|
< < <
Date Index > > > |
new world systems data on technological dependence by Tausch, Arno 21 August 2001 14:55 UTC |
< < <
Thread Index > > > |
Dear colleagues,
years ago colleagues from the Zurich department of sociology headed by
Volker Bornschier provided excellent analyses on the issue of patent
penetration and technological dependence. Now, the UNDP HDR 2001
http://www.undp.org/hdr2001/
http://www.undp.org/hdr2001/indicator/
present a new data series that provides you with a link-up to that
well-known theme, so important for the distinguishing between the center,
the semi-periphery and the periphery.
The TAI-Index of the UNDP combines technology creation, diffusion of recent
innovations, diffusion of old innovations and human skills, and reaches from
0 (low value) to 1 (best value). It is based on the combination of a
technology creation index (patents granted to residents per 1 million people
and $ receipts of royalties and license fees received per 1.000 people); a
diffusion of recent innovation index (internet hosts per total population;
high and medium technology exports as % of total exports), a diffusion of
old innovation index (log mainline and cellular telephones per 1.000
population; log energy consumption per capita) and a human skills index
(mean years of schooling of the population age 15 +, gross tertiary science
enrolment ratio in % of the age group). The indicator index is equal to
[(actual value - observed minimum value)/(observed maximum value - observed
minimum value)] for each component of the indicator.
The world scale of technological achievement is:
TAI-Index world technology achievement rank
Finland 0,744 1
United States 0,733 2
Sweden 0,703 3
Japan 0,698 4
Korea, Rep. of 0,666 5
Netherlands 0,630 6
United Kingdom 0,606 7
Canada 0,589 8
Australia 0,587 9
Singapore 0,585 10
Germany 0,583 11
Norway 0,579 12
Ireland 0,566 13
Belgium 0,553 14
New Zealand 0,548 15
Austria 0,544 16
France 0,535 17
Israel 0,514 18
Spain 0,481 19
Italy 0,471 20
Czech Republic 0,465 21
Hungary 0,464 22
Slovenia 0,458 23
Hong Kong, China (SAR) 0,455 24
Slovakia 0,447 25
Greece 0,437 26
Portugal 0,419 27
Bulgaria 0,411 28
Poland 0,407 29
Malaysia 0,396 30
Croatia 0,391 31
Mexico 0,389 32
Cyprus 0,386 33
Argentina 0,381 34
Romania 0,371 35
Costa Rica 0,358 36
Chile 0,357 37
Uruguay 0,343 38
South Africa 0,340 39
Thailand 0,337 40
Trinidad and Tobago 0,328 41
Panama 0,321 42
Brazil 0,311 43
Philippines 0,300 44
China 0,299 45
Bolivia 0,277 46
Colombia 0,274 47
Peru 0,271 48
Jamaica 0,261 49
Iran, Islamic Rep. of 0,260 50
Tunisia 0,255 51
Paraguay 0,254 52
Ecuador 0,253 53
El Salvador 0,253 54
Dominican Republic 0,244 55
Syrian Arab Republic 0,240 56
Egypt 0,236 57
Algeria 0,221 58
Zimbabwe 0,220 59
Indonesia 0,211 60
Honduras 0,208 61
Sri Lanka 0,203 62
India 0,201 63
Nicaragua 0,185 64
Pakistan 0,167 65
Senegal 0,158 66
Ghana 0,139 67
Kenya 0,129 68
Nepal 0,081 69
Tanzania, U. Rep. of 0,080 70
Sudan 0,071 71
Mozambique 0,066 72
Research by the Zurich school of sociology already showed that technological
dependence had a negative effect on long-run economic growth and income
redistribution (Bornschier et al. 1980; Bornschier and Heintz, 1978).
Another new data series, presented by the World Bank WDR 1999 , together
with the earlier data, presented by the Zurich school, allow for a
comparison of the evolution of technological dependence on a global scale.
Today, the European Union (15) controls 25% of the world resident patent
applications, the United States 16%, while Japan and its regional orbits
South Korea and the Philippines control not fewer than 57% of world resident
patent applications.
Europe - in contrast to the USA and Japan - is facing globalization from a
passive perspective - as a prolonged workbench of the TNCs, which invest in
Europe in pretty much the same way as the TNCs did in Latin America during
the time of import substitution - to be present in a market, shielded by an
average level of 7% external customs for industrial products.
Our materials show that Japan is by far the technologically most dominant
country in the world, with over 340.000 resident patent applications per
year, while in the US this figure is over 110.000. South Korea leads Germany
by over 68.000 applications compared to Germany's 56.757. With hardly a
quarter of world resident patent applications, the European Union is in no
position to effectively be a technologically leading center of the world
economy in the 21st Century
Table 2: technological dependence in the world system
resident patent applications nonresident patent applications
patent penetration (=2*100/(1+2)) (unweighted coeffi-cient) % of world
resident patents % of world non-resident patents
Japan 340861 60390 15,05 47,4 2,64
United States 111883 111536 49,92 15,56 4,88
Korea Republic 68446 45548 39,96 9,52 1,99
Germany 56757 98338 63,41 7,89 4,3
UK 25269 104084 80,47 3,51 4,56
Russian Federation 18138 28149 60,81 2,52 1,23
France 17090 81418 82,65 2,38 3,56
China 11698 41016 77,81 1,63 1,8
Australia 9196 34125 78,77 1,28 1,49
Italy 8860 71992 89,04 1,23 3,15
Netherlands 4884 61958 92,69 0,68 2,71
Ukraine 3640 22862 86,27 0,51 1
Canada 3316 45938 93,27 0,46 2,01
Finland 3262 61556 94,97 0,45 2,69
Switzerland 2699 75576 96,55 0,38 3,31
Spain 2689 81294 96,8 0,37 3,56
Brazil 2655 29451 91,73 0,37 1,29
Austria 2506 75985 96,81 0,35 3,33
Denmark 2452 72151 96,71 0,34 3,16
Poland 2414 24902 91,16 0,34 1,09
Romania 1831 22139 92,36 0,25 0,97
India 1660 6632 79,98 0,23 0,29
Norway 1550 25628 94,3 0,22 1,12
New Zealand 1421 26947 94,99 0,2 1,18
Israel 1363 12172 89,93 0,19 0,53
Belgium 1356 59099 97,76 0,19 2,59
Kazakhstan 1024 20064 95,14 0,14 0,88
Ireland 925 52407 98,27 0,13 2,29
Uzbekistan 914 21088 95,85 0,13 0,92
Hungary 832 24147 96,67 0,12 1,06
Belarus 701 20347 96,67 0,1 0,89
Czech R 623 24856 97,55 0,09 1,09
Egypt 504 706 58,35 0,07 0,03
Greece 434 52371 99,18 0,06 2,29
Mexico 389 30305 98,73 0,05 1,33
Turkey 367 19668 98,17 0,05 0,86
Bulgaria 318 22235 98,59 0,04 0,97
Slovenia 301 21868 98,64 0,04 0,96
Table 2 shows the dramatic decline of the European technological position
over time. The European Union (15) and the EU accession countries were among
the countries with the highest growth rates of technological dependence,
while the Pacific/Indian Ocean area nations Canada, South Korea, India,
Australia and Japan had very slow or even negative growth rates of
technological dependence. They, and not the present or extended European
Union, are the future dynamic pole of the world economy. Although the United
States also lost its former strong position (patent penetration increased
from 27% to nearly 50% over the last 20 years), the European (EU 15)
position is now alarmingly weak. Germany is today's most technologically
independent nation in the Union, with a patent penetration coefficient of
63.41%, followed by the UK (80.47%) and France (82.65%). Germany's resident
patent applications (56.757) were lower than those in South Korea (68.446).
Within 20 years, Germany lost more than 16% of its technological
sovereignty:
Table 3: the increases/decreases of technological dependence over time
patent penetration end 1990s
patent penetration 1965-1975 rate of change 1975-end 1990s
Romania 92,36 10,5 81,86
Czech Republic 97,55 23,44 74,11
Poland 91,16 24,58 66,58
Russian Federation 60,81 3,81 57
Greece 99,18 42,49 56,69
Hungary 96,67 56,84 39,83
Bulgaria 98,59 60,37 38,22
Switzerland 96,55 72,59 23,96
Spain 96,8 73,94 22,86
United States 49,92 27,38 22,54
Finland 94,97 73,37 21,6
France 82,65 66,01 16,64
Germany 63,41 47,05 16,36
Austria 96,81 84,17 12,64
Brazil 91,73 80,35 11,38
New Zealand 94,99 85,6 9,39
Italy 89,04 79,81 9,23
Denmark 96,71 89,22 7,49
Netherlands 92,69 86,11 6,58
Belgium 97,76 91,33 6,43
Turkey 98,17 91,96 6,21
Mexico 98,73 92,74 5,99
Norway 94,3 89,04 5,26
UK 80,47 76,18 4,29
Israel 89,93 86,63 3,3
Ireland 98,27 97,78 0,49
Korea Republic 39,96 39,75 0,21
Canada 93,27 94,78 -1,51
India 79,98 85,07 -5,09
Australia 78,77 89,11 -10,34
Japan 15,05 28,46 -13,41
Egypt 58,35 95,99 -37,64
Belarus 96,67
China 77,81
Kazakhstan 95,14
Slovenia 98,64
Ukraine 86,27
Uzbekistan 95,85
Legend: countries printed in bold letters are members of the European Union;
countries printed in bold and indented letters are candidates for European
Union membership
This assessment about an erosion of the European long-term power base in the
world economy also applies to the European share in the world-wide stock of
foreign direct investments and in the share of the top 50 companies of the
world economy. Europe was on the rise until 1990, but has declined since
then:
Table 4 now shows the most important correlations of technological
dependence with social decay on the level of the industrialized and
transformation countries:
Table 4: the correlates of technological dependence
unemployment benefits per Gov expenditures 0,42
female long-term unemployment 0,37
agriculture as % of GDP 0,29
youth unemployment 0,26
infant mortality 0,26
female unemployment 0,24
male long-term unemployment 0,24
under five mortality rate 0,24
male unemployment 0,23
population below $14.40 a day 0,22
people not expected to survive age 60 0,18
private consumption as % of GDP 0,18
CO2 emissions per US $ of GDP 0,11
inflation rate 0,11
maternal mortality 0,1
budget surplus per GDP -0,1
real earnings per employee growth rate 1980-92 -0,11
gross domestic savings -0,2
labour force participation ratio -0,21
gross domestic investment -0,23
services as % of GDP -0,3
female net secondary school enrollment ratio -0,33
real GDP poorest 20% -0,39
terms of trade (1987 = 100) -0,46
population served by public sanitation -0,56
economic size (GDP in $) -0,61
R&D scientists and technicians per 1000 people -0,61
public health expenditure (per total pub expenditure) -0,86
Legend: our own calculations from UNDP Human Development Report electronic
data file
An enlarged Europe is even more under a motive to reflect on the kind of its
political elites. High subventions, a large state sector, a weak democracy
on a Union level, close links between the agro-multis and the urban business
elites, and a pervasive and growing influence of transnational criminal
corporations of the mafia, n'drangheta etc. type in major European countries
and their systematic and fraudulent misuse of EU subventions would be a 21st
Century type of terra-ferma constellation that could bloc Europe's path
towards the 'Modelski' constellation of global leadership:
an oceanic navy
lead industries, fiscal strength
democratic potential, party system
strong active media
Western Europe lost in terms of world market shares in a secular trend
vis-à-vis the countries of the Pacific; the dynamics of growth in the world
economy seem to work to the detriment of the old European centers. Asia's
'basics' are healthier than expected, and the tide turns to the detriment of
the Europeans, now that the initial positive effects of European Monetary
Union fade away and transnational capital flows again to the Pacific region.
This is also the true background to the present weakness of the 'Euro'.
the EU in the capitalist world system. Relative share in %
EU share in top world collective service companies 74,60
EU share in world development aid 56,40
EU share in top world intermediary good companies 55,30
EU share in top world insurance companies 55,00
EU share in top world energy companies 50,20
EU share in OECD total unemployment 47,70
EU share in top world banking companies 45,90
EU share in top world automobile industry 41,60
EU share in top world chemical and pharma companies 40,00
EU share in top world electrical equipment companies 38,30
EU share in top world distribution companies 38,10
EU share in OECD total GDP 36,50
EU share in top world food industries 34,30
EU share in OECD population 34,30
EU share in top world telecom companies 33,70
EU share in OECD defense expenditure 33,50
EU share in top world electronical companies 25,70
EU share in the turnover of the top 45 world companies 21,10
EU share in top world consumer good companies 17,10
EU share in top world defense/aeronautic industries 16,80
EU share in top world mass communication companies 10,10
EU share in top world informatic companies 0,00
Legend: Our own calculations from Le Monde, Bilan du Monde, 2000
MR Doz. Dr. Arno Tausch
EUI 13/EUI 12
BMSG Stubenring 1
A-1010 Wien
Tel. 71100-2272
e-mail: arno.tausch@bmsg.gv.at
|
< < <
Date Index > > > |
World Systems Network List Archives at CSF | Subscribe to World Systems Network |
< < <
Thread Index > > > |