge the Wallersteinian distinction between
> > a world-empire and a world-economy.
On Tue, 18 Jul 1995, Teivo Teivainen wrote:
> I totally agree that it would be absurd to claim that the British
> hegemony was a a true world state. That`s why I speculated that the
> choice of terminology (calling the capitalist world-economy as
> reconstituted under British hegemony a "world empire") might be some kind
> of exagerration to open up a debate (this can be
> interpreted as a question to Arrighi).
While I fear this may be a bit pedestrian[*], from my reading,
these points are discussed rather clearly in TLC, including on the same
page as the statement comparing "world empire" to "world-economy" (p. 58).
First, when 'the capitalist world-economy in the 19th C was as much a
"world empire" as a "world-economy" -- an entirely new kind of world
empire, to be sure, but a world empire none the less.' I think this
challenges the dichotomy, but in a positive way: it does not denigrate the
usefulness of the distinction, but it challenges us not to abuse the
dichotomy to exclude relevant information. As noted in a prior post, this
is not a world-empire *within the core*, but that is not what TLC says:
the text describes a world empire *of the core*: "The most important and
novel feature of this world empire _sui generis_ was the extensive use by
its ruling groups of a quasi-monopolistic control over universally
accepted means of payment." At least in Latin America, where I have done
some modest personal study of this control in the case of the Argentine
railway system, this is not limited to the British -- but it *is* limited
to the core.
It might be especially relevant to this world empire - but not in
the core - that in the case of the British, unlike the case presented
earlier in this first chapter, other imperial European countries might
contest particular imperial territorial gains, but none could contest the
basis of Empire. This included oceanic empires of France, Belgium, the
Netherlands, and (the remnants of) the Iberian empires, as well as the
land empires of Austria and Russia. This would seem to be part of the
reason that the *quasi* monopoly on which the 'world empire' was based
stood. until it was challanged by European late-comers lacking a vested
interest in the system and the US where colonization involved an entirely
different strategy. If a substantial part of the leadership component of
a hegemon involves leading where the followers wish to go, there may be
nothing so disruptive as the rise of power who wish to go elsewhere.
Virtually,
Bruce McFarling, Knoxville
brmcf@utkux1.utk.edu
[*] On which point, I can beg that a pedestrian development economist is
at least better situated to view his subject than the chauffered
'development' economists that one may see (provided one stays close enough
to the capital).