Re: On events of short and long duration

I think Ray's suggestion is excellent, though the first of the three
positions is vague, or there was a typo.  I think it is NOT ok to condone US
leadership in bringing the terrorists to justice precisely because this is
the basis of renewed US leadership, and possibly renewed hegemony.  One
might argue that the terrorists should be obtained and tried, but by whom?
Through the UN?  I'm concerned that this will only contribute to
strengthening First World dominance over the Third World.  How do we
formulate a position on "yes" to justice, but "no" to increasing the power
of the powers that be?

The second parts of Ray's suggestions are good: no invasion of Afghanistan
and increased pressure on Israel (if not also a reduction in aid to Israel
and an increase in aid to Palestine) to make peace and allow the formation
of a Palestinian state.  I think the US has aid on the table for Palestine,
as a bargaining chip for peace; but since Netanyahu came to power, followed
by Bush, the entire process was intentionally derailed.  However, I think
Steve Sherman is right that the attack in New York will actually work to the
benefit of Palestine -- especially in the wake of attacks in the US on
Muslims and others.  The US must pretend show it is not biased to Islam nor
the Palestinians, and progressives should push the US in that direction.

Toward the third part of Ray's suggestion, we certainly need to understand
and explain the long and middle run historical processes behind the
attack -- the global structures of inequality, and the regional geopolitics
during the Cold War and since, which of course hinge on oil extraction and
arms sales.  Very few in the media are in fact trying to explain why this
happened.  And if we don't know why, then we can change social structures to
prevent reoccurrences, wars, and miserable living conditions.

From a long run view, this entire affair, as with the war on Iraq which
continues, is a core-periphery war, but one that assumes the form of, and is
thus decisively conditioned by, fundamentalist Islamic elements.  In the
middle run, the Islamic terrorists are of course only one level of anti-US
neo-imperialism that has developed in the region -- indeed, which has spread
around the world linking the Uigher struggle in China, the Muslim radicals
in Philippines and Indonesia, and throughout the middle east, where there
exists a general anti-US sentiment among many in the region who oppose both
terrorism and US domination in its many forms.

For those not familiar, I'm enclosing an article that gives us some
background on the middle run geopolitics of the region related to the Cold
War and oil.

Special Report
http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/papers/mideast/index.html
Continuing Storm:
The U.S. Role in the Middle East

By Stephen Zunes
An associate professor at the University of San Francisco, Stephen Zunes is
an expert on Middle Eastern history and politics.

Throughout the centuries, Western nations have tried to impose their order
on the region now commonly known as the Middle East. For certain periods of
time they have succeeded, only to find themselves at the receiving end of a
popular and oftentimes violent backlash. Now, with the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the triumph in the Gulf War, the United States standsat
least for a timeas the regions dominant outside power.Some in Washington
have traditionally argued that because the United States has entered the
region eschewing colonial ambitions, championing the rule of law and the
authority of the United Nations, and seeking economic growth and political
stability, America stands out as a singular and responsible overseer. Most
of those in the Middle East and most independent Western observers, however,
see the United States role as far less benign, citing U.S. support for
repressive and corrupt monarchies, the exploitative practices by American
oil companies and other multinational corporations, the promotion of a
secular and materialistic lifestyle, the highly prejudicial use of the UN
Security Council, the arming and bankrolling of a militaristic and
expansionist Israel, destabilization efforts against internationally
recognized governments, and periodic military interventions.

Whatever the nature of U.S. policy, however, there is no question that the
United States recognizes the regions significance. At the intersection of
three continents and the source of most of the worlds petroleum reserves,
the Middle East has been described by leading American officials as the most
strategically important area in the world. No longer concerned that the
region might fall to Soviet influence, the United States is still
apprehensive about the influence of homegrown movements that could also
challenge American interests. There is a widely perceived, ongoing threat
from radical secular or radical Islamic forces, as well as concern over the
instability that could result from any major challenges to the rule of
pro-Western regimes, even if led by potentially democratic movements. The
most crucial part of the Middle East, according to most U.S. policymakers,
is the Persian Gulf region, where conservative, pro-Western monarchies feel
under threat from the radical regimes in Iraq and Iran and look to the
United States for protection. The Persian Gulf

Figure 7
Major Oil-Producing Nations

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Iraq, and
Iran possess 64% of the world's proven oil reserves.
Source: Phyllis Bennis, "Middle east Oil," Foreign Policy In Focus, January
1997.

The six Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf are guardians of valuable oil
reserves to which the United States seeks access, not just to supplement
American reserves (currently around 18% of U.S. consumption) but as a means
of maintaining a degree of leverage over the import-dependent European and
Japanese markets. During the war between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s, the
United States played the combatants off against each other to ensure that
neither of these militant regimes would become too influential. With oil,
water resources, and sizable populations, both had the potential to become
regional powers that could conceivably challenge American interests. Since
1993, the U.S. has articulated a policy of dual containment toward these
governments, guarding against potential expansionist ambitions by either
against the pro-Western sheikdoms. More recently, however, the extreme
hostility toward Iran may be lessening as a result of the election of a more
moderate Islamic government in 1997, which has provided a justification for
those in Washington already interested in rebuilding ties with the oil-rich
and potentially powerful country.The British had been the dominant power in
the Persian Gulf for most of the 20th century, butin recognition of their
decline as a major world powerthey announced their military withdrawal from
the region in 1969.

The United States, which had been increasing its presence in the Middle East
since the end of World War II, was determined to fill the void. President
Richard Nixon, facing growing opposition to the Vietnam War, knew that
sending U.S. combat troops into this volatile region would not be
politically feasible. By the early 1970s, antiwar sentiment had lessened,
due in part to Nixons Vietnamization program, whereby the reliance on South
Vietnamese conscripts and a dramatically increased air war had minimized
American casualties. As a result, the Nixon Doctrine (also known as the Guam
Doctrine or surrogate strategy) came into being, wherein Vietnamization
evolved into a global policy of arming and training third world allies to
become regional gendarmes for American interests.The Persian Gulf was the
primary testing ground, with Irans shahwho owed his throne to CIA
intervention in the 1950s and had long dreamed of rebuilding the Persian
Empireplaying the part of a willing participant. Throughout the 1970s, the
U.S. sold tens of billions of dollars worth of highly sophisticated arms to
the shah, and sent thousands of U.S. advisors to turn the Iranian armed
forces into a sophisticated fighting unit capable of counterinsurgency
operations. Such a strategy proved successful when Iranian forces helped
crush a leftist insurgency in the southeastern Arabian sultanate of Oman in
the mid-1970s.

This strategy came crashing down in 1979, however, with Irans Islamic
revolution, which resulted from the popular reaction against the highly
visible American support for the Iranian regime, the shahs penchant for
military procurement over internal economic development, and his brutal
repression against any and all dissent. The vast American-supplied arsenal
fell into the hands of a radical anti-American regime. It was then that the
Carter Doctrine came into being with the establishment of the Rapid
Deployment Force (later known as the Central Command), which would enable
the United States to strike with massive force in a relatively short period
of time. This extremely costly effort would enable the U.S. to fight a war
that would rely so heavily on air power, be over so quickly, and enjoy such
a favorable casualty ratio that popular domestic opposition would not have
time to mobilize.This was precisely the scenario for Operation Desert Storm.
Though the exact circumstances that would trigger such a war were not known,
the military response had in effect been planned for more than a dozen years
prior to the Gulf War and was designed in part for domestic political
impact. From Washingtons strategic vantage point, it worked well.

The massive international mobilization led by the United States forced Iraqi
occupation forces out of Kuwait and severely damaged Iraqs military and
civilian infrastructure in less than six weeks and with only several dozen
American casualties. The war was a dramatic reassertion of U.S. global
power, just as its former superpower rival was collapsing, and it
consolidated the U.S. position as the regions most important outside
power.Ironically, the United States had been quietly supporting Iraqs
brutal totalitarian regime and its leader, Saddam Hussein, through financial
credits and even limited military assistance during its war against Iran in
the 1980s, including offering components and technical support for programs
bolstering the development of weapons of mass destruction. Washington
downplayed and even covered up the use of chemical weapons by Saddams armed
forces against the Iranian military and Kurdish civilians during this
period, and the U.S. opposed UN sanctions against Iraq for its acts of
aggression toward both Iran and its own population. It was only after Iraqs
invasion of the oil-rich, pro-Western emirate of Kuwait in August 1990 that
Saddam Husseins regime suddenly became demonized in the eyes of U.S.
policymakers and the American public at large.

Since the Gulf War Even prior to the Gulf War, the United States had thrown
its immense military, diplomatic, and economic weight behind the monarchies
of the Persian Gulf. Though they rule over less than 10% of the Arab worlds
total population, these regimes control most of its wealth. Prior to the
war, it was difficult for the United States to engage in military exercises
or even arrange a port call without asking for permission months in advance.
Not any more.Figure 1

Oil Reserves and U.S. Imports
Sources: BP Amoco, Statistical Review of Worl Energy 1999 (Chicago: BP
Amoco, 1999) Available on the internet at:
http://www.bpamoco.com/worldenergy/

There is now an effective, permanent U.S. military presence in the Persian
Gulf. The financial costs are extraordinaryrunning between $30 and $60
billion annually, according to conservative estimatesand are shared by the
U.S. and the gulf monarchies. Though there appears to be a bipartisan
consensus in Washington that there is a clear strategic imperative to
maintaining such an American presence, there are criticseven among
conservativeswho argue that such a presence is too costly for the American
taxpayer and creates a situation where American military personnel are
effectively serving as a mercenary force for autocratic sheikdoms.Most
Persian Gulf Arabs and their leaders felt threatened after Iraqs seizure of
Kuwait and were grateful for the strong U.S. leadership in the 1991 war
against Saddam Husseins regime. At the same time, there is an enormous
amount of cynicism regarding U.S. motives in waging that war. Gulf Arabs,
and even some of their rulers, cannot shake the sense that the war was not
fought for international law, self-determination, and human rights, as the
Bush administration claimed, but rather to protect U.S. access to oil and to
enable the U.S. to gain a strategic toehold in the region. It is apparent
that a continued U.S. presence is welcome only as long as Arabs feel they
need a foreign military presence to protect them.Iraq still has not
recovered from the 1991 war, during which it was on the receiving end of the
heaviest bombing in world history. The U.S. has insisted on maintaining
strict sanctions against Iraq to force compliance with international demands
to dismantle any capability of producing weapons of mass destruction. In
addition, the U.S. hopes that such sanctions will lead to the downfall of
Saddam Husseins regime. However, Washingtons policy of enforcing strict
sanctions against Iraq appears to have had the ironic effect of
strengthening Saddams regime. With as many as 5,000 people, mostly
children, dying from malnutrition and preventable diseases every month as a
result of the sanctions, the humanitarian crisis has led to worldwide
demandseven from some of Iraqs historic enemiesto relax the sanctions.

Furthermore, as they are now more dependent than ever on the government for
their survival, the Iraqi people are even less likely to risk open defiance.
Unlike the reaction to sanctions imposed prior to the war, Iraqi popular
resentment over their suffering lays the blame squarely on the United
States, not the totalitarian regime, whose ill-fated conquest of Kuwait led
to the economic collapse of this once-prosperous country. In addition, Iraq
s middle class, which would have most likely formed the political force
capable of overthrowing Saddams regime, has been reduced to penury. It is
not surprising that most of Iraqs opposition movements oppose the U.S.
policy of ongoing punitive sanctions and air strikes.In addition, U.S.
officials have stated that sanctions would remain even if Iraq complied with
United Nations inspectors, giving the Iraqi regime virtually no incentive to
comply. For sanctions to work, there needs to be a promise of relief to
counterbalance the suffering; that is, a carrot as well as a stick. Indeed,
it was the failure of both the United States and the United Nations to
explicitly spell out what was needed in order for sanctions to be lifted
that led to Iraq suspending its cooperation with UN inspectors in December
1998.

The use of U.S. air strikes against Iraq subsequent to the inspectors
departure has not garnered much support from the international community,
including Iraqs neighbors, who would presumably be most threatened by an
Iraqi biological weapons capability. Nor have U.S. air strikes eliminated
that capability. In light of Washingtons toleranceand even quiet
supportof Iraqs powerful military machine in the 1980s, the Clinton
administrations exaggerated claims of an imminent Iraqi military threat in
1998, after Iraqs military infrastructure was largely destroyed in the Gulf
War, simply lack credibility. Nor have such air strikes eliminated or
reduced the countrys biological weapons capability. Furthermore, only the
United Nations Security Council has the prerogative to authorize military
responses to violations of its resolutions; no single member state can do so
unilaterally without explicit permission.