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Re: [A-List] Geostrategic imperatives by wwagar 08 November 2001 01:15 UTC |
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Yes, indeed. While Bush II plays with his 15,000-pound bombs and his GOOD (as opposed to BAD) Islamic warlords in Afghhanistan, the whole Islamic world writhes in deep turmoil. The regime in Pakistan is holding on by a hair (perhaps of the same construction as the one that suspended the Sword of Damocles), and I am not sure the regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and elsewhere are doing much better. Our dear friends in Israel, who all by themselves obviate the need for enemies, continue as usual, making the whole notion of a sovereign Palestinian state slightly less ludicrous than independence for the District of Columbia. If "we" are serious about staying the course, I think "we" should bring back selective service as soon as possible, sell lots of war bonds, and hunker down for the next Vietnam. Ooops. Make that the next three or four Vietnams. Anyway, thanks to Mark and Michael for this bracing dash of realism. I am half-expecting that most of my students next semester will be women. As ever, with a brave tootling of fifes and a happy rattling of drums, Warren On Wed, 7 Nov 2001, Mark Jones wrote: > At 07/11/2001 08:49, Michael Keaney wrote: > > > the post-Cold War era, far > >from ushering in a "new world order", threatened global anarchy instead. > > Pakistan appears to be on the verge of collapse. If there is an > anti-Musharraf coup by pro-Taleban elements within the Pakistani > intelligence service and armed forces, how wide will popular support be for > such a coup? According to media reports, the Americans are preparing to > insert large troop formations to secure Pakistan's stockpile of nuclear > warheads (estimated at 30-60 weapons). Any American intervention is bound > to meet stiff resistance from the Pakistan army, for whom the nuclear > 'crown jewels' are not merely military assets but iconic symbols of > national power and sovereignty. > > If Pakistan erupts in civil war and revolution,effectively there will soon > be a revolutionary-military bloc comprising Pakistan and Afghanistan, > nuclear-armed and able to defend itself. This Islamic revolutionary bloc > will confront Russia and its proxies to the north, Iran to the west and > India to the south, in addition to whatever armed formations the Western > powers are able to introduce. > > Pakistan's nuclear warheads were built with Chinese technical help. Will > China sit on its hands and allow its main ally in the region be overwhelmed > by its traditional enemies? > > In the event of a pro-Taleban revolutionary regime emerging in Pakistan, > what will happen to Pakistan's close neighbours in the Gulf States and > above all Saudi Arabia? What effect will the shockwaves have in > Israel/Palestine? What will the Sharon government's response be to the > appearance of a nuclear-capable Taleban-backed Pakistan? > > History appears to have reached a bifurcation of roads. The only certain > thing is that the pre-September 11 world-system has vanished. Even if by > some fate of political legerdemain the Bush regime manages to hang on in > South Asia and restabilise its strategic positions there, without recourse > to general war--in other words, even if the Bush regime shows enough acumen > to avoid the abyss (likely, given the record?)--there will be a big shake > up and massive losers--and winners. > > It is hard to see any kind of outcome which is satisfactory to US interests > or favourable to the US version of 'world civilisation'. > > The consequences in Russia must also be monumental, if it turns out that at > the very moment Putin has thrown his lot in with the West, the entire basis > of US global hegemony unravels, turning south and central Asia into a > boiling cauldron which no-one can put the lid back on. If Putin's great > gamble fails, there will be a seismic change in Russia too. > > > Mark Jones > >
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