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AGF's scenario - more materials to support his thesis
by Tausch, Arno
03 June 2002 08:56 UTC
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friends, again i think that our friend AGF is basically right in his
predictions. look at these high quality international press clippings. what
i personally would fear in addition is also that communal tensions will
tremendoulsy increase in the wake of an escalationb scenario in india. have
a look at:


kindest regards - as always my own private opinion

arno tausch

EPW Commentary May 18, 2002 

Gujarat Violence: Meaning and Implications
For years to come, the recent communal violence in Gujarat is going to
remain a reference point in identity narratives about the 'self' and the
'other'. Therefore, the different narratives of the violence discussed here,
along with their internal nuances, will continue to shape and influence
collective memories. In a sense, these narratives, in the larger context of
the environmental factors, will influence the political orientations of the
Riaz Ahmad  

Notwithstanding the politics of playing down the gravity of the unending
violence in Gujarat by extending arguments that longer-duration violence is
not new to the state1  and that loot, arson, killing and rape are common to
many such cases,2 more than two-and-a-half months of continuing violence
have sent shock-waves across the globe. Numerous individuals, groups and
agencies in India and abroad have voiced serious concern about issues like
human rights and citizenship rights, and the role of the state as an actor
responsible for the protection of such rights as well as for the maintenance
of law and order. What is not disputed is the fact that two coaches of
Sabarmati Express were attacked and set afire by a mob at Godhra and that
the violence ultimately led to the burning alive of 58 Hindu karsevaks who
were returning from Ayodhya, most of the dead being women and children. It
is also not disputed that in the following weeks Ahmedabad and Baroda and
many villages and towns of Vadodhara, Panchmahals, Mahasana and Sabarkantha
witnessed unusual mob frenzy. Even according to the official accounts, by
now, the death toll crosses 900 whereas according to unofficial assessments
it ranges from 2000-5000. Men, women and children have been killed
mercilessly; many of them have been burnt alive. Property worth hundreds of
crores has been destroyed. Dargahs and mosques have been destroyed; some of
them have been converted to temples. Women have been sexually assaulted. And
the madness goes on. There is no disagreement that the loss of every kind
has mainly been suffered by the Muslims.

Narratives of Violence 

In short, there appears to be no controversy about the victims and
perpetrators of violence on and after February 27, 2002. Nevertheless, once
we try to go beyond this, once we try to find out 'who did what, and why?'
we are faced with a multiplicity of responses marked by several
controversies. In fact, dissemination of knowledge about all cases of
collective violence is a function of narratives about them. And,
construction of a narrative is, largely, an exercise in focalisation,
contextualisation and representation of facts. Hence, there are strong
possibilities that any narrative of collective violence may be subjective,
presenting a jaundiced view of the whole truth. Nevertheless, it is the
current or the future potential of such a narrative as a weapon in the
struggle for power, which makes it an interesting subject of study. 

It is with this perspective that one should approach the narratives of the
ongoing violence in Gujarat. If we fail to do so, many of us may dismiss,
for example, a particular narrative as being subjective and therefore
unworthy of any serious attention. Such a rejection may obstruct a
comprehensive view about future direction of Indian politics. I will,
therefore, like to talk about different narratives of the current violence
in Gujarat. Nevertheless, before doing so I will also like to argue that the
great mass of Indians living at the margins of existence, have no active
role in the construction of such narratives. They have neither the time nor
the expertise required for undertaking such an exercise. Many of them may be
the carriers of the knowledge disseminated through the narratives; the
construction of the narratives remains a function performed by the elite,
divided internally on various counts. Thus, a narrative is, generally,
constructed by a small minority and seeks to influence the behaviour of more
and more people.

As suggested earlier, the construction of a narrative is an exercise in
focalisation, contextualisation and representation of facts. Any
preconceptions about 'us' and 'them', about fears and suspicions, and about
history, culture and politics may impact the processes of focalisation,
contextualisation and representation of facts. It is primarily for these
reasons that we discover dissimilar narratives of the 2002 violence in

A section of the Hindu elite focalises the Godhra incident, places it in the
context of the perceived age-old Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism that
allegedly came into sharp focus after the terrorist attacks in the US and
India on September 11 and December 13, 2001 respectively, and represents the
Godhra carnage as an instance of Islamic terrorism planned and funded by
Pakistan's ISI and implemented by their local agents. It sees the following
violence as a natural and spontaneous reaction. Although the considerations
of realpolitik prevent some of them to cross this line, others go on to
justify the violence as a fitting reply: not merely an eye for an eye and a
tooth for a tooth, but both eyes for an eye and the whole jaw for a tooth.
The gory violence is represented as spontaneous and quick justice, which
also establishes the Hindu manliness beyond doubt. This narrative argues
that the violence reached such proportions because of the failure of the
Muslims and the opposition parties to condemn the Godhra carnage and due to
the role of the media, which publicised one-sided stories.

A section of the Muslim elite, on the other hand, constructs a qualitatively
different narrative of the same events. It focalises death, destruction and
humiliation suffered by the Muslims and places it in the larger context of a
perceived conspiracy against Islam and the Muslims. A few of them see the
continuing violence as an outcome of an international conspiracy of
targeting Islam and the Muslims throughout the world: a manifestation of the
theory of the clash of civilisations. Nevertheless, many of them see it as a
conspiracy of the Hindutva forces to wipe out or enslave 20 crore Indian
Muslims as a revenge for 1,000 years of the Muslim rule. The Ayodhya
movement is also seen in the same context. It is argued that the tension
built up due to this movement in February 2002, the misbehaviour of the
karsevaks returning from Ayodhya on and before the day of the Godhra
carnage, and particularly the misbehaviour of the karsevaks travelling in
the coaches that were attacked and burnt instigated the violence against
them. They believe that the Godhra incident was then used as an excuse to
execute violence that was planned much in advance. They argue that even if
the Godhra carnage had not taken place, the Muslims would have been targeted
on some other pretext. The state itself is viewed as a sponsor and a partner
of the crime that includes four-pronged attack against the Muslims' lives,
economic status, self-respect, and religious and cultural identity.

One notes that each of the above two narratives has shades of differences of
opinion on certain points. Nevertheless, the total impact of each as well as
both of them remains a hate campaign and thus communal polarisation.
However, a section of the Indian elite coming from different religious
backgrounds is reading the Gujarat violence in a third way. Treating the
Indian Muslims as citizens of India, it focalises the violation of
citizenship rights and human rights along with the role played by the state
of Gujarat and the Indian state in this regard. It places the issue of
violation of rights and the role of the state in the context of national
politics. It represents the violence as a consequence of identity politics
based on religio-cultural nationalism, and as a serious challenge to India's
constitution, secularism and democracy.

The convergence of these narratives has implications for the direction of
the Indian politics. I will return to such implications later. At this
stage, I want to make some broad observations about the current violence,
trying to compare the same with the Ahmedabad riots of 1969.

Understanding the Current Collective Violence 

The current violence in Gujarat should be seen in the context of the total
crisis sweeping through the Indian political system. The political and
economic crisis is both a cause and consequence of the processes of
globalisation, authoritarianism and communalism. Globalisation has not
merely opened up new economic avenues; it has also made the economic crisis
worse. The political crisis emanating from inadequate responsiveness of the
political system has contributed to greater authoritarian tendencies that
have further distanced the people and the state, thus making the crisis even
more serious. The economic and political contradictions have been
manipulated to promote communalism so that it serves as an escape route for
the brewing tensions among people, provides a breathing space to certain
sections of the ruling elite and ensures the victory of some of them in the
number game of electoral politics. Deeper penetration of communalism in the
Indian society has serious long-term implications for the values of peace,
pluralism and secularism here.

The current Gujarat violence is a glimpse of the ugly face of the
convergence of the processes of globalisation, authoritarianism and
communalism. Over the last two decades, deepening economic crisis, further
accentuated by the globalisation process during the 1990s, has led to the
closure of over 50 textile mills only in Ahmedabad, resulting in at least
one lakh workers becoming unemployed (Jan Breman, 'Communal Upheaval as
Resurgence of Social Darwinism', Economic and Political Weekly, April 20,
2002). Their struggle for survival has made them dependent on casual work.
With no regular source of income and without any regular job, they,
exceptions apart, have been swept by a wave of lumpenisation. This aspect of
the globalisation process is not restricted to Ahmedabad. 

Gujarat state symbolises the authoritarian tendencies of the Indian
nation-state that have time and again been reflected in its response to
various peoples' rights movements as well as in its love for draconian laws
like Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) and
Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA). Gujarat is, after all, said to have
earned the dubious distinction of making the largest number of arrests under
TADA during the 1980's and the 1990's. The manner TADA was generally used
has contributed to the projection of the Muslims as a bunch of criminals and
terrorists, simultaneously promoting among sections of Muslims a feeling of
being discriminated against by the state and thus alienating them from the
system. What better example can be cited to prove the point than to make a
mention of the Gujarat chief minister Narendra Modi's urge to invoke
Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (POTO) only for the culprits of the Godhra
carnage and not for those involved in the following violence. It was only
after a backlash of protest that the Gujarat state surrendered its
discriminatory intentions in this case and decided against using POTO. 

The Sangh parivar has treated Gujarat as its laboratory since the 1980s,
experimenting with its saffronisation project. The systematic and planned
penetration of the Gujarati society by the sangh parivar has had far-
reaching implications. Movements for women's rights, tribal autonomy,
workers' rights, civil liberties and human rights have been swept gradually
by the rising tide of anti-Muslim and anti- Christian campaign. Systematic
mobilisation of the tribals, middle classes and women and their induction
into the Hindutva fold, methodical social engineering directed at achieving
communal polarisation through a propaganda for religio-cultural nationalism
and a related hate campaign against the Muslims and the Christians, and
gradual penetration of the Hindutva forces and their sympathisers in
government, administration and police, are symptomatic of the level of
communal divide experienced by the Gujarati society during the last two
decades, simultaneously sounding alarm bells about the future of peace,
pluralism, secularism and constitutional democracy in the state. 

Notwithstanding innumerable islands of hope promoting the cause of people's
rights, peace, pluralism, secularism and constitutional democracy, thousands
of lumpenised youth's willingness to indulge in collective violence,
simultaneous authoritarianism and communalisation of the state in Gujarat
along with a general communalisation of the Gujarati society, all converged
to produce the atrocious violence being witnessed in Gujarat. One may
therefore argue that the ongoing Gujarat violence presents a synoptic view
of the convergence of the processes of globalisation, authoritarianism and

Let me make one more point about the present case of the Gujarat violence.
The madness that followed the brutal Godhra incident was not, for many
weeks, a riot; it was a planned, one-sided, state-sponsored violence against
the Muslims. If the gruesome convergence of globalisation, authoritarianism
and communalism is not stalled and reversed, the Gujarat experiment may be
repeated and replicated by the vested interests in other parts of the
country too. Such developments may have implications for the theory of state
in the third world. Gujarat, during the early phase of violence seemed to
have lost its relative autonomy; it appeared to have been controlled by the
Sangh parivar. It was much later that group clashes started. The violence
taking place now appropriately fits the definition of communal clashes
between the Hindus and the Muslims. It follows, therefore, that the Gujarat
violence has passed through different phases. The initial phase stands out
for the reasons cited above and overshadows the discourse on Gujarat

A comparison of the current violence with the 1969 riots brings out
similarities and dissimilarities between the two cases. Both, like all other
cases of collective violence, are examples of failure of the civil society
and the state to foresee and forestall violence. The point involved is this:
there are no sudden riots. A developmental cycle constitutes the internal
structure of a riot. It is the convergence of various elements like
vitiation of atmosphere, aggravation of communal tensions, a trigger
incident, mass violence, rumors before and during collective violence, and
relief and rehabilitation that goes into the making of a riot. I am trying
to argue that any incident of a communal nature cannot spark off violence if
the atmosphere is not communally vitiated and if the communal tensions are
not aggravated to a bursting point. Therefore, before mass violence takes
place, there is sufficient time to foresee and avert its possibilities.
Actual collective violence is indicative of the fact that it has caught both
the civil society and state napping.

Planned Violence 

Even though there were a few allegations of planned targeting of the Muslim
lives and properties during the 1969 riots, by and large the violence then
appeared to be spontaneous. In sharp contrast, the current violence stands
out for its planning. (Kamal Mitra Chenoy, S P Shukla, K S Subramanium and
Achin Vanaik, Gujarat Carnage 2002: A Report to the Nation by an Independent
Fact Finding Mission.) Writing more than a decade ago I likened Ahmedabad
riots of 1969 to a drama that passed through a series of stages: a prelude,
various acts, and then a drop scene. Having followed the current violence
quite closely, I still feel that the collective violence has unfolded itself
like a drama. However, as the initial phase of this violence indicates, it
is more a case of a well scripted, well directed, and meticulously planned
drama. The selective targeting of the Muslim families and their business
establishments, the large-scale use of cooking gas cylinders to set
buildings ablaze, and the use of vehicles to bring armed rioters who had
water bottles are indicative of the execution of a planned operation.

During the 1969 riots also the performance of the state government did not
come up to the expectations. Curfew was not imposed in time. For 36 hours,
the police and administration failed to control the ongoing loot, arson and
murder, but the army was not given a free hand. There were allegations of
communal prejudice against them. However, the current violence tells a
completely different story. The state government does not merely appear to
be guilty of complacency, inefficiency or occasional connivance with the
rioters. It seems to be the main sponsor (see Chenoy 2002) of and partner in
the planned massacre, loot and arson. Far from making any efforts to control
the tensions generated by the Godhra carnage, the political leadership of
the state went on to circulate unfounded theories of ISI-planned and
financed terrorist attack on the karsevaks. When violence started against
the Muslims, it was described as a natural reaction as if to justify the
same. In the evening of February 28, after many hours of anti-Muslim
violence, a senior vice president of the Vishva Hindu Parishad appeared on a
news channel to justify the Bharat Bandh call for March 1 and said that the
anger against the Godhra killings had not been released properly. All this
explains the mood of the political leadership of the state and of the
leaders of their larger parivar. Reports say that the Muslim settlements
were attacked by mobs that were accompanied by the police. In places where
Muslim mobs resisted, the police fired on them to break their resistance.
Once this was done, the attacking mobs indulged in unhindered violence of
all kind. The story of the gruesome murder of Ehsan Jafry also indicates the
role of the state in violence. It is also reported that ministers in state
government and senior leaders of the local BJP monitored the situation from
police stations and control rooms.

The cases of 1969 and 2002 are distinguishable from another angle too.
Gujarat 2002 looks a glaring example of a place having, what Paul Brass
(Theft of an Idol. Calcutta: Seagull Books, 1998.) calls, an
institutionalised riot system. Gujarat having the reputation of being a
Hindutva laboratory has forces that continue to tend communal fire, in order
to keep the situation ready for a communal flare up when required. It
follows from what has been mentioned a bit earlier that this violence has
seen actors who played a crucial role in converting the communal incident of
Godhra into a large-scale communal flare up. It is also clear local as well
as national level sangh parivar leaders and politicians interpreted the
trigger incident communally and in fact desired the violence to take place.
That the leaders of the rioting mobs had detailed information about the
homes and business establishments of the Muslims, that they had mobile
phones to contact one another as well as their leaders, that the BJP, the
VHP and the Bajrang Dal leaders were constantly monitoring the situation,
all point to an informal organisational network of persons and forces,
suggesting the existence of an institutionalised riot system. In an
institutionalised riot system, there are experts for playing specialised
roles. During the current violence truckloads of slogan-shouters came and
went away. Truckloads of rioters came who indulged in violence. Use of
cooking gas to set buildings ablaze also required expertise. Local papers
like Sandesh and Gujarat Samachar excelled in rumour-mongering. Inflammatory
pamphlets were circulated. It follows there were some who specialised in
writing them, some others in printing them, and still others in distributing
them. The examples of actors playing specialised roles can be multiplied.
Nevertheless, it is important to understand that an institutionalised riot
system, despite the specialised performance of roles, leaves scope for the
role of extras in the drama of a riot. The current violence, therefore, also
witnessed the people joining in without any special role assigned to them.
It was their presence at the scenes of violence that could make it look
spontaneous, at least superficially.

The character of participants in violence in Gujarat also appears to have
changed overtime. Sexual subjugation of the female body as a weapon to
humiliate a whole community was seen in 1969 as well as 2002. In fact,
unfortunately, women do have to bear a lot of pain and torture in almost all
cases of collective violence. But what distinguishes the current case from
the 1969 riots is a strikingly different role, a surprisingly new 'avtaar'
of the women. Some of them participated in the perpetration of violence and
the looting of goods. Similarly, the participation of apparently well-to-do
middle class individuals in violence and loot was a new feature, absent in
the 1969 riots. Extensive mobilisation of tribals for the sake of violence
against Muslim lives and properties is yet another new feature which
distinguishes the present one from the 1969 case. 

Commitment to Gandhian values also appears to be declining. The 1969 riots
witnessed Morarji Desai and Indulal Yagnik undertaking indefinite fast and
Ravi Shankar Maharaj, a Sarvodya leader of Gujarat, going on a 'padyatra'
for the sake of normalcy and peace. In the present case, although some of
the leaders awoke to the need of peace-marches in Gujarat, nobody has
undertaken an indefinite fast for the sake of peace there. Gujarat has the
dubious distinction of being the scene of the first large-scale riots in the
post independence period. The 1969 riots were unparalleled in scale and
magnitude. The state has once again earned this dubious distinction for
being the scene of the first large-scale violence in the age of satellite
television. Perhaps it was and it is the depiction of images of victims and
consequences of violence that has contributed to sending shock waves through
the country and abroad.

In view of the earlier arguments relating to planning and execution of
violence and the role of the political leaders and other members of the
Hindutva parivar in the same, and in view of the BJP's poor performance in
many of the recently concluded elections, the forthcoming national and state
elections, the polarisation being achieved by the violence and the
possibilities of a favourable impact of this polarisation on the BJP's
prospects in the forthcoming elections, I conclude that the current violence
is a case of continuation of politics through unconventional means. I do not
place the 1969 riots under the same category.

Implications for the Indian Politics 

I now return to the issue of implications of the current violence for the
direction of Indian politics. For years to come, it is going to remain a
reference point in the identity narratives about the 'self' and the 'other'.
Therefore, its three narratives discussed earlier, along with their internal
nuances, will continue to shape and influence collective memories. In a
sense, these narratives, in the larger context of the environmental factors,
will influence the political orientations of the people. Since the
narratives are essentially different, the resultant political orientations
will also be different. The direction of Indian politics will therefore be
marked by complexity.

First, we may see greater communal polarisation. We may witness a more
aggressive Hindu religio-cultural nationalism in search of political power.
Second, a Muslim political party may be floated. But, if the present
political scenario serves as a guide, the overwhelming majority of Muslims
will not support it. Nevertheless, it may prove a source of more communal
polarisation, thus serving the political ends of Hindu religio-cultural
nationalism. Third, Muslims in general will continue to support political
parties that look capable of defeating the BJP in elections. Fourth, in view
of the erosion of the legitimacy of the state, many Indians may withdraw
from the political process, thereby leaving a scope for the continuation in
power of forces responsible for such erosion. Fifth, in the face of
alienation some Muslims may get involved in political violence including
terrorism, which too will be counter-productive. Nevertheless, the fact that
despite dramatic depiction of death, destruction and humiliation of their
co-religionists by the print and visual media, the Muslims in other parts of
the country, in general, refrained from violent reactions shows that vocal
and visible protest by the secular forces including the mass media moderated
their anger and anguish and gave them hope in such a critical time. Many of
them may now lend support to strengthen democratic politics. Therefore,
sixthly, the coming years may see a resurgence of new politics: pressure
groups, people's rights movements, NGOs etc. working towards the protection
of civil rights, human rights, rights of the minorities, dalits and the
deprived sections. We may even see a networking of such groups. Lastly, a
realignment of political forces may take place.

In the end, I will very briefly touch upon the issue of preventing communal
violence. There are structural roots of communal violence in India; and
unless far-reaching structural changes take place conflict situations will
keep on emerging again and again. Also, in the given conditions, those who
hope to gain from communal polarisation and violence will continue with
their game plan. The situation therefore calls for meaningful interventions
by peace-loving secular and democratic forces. People's rights movements
involving struggle for procedural as well as substantial democracy may
provide an answer to the problem of communal violence. Participation in
these movements may carve out such identities for people that may have
potential to ultimately scuttle the politics of communal mobilisation. These
movements may draw people from different religious background. They may thus
get an opportunity of obtaining a personal experience and knowledge about
one another. This may serve to change the communal mind-set.

Serious attention needs to be paid to the argument that the developmental
cycle of a riot can be disturbed through outside intervention. This makes a
strong case for a constant watch of the communal situation and its
management by the state and the civil society. The peace-loving forces in
the civil society may develop grass- root resistance to violence. They may
contribute to build bridges between communities partially isolated from each
other. Lastly, Gujarat is also a reminder that every one of us does some
introspection to find out the depth and strength of our faith in secular


1 The 1969 riots in Gujarat continued for over three months.
2 India's defence minister George Fernandes is reported to have followed the
same line in his speech delivered on 30 April 2002 in the Lok Sabha. He
said, 'Stories are being told about Gujarat violence as if it was happening
for the first time.' Reported in the Times of India, May 1, 2002. 

03Jun2002 PAKISTAN: Kashmir crisis Pakistani leader juggles support for
militants with threat of 'surgical' at
By Rory McCarthy in Islamabad.
Kashmir crisis Pakistani leader juggles support for militants with threat of
'surgical' attack from nuclear rival - Risk-taker Musharraf prepares to show
his hand.

Close friends describe him as a general who delights in pressure, a
risk-taker. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's adroit military dictator, has
rarely looked troubled since he swept to power in a peculiarly well-received
coup nearly three years ago.
Now suddenly a horrifying nuclear war beckons with India, threatening the
lives of millions and the future of the subcontinent. The general's
disarmingly forthright manner no longer seems enough and the risks do not
look so manageable.
In the days after September 11, Gen Musharraf appeared ready to play to the
west's tune. He moved quickly to cut off years of military and financial
support for the Taliban, against the wishes of several of his more hardline
But Kashmir was always going to be different. The struggle for the disputed
Himalayan state virtually defines Pakistan's national identity. The general
hoped to continue unhindered the army's covert support for the militant
guerrilla war in the Kashmir mountains, naively turning a blind eye to the
militants' al-Qaida links.
Only under mounting pressure from London and Washington and the threat of
retaliatory strikes from India has he begun to curb their activities.
Sources in Pakistan say that, in the past two weeks, Gen Musharraf has
ordered the army to stop militants crossing the line of control, the
ceasefire line which divides Kashmir. It appears the order is only
temporary, intended to last just six weeks, and it is unclear whether the
general has complete control over his intelligence agency, which runs the
On Friday Colin Powell, the US secretary of state, said "instructions have
been given" to halt infiltration. But he added: "It is too early to say that
it has stopped."
The move goes some way to meeting international demands for an end to what
India and the west now call "cross-border terrorism", but it may not be
The general's aides say more patience is needed. "You have to give time to
General Musharraf. He is moving in the right direction, but it is not easy
to turn around," said Lieutenant General Talat Masood, a retired army
officer and friend of the Pakistani leader.
The new order is another of Gen Musharraf's much-loved risks. He is under
immense pressure from the country as a whole, and from the top ranks of his
army, not to concede an inch.
"No military or elected government has ever been able to change the policy
on Kashmir or our commitment to nuclear weapons," said Gen Mirza Aslam Beg,
a former army chief. "You cannot go back after the sacrifices that have been
And so, appearing ashen-faced for a crucial television address last week,
Gen Musharraf played the defiant leader, promising that Pakistan would
respond with "full might" to any Indian attack.
He also clearly feels he has made huge concessions. "I personally feel that
I've taken actions which couldn't have been imagined before," he told CNN in
an interview over the weekend.
But the 58-year-old is no hawk. Many of the more religious officers, the
"beards," regard him as too secular, even a liability for the Islamic cause.
Just days after the coup he let himself be photographed holding up his pet
dogs, a distinctly un-Islamic image, and he spoke ardently about his respect
for Kemal Ataturk, the secularist founder of modern Turkey.
The only problem in his exemplary and liberal military career is the issue
of Kash mir and particularly Kargil, the 10-week battle in the northern
Kashmir mountains in 1999 which made him appear a dangerously unpredictable
hardliner. Gen Musharraf and his generals covertly masterminded the capture
of a handful of mountains in Indian Kashmir, secretly prepared Pakistan's
nuclear warheads and militarily delivered a bloody nose to their Indian

Sources:GUARDIAN 03/06/2002 P11 

02Jun2002 UK: Fear that rogue generals could launch 'own war'. 
By Tony Allen-Mills, Tom Walker and Marie Colvin.
IT WOULD start, like Hiroshima, with the light from a thousand suns. A
nuclear warhead detonated over Bombay would send a blinding flash and pulses
of shattering thermal energy across one of the world's most densely
populated cities.
A Pakistani warhead of 15 kilotons - about the same size as the first atomic
bomb dropped on Japan in 1945 - would erupt in a furnace of shock waves,
fireballs and screaming winds creating hailstorms of lethal debris. The sand
on Bombay's beaches would "explode like popcorn", says MV Ramana, an Indian
nuclear physicist, in a 57-page study of the likely effects of nuclear
Granite would melt, buildings would vaporise and up to 860,000 people could
die from a single missile strike, Ramana predicts. Depending on wind
direction and the location of the blast, millions more might be exposed to
potentially fatal radiation. The seething slums of India's leading
commercial centre would be death traps.
It seems too horrible to imagine, yet military planners from Pakistan to the
Pentagon were last week soberly calculating potential casualties of a
nuclear war in south Asia.
As efforts intensified to mediate in the tortured dispute over Kashmir,
officials were considering questions that had not been asked since the
frigid face-offs of the early cold war.
Who will fire the first nuclear shot? How will it be provoked? Where will it
be aimed? How many will die?
In the modern age of computer simulation and military war games there has
been no shortage of answers, with some calculating that a stumble into
nuclear conflagration might eventually cost 12m lives.
Yet even the direst warnings appear to have had little effect on the
military establishments in New Delhi and Islamabad.
If Pakistan feels sufficiently threatened, said Lieutenant-General Talat
Masood, a retired officer, "we will go nuclear. It may be suicidal, but
Pakistan will use its nuclear weapons rather than accept the disappearance
of our nation".
As for India, Arjun Makhijani, a nuclear physicist based in Washington,
said: "There are certainly people in Delhi who are very wary of using
nuclear weapons. But there are also hotheaded militarists who believe that
India can absorb some nuclear blows and still wipe Pakistan off the map."
If another war breaks out in the region, several military and nuclear
sources predicted, it will start with a terrorist provocation in Kashmir,
develop into cross-border clashes and, if all international diplomacy fails,
might ultimately ignite in an escalating series of nuclear exchanges that
could - if the world is lucky - begin with warning shots. Where it would end
is anybody's guess.
Mogul emperors and Victorian poets once rhapsodised about the beauty of
Kashmir's lakes and mountain valleys, but over the past 50 years the
mystical vale has known little but tears. At issue in a crisis that has
spawned three wars since Britain partitioned India in 1947 is the state that
most Pakistanis believe got left on the wrong side of the border. Much of
Muslim Kashmir became part of Hindu India.
Delhi has always blamed Pakistan for encouraging Kashmiri rebels seeking an
end to Indian rule. A flurry of guerrilla attacks on Indian targets -
notably the May 14 assault on a military camp, where women and children were
among 34 people killed - provoked Atal Behari Vajpayee, India's hardline
Hindu prime minister, into talk of a "decisive fight".
Complicating the conflict are claims that hundreds of Al-Qaeda fugitives
from Afghanistan may have taken refuge among Islamic militants in Kashmir.
There have long been close contacts between Al-Qaeda and Kashmiri rebels.
When President Bill Clinton fired Tomahawk cruise missiles at Osama Bin
Laden's Afghan camps in 1998, casualties included Kashmiri Muslims.
American military sources suspect Bin Laden's men may be bent on provoking a
nuclear exchange to drive US forces out of the region and topple Pakistan's
military president, Pervez Musharraf. If India suffers another terrorist
bloodbath, intelligence sources say, Vajpayee is certain to retaliate.
Despite its ferocious rhetoric, military sources in the region believe India
would initially tread carefully. It might send four or five infantry
brigades - about 10,000 men - across the line of control that divides
Kashmir to attack terror camps on Pakistani soil; the air force, which flies
Jaguars, Mirages and MiG 29s, might also strike at Pakistani airbases in a
"bloody nose" campaign.
For Musharraf, the options for containing the crisis look bleak. The
Pakistani military has shown little appetite for curbing the Kashmiri
militants. Even if he wanted to, he would have difficulty preventing
Al-Qaeda sympathisers from committing a fresh atrocity.
If India is provoked into action, "the next step will inevitably be a
conventional land battle", predicted General Mirza Aslam Beg, a former chief
of Pakistan's armed forces. Confronted by overwhelming odds in Kashmir,
where 350,000 Pakistani troops face at least 650,000 Indians, Islamabad
might attempt to catch India by surprise, crossing the border into Punjab or
further south.
"Under the umbrella of nuclear weapons, we will fight a conventional war,"
said Beg.
Other sources believe that Indian air superiority and sheer weight of
numbers mean Pakistan will be doomed to defeat in any clash of troops. At
that point, Musharraf might be forced to consider use of his nuclear
equaliser to deter Delhi, and to save his own skin from hardline military
Islamabad is believed to possess between 30 and 50 enriched uranium warheads
averaging around 15 kilotons. India has up to 100 plutonium warheads, some
of at least 43 kilotons - almost three times the power of the Hiroshima
Pakistan's warheads can be delivered by its short-range Ghaznavi or
long-range Ghauri missiles, which can reach Delhi and Bombay. Both were
ostentatiously tested last month.
Analysts in Washington believe there are three possible options for a first
nuclear strike: the Indian fleet in the Arabian sea; Indian forces that
advance onto Pakistani soil; or a symbolic launch at a remote military
outpost in the Himalayas, with few civilian casualties.
The question then would be whether India, which has pledged not to fire
nuclear weapons first, would restrict itself to a single riposte - or
whether it would seek to escalate.
"These guys seem to think they can play a game of nuclear war as if it were
chess," said one US intelligence analyst. "They just don't seem to get it.
One accident, one misfire, one wrong co-ordinate and boom - 10m people are
Whatever the chosen options,the environmental and economic consequences
would be grave. Radiation rising into the troposphere at 30,000ft could be
carried for 2,000 miles. The impact on the global economy would be greater
than that of September 11.
The wild card is the system of command and control that theoretically
prevents accidental or unauthorised launches of nuclear missiles. Experts
believe neither India nor Pakistan has instituted a fail-safe security
The danger in both countries - but especially in Pakistan - is that hardline
military elements might gain control of a missile and start their own war.
"There's a lot of potential for this spiralling out of control," warned
David Albright, a leading US nuclear expert. Another analyst added:
"Pakistan's view of its nuclear deterrent is increasingly, 'Use it or lose
When he wrote his report entitled Bombing Bombay in 1999, Ramana was hoping
to deter politicians from considering the nuclear option. Instead, his
scientific study provides a chilling insight into what may lie ahead.
"Given the large population of Bombay and the likely damage to
transportation infrastructure," he wrote, "evacuation of inhabitants will be
impossible. It is extremely likely that the injured, estimated up to 2.1m,
will not find any medical treatment to help them survive."
If Pakistan strikes Bombay, India could wipe out Lahore. If Delhi suffers,
so will Islamabad. "They know how to start it," said Albright. "But will
they know how to stop?"
oJapan has no plans to end its ban on producing nuclear weapons, according
to the prime minister Junichiro Koizumi. He was speaking after one of his
officials suggested the ban could be lifted.
(c) Times Newspapers Ltd, 2002.
(c) Not Available for Re-dissemination. 

Sources:SUNDAY TIMES 02/06/2002 

02Jun2002 INDIA: Eyeball to Eyeball, And Blinking in Denial. 
NEW DELHI - AS India and Pakistan, fledgling nuclear powers, edge closer to
war, the rest of the world looks on aghast at a possible nuclear exchange
that could kill millions of people. British and American envoys are rushing
to the region in last-ditch efforts to avert catastrophe. On Friday, the
United States government urged tens of thousands of Americans living in
India to leave.

But here in India's capital - a plausible bull's-eye - there has been no
panic. The sweltering city moves to its usual somnolent summer rhythm. At a
recent seminar titled "Preparing to Survive," the subject was earthquakes
and cyclones, not nuclear firestorms and radiation sickness.

And that is in large measure because India's ruling elite and many of its
leading strategic thinkers are in nuclear denial.

Though Pakistan's leaders have spoken openly over the years and in recent
days and weeks about the possibility of using the country's nuclear weapons,
India has seen this "loose talk," as a spokeswoman for India called it
Thursday, as evidence of Pakistan's bluffing and blackmail.

K. Santhanam, a physicist who helped organize India's 1998 nuclear tests and
now heads the government-financed Institute for Defense Studies and
Analyses, said the risk of nuclear war is "overdramatized."

"The probability of occurrence is very low, extremely low, vanishingly low,"
he said.

Pakistan's leaders and thinkers, too, are living their own form of nuclear
denial - that of the smaller, militarily weaker nation. They believe
Pakistan's conventional military prowess, combined with its credible nuclear
threat, will deter the region's dominant power, India, from daring to attack
Pakistan. They also expect that it will force the United States to pressure
India to give ground on Kashmir, the land India and Pakistan have fought
over for a half century.

"There will be no war, conventional or nuclear," Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg,
retired chief of Pakistan's armed forces, declared. "This military buildup
is to pressurize Pakistan to stop the liberation movement in Kashmir."

India's and Pakistan's mirrored denials of the nuclear dangers are part of
the treacherous dynamic that could lead to war, military analysts and South
Asia experts say. As they intensify their rhetorical belligerence and
military preparations, each expects the other to back down. But they may
just fall into the nuclear abyss.

"There's a complacency that the weapons won't be used which I find
baffling," said a senior Western diplomat here. "It's like the early days of
the cold war. People here haven't understood what these weapons can do. I
don't think most people here have ever heard of Hiroshima and Nagasaki."

While many Indians and Pakistanis say there will be no nuclear war, they
often paradoxically acknowledge the possibility in the next breath,
exhibiting also the unspoken assumption that these two hugely populous
nations - India has a billion people and Pakistan 150 million - would

Mr. Santhanam, the Indian physicist, said his hunch is that a war would
remain conventional, but he also said, "If we're hit, we'll know how to
handle it. If there's a nuclear attack, India's policy is severe

Asked at a public meeting in Islamabad last week if there could be a nuclear
catastrophe, General Beg, the former Pakistani army chief, said more people
died in the Allied bombing of Dresden than in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and
that millions have been killed by small arms fire.

"Look," he said, "I don't know what you're worried about. You can die
crossing the street, hit by a car, or you could die in a nuclear war. You've
got to die someday anyway."

After the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, which surprised and
frightened the United States and the Soviet Union at how quickly they could
unintentionally slide toward a nuclear exchange, the superpowers shifted to
engaging each other indirectly through proxy wars in the third world rather
than in direct conflicts. They also began an arms control process to
regulate nuclear competition.

In contrast, India and Pakistan have hundreds of thousands of troops poised
for war along their border who have been engaged in fierce artillery duels
for two weeks. And their senior leaders are not talking. India has withdrawn
its ambassador to Pakistan and expelled Pakistan's envoy to Delhi.

A part of this may be due to the sheer power of disbelief that military
planning could go so awry that nuclear arms would come into play.
Strategists and Indian officials, including Defense Minister George
Fernandes, have argued that India can wage a limited conventional war. They
say Pakistan would not hit India with nuclear weapons and risk devastation
in reprisal. They say they know Pakistan's trip wires and have no desire to
conquer or vanquish Pakistan.

BUT what if a provoked India aggressively counterattacked across the border
and Pakistan responded more effectively than anticipated? If that opened the
way toward a general war, at what point would Pakistan's military rulers
feel so endangered they would consider firing a nuclear weapon? Pakistan's
leader, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, recently told Der Speigel that if Pakistan's
survival as a nation were threatened, "then it would be a case of: in
extreme emergency, even the atomic bomb."

Miscalculation is, after all, at the heart of virtually all the nightmare
visions of how any nuclear exchange would start. India's external affairs
minister, Jaswant Singh, said last week that India and Pakistan were of the
same womb - suggesting they therefore understood each other. But their
history is littered with deadly misunderstandings, scholars say. Often,
Pakistan underestimates India's military determination and democratic
resilience, while India underestimates the depth of Pakistan's suspicion
that India is out to vivisect it.

Their misjudgments could be catastrophic. General Musharraf openly
threatened Wednesday to take the war into "the enemy's territory" if India
stepped even an inch across the line of control that divides Kashmir between

This is complicated by the fact that these countries, unlike the United
States or the Soviet Union, have no experience of the horrors of modern
total war, waged against whole cities with the very intention of leveling
them. Americans, while their own cities were left untouched during World War
II, dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Soviets saw vast
parts of their homeland devastated.

What the Indians and Pakistanis do have is a legacy of deep, intimate
mistrust. They are neighbors born in a moment of cataclysmic religious
violence. They have a blood feud that features deep personal bitterness
between the most senior leaders of the two countries. And they have large
cities so close to each other that a nuclear missile could hit its target in

Pakistan's president, General Musharraf, was born here in India's capital.
But his Muslim family fled to Pakistan, the newly created Islamic nation
hacked from the British Indian empire in 1947 at the same hour as India. His
parents later told their children that they had escaped on the last train to
leave India safely - and that Hindus and Sikhs had massacred the Muslims on
the trains that came after. As a boy, the general was taught to deeply
mistrust the Hindus who are predominant in India, his brother Naved said.

India's leaders also mistrust General Musharraf, whom they believe betrayed
India by plotting to sneak army regulars into the Kargil region of Indian
Kashmir in 1999. His troops took mountain peaks overlooking a crucial Indian
supply route even as India's prime minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, was on a
peace mission to Pakistan.

Many believed Pakistan was emboldened to act so recklessly because the army
assumed its nuclear arsenal would deter an Indian counterattack. At the
time, India heeded American pleas that, to avoid the possibility of an
escalating war, it not cross into Pakistan-administered Kashmir. But after
Kargil, frustrated Indian officials talked more about the feasibility of a
limited war that involved striking into Pakistani territory.

During the Kargil war, which ended with Pakistan's ignominious withdrawal,
American intelligence officials concluded that Pakistan had taken steps to
prepare its nuclear weapons for possible use, according to an essay by Bruce
Riedel, a special assistant to President Bill Clinton, published by the
Center for the Advanced Study of India at the University of Pennsylvania.

The current crisis is another incarnation of the struggle for Kashmir that
began in 1947. Pakistan has long backed Islamic extremists who have
committed atrocities against civilians as they battle Indian rule. Now,
inspired in part by President Bush's post-Sept. 11 policy of zero tolerance
for terrorists, India has warned that it will take military action unless
Pakistan stops sheltering and arming them.

Human rights monitors say Indian forces have committed gross human rights
violations in battling the insurgency, which General Musharraf never fails
to describe as an indigenous freedom struggle. LAST week, in a speech, he
effectively cast the battle as a Hindu-Muslim conflict, an inflammatory step
in the nuclear context. "If war is imposed," he vowed, "a Muslim is not
afraid and does not retreat, but with the cry of Allah o-Akbar he jumps into
the war to fight."

As alarmed American officials watch the crisis unfold, they worry that India
and Pakistan could become a model and inspiration for the likes of Iraq and
North Korea if they should ever use their nuclear weapons against each
other. "Once you use it," one official said, "that almost mystical taboo is
c. 2002 New York Times Company. 

Sources:THE NEW YORK TIMES 02/06/2002 

25Apr2002 PAKISTAN: Court told of Politicians, ex Generals having billion
dollars assets abroad. 
RAWALPINDI April 25 (PPI) Names of those Pakistani politicians and retired
Generals having illegal assets of billion of dollars in foreign banks have
been submitted before the Lahore High Court Rawalpindi bench here Thursday.
Senior Advocate Habib Wahabul Khairi counsel for petitioner Mukhtar Rana an
ex Member National Assembly (MNA) of 1970's assembly from Faisalabad placed
the list of corrupt politicians and retired Generals in a petition seeking
ruthless accountability against them. He submitted lists appeared in the
Wall street Journal, weekly Nation, London Jang London. The lists contain
following names allegedly having billion of dollars assets in the foreign
banks. Nawaz Sharif former Prime Minister, Ijazul Haq son of Gen.Ziaul Haq
ex President, Gohar Ayub Khan ex minister and son of Field Marshal Ayub Khan
ex President, Hamayun Akhtar son of Gen. Akhtar Abdur Rehman ex Director
General ISI, Anwar Saifullah son-in-law of ex President Ghulam Ishaq Khan,
Lt. Gen (Retd) Fazle Haq ex Governor North West Frontier Province (NWFP),
Gen. (Retd) Mirza Aslam Beg ex Chief of the Army Staff, Lt. Gen. (Retd) Ali
Akbar ex Chairman Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), Chaudhry
Shujat Hussain former interior minister, Asif Ali Zardari ex minister,
senator and spouse of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, ex Banker of the
Allied Bank Sahukat Kazmi, Brig (Retd) Imtiaz ex DG Intelligence Bureau,
Former secretaries of the federal government Ahmed Sadik ex Principal
Secretary to Prime Minister, Capt. Naseer, Salman Farooqi, ex Chief
Ministers Manzur Watto (Punjab) and Aftab Sherpao (Frontier). The list
placed Nawabzada Mansoor Ali Khan ex revenue minister Punjab and son of
Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan chief of the ARD alliance in category of those
allegedly having million dollars assets abroad. Petitioner also referred to
a report appeared in Jang London and a statement attributed to Air Marshal
(Retd) Asghar Khan regarding proof of the corruption of former Generals who
had eaten up major chunk of US $60 Billion during Afghan war against former
Soviet Union. Interestingly name of Ms. Benazir Bhutto former Prime Minister
does not figure in the lists of those former rulers and Generals having
assets in the foreign banks.
(c) 2002 Asia Pulse Pte Limited.
Asia Pulse gives no warranty or guarantee as to the accuracy of the
information, Asia Pulse shall not be liable for errors or omissions in, or
delays or interruptions to or cessation of delivery of, the data through its
negligence or otherwise. 


10Apr2002 PAKISTAN: CITY - Raja Zafarul Haq, Mushahid, diplomats to address
Palestine seminar on April 13. 
Islamabad, April 10 (PPI) PML leaders, former federal Ministers Raja Zafarul
Haq and Mushahid Hussain Syed will address a seminar on "Palestine Bleeds"
on April 13 here at a local hotel. Foreign policy and geo-strategic experts
and some Arab diplomats will analyze the current volatile situation in
Palestine and its implications for the Muslim Ummah, Middle East and the
entire world. Others who will speak on the occasion included minister for
religious affairs Dr Mehmud Ahmed Ghazi General (Retd) Mirza Aslam Beg,
former Chief of Army staff, Dr. S. M. Queshi, a former diplomat and foreign
policy expert, Mr. Ahmad Razak El-Salman, Ambassador of Palestine, who is
also dean of the Diplomatic Corps and Mr. Ali S. Awadh Asseri, Ambassador of
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
(c) 2002 Asia Pulse Pte Limited.
Asia Pulse gives no warranty or guarantee as to the accuracy of the
information, Asia Pulse shall not be liable for errors or omissions in, or
delays or interruptions to or cessation of delivery of, the data through its
negligence or otherwise. 


16Feb2002 USA: Laden, al-Qaeda could not have carried out Sep 11 attacks -
Washington, Feb 16 (PTI) A former Pakistani army chief has said that many
"in this region" believed that Osama bin Laden or his al-Qaeda did not carry
out the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US.
"Many of us in this region believe that Osama or his al-Qaeda were not
responsible for September 11 attacks in New York and Washington," General
Mirza Aslam Beg was quoted as saying by 'Executive Intelligence Review'.
He said they "definitely" did not have the know-how or capability to launch
operations involving such high precision coordination based on information
and expertise.
"Yet the coalition led by US is busy on 'Afghan-bashing,' chasing objectives
which go much beyond Osama bin Laden," he said without clarifying.
Beg said that the UN-sponsored interim government would not work because
Pashtuns representing 60 per cent of Afghanistan's population were not given
proportionate representation "which is unjust".
He expressed the fear as a result of the Afghan war, Pakistan may be facing
hostility on two fronts because of a volatile Pushtun population both within
its boundaries and in Afghanistan, "bolstered by over 40,000 armed Taliban
who feel badly let down by Pakistan."
The situation had created a deep impact on the Pushtun population as a
whole, "forcing it to assert itself as a separate entity at the cost of both
Afghanistan and Pakistan," he said.
(c) 2002 Asia Pulse Pte Limited.
Asia Pulse gives no warranty or guarantee as to the accuracy of the
information, Asia Pulse shall not be liable for errors or omissions in, or
delays or interruptions to or cessation of delivery of, the data through its
negligence or otherwise. 

Sources:PRESS TRUST OF INDIA 16/02/2002 

13Jan2002 PAKISTAN: ANALYSIS-Pakistan's Musharraf talks tough, but is it
By Andy Soloman
ISLAMABAD, Jan 13 (Reuters) - Pakistani military ruler General Pervez
Musharraf's clampdown on Islamic militants might mollify India, but his aim
to rid Pakistan of religious extremism and promote a modern state will be
far from easy.
After years in which Islamic fundamentalism has been tolerated and even
nurtured by a succession of failed civilian governments and hardline
military rulers, the lobby pushing for a theocratic state remains powerful.
Not for much longer if Musharraf has his way.
"They have spread hatred. They've been provoking people for terrorism,"
Musharraf said in an address to the nation on Saturday.
"Militancy, intolerance, extremism ... are to be brought to an end," he
But there are hurdles, not least Pakistan's support for Muslim Kashmiri
separatists fighting Indian rule in the Himalayan region and the problem of
preventing militant Pakistanis infiltrating across the border to attack
Indian security forces.
In his address, the army general who seized power in a 1999 bloodless coup,
in an opaque reference to what India calls "cross-border terrorism", said
Pakistanis should not infiltrate other countries.
Easier said than done, said former Pakistan spymaster Hamid Gul.
"As long as there is a Kashmir liberation cause young men will always find a
way to get into Kashmir and the people will welcome them," said Gul,
ex-chief of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).
A bloody December 13 attack on the Indian parliament, blamed by New Delhi on
militants from two Pakistan-based groups, has taken the nuclear-capable foes
to the brink of a fourth war since independence in 1947.
Up to a million troops now face each other over the shared border and both
sides exchange daily fire. Musharraf banned the two groups -
Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba - but India says it wants to see
concrete action.
The Kashmir issue amply illustrates the raft of problems facing Musharraf as
he tries to end extremism and turn Pakistan into a tolerant, progressive
Pakistan's years of policies either to protect or promote interests at home
or abroad in Afghanistan or Kashmir, have come to haunt the military ruler.
The country is swamped with guns, drugs and crime, while waves of sectarian
violence wash over the cash-strapped nation.
In the speech, Musharraf banned five Islamic groups - two sectarian outfits
from across the Sunni and Shi'ite Muslim divide and a pro-Taliban group in
addition to the Kashmiri militants.
Curbs were placed on mosques, while madrassas, or Islamic schools, some of
which were key in breeding fundamentalists and Afghanistan's former ruling
Taliban, will be regulated and have to offer broad education rather than
just narrow Islamic tuition.
"The speech attempts to reverse 30 years of Pakistani state-sponsored
militancy among religious parties," said Najam Sethi, editor of the
influential Friday Times.
"It's going to be a long haul ... but this is the most significant speech
I've heard in 30 years."
But analysts said clampdowns on radical and militant Islamic groups could be
counter-productive, with extremists driven underground and turning their
wrath on the state.
"This could force Pakistani Islamic groups underground like in Egypt and
Algeria, and we all know all that has done is produce more terrorism," said
Husain Haqqani, a political analyst and former adviser to ex-premiers
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif.
Pakistan's relationship with religious extremism began under former military
dictator Zia-ul-Haq. Partial Islamisation of the country's institutions
followed, breeding deep-seated theocratic support within the army,
intelligence services and judiciary.
"All these (militant) groups have been allowed by the state because they
served one function or another, because they were useful," said Haqqani. "I
think the state thinks they have outlived their usefulness."
Sethi said the government would have to cope with a sense of betrayal among
extremist groups suddenly finding themselves marginalised and denied their
long-term patronage.
"These are armed groups ... you can't rule out the factor that some may go
mad," he said.
Internal problems have been compounded by complex relations with arch rival
India, especially over the seemingly intractable issue of Kashmir, India's
only Muslim-majority state where tens of thousands have been killed in
separatist strife since 1989.
Musharraf's hand was forced by the September 11 attacks on the United States
and subsequent war in Afghanistan.
He won broad admiration a quick decision to dump the Taliban, but has since
been pushed to rein in Pakistan-based Muslim militants fighting Indian rule
in Kashmir.
The attack on the Indian parliament, in which 14 people died, including the
five assailants, left Musharraf having to move fast to avert war and avoid
Pakistan slipping into pariah status for alleged links to terrorists.
"He's responding to the pressure in the way that he's not undermining the
fundamental concerns and interests of Pakistan," said political commentator
Naseem Zahra, in reference to Musharraf's comments reiterating political and
diplomatic support for Kashmiri separatists.
Mirza Aslam Beg, a former head of the Pakistani armed forces, praised
Musharraf for combating Islamic militancy.
"I think it was a much needed decision that should have been taken a long
time back," he told Reuters. "But this has not compromised Pakistani
government support for the liberation movement inside Kashmir."
It is this support that angers India so much and perpetuates the doubt in
New Delhi over Pakistan's resolve to shut down militant groups fighting
India's rule in Kashmir and makes it hard to ease tensions between the
(C) Reuters Limited 2002. 


01Jan2002 INDIA: The new Indian brinkmanship. 
By Copley, Gregory and Kondaki, Christopher.
The apparent READINESS OF THE INDIAN Government in early January 2002 to
initiate a major conflict with P stg indicated that the Indian leadership
felt that it had an understanding of he most critical intelligence factor of
the equation: a knowledge of the trigger points) at which the Government of
Pakistan would resort to the use of nuclear weapons during a conflict.
The principal goal of Indian intelligence vis-a-vis Pakistan for the past
three or more years has been to determine the policy and doctrinal levels or
triggers at which the Pakistan Armed Forces would use tactical or strategic
nuclear weapons against either Indian force concentrations,
military/strategic targets, or Indian population centers. At the same time,
Pakistan has been at great pains to guard the secrecy of such trigger
levels, knowing that India could undertake offensive operations up to, but
not beyond, the trigger points for nuclear conflict.
It remains to be seen whether the Indian Government, even at this stage,
does, in fact, have a correct understanding of Pakistani nuclear trigger
levels. Miscalculation on this point could prove disastrous (or at least
pivotal), not only for India, but for a wide range of other international
strategic situations. The fact that the Government of the People's Republic
of China (PRC) has taken an ambiguous position in early January 2002 as to
whether it would offer military support to its traditional ally, Pakistan,
in a conflict with India must make any Indian projections on the outcome of
an Indo-Pakistani war open to question.
India's brilliant and pragmatic Defence Minister, Georges Fernandez, seems
to be of the opinion that nuclear weapons would not become an issue in the
current confrontation, which hints at the prospect that India's military
objectives in the current situation may be clearly circumscribed.
However, India has the advantage of such massive military superiority over
Pakistan, as well as great geographic strategic depth, which Pakistan lacks,
that New Delhi knows that in any major war with Pakistan it would be
Pakistan which would be forced into first-use of nuclear weapons. India has
sufficient superiority that it could occupy and dominate all of Pakistan
without having to resort to nuclear weapons. Pakistan, to resist this, must
be able to plausibly threaten escalation to nuclear levels in order to
create uncertainty into the minds of the Indian leadership.
Pakistan, additionally, has had nuclear weapons deployed since the 1970s and
has had time to develop a credible operational doctrine to ensure efficient
utilization as well as to create and refine a viable nuclear strategy.
Pakistan has, significantly, proven extremely responsible in its handling of
its nuclear technology and has not - contrary to Indian-inspired reports -
ever been verifiably known to have leaked such technology to any other
power, despite strong attempts by the governments of Saudi Arabia and Iran
to obtain Pakistani nuclear technology.
Thus, if it is assumed that Indian leaders feel comfortable that they can
initiate a major war against Pakistan without triggering nuclear conflict,
it must also be assumed that they are contemplating a military assault
solely over the Line of Control (LoC), the de facto border between the
Indian-and Pakistani-held portions of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). Indeed, the
only Indian legitimacy for an invasion is on the pretext of combating
Pakistani-based, Kashmir-oriented armed groups, some of which are
terrorist-oriented, some of which are - by United Nations definitions -
nationalist insurgents. However, it is the level and mechanisms of Pakistani
response to such an invasion which would determine whether the conflict
escalates to a nuclear war at full national levels, or whether it remains -
as India clearly wishes - at a puitive "police action" level.
Some of the "worst case" ramifications which must be considered are:
A major conflict could lead to the breakup of Pakistan. Baluchistan, which
sits astride the Strait of Hormuz (with part of Baluchistan in Iran; part in
Pakistan; and a northern part in Afghanistan), is already restive, almost
explosive. A strong Iranian Government could easily move to recover the
Pakistani portion of Baluchistan, restoring this historic Persian territory
to Iran. With the prompting of a (currently) weak Iranian clerical
leadership, it is possible that the Baluch could be persuaded to attempt
secession from Pakistan. India, which would support this by every means at
its disposal, would also almost certainly step up its support for the Sindhi
independence movement (not presently at a decisively strong level) to
attempt to cut off Karachi from central Pakistan and the Punjab. There are
additional aspects to this possible scenario.
A major conflict could lead to a coup against Musharraf. A punitive invasion
of Pakistan - even Azad Kashmir, the portion of J&K controlled by Pakistan
could lead to a military coup against Pakistani Pres. Pervez Musharraf,
given the fact that any such war, even if it does not go nuclear, would
impoverish the already-poor State. Pakistan has endured five military coups,
none against a military government. This could well be the first time. There
are no known alternatives to Gen. Musharraf within the Pakistan Armed Forces
who would be as acceptable to the West as Gen. Musharraf.
A broken-up or destabilized Pakistan would place nuclear weapons in the
hands of less stable forces. Any conflict scenario which results in a
fragmented Pakistan, or a Pakistan in which the control of the currently
pro-Western military is diminished would leave a major nuclear arsenal in
the hands of forces of unknown orientation, and possibly in the hands of a
radical leadership.
A major conflict would dramatically curtail the stabilization of Afghanistan
and the war against terrorism. An Indian invasion of Pakistan would be
perceived throughout much of the Muslim world as a Western-sanctioned
extension of what is already widely perceived as a "war against Islam"
rather than a "war against terrorism" The first effect would be to
physically interrupt the US-led coalition's activities in Afghanistan,
limiting the stabilization of that state and the war there against the
remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaida. The second effect would be to act as a
spur, or stimulus, to the immediate widening of the Arab-Israeli war. It is
highly likely that, with the international community preoccupied with the
IndoPakistan war, Iraq would immediately implement long-standing plans with
various Palestinian allies and probably Syria to instigate a war against
Israel, but also - de facto, but very much part of the plan - against
Jordan. Thus, an Indian invasion of Pakistan would almost certainly lead to
the full onslaught of the war against Israel, India's key ally. It may be
that Israel is prepared for this eventuality, and may be ready to act
accordingly to meet this escalation, but it does obviate the prospect of
Israel being able to negotiate a regional settlement on its own terms.
The position of the PRC is an open question in the event of a major
Indo-Pakistan war. The PRC relies on the corridor through Pakistan to ensure
its strategic position in the Arabian Sea, the Middle East and the Indian
Ocean. It has, since September 11, 2001, welcomed the various moves which
have been made toward the eradication of radicalism in Pakistan, because
that radicalism has also destabilized the Uighur peoples of Xinjiang
Province of the PRC. Beijing is unlikely to welcome any move which is likely
to revive instability and radicalism in Pakistan. PRC Foreign Minister Tang
Jiaxuan was quoted in early January 2002 as telling US Secretary of State
Colin Powell in a telephone conversation: "If the situation gets out of
control and results in large-scale armed conflict, not only India and
Pakistan would suffer, it would influence the peace process in Afghanistan
and endanger the stability and development of South Asia and even all Asia."
A major war between India and Pakistan would severely disrupt the US war on
terrorism, and would seriously jeopardize the prestige and authority of the
US to continue the prosecution of its war on terrorism, and, indeed, its
ability to restructure global alignments along more productive lines.
There is no guarantee that a major war between India and Pakistan will not,
apart from providing the opportunity for Iraq/Syria, etc., to initiate the
planned major war with Israel, also trigger (a) some kind of Israeli
response which would involve an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, and
(b) an uprising in Saudi Arabia.
THE MOTIVATIONS for the threat of an Indian invasion of Pakistan stem in
large part from domestic Indian considerations, rather than from the extent
of the threat to Indian interests from Pakistani-based Kashmiri militants,
terrorists and insurgents. Given the escalation of the war in Kashmir -
certainly in part attributable to Pakistan Government support for insurgent
groups in the past - there is a major surge in the Indian population
favoring, even demanding, an Indian "settling of accounts" with Pakistan. It
would be difficult for Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to back
away from war with Pakistan at this stage without achieving some tangible
"victory" However, any such "victory" would be perceived as a "defeat" for
Pakistani Pres. Pervez Musharraf, which would also be politically
unacceptable for that leader.
Secondarily, the Indian Prime Minister's BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) is
engaged in a bitter campaign to win control of the important Uttar Pradesh
(UP) State Government in imminent polls. Opposition parties there have
already accused the Prime Minister of interfering with "distractions" to the
real issues affecting this provincial election. Prime Minister Vajpayee
cannot afford to be seen to be weak at this point.
It is entirely possible that the Indian Government considers the prospect
that it will force concessions from the Pakistan Government under the threat
of invasion, and also that it will win greater respect and support from the
United States Government by demonstrating its potential power. This may
indeed be the goal of the Vajpayee Government, but it has already unleashed
a momentum of political rhetoric and military escalation which it may be
unable to restrain appropriately. Clearly, Prime Minister Vajpayee, in
rejecting any "dignified" offer of concessions from Pres. Musharraf, has
embarked on a course or brinkmanship which may yield some positive results,
but which may also yield a decade of mistrust from Washington, regardless of
the outcome.
The Indian Government has insisted that Pakistan must demonstrate that it is
prepared to go beyond what New Delhi claims to be only symbolic steps
against the armed military groups its military and intelligence service have
nurtured and directed for years. In early January 2002, India consolidated
the massing of troops and arms along the Indo-Pakistani 1,100 mile border in
the largest such buildup in more than a decade. India has reportedly moved
short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to the border with Pakistan. India and
Pakistan exchanged mortar and machinegun fire in disputed Kashmir
consistently through the first week of January 2002, as British Prime
Minister Tony Blair led an international effort to bring about a reduction
of tensions.
Pakistani officials claim that the Indian Government was using the December
13, 2001, assault on the Indian Parliament building, in which 14 people
died, including the five attackers, to tarnish the image of Pakistan and to
depict it as a "Rogue State" They have claimed that India was trying to
thwart Pakistan's emergence as a credible state, just as that country was
developing close ties with the US by assisting with the coalition against
the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaida. In addition, Islamabad stated that India
was using the December 13, 2001, affair to blur any distinctions between
"terrorists" and "freedom fighters" supporting the anti-Indian side in the
50-year-old Kashmir dispute.
Indeed, the Indian Government knows well that the two major groups involved
in recent attacks on India - Jaish-e-Mohammadi and Lashkar-e-Toiba - had
long since failed to respond to any Pakistani Government influence but were,
in fact, responsive to the Afghan Taliban and to al-Qaida. These groups
almost certainly undertook their attacks on high-profile Indian assets, such
as the Parliament and the J&K Assembly building in Srinagar, to deliberately
provoke an Indian war against Pakistan. These two groups were, and
apparently remain, anxious to see the Musharraf Government of Pakistan
punished for abandoning the Taliban.
The Indian Government has said that one of those detained for involvement in
the attack on the Parliament building had admitted that he had been trained
at a camp allegedly run by Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in
Muzzafarabad in the Pakistani-controlled part of Kashmir. Prime Minister
Vajpayee accused Pakistan of thrusting a war on India, and Indian officials
claimed that the December 13, 2001, attack by Pakistan-based Islamists was
an attempt to eliminate India's political leadership and to bring about
chaos in "the world's largest democracy".
"An attack on the Indian Parliament in broad daylight by groups supported in
Pakistan is pretty clear. These are facts for the world to see," said Navtej
Sarna, spokesman for the Indian Embassy in Washington. "Whatever cover these
groups have now has been blown. The terrorists can change their names or
organizations, they can hide their sponsorship. But the fact that the US
banned the two groups we named is a pretty good indicator of what the US
believes." This statement would seem to indicate that India believes, like
Israel, to be kindred spirits with the United States and is piggy-backing
off of US "war on terrorism" policy precipitated by the September 11, 2001,
World Trade Center/Pentagon attacks. In essence, Indian officials believe,
US policy gives India [and Israel] the moral high ground to combat terrorism
by whatever means necessary. However, the Indian statement deliberately
skirts the issue of whether the attacks on the Parliament building and the
J&K Assembly in Srinagar were, in fact, sponsored by, or known to, the
Government of Pakistan. There is no disclosed evidence that the Pakistan
Government in any way supported the actions, or knew of them in advance.
In its efforts to obtain ihe continued cooperation of Pakistan in the fight
against Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaida organization, the US Bush
Administration had originally refrained from pushing too hard for it to
clamp down on the two organizations, Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Muhammadi,
which operate openly in Pakistan and advocate violence to drive India out of
Kashmir. In fact, as Defense & Foreign Affairs reported early in 2000,1 the
Musharraf Administration began trying, as soon as it took office, to clamp
down on the major radical Islamist and jihadi groups based in Pakistan or
Azad Kashmir. It had been making strong progress in this regard - especially
bearing in mind that the radicals had more weapons and manpower than the
Government when the September 11, 2001, situation occurred. It had also
isolated Jaish-e-Mohammadi and Lashkar-e-Toiba as being strongly
anti-Government in their approach, and therefore a threat to the Musharraf
Under US and Indian pressure, which may not have been needed to spur action,
Pakistani police arrested members of the militant groups blamed by India for
the attack on Parliament. Pakistani officials were quoted as saying that
Pres. Musharraf had ordered a cutoff of support to Pakistan's
never-acknowledged backing for Islamic militant groups fighting in Kashmir.
However, Jaish-e-Mohammadi and Lashkar-eToiba had long been "out of the
fold" Additionally, three major Pakistan-based Kashmir militant groups had
been ordered to close their offices. They are Harkat Mujahedin, which was
active in Afghanistan and had ties to Osama bin Laden, and the two groups
India accuses of being behind the attack on its Parliament, Lashkar-e-Toiba
and Jaish-e-Muhammadi. Their financial assets have been frozen and their
leaders arrested, along with more than 100 of their supporters.
Even before September 11, 2001, President Musharraf had laid plans to crack
down on religious extremism and end the relationship between some of his
intelligence officials and the religious leaders. It is believed that the
formation of the international coalition against terrorism gave him the
opportunity to dramatic escalate and enforce these policy changes.
President Musharraf made top-level changes in the ISI which was often
sympathetic to militants.
The extent of Musharraf s crackdown [a risky enterprise in a country founded
as an Islamic republic] surprised even Western political analysts. But
despite these affirmative actions, India remains cynical and impassive. In
fact, Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes stated that the steps
Pakistan had taken so far to crack down on Islamic militant groups fighting
India in Kashmir were "illusory".
The PRC is a longstanding ally of Pakistan and has been widely credited with
having supplied the know-how which allowed the country to become a nuclear
power. Pakistani nuclear physicists dispute this claim, saying that PRC
assistance was only secondary and came after Pakistani scientists had, in
any event, demonstrated that they had developed an indigenous nuclear
capability. For decades, the PRC's relationship with the largely Muslim
country provided a strategic counterbalance to India, with which the PRC has
territorial disputes. But the PRC has grown increasingly wary of Pakistan,
fearing that Islamic fundamentalism would be spread by Pakistani citizens
(mostly Saudi-financed Wahabbis) to Muslim areas of the PRC, as in fact has
There were fears that the Pakistani nuclear technology could also be
compromised by radicals. This fear was to some extent realized by an
Associated Press report which stated that the Pakistani Government had
recently detained two individuals, Sultan Bashir-ud-Din Mahmood and Abdul
Majid, "on suspicion of sharing technical information with Osama bin Laden"
Reportedly, the pair worked for Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission until
retiring in 1999. Certainly, evidence uncovered in overrun al-Qaida
compounds and bunkers in Afghanistan pointed to the keen interest which
al-Qaida had in acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
But with regard to the possible direct and physical ramifications of a major
Indo-Pakistani conflict, the following points require attention:
Environmental Concerns: Reports indicate that the yield of Indian and
Pakistani nuclear devices may be relatively small (eight to 10 kilotons) and
detonations would be planned as airbursts, which maximize damage to
structures and minimize fallout. Unlike groundburst detonations, airbursts
do not create large craters or kick up vast clouds of radioactive soil
particles which in turn produce abundant airborne fallout. Despite this,
millions would die (some estimates run between three-and nine-million), most
of them instantly, with surviving victims overwhelming health services near
targeted cities. The social and economic infrastructure would immediately
collapse along with normal transportation, market and food distribution
mechanisms; this would hamper or disrupt completely distribution of food and
water to survivors. Depending upon whether the nuclear exchange occurred in
Summer or Winter, different geographical regions would be affected. Winds
blow over the subcontinent to the east in Winter, affecting Bangladesh and
Myanmar. As fallout plumes move eastward, nuclear rain would filter through
the fallout plumes, washing out radioactive particles, and creating hot
spots along their path. Exposed populations would be contaminated and a few
thousand abnormal incidents of cancer would statistically be probable.
Likewise, all crops and domestic animals would be contaminated and unfit for
consumption. The gentler summer winds blow westward and the fallout
contamination might affect the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia.
Humanitarian Concerns: It is estimated that up to, say, four-million people
would die immediately as a result of the nuclear blasts and between
three-and six-million would be badly injured, depending upon how many
devices were detonated [in comparison: the nuclear blasts that decimated
Hiroshima and Nagasaki accounted for 80,000 and 30,000 deaths respectively].
Within 90 days, many of the injured would die from radiation sickness, burns
and infections. Reports from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings reveal that
survivors experienced higher incidences of cancer, leukemia, cataracts, and
birth defects. Health care services would be overwhelmed by nuclear
casualties. Increased health threats from cholera and other diarrheal
diseases, malaria, typhus and influenza would rise within days [the death
rate could rise to 40,000 people per day if a cholera epidemic emerged].
Many city survivors would receive no emergency services in the immediate
aftermath of the attack and the death rate of ill survivors would remain
high until transportation and communication links were restored and medical
assistance arrived. The poor Indian disaster response to the earthquake in
Gujarat in 2001 is worth examining as an indicator. However, UN
organizations have not done contingency planning for nuclear conflict in
South Asia and NGOs would probably balk at the idea of working in
contaminated areas.
It is worth noting that it is possible even probable - that both India and
Pakistan would use weapons of greater yield than the eight to 10 kilotons
believed to represent the bulk of their forces (indeed, as noted below, most
estimates of Pakistani weapons are that they are higher-yield than the eight
to 10kt). As well, casualty levels would depend on targeting. Initial
Pakistani nuclear weapons use would almost certainly be against military
force structures, to break up any major thrust across the Punjab border into
Pakistan (should the war escalate beyond an incursion over the LoC in
Kashmir). This would mean lower casualty numbers from the use of initial,
low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons. Indian escalation in a counter-strike
mode would probably be against city (ie: political) targets, and this would
result in major civilian casualties, leading in turn to a counter-city
strike by Pakistanis, probably using F-16As and missiles for deliveries
against Mumbai and/or Delhi. At this point, casualty levels would escalate
India did not sign the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT), but did sign the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963. Every Indian
government has advocated the worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons, but
still New Delhi refuses to enter into any agreements with Pakistan. Both
India and Pakistan began ballistic missile development programs during the
1980s, using technology from foreign suppliers as well as technology already
available from their respective space launch vehicle programs. Pakistan has
acquired ballistic missile technology and complete missile systems from the
PRC and DPRK (North Korea). India has acquired technology primarily from
Russia and Europe, but has pursued ballistic missile development programs
instead of purchasing complete systems. Both countries require ballistic
missiles as strategic weapons capable of targeting major population centers,
key research and development (R&D), industrial centers, and significant
military facilities and not only for use as tactical battlefield weapons.
India can fulfill this need with short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs)
because of Pakistan's small geographical area. Pakistan, however, is forced
to develop and/or acquire SRBMs and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs)
because of India's larger size. An SRBM is defined as a ballistic missile
with a range of 1,000km or less, while an MRBM is a ballistic missile with a
range between 1,000 and 3,100km. Nonetheless, Pakistan's primary nuclear
delivery system is still believed to be the PAF's Lockheed Martin F-16A
combat aircraft.
Minimum deterrence in a conventional war means parity at the operational
level, which Pakistan has constantly sought against India. However there is
certainly no equality in nuclear capabilities between Pakistan and India.
India is much larger than Pakistan in both resources and geography. Because
of this disparity, Pakistan has consistently sought "force multipliers" in
the form of advanced technology and weapons to counter India's advantages in
size and numbers. Likewise, India has continuously sought to achieve weapons
superiority over Pakistan.
Defense & Foreign Affairs had information following the 1998 nuclear tests
by Pakistan and India that the Pakistani weapons were substantially more
advanced than those of India. US officials were quoted as having said that
the Pakistanis were more likely to have 25 to 100 weapons. However, Defense
dr Foreign Affairs analysts, who first disclosed the quality and depth of
the Pakistani nuclear program in reports in 1998 and 1999, well ahead of the
US estimates, also said on June 7, 2000, that the US had over-estimated the
input of "generous Chinese assistance" and underestimated the extent to
which indigenous Pakistani scientists had developed the weapons. "If
anything, the PRC has probably benefited from Pakistani research in many
ways," a Defense dr Foreign Affairs statement said on June 7, 2000.
The US report in 2000 also stated that "India probably has a handful of
nuclear bombs", meaning about five. With regard to delivery systems - the
missiles and bombers needed to launch a nuclear strike - "US officials now
believe Indian capabilities to be seriously lagging". Clearly, India has now
a larger number of deployable weapons.
A US official stated that Pakistani air and missile delivery systems were
now believed to be "fully capable of a nuclear exchange if something
happens". Defense dr Foreign Affairs estimates indicate, in fact, that the
Pakistan Air Force has had nuclear-capable F-16As modified and ready since
about 1985, and had a successful 15 years of nuclear weapons operations
before the present situation emerged. "Other officials noted that Pakistan's
air force, with its US F-16s and its French (and Australian-built) Mirage
fighterbombers, are superior to India's Sovietdesigned MiGs and Sukhois at
penetrating enemy airspace. Most importantly, Pakistan is now thought to
possess about 30 nuclear-capable missiles: the Chinese M-11 short-range
missile and its Pakistani variant, the Tarmuk, as well as the DPRK's No Dong
intermediate-range missile (known locally as the Ghauri)."
But Defense & Foreign Affairs notes that, more significantly, the Pakistani
Ghauri is liquid-fueled and is therefore less capable of rapid operational
readiness than would be the case with a solid-fueled rocket. As a result,
the Shaheen II, with an estimated 1,500km range, is now believed to be close
to a decision on production and deployment.
The Indo-Pakistani ballistic arms race is a struggle for power and security
which grew out of Britain's Indian Empire being dissected into the states of
India and Pakistan in 1947. There is widespread belief among Pakistanis that
New Delhi's ambition is to dispense with an independent Pakistan and bring
it back under Indian rule. Indian leaders have always been opposed to the
partition and the Pakistani view was strengthened when, as a result of
Pakistan's defeat by India in the 1971 war, East Pakistan was created [with
Indian support] as Bangladesh. Since 1947, India and Pakistan have fought
three wars. Since India has been the victor in each conflict, Indians
believe that Pakistanis want revenge for these "national embarrassments" The
unsettled status of the province of Kashmir exacerbates this bi-national
India's Weapons
SINCE INDIA'S FIRST nuclear detonation in 1974, New Delhi has managed to
weaponize its nuclear capability for aircraft delivery [the most viable
nearterm delivery option]. Additionally reports indicated that India
currently had the components necessary for 10 to 20 plutonium based nuclear
weapons. India probably holds the components in unassembled form for
security reasons but they could be assembled within days if an emergency
In 1983, India began a major missile R&D program - its Integrated Guided
Missile Development Program - which commenced the development of two
surface-to-air missiles, an antitank guided missile, and the Prithvi (Earth)
SRBM [also designated the P-1]. The original Prithvi later developed for the
army and was designated the SS-150 (surface-to-surface, 150 km) while the
P-2 or SS-250 (250 km range) was developed for the air force. The P-1 is a
single-stage, liquid-fueled rocket and was first flight tested in 1988.
Production started after army trials in 1994. The P-1 is derived from
licensed Russian SA-2 surface-to-air technology. The missile is reported to
be capable of carrying a 1000kg payload to a range of 150km.
Indian Press reports indicate that India is developing a variety of
conventional warheads for the Prithvi, including high-explosive (HE), HE
submunitions of various types, and fuel-air-explosive (FAE). The Indian
Government has stated that it does not intend to put a nuclear warhead on
the P-1. However, reports indicate that the fuselage is of acceptable
diameter to accommodate a nuclear payload and that development is in
progress. It is also reported that one or more CW warheads may eventually be
developed for the P-1. India is reported to be developing or acquiring a
global positioning system (GPS) for incorporation into its SRBM and MRBM
guidance systems. The missile is approximately nine meters long and one
meter in diameter. It is powered by two SA-2 sustainer engines [mounted
side-by-side] and uses SA-2 liquid propellants. Reports indicate that the
P-1 uses a strapdown inertial guidance system with twin microprocessors, and
that it also has both thrust vector control and aerodynamic control. The P-1
flies like a cruise missile; climbing to an altitude of 30km at launch, then
(upon reaching the target area) diving at an 80 degree angle toward the
target. It is not known whether it will receive data from the US commercial
GPS satellite system or the Russian GLONASS system. In any case, the
positioning data coming to the missile's guidance and control system will
enable the P-1 to achieve accuracy of within 0.1 percent of achieved range,
or 150 meters. The Prithvi-1 is currently operational and could be armed
with a nuclear warhead in a crisis. Indian press reports state that P-1
missiles are stored at a depot at Jullundar, about 90km from the
Indo-Pakistani border. P-1 launch units reportedly are deployed with the
333" Missile Group located at Secundaraband.
The P-2 variant is reported to be capable of carrying a 500kg payload to a
range of 250km with an accuracy of 0.1 percent of range, or 250 meters.
However, with the incorporation of GPS the accuracy of the P-2 should also
be in tens of meters. The airframe has been lengthened by about 1.0 meter so
that the missile can carry additional fuel [in order to give it strategic
range] but the diameter remains the same as the P-1, The P-2 is known to
have been flight tested three times. The missile uses the same inertial
guidance system as the P-1. Warhead capability for the P-2 will probably be
the same as the P-1 but since the P-2 is a strategic weapon, nuclear weapons
are probably being developed for it. The Prithvi-2 is currently in
production. Additionally, reports indicate India is developing a naval
variant of the P-2, which is named Dhanush (bow). However, this variant has
not yet been flight tested.
Because India was defeated by the PRC in a war over their mutual borders in
1962, and the PRC controls territory claimed by India, and primarily due to
the PRC's apparent support of Pakistan's nuclear program, Indian leaders
fear potential strategic missile attacks from the PRC in the event of a
future Indo-Pakistani war (despite the fact that the PRC has never deployed
its armed forces in support of Pakistan in past wars with India). Therefore,
in addition to developing SRBMs, the alliance between the PRC and Pakistan
is the catalyst for the Indian development of a two-stage, solid propellant
system MRBM named the Agni-II (fire). The Agni-II is a deterrent (and means
of reprisal/second strike) to any potential PRC nuclear attack. The range of
the Agni-II is reported to be in excess of 2,000km. The payload of this
weapon remains undisclosed but estimates indicate that it is at least
1,000kg. Presumably, nuclear warheads, and possible chemical warheads, will
be available for the missile. The 3,700km Agni III is also reportedly being
developed to target all of the PRC.
Pakistan's Weapons
IT HAS BEEN REPORTED that Pakistan possesses the components vital to
construct 25 to 75 nuclear weapons, each with a yield between 10 and 15
kilotons. Like India, it is widely believed that Pakistan stores its nuclear
weapons in component form for security reasons and that these weapons could
be easily constructed within a few days. However, some Defense & Foreign
Affairs sources have indicated that some nuclear weapons have been
maintained on a far more rapid deployment schedule than that. It has been
reported that Pakistan has successfully miniaturized its nuclear device for
delivery by either F-16, Mirage III/V aircraft or the M-11 missile.
General Musharraf, has stated that Pakistan would not attempt to match India
with respect to number of missiles produced, but that Pakistan would retain
sufficient missiles to reach anywhere in India. Pakistan continues to
modernize its nuclear weapon capability and reports indicate that they
maintain a technological superiority over their larger rival. Currently,
both the 700km range Shaheen missile and the 1,300km range Ghauri missile
are reportedly capable of carrying Pakistan's current nuclear weapon design.
Pakistan's ballistic missile program began during the early 1980s under the
guise of being a satellite launch vehicle development program. Pakistan
obtained technical expertise/assistance from European companies until the
commencement of the Missile Technology Control Regime in 1987. The PRC and
DPRK have been the principle suppliers of technology since 1987. By the late
1980s, Pakistan was developing two solid-propellant rockets, the Hatf-1
(deadly) and the Half-2. The Hatf-1 is reported to use solid fuel and can
carry a payload of 500kg to 80km. It is a single-stage missile, 6.0 meters
long and 0.56 meter in diameter. Photographs of the rocket show no movable
control surface and reports indicate that the Hatf 1 is an unguided rocket
[it is launched via a rail launcher like some artillery rockets, such as the
Russian FROG7, adding credibility to this report]. Deployment of the Hatf-1
began in 1991. The Pakistanis later redesigned a variant, the HatfIA, with
improved propellants which reportedly increase the range to 100km. The
rocket is currently assessed to use conventional HE warheads and because of
the narrow fuselage of the missile it is widely believed that the Pakistanis
may not be able to package a nuclear warhead for the rocket.
In 1994, while the M-11 was still being developed, Bill Gertz, the very
experienced defense writer of The Washington Times, reported that Pakistan
had signed a contract with the PRC to purchase both the system and a
production capability. However, Pakistan, which named the missile the
Hatf-3, apparently took the first delivery of missiles during 1992. Reports
indicate that factories for producing the M-11 were completed during 1996.
The Pakistanis clearly intend for the missile to carry nuclear warheads as
former Pakistan Army Chief of Staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg, stated in 1994
that the M-11 was a "potential part of Pakistan's nuclear bomb delivery
The M-11 is 9.75 meters long and has a diameter of 0.8 meter, and is capable
of carrying a 1000kg payload to 300km. The missile consists of a single
stage, uses solid fuel, and most likely incorporates the strapdown inertial
guidance system used by all PRC M-series missiles [giving it an accuracy of
0.1% achieved]. M-11 missiles are reportedly stored near Lahore.
The first flight test of Pakistan's Shaheen (eagle) SRBM (also designated
the Hatf-4) occurred during April 1999. The development program reportedly
began [with PRC assistance] in 1993. The Shaheen was originally named the
Tarmuk; the reason for the name change is unknown. Pakistan claims that when
deployed, the Shaheen would have the capability to carry a 1,000kg payload
to 750km. The missile is reportedly 10 meters in length and 1.0 meter in
diameter. It appears to consist of a single stage and to use solid
propellants. The missile will be capable of carrying nuclear, conventional,
and CW warheads. Initial deployment of the Shaheen SRBM could occur by 2005.
Pakistan currently possesses an MRBM (Ghauri), named after a famous Muslim
warrior who defeated the Indians in battle. The Ghauri has also been
designated the Hatf-5. Various sources have reported that the Ghauri is a
single stage liquid-fueled MRBM, very similar in size, shape, and
performance to the 1,300km North Korean No Dong L Reportedly, Pakistan has
purchased a number of Ghauri missiles from North Korea; the missiles are
reportedly assembled at Khan Research laboratories, outside of Islamabad.
For demonstration purposes [as an implied message to India], the Ghauri was
launched in April 1998.
A missile called the Ghauri-2 was launched during April 1999 following an
Indian Agni-Ill launch. Pakistan claims to be developing the Ghauri-2 [also
known as the Hat)-6] with a range of 6,000km. Since Islamabad acquired a
missile assembly rather than full development and production capability from
North Korea, analysis would indicate that it is doubtful that Pakistan had
acquired the technology to fully develop the Ghauri-2. Historically, all of
Pakistan's ballistic missile activity has focused on the development of
solid-propellant missiles. Reports indicate that the Ghauri-2 is probably a
stop-gap MRBM until a solidpropellant MRBM can be developed.
In conclusion, it is worth noting that a new Indo-Pakistani conflict at this
stage raises the prospect of strategic ramifications across a broad
spectrum, even if such a conflict did not lead to a major nuclear exchange,
or even to the use of tactical (battlefield) nuclear weapons.
1 See Global Information System (GIS) Pakistan Special Reports and Defense
cr Foreign Affairs Daily reports online. See also reports on pages two and
three of this edition.
1. Gertz, Bill, "Pakistan-China Deal For Missiles Exposed", The Washington
Times, September 7, 1994.
2. Kumar, Dinesh, "Pakistan has 84 M-1 I Missiles Which Can Hit Delhi,
Bombay", The Times of India, July 10, 1995.
3. "Missiles: India", Air et Cosmos (France), issue 1560, June 1996.
4. Sheppard, Ben. "Regional Rivalries Are Replayed As India And Pakistan
Renew Ballistic Missile Tests", International Defense Review, May 1, 1999.
5. Bodansky, Yossef, "The Kashmir War: Neither Safe Nor Ending", Defense &
Foreign Affairs Daily, July 15, 1999.
6. "Pro Bin Laden Group Makes Immediate Comment On Pakistani Coup," Defense
& Foreign Affairs Daily, October 13, 1999.
7. Copley, Gregory, "US Pressures Pakistan As India Attempts To Marginalize
Its Neighbor", Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, January 23, 2000.
8. "The Hatf Test," editorial in Karachi Business Recorder (Internet English
version), February 10, 2000.
9. Dugger, Celia W. "Suicide Raid in New Delhi; Attackers among 12 Dead The
New York Times, December 14, 2001.
10. Frantz, Douglas with Purdum, Todd S, "Pakistan Faces Increased US
Pressure to Curb Militants", The New York Times, December 16, 2001.
11. "India: Congress party says diplomatic offensive against Pakistan
`justified"; The Times of India, December 28, 2001.
12. Ahmad, Dr Ishtiaq, "Deterring war with nukes", Pakistan Observer,
December 28, 2001. 13. Marquand, Robert, "S. Asia Crisis Hits US War
On Terror", The Christian Science Monitor, December 28, 2001.
14. Dugger, Celia. "India And Pakistan Add To War Footing", The New York
Times, December 28, 2001.
15. Interview with Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes: "Why India Is
Risking War", Far Eastern Economic Review, January 1, 2002.
16. Pearl, Daniel, "Pakistan Clamps Down On Islamic Militants To Avert War
With India, Terror At Home", The Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2002.
17. Dugger, Celia, "India Defense Minister Belittles Pakistan's Latest
Gestures" The New York Times, January 3, 2002.
18. Lamb, David, "Pakistan's New War On Extremism" The Los Angeles Times,
January 4, 2002.
19. Champion, Marc, "Blair Continues Ambassadorial Rale In Visit With India,
Pakistan Leaders", The "all Street Journal, January 4, 2002.
20. Gaffney, Frank, "Unhidden Dragon in Standoff", The Washington Times,
January 4, 2002.
21. Smith, Craig. "China Asks That Pakistan Show Caution", TheNew York
Times, January 4,2002.
22. Bedi, Rahul and Sparrow, Andrew, "Blair Warning After Clashes In
Kashmir", The Daily Telegraph, UK, January 4, 2002.
Copyright International Media Corporation Ltd. Jan 2002
(Copyright 2002)
c2002 ProQuest Information and Learning; All Rights Reserved. Only fair use,
as provided by the United States copyright law, is permitted. ProQuest
Information and Learning makes no warranty regarding the accuracy,
completeness or timeliness of the Publications or the records they contain,
or any warranty, express or implied, including any warranty of
merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose, and shall not be liable
for damages of any kind or lost profits or other claims related to them or
their uses. 


12Dec2001 PAKISTAN: En trois mois, le Pakistan a perçu 6 milliards de
dollars d'aide - Les mises en garde du g
En trois mois, le Pakistan a perçu 6 milliards de dollars d'aide - Les mises
en garde du général Mirza Aslam Beg.

L'ancien chef d'état-major des armées de Benazir Bhutto, le général Mirza
Aslam Beg, prédit un avenir sombre pour le Pakistan, tout en affichant un
penchant marqué pour les talibans: c'est « la meilleure chose qui pouvait
arriver pour l'Afghanistan et le Pakistan. »
« La défaite des talibans dans le nord et leur repli sur Kandahar va avoir
de sérieuses répercussions sur le Pakistan, avance-t-il. Les tribus
pachtounes pakistanaises risquent de réactiver leur vieux rêve d'un
Pachtounistan indépendant. En Afghanistan, une nouvelle guerre civile
commence et nous allons de nouveau en payer le prix. Et puis le général peut
dire ce qu'il veut: les partisans du djihad au Cachemire indien continueront
leur lutte contre le gouvernement de New Delhi. Personne ne pourra les
arrêter, quel que soit le contenu de la nouvelle politique [du président]
Moucharraf. » - (Corresp.).
(c) Le Monde, 2001

Sources:LE MONDE (FRENCH LANGUAGE) 12/12/2001 P4 

13Nov2001 PAKISTAN: GULF NEWS - Islamabad confirms ISI was involved in poll
The Pakistan government has confirmed for the first time that the country's
military wing, called the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI), had been
involved in domestic politics and that it had formed a multi-group alliance
of parties in 1990 to defeat the Pakistan Peoples' Party administration of
former prime minister Benazir Bhutto.
The confirmation came from Interior Minister Moinuddin Haider, a former
general, who told a radio press conference on Thursday night that the then
ISI chief General Hamid Gul and former army chief General Mirza Aslam Beg
had helped formed the Islamic Democratic Alliance in order to defeat the PPP
in the polls.
Bhutto and her party have been alleging that the elections in 1990 were
stolen against them, but authorities at that time, including the Pakistani
election commission, which is headed by a Supreme Court judge, had ignored
the protests.
Haider, who was part of the military then, demanded that both Hameed Gul and
Aslam Beg should be held accountable for the offence they had committed. The
IDA formed the government after defeating PPP in the elections.
Pakistan Muslim League leader Nawaz Sharif became the prime minister, but he
too was removed from office after about three years. "It was all wrong and
Hamid Gul must be questioned and be held accountable for his personal acts,"
Haider said.
The minister severely criticised the former ISI chief and his blatant
statements pouring in the national press since 1988 about his controversial
role in creation of an alliance against a political party.
The minister said he always stated that his (Hameed Gul's) statements did
not correspond to his assignment as a chief of sensitive intelligence
According to a statement in The News, the minister, in reply to a question,
stressed that the army should also share the responsibility of strengthening
the religious groups and using them as a tool against the political parties
and destabilising the elected governments in the country since 1985.
Speaking on other problems, he said that Pakistan had taken up the cases of
its fugitives with the Western countries and had handed over a list of its
accused to them for their immediate extradition.
The minister defended his government's decision to take strict action
against the religious parties' activists during demonstrations saying they
had started to take the law into their own hands by burning banks and other
public properties.
All Material Subject to Copyright
Copyright 2001:. All Rights Reserved. 

GULF NEWS 13/11/2001 

07Nov2001 FRANCE: Le Pakistan face au risque de talibanisation. 
Le président Pervez Musharraf attendu aujourd'hui à Paris

Attendu aujourd'hui à Paris, le général président pakistanais Pervez
Musharraf entreprend sa première grande tournée en Occident, qui le conduira
aussi à Londres et New York. Grâce à son ralliement à l'intervention
américaine contre le régime taliban, le chef de l'Etat pakistanais,
longtemps considéré comme un général putschiste par la communauté
internationale, va rencontrer Chirac, Blair et Bush, après avoir reçu à
Islamabad de nombreux dirigeants occidentaux.
Cette politique de soutien n'est pourtant pas sans risque pour Musharraf,
surtout en cas de poursuite des raids américains sur l'Afghanistan pendant
le ramadan. C'est du moins l'analyse d'un ancien collègue du chef de l'Etat
pakistanais, le général en retraite Mirza Aslam Beg. « Si la guerre continue
pendant le ramadan, Musharraf ne sera plus là pour fêter l'aid-ul-fitar »,
qui marque la fin du mois de jeûne des musulmans, affirme cet officier dans
un entretien au Figaro.
Quand Musharraf s'est emparé du pouvoir il y a deux ans, Mirza Aslam Beg a
discrètement pris ses distances avec lui. Tout en se réclamant de « la
démocratie », il dit admirer « la pureté et la rigueur » des talibans à
Kaboul. « Plus la guerre s'éternise en Afghanistan, plus les partis
religieux prennent de l'importance au Pakistan », estime-t-il.
« La talibanisation du Pakistan, qui a commencé depuis longtemps, sera de
plus en plus facile à consolider si la guerre dure », explique le général
Mirza Aslam Beg. Il croit que les fidèles du mollah Omar représentent « la
jeune génération ». « C'est la même chose au Pakistan, ce sont les jeunes
qui sont contre les Américains et contre Musharraf, ajoute-t-il. Or ils sont
l'avenir du pays, que vous le vouliez ou non. ».
Le Figaro.
(c) Copyright 2001 Le Figaro.

Sources:LE FIGARO 07/11/2001 P1 

28Oct2001 PAKISTAN: US wants to prevent creation of Muslim Bloc in region -
Aslam Beg. 
Lahore, Oct 28-PPI: Awami Qiadat Party (AQP) Chief Mirza Aslam Beg Sunday
said purpose behind US bombardment over Afghanistan was to prevent creation
of strong Muslim Bloc in the region. "United States have sensed developing
Muslim Bloc comprising of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran and to check its
way of establishment, they have inroad Afghanistan." These view were
expressed by him while talking to the newsmen here today. Aslam Beg observed
that US was afraid of religious organizations and freedom fighters (Jehadi)
groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan and wanted to eliminate them by all
means. He said US was of the view that if any of religious parties in
Pakistan comes to power, it might use atomic bomb against anti-Islamic
forces. "US air strikes over Afghanistan are a clear message to Pakistan to
abandon its Nuke-Prog," he claimed. The former army chief further said Bush
Administration was striving for installing her puppet government in
Afghanistan. He told reporters that Afghan commander Jalalud din Haqqani had
called him during his recent visit to Pakistan. He (Haqqani) revealed him
that Taliban had already handed over Osama bin Laden to Saudi government. He
also expressed his willingness about holding of dialogues with United
States. Condemning killing of innocent Afghan people through bombardment by
the United States, Aslam Beg stressed for political solution of the issue.
Replying a question, Aslam Beg said, it seems very difficult that America
would succeed in ousting Taliban government. Commenting on the countrywide
protest rallies by religious parties against US-led attacks on Afghanistan,
AQP Chief expressed the apprehensions, if the was war prolonged, people
would definitely become arrogant and the protests would be more violent. He
said almost all country's major political parties including Peoples Party
were backing the government's Afghan policy and this is very much
encouraging for the present regime. Aslam Beg empathetically urged the
religious parties and Jehadi groups to stage their anti-US demonstrations in
peaceful manners as taking the law in hands would put Pakistan in more
trouble besides bringing economic crisis further.
(c) 2001 Asia Pulse Pte Limited.
Asia Pulse gives no warranty or guarantee as to the accuracy of the
information, Asia Pulse shall not be liable for errors or omissions in, or
delays or interruptions to or cessation of delivery of, the data through its
negligence or otherwise. 


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