Re: Proof of US hegemony and its decline?

In a message dated 4/26/2003 4:28:59 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
mcforte@tstt.net.tt writes:

These are good questions, that get to the heart of some of the strengths and 
weaknesses of hegemonic theories in world systems analysis.

> First, one commented with reference to recent articles by Wallerstein on the
> FBC website, what Wallerstein does is to stipulate that American hegemony is
> in decline, rather than to demonstrate it.
> 
> Secondly, in a twist on this, one asked: was the US ever hegemonic? It
> surely has been dominant in many fields, but is dominance the same as
> hegemony?
> 
> Thirdly, and I think this is where I began to find the issues more tricky,
> if dominance = hegemony, then the US certainly is dominant in military terms
> at least, and not exactly at the bottom of the food chain in economic terms.
> 

Hegemony clearly means different things to different writers.  There are at 
least three moderately interrelated traditions that use the term--international 
relations, where it is meant to indicate dominance, political science, where it 
is meant to indicate the construction of a 'hegemonic' bloc that usually 
includes multiple classes and some ideo-cultural work to marry them together, 
and cultural studies, where it is meant to incorporate power into 
understandings of popular and other forms of cultural text production.

Wallerstein is heavily focused on the first meaning, but he does emphasize the 
importance of other actors in the world following the leader (i.e. its not only 
a question of how many arms the US has or how the large the economy is, but the 
willingness of other nations to follow its lead).  Arrighi focuses more on the 
second meaning.  The third meaning is underdeveloped in world systems 
analysis--Wallerstein has a lot of interesting things to say about the dominant 
culture, but this is poorly integrated with his ideas about hegemonic decline, 
since the cultural analysis has a roughly 200 year temporality, whereas 
hegemonies (including rise and decline) are roughly century long phenomena.  

The decline of a hegemony would presumably mean the fall of the world order it 
tries to enforce, either to chaos, a new hegemony, or some kind of anarchic 
system.  The collapse of such an order can be sudden compared to its decline.  
Take, for example, the French revolution, the most studied event in history.  
Numerous writers have identified long term social, economic, and cultural 
trends that were eating away at the old order, but few in 1779, or even 1788, 
had any idea how dramatic the collapse of the old order would be.

For both Wallerstein and Arrighi, US hegemony begins at the end of World War 
II, and two facts are particularly salient.  One was the overwhelming position 
of economic dominance the US possessed, and the other was the presence of the 
Soviet Union, something of a rival, but also something of a junior partner, 
which reinforced the world order the US shaped (through the construction of 
institutions like the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, as well as aid agencies, 
congress of cultural freedom, etc).  The Soviets simultaneously scared the 
Europeans into the US camp, and could be called upon to help bring order to 
chaotic spots in the 'third world.'  I think both would also note that 
aspirations in the world were generally put in terms the US approved 
of--national independence, rapid economic growth through industrialization...

Of course there was some opposition from the start.  When was Nixon's motorcade 
stoned in Venezuela--1953?  But this worked for a time.  

Flash forward to 1980, when Wallerstein first wrote about the idea that the US 
was in decline.  The world economy now included three poles (Western Europe (or 
'Germany'), Japan (no one was talking about East Asia at the time, and the US). 
 The concept of European Unity was picking up speed.  Added to that these days, 
you have a much larger East Asian micro-world economy, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, and the emergence of various actors--Al Quaeda, 
anti-globalization movements, etc that can't be easily bought off through US 
hegemonic ideas.

Wallerstein tends to see US decline as completely inevitable, and every action 
that US takes as proof of this point.  Which can certainly seem 
self-confirming.  I think he's basically right, but some US strategies, 
particularly the deployment of human rights democratization rhetoric and 
revamped consumerism in the late 80s and early 90s, worked better than others 
(such as unilaterally attacking countries) in terms of reviving the concept of 
US leadership.

Steven Sherman