NYTimes.com Article: The Next Debate: Al Qaeda Link

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National Security Council finds literally no evidence of the alleged link 
between Iraq and Al-Qaeda.  

tganesh@stlawu.edu

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The Next Debate: Al Qaeda Link

July 20, 2003
 By DANIEL BENJAMIN and STEVEN SIMON 




 


WASHINGTON 
In all the debate over the disputed claims in President
Bush's State of the Union address, we must not forget to
scrutinize an equally important, and equally suspect,
reason given by the administration for toppling Saddam
Hussein: Iraq's supposed links to terrorists. 

The invasion of Iraq, after all, was billed as Phase II in
the war on terror that began after the attacks of Sept. 11,
2001. But was there ever a credible basis for carrying that
battle to Iraq? 

Don't misunderstand - we should all be glad to see the
Iraqi people freed from Saddam Hussein's tyranny, and the
defeat of Iraq did spell the demise of the world's No. 4
state sponsor of international terrorism (Iran, Syria and
Sudan all have more blood on their hands in the last
decade). But the connection the administration asserted
between Iraq and Al Qaeda, the organization that made
catastrophic terrorism a reality, seems more uncertain than
ever. 

In making its case for war, the administration dismissed
the arguments of experts who noted that despite some
contacts between Baghdad and Osama bin Laden's followers
over the years, there was no strong evidence of a
substantive relationship. As members of the National
Security Council staff from 1994 to 1999, we closely
examined nearly a decade's worth of intelligence and we
became convinced, like many of our colleagues in the
intelligence community, that the religious radicals of Al
Qaeda and the secularists of Baathist Iraq simply did not
trust one another or share sufficiently compelling
interests to work together. 

But Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld promised that the
Bush administration had "bulletproof evidence" of a
Qaeda-Iraq link, and Secretary of State Colin Powell made a
similar case to the United Nations. Such claims now look as
questionable as the allegation that Iraq was buying uranium
in Niger. 

In the 14 weeks since the fall of Baghdad, coalition forces
have not brought to light any significant evidence
demonstrating the bond between Iraq and Al Qaeda.
Uncovering such a link should be much easier than finding
weapons of mass destruction. Instead of having to inspect
hundreds of suspected weapons sites around the country,
military and intelligence officials need only comb through
the files of Iraq's intelligence agency and a handful of
other government ministries. 

Our intelligence experts have been doing exactly that since
April and so far there has been no report of any proof (and
we can assume that any supporting information would have
quickly been publicized). Of the more than 3,000 Qaeda
operatives arrested around the world, only a handful of
prisoners in Guantánamo - all with an incentive to please
their captors - have claimed there was cooperation between
Osama bin Laden's organization and Saddam Hussein's regime,
and their remarks have yet to be confirmed by any of the
high-ranking Iraqi officials now in American hands. 

Indeed, most new reports concerning Al Qaeda and Iraq have
been of another nature. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu
Zubaydah, the two highest-ranking Qaeda operatives in
custody, have told investigators that Mr. bin Laden shunned
cooperation with Saddam Hussein. A United Nations team
investigating global ties of the bin Laden group reported
last month that they found no evidence of a Qaeda-Iraq
connection. 

In addition, one Central Intelligence Agency official told
The Washington Post that a review panel of retired
intelligence operatives put together by the agency found
that although there were some ties among individuals in the
two camps, "it was not at all clear there was any
coordination or joint activities." And Rand Beers, the
senior director for counterterrorism on the National
Security Council who resigned earlier this year, has said
that on the basis of the intelligence he saw, he did not
believe there was a significant relationship between Saddam
Hussein and Al Qaeda. 

The Congressional oversight committees evaluating the
administration's use of intelligence on Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction have said they will also examine whether
the administration manipulated information regarding Iraq's
involvement in terrorism. The terrorism issue must not be
given short shrift because of the current controversy over
claims of Iraq's unconventional weapons. The truth is, we
knew for decades that Iraq had nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons programs - yet it was only after 9/11
that these programs were viewed as an intolerable threat
that necessitated a regime change. 

This is not only a question of political accountability -
it also bears on our nation's fundamental approach to
security. United States policy changed dramatically when
the Bush administration, lacking compelling evidence of an
Iraq-Qaeda link, decided to base the Qaeda part of its
pro-war argument on a hypothetical situation. "Iraq could
decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical
weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists,"
President Bush said in October. "Alliance with terrorists
could allow the Iraqi regime to attack America without
leaving any fingerprints." 

But this scenario is extremely unlikely. For years now the
world's leading state sponsors of terrorism have had no
confidence that they could carry out attacks against the
United States undetected. That is why this brand of
terrorism has been on the wane. 

After it became clear to Libya that the United States could
prove its responsibility for the 1988 attack on Pan Am 103
- and United Nations sanctions were imposed - it got out of
the business of supporting attacks on Americans. After
American and Kuwaiti intelligence traced a plot to kill
former President George H. W. Bush in 1993 to Baghdad, the
Iraqi regime also stopped trying to carry out terrorist
attacks against America. And when the Clinton
administration made clear that it knew Iran was behind the
1996 bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, Tehran
ceased plotting terrorist strikes against American
interests. 

Because of America's intelligence and law enforcement
capacities, the world's outlaw states know that they will
pay a high price for sponsoring terrorists act against us -
and an overwhelming one should they assist in attacks
involving weapons of mass destruction. That is why Iraq,
Iran, Libya, Syria and some 20 other countries with
chemical and biological weapons have never, as far as we
know, given one to terrorists. 

Of course, the return of state-backed terror against
America cannot be ruled out. And we are right to be
concerned that North Korea, the world's most unpredictable
regime, might sell a nuclear weapon to terrorists. But this
much is clear: all states, even rogue ones, have a strong
conservative impulse for self-preservation. 

American policy must recognize this clear division between
the old state-sponsored terrorism, which we have shown we
can deter, and the new, religiously motivated attacks.
First, we should think long and hard before seeking regime
change as a means of behavior modification. Those who chafe
to topple the mullahs in Iran, for example, court
unforeseen consequences that may ultimately damage
America's interests. 

If we were to confirm that extreme elements like the
Iranian Revolutionary Guards are harboring Qaeda
operatives, we would need to press hard diplomatically,
economically and even be prepared to threaten military
action. But a concerted effort to upend the regime could
well backfire, ending the slow but nonetheless clear
evolution of Iran into a genuine democracy. 

Second and most important, the Bush administration should
focus more on Al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that poses
an imminent, undeterrable danger. New instability in
Afghanistan and the continued spread of jihadist ideology
in the Islamic world mean that the prospects for another
9/11 are growing. America has been fortunate in capturing
some high-ranking terrorists, but we still lack a
comprehensive program to deal with a growing global
insurgency and the long-term threat of radical Islam, for
which intelligence and law enforcement will not suffice. 

Rogue regimes are bad for the world and worse for the
people forced to live under them. Over time, we can use
diplomacy - including coercion - and deterrence to bring
about change. For now, however, the direst threat to
Americans comes not from the mullahs of Tehran, but from
the mass-murderers of Al Qaeda. 

Daniel Benjamin, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, and Steven Simon, an analyst at the
Rand Corporation, are authors of ‘‘The Age of Sacred
Terror.’’ 

http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/20/opinion/20BENJ.html?ex=1060090623&ei=1&en=1bafcc31804e8cd9


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