Joseph's posing of the question of the fall of the dollar, and Doug's
characteristically trenchant and fact-driven response pointing to the
strength of the currency as a powerful, perhaps THE powerful, indicator of
hegemonic position (or simply of relative strength), seem to me important
starting points for exploring the changing shape of the w-s in general and
the question of the Japanese (and I would add East Asian) challenge to U.S.
supremacy in particular.
My recent research on postwar East Asian regional development focuses on c.
1970 as a watershed in the transformation of the region, and of global
power, in conjunctural ways among which the collapse of the dollar is one
key marker indicative of the end of virtually unchallenged U.S. global and
regional hegemony. Others include the transition from a polarized Asia to
an integrated Asia beginning with the U.S.-China opening; the end of the
Cultural Revolution and the internal power shift in China from Lin Biao to
Zhou Enlai; the U.S. acceptance of defeat in the Indochina War (but not in
the peace that would follow); the Asianization of the regional economy and
accelerated regionwide accumulation and growth . . . the latter tendency
driven by a stronger yen, and from 1985 a greatly stronger yen and more
powerful Taiwan and South Korean currencies paving the way for regional
integration with China as the focus of change and crossregion capital
flows, DFI and booming trade as the motor of change.
Yet isn't it the case that no shift from old to new hegemon is forseeable
over the next ten to twenty years? What strikes me in looking at Asia is
the overwhelming military-strategic- political strength of the U.S. (not
only unchallenged, but strengthened by the collapse of the Soviet Union and
communist parties most everywhere) and Japan's relative weaknesses in all
these areas; the desire of ruling groups throughout Asia to maintain a U.S.
position in the region (above all motivated by fear of Japan, but also of
China and perhaps others); and the simultaneous integration of the region
(through trade and investment) AND its global integration (the U.S. is, and
I expect will rather long remain the primary market for Asian goods).
What is the meaning for global dynamics of the sustained rise of East Asia
as a region, a fact perhaps in the end more important than the rise of a
Japan that is now deeply troubled by a host of problems? In contrast with
the 1930s and 1940s regional integration does not appear to suggest a road
to autarchy. Rather, for the present at least, the Pacific (including
North America and Australia) is probably a more significant marker, market
and magnet for capital than is an "Asia" that excludes the U.S. and points
rather toward three competing blocs in the global economy: North America,
Europe and Asia. This could change very quickly, but the previous
discussion suggests some reasons why, on balance, it seems unlikely to do
so, especially unlikey to change fundamentally in the near to medium range.
mark selden