NEWS: CNN lying about Blix's statement,leaving out about 900 words refu

http://www.indymedia.org/front.php3?article_id=237764&group=webcast

Do you trust CNN? (english)
Pestilence 12:42pm Sun Feb 16 '03
 article#237764

CNN changing words of Blix's address.
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/02/14/sp...pt.1/index.html
Read this. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2763653.stm
Then this.
http://www.un.org/webcast/
Then this.
Notice any difference between versions? CNN's is missing close 900 words on 
this - all of them having to do with Blix's refutations of P's "smoking 
gun." CNN also goes well out of their way to change the meaning of a few 
paragraphs.

Example:

Original:
"Not least against this background, a letter of 12 February from Iraq's 
National Monitoring Directorate ***may be irrelevant.*** It presents a list 
of 83 names of participants "in the unilateral destruction in the chemical 
field, which took place in the summer of 1991". As the absence of adequate 
evidence of that destruction has been and remains an important reason why 
quantities of chemicals have been deemed "unaccounted for", the 
presentation of a list of persons who can be interviewed about the actions 
appears useful and pertains to cooperation on substance. "

CNN:
"Not least against this background, a letter of 12 February from Iraq's 
National Monitoring Directorate ***may be of relevance.*** It presents a 
list of 83 names of participants "in the unilateral destruction in the 
chemical field, which took place in the summer of 1991". As the absence of 
adequate evidence of that destruction has been and remains an important 
reason why quantities of chemicals have been deemed "unaccounted for", the 
presentation of a list of persons who can be interviewed about the actions 
appears useful and pertains to cooperation on substance."

[[comments:
"Irrelevant" is changed to "of relevance." This changes the whole damned 
paragraph a bit, no?
All of this was left out of CNN's version (notice that it's stuff against 
having a war mostly) ]]

I trust that the Iraqi side will put together a similar list of names of 
persons who participated in the unilateral destruction of other proscribed 
items, notably in the biological field.

The Iraqi side also informed us that the commission, which had been 
appointed in the wake of our finding 12 empty chemical weapons warheads, 
had had its mandate expanded to look for any still existing proscribed 
items. This was welcomed.

A second commission, we learnt, has now been appointed with the task of 
searching all over Iraq for more documents relevant to the elimination of 
proscribed items and programmes. It is headed by the former minister of 
oil, General Amer Rashid, and is to have very extensive powers of search in 
industry, administration and even private houses.

The two commissions could be useful tools to come up with proscribed items 
to be destroyed and with new documentary evidence. They evidently need to 
work fast and effectively to convince us, and the world, that this is a 
serious effort.

The matter of private interviews was discussed at length during our meeting 
in Baghdad. The Iraqi side confirmed the commitment, which it made to us on 
20 January, to encourage persons asked to accept such interviews, whether 
in or out of Iraq. So far, we have only had interviews in Baghdad. A number 
of persons have declined to be interviewed, unless they were allowed to 
have an official present or were allowed to tape the interview.

Three persons that had previously refused interviews on Unmovic's terms, 
subsequently accepted such interviews just prior to our talks in Baghdad on 
8 and 9 February. These interviews proved informative. No further 
interviews have since been accepted on our terms.

I hope this will change. We feel that interviews conducted without any 
third party present and without tape recording would provide the greatest 
credibility. At the recent meeting in Baghdad, as on several earlier 
occasions, my colleague Dr ElBaradei and I have urged the Iraqi side to 
enact legislation implementing the UN prohibitions regarding weapons of 
mass destruction.

In a letter just received two days ago, we were informed that this process 
was progressing well and this morning we had a message that legislation has 
now been adopted by the Iraqi National Assembly in an extraordinary 
session. This is a positive step.

Mr President, I should like to make some comments on the role of 
intelligence in connection with inspections in Iraq. A credible inspection 
regime requires that Iraq provide full co-operation on "process" - granting 
immediate access everywhere to inspectors - and on substance, providing 
full declarations supported by relevant information and material.

However, with the closed society in Iraq of today and the history of 
inspections there, other sources of information, such as defectors and 
government intelligence agencies are required to aid the inspection 
process. I remember how, in 1991, several inspections in Iraq, which were 
based on information received from a government, helped to disclose 
important parts of the nuclear weapons programme. It was realised that an 
international organisation authorised to perform inspections anywhere on 
the ground could make good use of information obtained from governments 
with eyes in the sky, ears in the ether, access to defectors, and both eyes 
and ears on the market for weapons-related material. It was understood that 
the information residing in the intelligence services of governments could 
come to very active use in the international effort to prevent 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This remains true and we have 
by now a good deal of experience in the matter.

International organisations need to analyse such information critically and 
especially benefit when it comes from more than one source. The 
intelligence agencies, for their part, must protect their sources and 
methods. Those who provide such information must know that it will be kept 
in strict confidence and be known to very few people.

Unmovic has achieved good working relations with intelligence agencies and 
the amount of information provided has been gradually increasing. However, 
we must recognise that there are limitations and that misinterpretations 
can occur. Intelligence information has been useful for Unmovic.

In one case, it led us to a private home where documents mainly relating to 
laser enrichment of uranium were found. In other cases, intelligence has 
led to sites where no proscribed items were found. Even in such cases, 
however, inspection of these sites were useful in proving the absence of 
such items and in some cases the presence of other items - conventional 
munitions. It showed that conventional arms are being moved around the 
country and that movements are not necessarily related to weapons of mass 
destruction.

[[REFUTING POWELL LEFT OUT]]

The presentation of intelligence information by the US secretary of state 
[Powell] suggested that Iraq had prepared for inspections by cleaning up 
sites and removing evidence of proscribed weapons programmes. I would like 
to comment only on one case, which we are familiar with, namely, the trucks 
identified by analysts as being for chemical decontamination at a munitions 
depot.  This was a declared site, and it was certainly one of the sites 
Iraq would have expected us to inspect. We have noted that the two 
satellite images of the site [showen by Powell] were taken several weeks 
apart.

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