On Wed, 5 Jul 1995, Bruce McFarling wrote:
> Whether coincidentally or not, one of the early fights of
> theories of biological evolution was against the Lamarckian ladder of
> life, which was a progressive chain of development through which all
> species were assumed to pass. But, of course, reproduction of social
> institutions through enculturation in childhood is Lamarckian in the
> sense that modifications in individual behavior may be passed on; and
> even further removed from biological evolution are reproduction of
> institutions through emulation and assimilation. So in regards the
> question,
I am not so sure that reproduction of social institutions can
be *wholly* characterized as Larmarkian insofar as contingency
or chance also plays a role in the evolution of memes, ideas, the
prevailing mentalites collectives, and so forth.
Take, for example, individualism as a moral idea and symbolic form.
Elements of this idea can be traced back into the late Middle Ages
and beyond. It certainly has its roots in the Christian religion.
But it is only in early modern Europe that individualism is exalted
as a predominant moral idea -- an idea that resonated throughout
various social spheres, and was reflected in the atomism of the age.
But why did it resonate at this particular historical juncture
as opposed to another prior period? My guess is that it flourished
because of a multiplicity of mutually-reinforcing material and ideal
factors that happened to converge at a specific time and which together
provided a propitious environment where such an idea could find
a "niche". There was nothing inevitable or teleological about the
rise of individualism.
On one level, I certainly agree with you that ideas and modifications
can be passed on, and thus the evolution of social institutions
can be characterized as Lamarkian, but from a much larger perspective,
involving a much longer time frame (la langue duree?) I am not so
sure this is the case. The unintended consequences of peoples' actions
loom large in the course of history and chance plays an important
part in the "survival" of the broad symbolic forms and intersubjective
ideas of an epoch.
> chemistry, efforts to reduce the study of society to biology are not on
> the soundest of foundations. Use of Darwinian metaphors, or reductionist
> appeals directly to biological evolutionary theory, merely shy away from
> the harder task of understanding social evolution and other forms of
> social change in their own right.
I agree that we shouldn't reduce social science to biology, but
on Darwinian metaphors, I am not so sure I agree that we
should bypass them and try to understand social evolution "in its
own right."
This assumes that there is one correct representation of reality to
which all descriptions ultimately converge, something I am not so sure
about. It also seems to suggest that social evolution is bound
to one "true" description and none else.
I see nothing wrong with the use of evolutionary metaphors in
the social sciences if they help free us from our current conceptual
and theoretical blinders that are holding us captive and getting in
the way.
Cheers,
Ron Deibert
Institue of International Relations
University of British Columbia