Re: Future of Europe (Arno Tausch and Paul Kennedy) -Fwd: from Matteo Co

Forwarded post. I assume that these interesting comments were meant for all
of wsn. GK

----- Original Message -----
From: <mcolombi@uchicago.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, June 25, 2003 10:21 PM
Subject: Re: Future of Europe (Arno Tausch and Paul Kennedy)


 >    In Both Arno Tausch and Paul Kennedy's segments that were sent there
are
> incoherences.   For Arno it is not clear how an Argentinian destiny is
likely
> for Europe, other than I assume an implicit argument that Europe is
stagnating.
> Eurosclerosis is the permanent diagnosis for the COntinent.  I'd like to
see
> more evidence and less 'feeling'.   Secondly, the Eastern Enlargement is a
> complex issue both in terms of geopolitics (will eastern Europeans realign
> towards or help decohere an ever closer European Union?) and of economic
> development.   Tausch worries about an exploitative relationship between
east
> and west, but that would be possible only if flexibility is allowed to
western
> european capitalists.   It is not clear to me why then, when US-Mexico
> relationship is looked at as a source of competitiveness for American
capital,
> the West-East linkage in Europe should have the opposite effect?
>
> One could say that Eastern Europe is ageing as well, and that may make a
> peculiar difference; however the crucial income gap between East and West
will
> have an uncertain destiny.   Above all Eastern Europe has a much higher
> literacy and trained workforce per capita.   European dynamics might yet
> surprise us.   On what basis does Tausch predict only stagnation and even
> retrocession for Europe?   Will the Eastern membere-states converge to
Western
> GDP levels, overtake them, or will the West converge to Eastern European
> levels?   Will there be a meeting halfway?
>
> Similarly Paul Kennedy does not explain in what way agricultural
protectionism
> diminishes hegemony?   He seems to compile a list of things he does not
like
> about 'core' countries of the EU and thus derive that these are signs of
> weakenss.   I think, implied, is an idea, assumed, of 'long-term good
> performance' by the US and UK.   In fact, however egregious it might be,
EU's
> agricultural policies are reviled and attacked precisely because of their
> enormous effect on third parties in the rest of the world.   This is an
> indication of power, and not its opposite.   Secondly, Paul Kennedy does
not
> appear credible in terms of how 'inflexible' continental economies have
been.
> I wonder if he was one of the many that during the bubble economy told us
that
> America had a superior economy, with the most transparent and efficient
capital
> markets bla bla bla bla...beacuse of the enormous productivity gains
produced
> by the adoption of IT technology.     Supposing that he were right in many
> instances of his argument, he points to obstacles that do not seem
> unsurmountable.
>
> The implicit arguments tend to be oriented around: population size,
> insufficicent liberalism in the economic front, prediction of permanent
lag in
> GDP growth.  For Kennedy one must add a lack of capabilities.
>
> It seems to me that dependence tied to capability sustained over time is a
> correct measure of geopolitical power.   While it does seem to me that one
of
> the possible futures is a stagnation of Europe; the biggest obstacle today
is
> the difficulty of translating latent capabilities into effective
capabilities
> since it involves federalization, a touchy ongoing process.
>
> An argument made about Europe must also apply to China, India, the US.
What
> guarantee is there that the US can sustain rapid gdp*capita growth?   We
know
> that its population is expanding, population growth adds GDP but also ties
it
> up.   IF added population growth does not translate in growing GDP*capita
one
> becomes a growing economy and a poorer society.   This implies harder
trade-
> offs in fiscal policy, in security vs. productive investments and so on.
>
> That can be seen with China, where population has been large for a long
time,
> and it is the growth in GDP*capita that makes of China a potential future
> hegemon.   A good comparison is India:  large population, more difficulcty
in
> sustaining large jumps in wealth per person.
>
> On what basis can we expect Europe to stagnate or follow a Russian rout,
and on
> what basis can we expect the U.S. to keep growing economically in a way
that it
> increases its clout?
>
> It seems to me that there is a "range of sufficient population size" for
the
> projection of power, and that it is related to 'capabilities and
productivity.'
> I would suggest that the destinies of mankind are relatively open.   From
out
> point in time the US seems advantaged; but we need far more careful
reasoning
> about what underpins hegemony.
>
> Also, we should be careful about demographics, trend estimated derived
from
> behavior in a point in time can give very misleading results the further
out we
> extend our predictions.
>
> In Russia population decline was accellerated by the disruption of the
Soviet
> economy and not vice-versa.   In the West, economic growth implied a shift
in
> family structres and reduced childbirth between the 60s and 90s.   Again,
it is
> not clear why inmigration and a resurgence of childbirths should not
happen as
> the European society's demographic and economy will change.
>
> Sincerely,
>
> Matteo Colombi
> University of Chicago,
> Ph.D. student
> MA, 2002
> MAES, 1999
>
>
>
> Quoting Gernot Koehler <gktbg1@tiscali.de>:
>
> > Arno Tausch (Europe) and Paul Kennedy (USA) share a considerable amount
of
> > scepticism as regards the future global weight (or not) of Europe.
Compare
> > the two pieces below.
> >
> > Gernot Köhler, Ph.D.
> >
> > *  * *
> >
> > (1) Tausch writes
> > (see also, my post to wsn on 18jun03, "Future of Europe
> > (Tausch vs Derrida-Habermas)"):
> >
> > "Hypothesis 14: . . . Europe, with its huge state sector, its high
tariff
> > walls against foreign competition, and its large scale penetration by
> > foreign capital, its slow process of technological innovation, is
destined
> > to become the 'Argentina' of the 21st Century. Also its small future
> > population base and rigid migration regime do not qualify it for a rapid
> > 21st Century economic growth. There is a great risk that the European
West
> > will treat the newly democratic East as a reservoir of surplus value and
> > exploitation."
> >
> > (Arno Tausch is a Ministerial Counselor at the Department of European
and
> > International Affairs, Vienna, Austria
> > and is associated with the University of Innsbruck, Austria)
> >
> > REFERENCE
> > Tausch, Arno, "The European Union. Global Challenge or Global
> > Governance? 14 World Systems Hypotheses and Two Scenarios on the future
of
> > the Union." In: Gernot Kohler and Emilio Jose Chaves (Editors)
> > "Globalization: Critical Perspectives" Hauppauge, New York: Nova Science
> > Publishers, 2003. ISBN 1-59033-346-2. See: www.amazon.com
> >
> > * * *
> >
> > and now a fellow Euro-sceptic from across the Atlantic --
> >
> > (2) Kennedy writes:
> > -------------------------
> >
> > Europe's old laggards will never balance US power
> > To be an effective counterweight requires far-reaching changes
> >
> > Paul Kennedy
> >
> > Tuesday June 24, 2003/The Guardian [U.K.]
> >
> > This year, it seems, the trendy debate among the foreign policy crowd no
> > longer hails from Harvard Square or midtown Manhattan. No more waiting
for
> > America to come up with slogans such as "the clash of civilisations" and
> > "the end of history". With the publication of an essay by the French
> > scholar
> > Jacques Derrida and the German scholar Jürgen Habermas in the
Frankfurter
> > Allgemeine Zeitung, at last European intellectuals have produced their
own
> > "hot idea". Arguing for a counterbalance to American global hegemonic
> > pretensions, Derrida and Habermas maintain that this can only be
> > accomplished through a unified European foreign policy led by the
> > pioneering
> > "core" European nations. What is more, the Derrida-Habermas call for a
> > European identity looms even more significantly when linked to the
belief
> > that Europe must act to curb American primacy and unilateralism. This is
> > hardly coffee house babble, since it articulates what many in Europe are
> > thinking.
> >
> > My problem with the Derrida-Habermas proclamation is that their thesis
is
> > not practical. The way to a powerful Europe is not even sketched out. It
is
> > an aspiration, not a policy. If Europe is to become an effective
> > counterweight to America - or an amiable and near equal world partner -
it
> > must make some tough decisions and institute tough practical policies.
> > Constitutional decisions, like creating the office of a single foreign
> > minister, go part of the way, but that is just the icing on the cake if
> > Europe itself is not made stronger.
> >
> > So, here, for consideration, are a half-dozen nettles that might be
grasped
> > to make Europe stronger, to give Europe credibility in the eyes of the
> > world
> > and to contribute to the greater sense of European identity for which
> > Derrida and Habermas yearn.
> >
> > Europe must develop greater military capacity, scrap national conscript
> > armies and train for integrated multiservice fighting in many parts of
the
> > world. This requires more money. Right now, the countries that take
> > military
> > reform most seriously are Britain and Poland. Many of the "old" European
> > countries talk about military reforms, but their small defence budgets
give
> > the game away.
> >
> > If Europe really wants improved international structures that provide
peace
> > and prosperity, it must push for serious reform of the United Nations,
> > especially in the composition of the permanent veto members of the
security
> > council, so that countries such as India, Brazil and South Africa may
also
> > achieve that status. Perhaps Europe should confront the fact that it is
> > over-represented on that body. There have been proposals from time to
time
> > for a single, rotating "European" permanent seat, an idea France always
> > threatens to veto.
> >
> > Europe must make a massive push against protectionism, especially in
> > agricultural goods, and to assist poorer countries in Africa and the
> > Caribbean in the export of their produce. But France is the most
obstinate
> > foe of free trade in agriculture and drags a complicit Germany along
with
> > it. Is it any wonder that developing countries are cynical when Europe
> > talks
> > about boosting world markets - when most trade experts believe that the
> > single biggest boost to African and Caribbean nations would be to scrap
> > Europe's (and America's, and Japan's) agricultural protectionism.
> >
> > Europe must offer large increases in development assistance, again to
help
> > the poorer countries of the globe, consisting not only of capital and
> > infrastructural investment but also technical assistance, scholarships
and
> > the waiver of intellectual property restrictions. To be sure, European
aid
> > is more generous than America's - the EU provides about twice as much as
> > the
> > US - but more is called for. Why not declare that the EU will devote a
full
> > 1% of its annual GDP to development assistance, as a symbol of its
> > leadership? Right now, only the Scandinavians give respectable totals in
> > aid.
> >
> > Europe should make a special commitment to Africa, not just because it
is
> > the poorest of the poor, and not just because of European colonial
history,
> > but also because of its geographical proximity and because in Africa it
> > could be an alternative model to US neglect or to the American concern
> > chiefly for military-security threats.
> >
> > Finally, it is vital for Europe to get its economy going again. If its
> > overall growth rates should lag behind those of the US and much of Asia
> > over
> > the next decade or two, then the whole idea of being a counterbalance is
> > off.
> >
> > Europe also needs, frankly, to get its youthful population going again.
The
> > astonishingly low fertility rates in much of Europe - in contrast to the
> > population increases forecast for the US over the next 50 years - will
be
> > as
> > important as the differences in defence spending. If population trends
are
> > a
> > good indicator, Europe shows more signs of shrinking than advancing on
the
> > world stage.
> >
> > Let us suppose for a moment that Europe were to succeed on all these
> > fronts.
> > Should that happen, it would indeed come close to being a strong and
> > influential player in world affairs. Europe need not be an angry
competitor
> > to the United States all the time - the present characters occupying the
> > White House and the Elysée Palace will not last for ever - but it would
> > once
> > again be important enough in military, economic and political terms to
be
> > respected and heeded by others, even American neo-conservatives. But
here
> > is
> > the rub: resistance to these tough reforms lies deepest in the "old" or
> > "core Europe" countries such as France, Belgium and Germany. They are
the
> > ones that most fiercely cling to agricultural protectionism; have the
> > deepest structural and ideological objections to economic reform; and
> > (France is a partial exception) are spending so little of their GDP on
> > effective armed forces.
> >
> > There is an extraordinary contradiction here: France and Germany provide
> > the
> > most political rhetoric about making Europe strong and competitive in
the
> > modern world, yet it is they who have so much yet to do to stay
> > competitive.
> > Even if their governments propose tough fiscal action, those thousands
of
> > French and Germans who marched against the US war with Iraq would be
right
> > back on the streets, marching against the necessary agriculture,
taxation
> > and spending reforms. And their governments will be forced to
compromise.
> >
> > This is the real reason why I think the appeal for a "core Europe" to
> > emerge
> > and balance the United States will not work. These "old" Europe
societies
> > are in so many ways the laggards in handling global challenges. Unless
> > serious structural changes are pushed through, the document that began
this
> > debate will remain merely academic.
> >
> > (c) Tribune Media Services International
> > * Paul Kennedy is a professor of history at Yale University. His books
> > include The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.
> >
> > ------------
> > (thanks to Jim D. for calling attention to this article)
> >
> >
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