Re: Affective measures in the social sciences produce more ideologic agi

In a message dated 9/19/2002 5:51:20 PM Eastern Daylight Time, malexan@net-link.net writes:


> I've read a bit of your website.  As far as I can tell the eonic effect is something like this: around 3000 BC some important stuff happens, then around 600 BC some more important stuff happens and then around 1800 AD some more important stuff happens.  Hence, there is a 2400 year cycle of important stuff.
>  
> What I don't see is a lot of evidence.  I see statements like "We call the period from the fall of the Roman Empire until modern times a ‘middle age’. This ‘middleness’ is a clue to how we in fact take our own history, not quite sure why, although we can see that the source of this earlier world lies in the onset of the classical age, many centuries before. This era rose to a height that was never matched until after 1500." 


Thanks for the comments. The evidence of the eonic effect is all the evidence we have, and mainly everything we already know, at the highest level, as this remains invariant at many zoom levels. 
Thus my model is built out of things like the 'rise of the modern', the 'middle ages', the 'Greek Miracle', the 'Greek Archaic', and so on. You see, it is a question of the 'meaning of events' taken as a whole. And we can match the model to that at that level. 
And once we do that the pieces fall into place, not because the model is certain, or exact, but because it is a rough match, and one with too many pieces in place to be too far off. 
You could make the same criticism of the data on economic cycles in the nineteenth century. The problems with data are critical and persistent, but in the final analysis the data converges, more or less. 
So after all is said and done, and we refine the data, the rise of the modern (which needs definition), the middle ages, the Greek Miracle, and the Greek Archaic, etc.. remain, and that's my basic foundation. 
There are a lot more pieces that this, but the point is that my objective is to demonstrate a non-random pattern. That's a cinch.But that conclusion has big consequences, which are hard to reckon. 
There's something macro involved, contrary to what is normally claimed. 

You are right though, the birth of civilization is not as solid as the rest. It is important to see that this is two books in one, one about the eonic effect, a non-random pattern, and a frequency hypothesis, which is just that. 
But I think the model stands one way or that other. It is like Chinese boxes. We have a theory, subtheory, and so on. 

However, if you look at the logic, the meaning, of events beginning with foundational Egypt and Sumer ca. -3000 onwards, you see the same logic of initial advance, peak, and plateau, as in the next cycle. So the issue is stronger that it stands. 
The problem may be the knack of seeing 'relative beginnings'. The 'relative beginning' of Sumer and Egypt in the time frame indicated is not the beginning of anything in an absolute sense. 
That's clear if you look at the later example. Greek history stretches backward ad infinitum. But the relative beginning in the Archaic is a distinct object of analysis. 

The quote is about the 'middle ages'. Do you advocate the non-use of this term? If you use it, I am also going to use it. We intuitively sense the 'eonic' effect because we see that civilization was in the 'middle of something'. Nice. You are already using eonic terms.

Your post is helpful to me, and I will reply to the rest in parts. 

The model indicated is, in a way, seemingly artificial. But once you follow it in detail, it uncovers some strange and remarkable facts. 
The problem is that we have no methods of conceiving of macrohistory that aren't metaphysical. I think, however, I have provided one way to approach the issues. 

John Landon
Website on the eonic effect
http://eonix.8m.com
nemonemini@eonix.8m.com