Dear Yurek
I respond below to some of your thoughts:
(1) "the main point of your divergence with Warren is that
you treat humanism from this aesthetic philosophical point whereas he approaches
it from a social philosophical point".
Yes and no, Yurek. It is certainly an aesthetic
philosophical viewpoint but it is no less political for all that.
There is in short a politics of the possible in the project of inventing
concepts, thinking with them, and articulating better the complexities
of the lived world. Is not the work of language the work of communicating,
and is it not this work that needs to be kept alive in tune with the variety
and plenitude of life despite all the threats that are constantly produced
against this variety and plenitude by those who seek to reduce and homogenize
the non-reducible character of lived experiences?
(2) "From your point you can talk about rupture, discontinuity,
unlimited freedom, lack of essence, etc. whereas from his point he seeks
continuity, classical values, stability, etc. You invoke post modernist
arguments whereas he invokes classical values and socialist ideas which
may be grounded in them. So the main point your discussion raises is what
in fact is post modernity? Is it a proposed rupture and discontinuity with
the “modern” or is it a maturation and transformation of the “modern” as
exposed in the Enlightenment thinking?".
I need to clarify here, Yurek. I am
not invoking postmodernist or post-modern arguments, even if in
appearance they may seem that way. That is something I am powerless
to prevent. I am critical of the postmodernist discourse, I do not
think that the processes of capital accumulation (and hence capitalist
modernity) have come to an end or that we live in an epoch outside of history.
In fact I think it is vital to develop critical positions with regard to
those who seek to put an end to all "meta-narratives". I like 'good'
meta-narratives, but not all meta-narratives are 'good' or interesting
or have adequate explanatory power. I also like the power that resides
in aphorisms and fragments, part of which is surely to challenge the manner
in which totalizations are constructed. Again, for me, it is not
a question of either-or, i.e., either you like meta-narratives or you like
the fragmentary. What matters is the mode in which narratives (meta
or otherwise) seek to express that which is at stake in a turbulent
world, and how they seek to connect with the multitudes, keeping in mind
the dictum of the philosopher of praxis in his well-know eleventh thesis
on Feuerbach.
Regarding the question of modernity and postmodernity: Capitalist modernity
is the name for the processes of "creative destruction" (Schumpeter), the
multiple ways in which the 'built environment' is constantly being formed
and transformed through multiple 'spatial fixes' (Harvey), the drive behind
this endless process being the quest for the new, the production of the
new, modernity in short is another name for the production and distribution
of newness in the form of commodities. The contemporary processes
of globalization refer to another round of spatial fixes to the acceleration
in the unfolding and in the pace of a recurring crisis of overaccumulation.
Warmaking is after all quite a traditional way of restructuring
the built environment (this is what I understand in the plans behind "nation-building"
and "reconstructing Iraq") and thereby trying to overcome the crisis itself.
But is that not what the project of "modernity" has always worked with
- the constant production of the new through a "creative" appropriation
of the past in order to re-configure the present? (But cf. also Adorno's
aphorism in Minima Moralia: 'the cult of the new and the idea of
modernity is a rebellion against the fact that there is no longer anything
new'). I do not share the confidence of the US in this warmaking
project. Many lives will be lost, many have already been lost,
but the project itself will not realize itself largely because of
the unintended consequences of the proposed occupation and redistribution
of Iraqi resources.
(3) "The same old discussion of continuity and change".
Not really, Yurek.
It is not just about continuity and change, it is also about repetition
and novelty and difference, of difference in kind vs. difference in degree.
I like Harvey's (1996) statement that what is at issue is not just any
difference but 'significant differences'. The contemporary fetishization
with identity politics is a referent in this discussion. The point
I want to make is not the fetishization of difference, in short, but the
development of perspectival differences that in combination can invent
something politically new. To revert to the question
of 'continuity'. First, no two repetititions are ever the same, each
historical case is unique, and it is the uniqueness and the specificity
of the 'case' that is of interest. Second, there are some moments
like the present when, as both Wallerstein and Prigogine remind us, our
choices make an enormous difference. That should give us hope in
terms of making choices that matter in the present. There is no time
for resignation or nihilism. This could very well be the only space,
at least in my lifetime and in yours, for some powerful forms of creative
invention and creative intervention. The dicethrow is all that matters
(apologies for this enigmatic utterance) in an overdetermined conjuncture!
(4) "I personally think that while post modernity, as an analytical
concept capable of throwing light on our present day reality by disjoining,
splitting and separating things, is analytically and conceptually useful,
the benefits of seeing a long duree and trying to find connections
are greater."
May I just say, in response to this, that
I agree with you, that I am proud to have been a student of Wallerstein,
of Arrighi, of Hopkins (and via them of Braudel, Amin, and Frank), and
yes I do see the compelling advantages of studying long processes, of long
time with cyclical rhythms . I have remained a long time student
of these long processes. But it is necessary to ask as well the question
of the 'heaviness' of the structure that makes for a certain slowness
of movement, and this may be a handicap at some moments when the conjuncture
demands quick responses and quick interventions. But for all that
the practitioners of the longue duree have an advantage in terms of elaborating
in more depth, the Ramakrishna Mukherjee questions: what is going on, why
is it going on, how has it been going on, and what will it be? Ganesh
Trichur.
Yurek Gierus wrote:
Dear
Trishur,
I can’t agree with you more on your last communication. It also gives
a perspective to what you communicated to the list prior to this.
I never assumed that Dostoyevski was a nihilist, or Nietzsche for this
matter. Dostoyevski depicted some of the characters who were nihilists.
He also depicted those who were humanists - in a rosy sweet politically
correct sense of the world as well as those who used humanist slogans as
a shield to perpetrate tyrany and violence. He also portrayed a peculiary
Orthodox Christian type of humanist, which one of the critic has called
a “Christian Buddhist” type. He also portrayed a universal type of humanist
who has gone through all doubts and pains and knows the value of the human
being. So he has this variety, diversity, freedom and unpredictability
you have written about. Dostoyevsky, however was not a thinker in a specifically
Western sense of the word. He picked some bits and pieces of philosophical
thinking (mostly of the German and French kind) and “lived them through”.
This is his biggest asset as well as his biggest limitation. In this sense
his philosophy is (to use a Tolstoi’s phrase) a “reflection of a reflection”.
To turn to Nietzsche, he was a new type of thinker in his time, who
has revolted against a routinised and idealised perception of the human
which too k ground in the old (to invoke Mr. Rumsfeld) Europe and tried
to introduce a liberalised fresh perception which he traced (consciously)
in the classical and perhaps (unconsciously) in the Anglo-Saxon. Yes, he
revolted against the Enlightenment concept of the human and to e degree
against the Enlightenment thought as such. This is why he brushed away
the very methodology of Enlightenment philosophy (German philosophic methodology
first of all) and formulated his philosophy predominantly in an aesthetic
romantic key.
Now the main point of your divergence with Warren is that you treat
humanism from this aesthetic philosophical point whereas he approaches
it from a social philosophical point. From your point you can talk about
rupture, discontinuity, unlimited freedom, lack of essence, etc. whereas
from his point he seeks continuity, classical values, stability, etc. You
invoke post modernist arguments whereas he invokes classical values and
socialist ideas which may be grounded in them. So the main point your discussion
raises is what in fact is post modernity? Is it a proposed rupture and
discontinuity with the “modern” or is it a maturation and transformation
of the “modern” as exposed in the Enlightenment thinking. The same old
discussion of continuity and change. I see two main approaches here. The
first one is offered first of all by French academics (Foulcaut, Leotard,
etc) who have read mostly German academics (Nietzsche, etc.) and who suggest
there is a discontinuity. Note, these are mostly continental European thinkers.
The second one if offered by Anthony Giddens who describes post modernity
as a radicalisation of modernity, i.e. suggests that the concepts and ideas
formulated since Enlightenment (rationalisation, autonomy of a human being,
abstraction, mechanisation, etc) have been developed further and have found
new ways of expression. I personally think that while post modernity, as
an analytical concept capable of throwing light on our present day reality
by disjoining, splitting and separating things, is analytically and conceptually
useful, the benefits of seeing a long duree and trying to find connections
are greater.
From a WS perspective we may, I think, regard “modernisation” (in a
broad sense) as a conceptual frame characteristic of a British hegemonic
cycle in WS, whereas post modernisation is a (mainly continental European)
response to a present day American hegemonic cycle. This for example puts
in a perspective Hardt and Negri’s “Empire” written in a clear cut post
modernist key. The main point of Hardt and Negri, as I see it, is that
they suggest that Europe should gain “immanence” (more ground root democracy,
more active involvement in the political, unmediated approach to other
humans, more efficient justice system, etc.) and get rid of “transcendence”
(Tocquevil’s aristocracy, mediation, buraucracy, inefficiency, etc.). Immanence,
Hardt and Negri maintain, not only underpins American constitution, but
is exercised by American institutions on a day to day basis. This tension
between (European) transcendence and (American) immanence is only too clearly
seen in the events of the recent time. Present day growing maturity and
strengthening of united Europe and its growing self awareness helps her
to become more “immanent”. This in turn may in a way restrict American
“immanence” tempted to be pushed too far and may help America to acquire
reasonable “transcendence” in acting on a wide scale. I think this should
help to create a truly global society which not only Warren but many of
us hope for.
Best wishes
Yurek
p.s. Although I was born and grew up in a Soviet Union, I am not a
Russian
-------Original Message-------
Date: 09 luty 2003 01:00:52
Subject: Re: so what?
Dear Yurek
In response may I just say that neither Doestoevsky nor Nietzsche are
nihilist? It is the interpretations of these two thinkers that have
dominated our thoughts about them. Who am I to convince an intelligent
Russian thinker like you about Doestovesky? Who am I to talk about
Cherneyvesky (the author of the famous 'What is to be Done'?)? But
certainly this I will say about Nietzsche, that contrary to Adorno's aphorism
(actually written in defense of Nietzsche which always bothered me especially
since I had always admired Adorno) - that 'thought does itself an honor
in defending what is damned as nihilism' ( Negative Dialectics)-
Nietzsche was no nihilist. He was certainly critical of a particular
kind of dialectical thinking (of the Hegelian variety) that produces 'the
man of ressentiment'. I will not write much more than just
this: today everything is conspiring against life, the multitudinous forms
of life in all their variety and difference are sought to be bulldozed
into a lacklustre uniformity. It is part of the contemporary project
of globalization. Eliminate all difference, let everyone be the same,
let everything be reduced to the simplest common denominator. Against
such an attitude, against such a mentality, I can and must define myself
pro-life, pro-variety, pro-difference, pro-heterogeneity. To declare
an unbounded attachment to life in all its plurality and novelty actually
demands multiple perspectives, the capacity to see many kinds of differences,
a keen appreciation for differences in life-styles and an affirmation of
those differences, an affirmation of the superabundance of life forms that
our most beautiful earth is endowed with. None of this can be grasped
under the 'simple' concept of humanism. None of this can be adequately
thought with the useless concept of man. To affirm life is also to
affirm the possible, which is much more complex, open, unpredictable, and
novel, more than all the sterile platitudes one can always muster
under the decrepit rhetoric of humanism. There is nothing nihilistic
about this affirmation. If anything it is an affirmation of life
and all that is possible in life, against all those who hate life, against
all those intent upon destroying life, against all those who seek to homogenize
the world into a simple set of understandable categories. The other
side of Marx's "Accumulate, accumulate, accumulate" is the bourgeois slogan
"Reduce, reduce, reduce", let everything be as simple as possible for we
need to understand! What if the world were more complex than you
and I can even imagine it to be? And if that is case do we not need
to develop more adequate concepts, more adequate perceptual equipment to
relate with, to live with, rather than just think in terms of death, destruction,
humanism, homogeneity, globalization...? Wish you well, my Russian
friend. Ganesh Trichur.
Yurek Gierus wrote:
Dear
Trichur, What an explosion of Dostojevskyite discontent! You have truly
rendered the letter and the spirit of the "Notes From Underground", which
he in turn grasped from Max Stirner's "Der Einzige Und Sein Eigentum".
Well, in my part of the world, where Russian culture - and Dostojevsky
- are still to a large extent a stuff of everyday life, people say "Dostojevsky,
no v mieru", which means "Dostojevsky, but to a certain point". What that
means practically is that there is always a danger of getting hooked on
Dostojevsky's nihilism and miss his pronounced "humanism". Regards, Dr.
Yurek Gierus
-------Original Message-------
Date: 07 luty 2003 17:22:06
Subject: Re: so what?
This is my response. I cite Wagar's text and then respond to
it below.
(1) "In my original post, I asked what "our" world-view should
be
in the 21st Century. I was referring to those of us attracted
to
world-system analysis and especially to Wallerstein's vision of a
democratic "socialist world-government" as the next stage of human
history--a stage not inevitable but much to be desired and sought
after.If such a stage is ever reached, I think it will need the sustaining
power of a very widely shared world-view..." (Wagar).
My response:
To keep a vision of a democratic socialist world-government is not,
in my mind at least, the same thing as being a "humanist". One can
be a democrat and a socialist in a world government without having
to purchase the hypocrisy that falls under the label of "humanism".
(2) "I find it hard to believe that a democratic and
socialist world-government can even come into existence, much less
thrive
and prosper, unless vast numbers of people everywhere on Earth reach
some
sort of rough consensus on fundamental values, goals, and priorities.
So,
yes, it's either that or multiplying chaos and division" (Wagar).
My Response:
What you are saying here applies not just to 'democratic socialist
world-governments', it applies equally, to non-democratic and non-socialist
world hegemonies as well. To use your words again, "vast numbers
of people everywhere on Earth" did indeed "reach some sort of rough consensus
on fundamental values, goals, and priorities", and it was indeed "either
that or multiplying chaos and division". Wallerstein's essay on "The
Three Hegemonies of Historical Capitalism" shows how liberal humanism
provides the ideological underpinnings of such a hegemony. ( Powerful analyses
of the multiple contradictions in liberalism, and of humanism as liberalism,
are there in two successive chapters in Polanyi's Great Transformation).
It is necessary to manufacture consent of the ruled for the complex of
business and governmental agencies that combine to produce order in the
world system. The loyalty of the vast numbers you speak about, of multitudes
in the core and the periphery, is obtained partly by consent and partly
by coercion, partly also by the means of payment. And all this because
of a demand for order....(For more on this cf. Ch.2 in Arrighi's Long
Twentieth Century).
(3) "Let's not turn this into a metaphysical conundrum.
Feminism is a
belief in the dignity of womanhood and in whatever advances the well-being
of women. Humanism is a belief in the supreme value of our species,
Homo
sapiens, and in whatever advances the well-being of humankind.
It teaches
ultimate and highest loyalty to the species, rather than to separate
nations or tribes or Fuhrers or corporations or sects alleging direct
private communication with omnipotent supernatural entities." (Wagar)
My Response: Not a "metaphysical conundrum", Warren, but
an anti-humanist non-conundrum. I do not have the faith that
you may have in liberal humanist values. In the long and barbaric
history of a Euro-centered capitalism, I see the multiple employment of
humanist slogans, humanist arguments, to further the projects of reason
and capital. The cunning of reason is that it has so successfully
employed humanism as its ideological tool so effectively. Toussaint
Overture's revolution in Haiti was against the hypocrisy of Enlightenment
humanism. In short, the Enlightenment ideology of 'liberty,
equality, and fraternity' has never been consistently applied to embrace
what you call 'humankind', but always selectively, one that also excluded
women for a very long time and still does; one that has exploited peoples
in the Third World consistently but all the time using humanist arguments
to do so - 'they need to be civilized', or as Bush says today, 'they need
to be liberated'. Then as now the pathetic humanist story is the
same. "Belief in the supreme value of the species"? Where have
you seen this applied? Or perhaps you mean the Western man as the
species whose 'supreme values' have no doubt been consistently upheld all
through your 'human' history. "Ultimate and highest loyalty to the species"?
Where? When? How? Unless again you mean Western man (white
man) as the ultimate of the species to whom of course the highest loyalty
has always been declared in the West and sought to be enforced over the
non-West. In short, I do not see any historical instances of what
you see to be resident in the content of 'humanism'. What I
do see in history is multiple different resistances against the hypocritical
sham that has been paraded around as "humanism" and "Western humanism"
in particular. The utter emptiness of that concept may be seen in
the rejection of Western humanism in the struggles of the oppressed, the
majority of whom are located in the periphery of the world system, but
what they clearly reject is "Western values", "liberalism", "developmentalism",
"globalization", because they see in it its utter hypocrisy. It is
all fine to define yourself as having descended from the Enlightenment
and the values of the Enlightenment - I have no such fascination with the
Enlightenment and its humanist representatives. It certainly is not for
me a principle on which to base my thinking, my work, my aspirations for
a freer and better life. You and I ofcourse differ here! As
for your statement regarding feminism - many feminists would strongly disagree
with your definition of feminism as 'a belief in the dignity of womanhood'.
Womanhood? What is womanhood? Are you saying
there is an essential woman that can be defined? That correspondingly
there is a "manhood" as well? Is that your "humanism"?
Well then, all the more reason for the distance I keep from that useless
concept. I do not believe in essences, and I do not believe
in the 'humanistically' constructed division between 'man' and 'woman'.
You may (or may not) want to read a most powerful, most engrossing, narrative
called Hercule Barbin with an introduction by M.Foucault.
If that does not challenge your attachment to 'manhood' and 'womanhood',
I may probably convert to your humanism. But please do give that
text a chance.
(3) "Humankind is not dead. There are now 6.3 billion of
us, all with
beating hearts and teeming brains. We have behaved atrociously
to one
another, there are many ways of imagining how we could get along better,
and we have learned a lot more about our dependence on the terrestrial
biosphere and how vital it is to preserve that wondrous envelope of
air
and water and soil that supports our existence, but humankind is not
dead." (Wagar).
My Response:
To say that there 6 million people living on this planet is not the
same thing as asserting that "humanism" is alive and well. Not very
good logic here, Wagar! Humanism is a concept,
it is a way of looking at the world, and in my mind not necessarily
the best way or even a very productive way. In fact it is a contested
concept, contested by those see its limited utility. It
is the reason why I mentioned Marx's "ensemble of social relations" which
is really anti-essentialist (your definition appears to me as essentialist)
why I mentioned Doestovsky and Nietzsche, thinkers who did not think with
an essence for all who live on this planet. It is also about
how you think and how I think that differs. You and I are different
: I can never be Wagar, Wagar can never be Ganesh, I can never live
or love or die as Wagar, and Wagar can never live or love or die as Ganesh....I
think there are better ways of coming to terms with these realities other
than through the empty use of the word 'humanism' to describe the multiplicity
and singularity all that lives, of all that is alive, of the infinite richness
of encounters and experiences that only through a certain poverty of thought
and imagination one would want to reduce to the 'human'.
(4) " Really? Then we will put an end to our discourse on
ourselves. I
think not."
My Response: Who is the one who wants to enagage in this
'discourse on ourselves'? And who is the 'self' in the 'ourselves'.
You think you know about that 'self' because you think
in terms of essences. I do not. I think there are multiple
'selves' in any person, there are in fact only multiplicities, and it is
often through violence (humanist violence?) that all these selves are made
to collapse into one single 'authentic' or essential self.
Keep lumping so many differences in experience under that concept of the
'human', and it becomes as empty as I pointed out earlier. Not to
say reductive, reductive of the richness, the diversity, the manifold contexts
into which I enter which often completely transform me sometimes beyond
all recognition. It takes a certain amount of reductive 'humanist'
violence to subsume all those experiences into the category of the 'human'.
(5) "Violence is committed every day, sometimes senselessly,
sometimes for pleasure, or in the "name" of everything from Almighty
God
to humanism, none of which proves a blessed thing about the validity
or
utility of humanism as the basis of a world-view. Same with socialism.
"Stalin was a socialist. Stalin killed millions of innocent people.
Therefore, socialism kills millions of innocent people." Bad
syllogism".
My Response: (i) A lot of the violence that has been
committed in the long course of world history has indeed been committed
in the name of 'humanism'. To you it may prove nothing about the
utility of humanism as the basis of a world-view. To me the connection
between violence and humanism is quite clear. You can of course will
yourself not to see it that way. That is not of interest to me.
(ii) What you call a "bad syllogism" arises out of a particular reading
of Soviet history and of the poor reading of the passage I wrote.
Of history first - you perhaps think that Stalin was a socialist, I have
never done so. Of the passage - I wrote that in the name of socialist
humanism a lot of violence has been committed. If you choose
to equate 'socialism' with 'Stalinist socialist humanism' - and I
do not - then obviously you will see only what you look for, a bad syllogism.
The problem with your mode of thinking is what I have already referred
to as essentialism. You, Wagar, can speak so confidently of
"womanhood", "mankind", "humankind", as if these terms contained within
them the essence of what it is to be a "woman", a "man", and a "human".
I believe in so such thing. So likewise you claim to know
what 'socialist humanism' is. Unlike you, I make no such claims but
I do not believe you either when you make these claims. No doubt
you and I are very different. You can be as "human" as wish to, I
refuse to allow your essentializing thought process the generalization
it seeks to impose in and through its "humanness".
(6) "The difference is quite simple. Humanism says that
all human
beings are human. Even George W. Bush. If he impregnated
Aung San Suu
Kyi, the child of their union would be a full-fledged human being."
(Wagar)
My Response: Bravo! As you say, it is indeed very
simple, it is the complete absence of any depth in the
concept of humanism that you so clearly, so simply reveal, that demonstrates
all that I have to say. I like to think of those whom I respect as
my friends as complex beings encountering different situations, leading
complex, beautiful, and irreducibly different, singular lives, none
of which has anything to do with your attachment to the "simple".
Therein again, resides the difference, between your humanist way of thinking,
and my non-humanist stance. As for your statement about humanism
'believing in the dignity and sanctity and humanity of all members of the
species' - I will ask you again a question I have already asked: who is
'the human' you are talking about? Bush? Aung San Suu Kyi?
Yourself? I would recommend that you speak for yourself.
(7) " Humanism believes in the dignity and sanctity and
humanity of all members of the species. Fundamentalists demonize."
My Response: If you look for historical evidence for the
first part of your statement you would be hard put to find it. If
anything, to repeat what you call my bad syllogism, it is in the very name
of humanism that all kinds of indignities against life have been performed.
You may believe anything you like about anything, but its materiality is
in its moment of translation from mere belief to acting out your belief.
The record of Western civilization has been pathetic in this regard.
It has called itself all kinds of fine-sounding names like liberal, like
humanistic, and it has duped many - like you - into thinking that there
is something sacred, something beautiful, something sublime, about it.
I see nothing but hypocrisy, a sham through and through. As Walter
Benjamin says, 'there is no document of [Western] civilization, that is
not also a document of its barbarism'. Call it humanistic if you
wish but do not forget that its roots, its forms, are barbaric through
and through!
Have a good night Dr. Wagar. Ganesh K. Trichur.
wwagar@binghamton.edu wrote:
On Wed, 5 Feb 2003, Trichur Ganesh wrote:
> The problem, in my opinion, in formulating the question in the manner
in
> which Dr. Wagar does, is to present it in the form of an 'either-or',
that
In my original post, I asked
what "our" world-view should be in
the 21st Century. I was referring to those of us attracted to
world-system analysis and especially to Wallerstein's vision of a
democratic "socialist world-government" as the next stage of human
history--a stage not inevitable but much to be desired and sought after.
If such a stage is ever reached, I think it will need the sustaining
power
of a very widely shared world-view, so in a larger sense when I write
"our",
I am also thinking of a substantial number of human beings, not only
the
few hundred of us, or the millions of people with a Left orientation
now
scattered around the globe, but millions more, most of them still unborn.
I wouldn't call this an "either/or" situation. There must be
plenty of
room for dissent and freedom of conscience in any world order that
seeks
to be democratic. Yet I find it hard to believe that a democratic
and
socialist world-government can even come into existence, much less
thrive
and prosper, unless vast numbers of people everywhere on Earth reach
some
sort of rough consensus on fundamental values, goals, and priorities.
So,
yes, it's either that or multiplying chaos and division. But
not, "either
you become a scientific humanist or you'll lose your job and maybe
we'll
torture you to death in Room 101."
> is to say in asking about scientific humanism there appears to be
a
> supposition, implicitly or otherwise, on a generally agreed preference
for
> humanism in particular. But what is humanism? After the
death of God -
Let's not turn this into
a metaphysical conundrum. Feminism is a
belief in the dignity of womanhood and in whatever advances the well-being
of women. Humanism is a belief in the supreme value of our species,
Homo
sapiens, and in whatever advances the well-being of humankind.
It teaches
ultimate and highest loyalty to the species, rather than to separate
nations or tribes or Fuhrers or corporations or sects alleging direct
private communication with omnipotent supernatural entities.
Do humanists
disagree on practically everything else? Of course. Do
they have
different ideas of what's good for humankind? Of course.
But is there
anything mysterious about pledging allegiance to humankind? Not
a bit.
> already announced in the West in the 19th century by different writers
> (Dostoevsky, Nietzsche)- are we not living in an epoch that
bears witness
> to the death of 'man'? A death of 'man' in different inter-related
senses
> of the term - one sense is that in which we have been introduced
to the
> death of the subject from very different theoretical perspectives,
another
> is the sense in which 'man' is a contested agent resistances against
whom
> opens up a whole new world of the possible, a third is the sense
in which
> one may elaborate non-reductively on 'the ensemble of social relations'
> (Marx) as well as the possibility of transforming those social relations
in
> differently productive spaces of interrogation and possibilities,
a fourth
> is the sense in which students of 'deep ecology' (Naess) have questioned
> the centrality of the human in different ecosystems....
Humankind is not dead.
There are now 6.3 billion of us, all with
beating hearts and teeming brains. We have behaved atrociously
to one
another, there are many ways of imagining how we could get along better,
and we have learned a lot more about our dependence on the terrestrial
biosphere and how vital it is to preserve that wondrous envelope of
air
and water and soil that supports our existence, but humankind is not
dead.
> Emerson's concept
> of the 'overman' is another useful critique of the model of 'human-ness'
or
> 'humanism' that informs so much of our thinking. As is Nietzsche's
> formulation of the problem in his critical references to the 'human,
> all-too human'. Humanism appears everywhere, in everyone's
tongue today as
> in the past, in such reified manner. Perhaps it is as empty a concept
as
> 'culture' and 'excellence'. I am tempted to say that perhaps
the 21st
> century will put an end to this discourse on humanism, scientific
or
Really? Then we will
put an end to our discourse on ourselves. I
think not.
> otherwise. The means by which that may happen will perhaps be
more violent
> than we care for, but then humanism itself has always carried with
it both
> reason and violence. We like to speak about humanism, and yet
we are
> surely aware how in different geographical spaces random and 'senseless'
> acts of violence are constantly being inflicted on 'humans' in the
name of
> some form or the other of humanism itself, whether it be liberal
humanism,
> Soviet-style humanism, or religious humanism. Where lies the
difference
Violence is committed every
day, sometimes senselessly,
sometimes for pleasure, or in the "name" of everything from Almighty
God
to humanism, none of which proves a blessed thing about the validity
or
utility of humanism as the basis of a world-view. Same with socialism.
"Stalin was a socialist. Stalin killed millions of innocent people.
Therefore, socialism kills millions of innocent people." Bad
syllogism.
> between humanism and
> fundamentalism? Are not fundamentalists very
> fundamental precisely about their particular claim to humanity and
the
> non-human character of some remainder of humanity? In our epoch
and in the
The difference is quite simple.
Humanism says that all human
beings are human. Even George W. Bush. If he impregnated
Aung San Suu
Kyi, the child of their union would be a full-fledged human being.
I
apologize for the incongruity, and especially to Aung San Suu Kyi,
one of
the finest people on Earth, just as W. is among its most nauseating,
but
the fact remains. Humanism believes in the dignity and sanctity
and
humanity of all members of the species. Fundamentalists demonize.
> terrible tensions of the coming days and weeks and months, is not
war
> itself being waged in the name of a military humanism? Are
not its
> champions using 'liberation', and calling themselves 'liberators'
even as
> they seek to inflict utter violence on the perceived un-humanness
of other
> humans?
Military humanism?
That's new to me. The last time I checked
with W. (State of the Union) he claimed to be an agent of Almighty
God.
> And what about art and the realm of the beautiful and the sublime?
Can
> that be so faciley subsumed under the rubric of the 'human'?
I doubt it.
Please let me know any definition
or identification of what is
beautiful and sublime not provided by human beings.
> Some of my doubts were a long time back aroused in the context of
what
> Benjamin referred to 'mechanical reproduction'. Art was then
already
> embedded in an age of mechanical reproduction, along with its experience
of
> the loss of the auratic. More on this later. I have a
student waiting for
> me. Ganesh.
>
> Respectfully, Ganesh.
Respectfully,
Warren
> Boris Stremlin wrote:
>
> > Steve wrote:
> >
> > "Since scientific humanism produced virtually
> > everything bad associated with
> > religion (intolerance, conformity, inquisitions, etc)
> > and left out the good
> > (spiritual ectasy, art, communal rituals) why exactly
> > are we supposed to
> > believe it is THE path for the twenty-first century?"
> >
> > I don't think that's right, actually. There is plenty
> > of evidence that "scientific humanism" (if by that we
> > mean the state religion of the Socialist Bloc
> > countries, or something very close to it) included the
> > "good" elements of religion - there were certainly
> > communal rituals (the popularity of which is often
> > understated or ignored in the West and among Soviet
> > emigres), there was a large amount of world-class art
> > (either in the early stages, or, in the case of the
> > later periods, usually in more traditional pursuits
> > such as ballet, opera, symphonic music). As for
> > spiritual ecstasy, we must understand under this
> > rubric not only sex, drugs and rock n' roll, but also
> > that which is sometimes called "the pursuit of Truth"
> > - in other words, all scientific research. The
> > categorization of such as a merely practical, material
> > pursuit is a legacy of orthodox Christian theology,
> > though because they accepted it and propagated it,
> > proponents of "scientific humanism" bear a share of
> > the blame as well.
> >
> > On the larger point - that there is no reason to
> > accept "scientific humanism" as THE path for the 21st
> > (or any other) century, Steve is, however, absolutely
> > correct.
> >
> > Warren Wagar wrote:
> >
> > "The
> > point is, to follow up on Steven Sherman's question,
> > what should our
> > world-view be in the 21st Century? If not scientific
> > humanism, then what?
> > If anyone has a better idea, let's hear it. I think
> > the question is
> > important precisely because I believe that religion in
> > the sense of shared
> > beliefs about the good and the real and the ground of
> > knowledge is vital
> > to our mental health. But reversion to Christianity,
> > Islam, Hinduism,
> > and the rest violates reason and promotes human
> > divisiveness. Is there an
> > alternative? People like Marx and T.H. Huxley and
> > Bertrand Russell and
> > Sigmund Freud thought so. Were they so wrong?"
> >
> > Why should there be a 21st century worldview which is
> > "ours" (who are WE, anyway?)? Who will be in charge
> > of enforcing that this view will remain "ours"? The
> > problem with "scientific humanism" as described above
> > is not that it fails to incorporate genuine religious
> > experience. It is that it sees only certain, and very
> > limited types of such experience as legitimate,
> > specifically those types which are generally
> > associated with the 19th century. This 19th century
> > religion is then counterposed to equally hypostasized
> > religions like Islam, which is assigned a century of
> > its own, the experiences of which it supposedly
> > fossilizes and carries into the present day. But
> > Islam is very diverse, and as a living religion, it
> > incorporates a variety of religious experiences
> > through the ages - there is nothing "7th century"
> > about "Islamic" art, "Islamic" science, or Sufism. It
> > is only when certain Muslims begin to prattle about
> > restoring the Medina Caliphate that Islam becomes
> > truncated (and not particularly religious). The same
> > is true about a religion that exists on sacralizing
> > the experiences of Marx or Freud at the expense of all
> > others. If that is what the legacy of Marx, Freud,
> > Russell and Huxley is, then one can only say that they
> > were, indeed, wrong, irrational, and divisive. If
> > they are to have a legacy, it is as proponents of
> > democratizing religious experience - in undermining
> > the clergies which claimed a monopoly on it, rather
> > than in building up a new scientistic orthodoxy. Can "scientific
> > humanism" become a living tradition and come to terms with other
> > traditions, instead of offering us a "humanistic civilization"
obsessed
> > with 1848 or 1917?
> >
> > __________________________________________________
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>
>
>
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