FW: [RRE]Mapping Globalization

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Subject: [RRE]Mapping Globalization

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Date: Sat, 4 Aug 2001 10:55:23 -0400 (EDT)
From: Eszter Hargittai <eszter@phoenix.Princeton.EDU>

American Behavioral Scientist
Special Issue on Mapping Globalization

Edited by Eszter Hargittai and Miguel Angel Centeno
Princeton University

This special issue is part of a larger project supported in
part by the International Networks Archive, Princeton University.
( http://www.princeton.edu/~ina )
AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Vol. 44 No. 10, June 2001 1545-1560
(c) 2001 Sage Publications, Inc.

Single copies are available from the publisher for $20 by phone
(800-818-7243 or 805-499-9774), fax (800-583-2665), or e-mail
(order@sagepub.com).

The Sage Web site is <http://www.sagepub.com/>.

CONTENTS

The Authors

Introduction
Defining a Global Geography
ESZTER HARGITTAI and MIGUEL ANGEL CENTENO

ECONOMIC NETWORKS

World-System Structure and Change:
An Analysis of Global Networks and Economic
Growth Across Two Time Periods
EDWARD L. KICK and BYRON L. DAVIS

Global Institutions and Networks:
Contingent Change in the Structure of World Trade Advantage, 1965-1980
MICHAEL ALAN SACKS, MARC J. VENTRESCA, and BRIAN UZZI

The Global 500:
Mapping the World Economy at Century's End
ALBERT J. BERGESEN and JOHN SONNETT

Shifting Governance Structures in Global
Commodity Chains, With Special Reference to the Internet
GARY GEREFFI

COMMUNICATION NETWORKS

A Longitudinal Analysis of the International
Telecommunication Network, 1978-1996
GEORGE A. BARNETT

World City Networks and Hierarchies, 1977-1997:
An Empirical Analysis of Global Air Travel Links
DAVID A. SMITH and MICHAEL F. TIMBERLAKE

THE INTERNET

Old Hierarchies or New Networks of Centrality?
The Global Geography of the Internet Content Market
MATTHEW A. ZOOK

Network Cities and the Global Structure of the Internet
ANTHONY M. TOWNSEND

Mapping the "Worlds" of the World Wide Web:
(Re)Structuring Global Commerce Through Hyperlinks
STANLEY D. BRUNN and MARTIN DODGE

KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS

Global Webs of Knowledge:
Education, Science, and Technology
THOMAS SCHOTT

Netting Scholars:
Online and Offline
EMMANUEL KOKU, NANCY NAZER, and BARRY WELLMAN

---

Introduction
Defining a Global Geography

Eszter Hargittai and Miguel Angel Centeno
Princeton University

The articles in this special issue provide a map for understanding the
networks of transfers and relationships that make up the international
web of globalization.  Globalization involves a variety of links
expanding and tightening a web of political, economic, and cultural
interconnections. A variety of data indicate that we are undergoing
a process of compression of international time and space and an
intensification of international relations. Both popular accounts
and more rigorous analyses tell us that international connections
are increasing; an expanding variety of goods and services are
being exchanged across boundaries; more and more people live their
professional, family, and intellectual lives in more than one country;
and cultural autarky is no longer possible (1).  Yet, individual data
sources tell us little more than that. How fast are we integrating?
What does the global web look like?  Who is in the center and who is
on the margins?  How have these positions shifted over the past two
decades?  The following dozen studies explore these questions through
systematic and historical data, delving into the underlying structure
of the apparent integration.

GLOBALIZATION IN CONTEXT

WHAT IS GLOBALIZATION?

Defining globalization has become something of a cottage industry.
Mauro Guillen (2001) has counted literally hundreds of citations
using the term globalization, each often offering a new version of
a definition.  Common elements include the intensification of global
compression, interdependence, and integration.  Essentially, global
inhabitants have much more to do with one another and interact more
often than they once did.

Definitional uncertainty aside, there is considerable debate regarding
the significance of this phenomenon.  Castells (1996, p. 92) contends
that we are living through a dramatic transformation into a global
economy distinct from the "world" economy born in the 16th century.
Yet, other scholars offer evidence indicating that the current process
of global interconnection is much less dramatic than what occurred
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Hirst & Thompson, 1996).
For some theorists, globalization has altered the economic chances of
significant populations (Reich, 1991; Rodrik, 1997), but others argue
that its effect has been exaggerated (Berger, 1996; Fligstein, 1998;
Krugman, 1994).

Does globalization matter?  We believe that much of the argument
stems from collapsing two quite different elements of the issue at
hand.  The first is the process of globalization, the mechanics of
international integration; the second is the product or consequences
thereof.  The latter has received more attention, and we turn to that
first.

SIGNIFICANCE AND CONSEQUENCES OF GLOBALIZATION

Given the themes of this special issue, we obviously believe that
globalization matters (or more accurately, might matter).  The
real question is how it will matter and for whom.  We may begin by
analyzing the limits of the effects of globalization to define the
outer boundaries of the phenomenon.  The naysayers do have a point
in reminding us that the talk of globalization is often precisely that.
The triumphalism (or panic) that often characterizes discussions of
the topic neglects the many aspects of daily life that for all intents
and purposes, remain relatively unaffected by international flows and
transfers.

Perhaps the most obvious limit on these is the continued salience
of territorial frontiers (2).  With very few exceptions, for example,
one must be both a citizen and a resident to vote in a political
election.  Some countries obviously have an international element
in their domestic politics, and ease of travel has complicated some
electioneering strategies (3).  The opinions of major international
players are courted and watched.  Nevertheless, each arbitrarily drawn
nation-state still formally determines the most significant aspects
of its policies.  Similarly, on which side of a border one is born
often makes a very important economic difference.  A child in Nuevo
Laredo, Mexico, might have a harder time accessing the potential of
the U.S. economy than one born across the border in Laredo, Texas;
citizens of Greece and Hong Kong enjoy access to wider markets than
those of Turkey and the People's Republic of China.

The significance of borders illustrates the different ways that
globalization affects social groups.  For example, borders are more
significant for labor than for capital.  The European Union may be
a transnational labor market, but it is not officially open to all
comers.  Latin American immigrants working on the bottom rungs of the
U.S. labor market have little protection.  In much the same way that
exclusive neighborhoods increasingly separate themselves from the
poverty that surrounds them, rich countries may build higher barriers
as a response to their being increasingly "near" to poorer societies.
One of the more interesting future developments in globalization will
be the extent to which it either allows freer transborder labor flows
or increasingly relies on the power of the nation-state to restrict it.

Frontiers place limits on other aspects of life.  Although capital
may face fewer restrictions than labor, states do sometimes try to
control the price of their currencies, limit their flows, and prohibit
certain transactions or interchanges.  Despite the possible congruence
in the definition of human rights (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Meyer, Frank,
Hironaka, Schofer, & Tuma, 1997), the opportunities available and
support expected differ radically from one citizenry to another, even
keeping all other factors constant.  Certainly, political violence
and the direction thereof is most often defined and constrained by
international boundaries.  Overall, as long as nation-states retain
a monopoly over the means of destruction, globalization will operate
under significant limitations.

Nor has globalization affected everyone.  Perhaps the most obvious
gulf is between societies internationally.  No matter what indicator
one may use (trade, communication, etc.), significant parts of the
world are essentially outside the new global society.  In some cases,
whole countries are excluded for a variety of reasons; for example,
North Korea is isolated ideologically, Sierra Leone economically.
This is to say not that the global economy or political divisions do
not affect what goes on in these countries but that the vast majority
of citizens and institutions do not regularly interact with the rest
of the world.  Generally, we may speak of a core group of countries
largely defined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), with some hangers-on where international
exchanges are a regular part of life for large parts of the society.
On the bottom, there is a group (much of Africa, for example) largely
isolated from these trends (4).  In between are the most interesting
countries, where significant groups of people and large parts of the
economy have been transformed by international contacts but isolated
regions and groups also exist in significant numbers.

What accounts for the different rates of participation?  The obvious
explanation is money.  Richer countries have more to buy and sell in
the global market-place and more access to the means with which to do
so (5).  Domestically, the same differences apply.  The upper class
and those living in major urban centers are, as a rule, much more
likely to participate in the globalized world (6).

What does it mean to be included or excluded?  Much of the academic
debate has dealt with the consequences for countries and their
populations of finding themselves within the global web.  The effect
of globalization on income distribution, state authority, and culture
has been amply studied and debated, but definitive conclusions elude
us (Geertz, 1998; Meyer et al., 1997; Panitch, 1996; Sklair, 1991;
Strange, 1996; see Guillen, 2001, for a fuller list).

Given that there is still little agreement about the possible
consequences of being globalized, we know even less about what effects
remaining marginalized from globalization might have.  From the point
of view of globalization boosters such as Thomas Friedman (1999),
avoiding globalization is both practically impossible and potentially
disastrous.  Those not connected to the global economy will miss out
on the next economic and social revolution and will be permanently
relegated to the global trash bin, they believe.  Although we may not
share Friedman's vision of no alternatives to globalization or his
enthusiasm for the changes it brings, he may be right in contending
that efforts to avoid participation or the inability to participate
will have dire consequences.

Even those who minimize the impact of globalization recognize that
the increasing amount of international contact has, at the very least,
transformed the context in which countries operate.  It is impossible,
for example, to analyze a modern economy without reference to trade or
foreign investment.  Labor may not flow freely, but the globalization
of production has had significant effects on employment and wages in
selected economic sectors.  A society's cultural preferences cannot
be studied in isolation; the international flow of images and ideas
(or the protection against these) must be considered.  But the
manner in which globalization affects different aspects of social and
economic life remains unclear.  What are the channels through which
international pressures make themselves felt?  Does this happen in
the same way that a uniform gas exerts identical pressure everywhere,
or are there special zones where influence is greatest?  What are
the windows through which societies observe globalization and through
which it penetrates their homes?

Arguably the most important (and most debated) consequence of
globalization is the increasing concentration of power and wealth.
For example, in practically every industry, a few transnational
firms now claim huge market shares.  How is globalization responsible?
Globalization has been accompanied and supported by an intense
process of international isomorphism on practically every level and
in almost all aspects of life.  We are seeing the universalization
of a single set of criteria for judging the worth of projects,
firms, and, yes, individuals.  Where previously each region, country,
or even city prized different things (or in the case of protection,
forced many competitors out of markets), now we have a global standard
for performance and, increasingly, a global standard for aesthetic
preferences.  Combined with the hegemony of the market, this produces
a set of efficiency mechanisms that prize specific criteria, encourage
the adoption of certain policies, and select a particular set of
actors for survival.  Although these mechanisms may not be operating
at a definition of efficiency that we like, what matters is that
what the global market says is good becomes good everywhere: There
is no escape.  This leads to concentration for several reasons.
First, the criteria for success are not socially or geographically
neutral but reflect the standards and preferences of leading powers.
These criteria tend to favor certain players (e.g., Hollywood films,
Web sites in English, Microsoft products).  Because competition
on a global market allows for massive economies of scale, these
increasingly large corporations can compete with anyone on price and
force local competitors out.  Their dominant positions create huge
barriers to entry.  In the end, the ubiquity of these products becomes
part of their appeal.  Homogeneity and monopoly reinforce each other.

We are particularly interested in how globalization will shape global
inequality as measured between nations and societies (7).  There is no
denying the interdependence that globalization brings about, but the
asymmetries of that dependence, the consequences of the hierarchical
flows, and the relative position within a set of relationships will
help shape the nature of global power over the next decades.  Research
done on telephone communications indicates that international contact
has increased, but so has the centrality of the United States in a
global system (Louch, Hargittai, & Centeno, 1999).  To what extent
can this new-found power be explained by the exogenous effects of
globalization itself, as opposed to the internal characteristics of
the countries involved?

A DIFFERENT ROAD MAP

To answer this question, we must shift to the second half of a
discussion on globalization: the process rather than the outcome.
Analysts have been understandably concerned with the substantive areas
linked to globalization: wages, trade balances, cultural diffusion,
and so on.  We have paid much less attention to the infrastructure
network that actually makes up globalization.

The transformation of the technical and organizational infrastructure
of international integration is obvious and needs to be considered
in any analysis of globalization.  The road - not only what is on it
- has changed dramatically over the past several decades.  Hirst and
Thompson (1996) are correct, for example, in noting that other periods
have also seen dramatic expansions in international commerce and
that international flows have been freer or played a more significant
role in social and economic dynamics.  This is certainly true if we
compare the relative importance of international trade within the
total global economic product or if we emphasize facility of movement
across frontiers.  What is new is the vast range of connections, the
speed at which they occur, and the complexity of their interactions.
International transfers now include a much wider array of products
and services across forms of technology unimagined a decade, much
less a century, ago.  More important, these transfers are much more
tightly intertwined, producing what we call a truly global web.
Figure 1 illustrates the dramatic decline in the cost of international
transport and communication, which not only has facilitated (and been
encouraged by) globalization but may be its most important legacy.
(Figure 1: Cheaper Tolls on the Global Highway)

Recent progress in international communications is a good example of
how today's information exchange happens in a truly global intertwined
network.  There is a tendency to exaggerate the novel aspect of the
Internet and its capacity to cut across vast distances in no time.
That facet is not what makes the Internet novel; the telegraph
had already achieved that more than a century ago (Standage, 1998).
Rather, the truly unique feature of the network is that it allows
communication in a type of distributed web that spans the globe in
an intertwined manner.  It allows a user to send a message from one
location to 50 others while also storing that message for subsequent
access by yet others from yet different locations.  This is how space,
time, and contact nodes genuinely converge, thanks to the Internet.
Moreover, one need not even send a message to a specific person for
it to be read.  A passive posting on a Web site will generate its
own readership.  If international communications used to represent
thousands or even millions of dyads, the current situation involves
billions or possibly trillions of overlapping and open-ended
multiperson groups (8).

Under the previous system of international contact, different parts
of the world might be connected to relatively few others.  Now, the
number of paths between different people and locations has exploded.
This implies that changes in the form and frequency of flows between
two points may have reverberations in unexpected paths far removed
from them.  Whereas previously we might have spoken of a world on
which a variety of lines were drawn, we now need to think of the
globe as enmeshed in a web (9).  The new global geography has made
relative position within the web simultaneously more difficult to
define and much more important.  The old references to continents
or even to core/periphery refer to a two-dimensional perspective on
the world, which has become increasingly useless and deceptive in an
N-dimensional reality (where N is the number of forms of international
interactions).

Globalization, if it is a significant social phenomenon in its own
right, involves much more than the intensification of a single form of
exchange or even the cumulative effect of a series of transformations.
It is the possibility of interaction between a variety of interchanges
across the globe, the complexity of these interactions, and the
density of the ties between previously distant societies that may be
truly consequential.  The potential significance of globalization can
be appreciated only when analyzed as a whole.  We believe the first
step toward a better understanding of the phenomenon in question is to
define a new global geography that takes into account not merely the
physical environment in which societies operate but their relational
environment - those with whom they work, speak, exchange, and fight.
Where countries fit in an overlapping set of global relations will
help determine the extent to which globalization will have an effect
on them and the nature of that influence.

If we are to ascertain the specific effect of globalization, we
need to define a standard measure not automatically correlated to
one of the substantive issues being addressed.  That is, we need an
indicator that both serves as a representation of a society's position
within a global web and is relatively independent of the phenomenon
globalization is supposed to affect.  Categorizations by income,
regime types, or political blocks may miss the critical dynamics of
global cliques.  Coordinates within a new geography of globalization
represent a much more promising alternative.  These indicators
would describe a country's position vis-a-vis other countries in a
combination of various transactions.  Centrality and reciprocity would
be obvious indicators of where a society stood.  Perhaps more useful
would be comparisons of its position within the various subnets
defined by specific transactions.  The combination of these measures
would then help explain (a) what forms of globalization affect a
particular society and (b) the direction of the change (10).

MEASURING GLOBALIZATION

NETWORKS AS MAPS

Except for the seminal but crude measures of world systems analysis,
we know of little work that has taken the different countries'
relational position in the process of integration itself as the
key differentiation between them (11).  Only this form of formally
structural approach allows us to begin to understand both the
processes of global integration and different societies' and
countries' position therein.  The absence of structural analyses
is especially surprising, given that the study of globalization
seems tailor-made for that buzzword of contemporary social science:
networks.  We now live, or so we are told, in a "network society"
(Castells, 1996; Wellman, 1988).  Some have suggested that networks
represent a third major category of human interaction (after markets
and hierarchies) and that increasingly, it is this form of connection
that will determine our lives (Powell, 1990).  Yet, network analysis
has only begun to map the manner in which relational structures shape
social action.

Network theory and methods offer an excellent means with which
to understand globalization; they are ideally suited to defining
the underlying pattern of the literally millions of sets of ties
across the globe (12).  To begin with, networks represent the best
metaphor for the new international society.  Borrowing from Powell
(1990), we can argue that global relationships cannot be understood
entirely as either markets or hierarchies; rather, they involve a
set of political, social, cultural, and economic links reinforcing,
producing, and contradicting each other.  Societies are connected
through language, transportation, trade, families, tourism, and
educational exchanges.  The resulting relationships are not a product
of any single one of these connections but of the manner in which
these reinforce or contradict each other.  Network analysis offers
the best means with which to begin mapping these relationships in a
coherent manner because it provides precise and concrete means with
which to measure and compare them.

Network analysis privileges relationships rather than individual
attributes.  Who you are may be irrelevant; it is whom you know
(or do not know) that counts (Granovetter, 1974/1995).  A society's
relative wealth or even military power may be relevant only in terms
of the network of political and economic relationships in which it is
embedded.  To understand A and B's relationship, their mutual links to
C may be more important than the specific attributes they share or the
nature of their conflict or cooperation.  With this emphasis on social
structure, network analysis is, thus, best positioned to provide
an accurate portrait of the new global relationships without the
encumbrance of a priori categorizations.  It provides an alternative
to overdeterministic explanations, whether materialist or culturalist.

Networks are particularly useful for the analysis of how globalization
channels its influence.  For example, the discussion of cultural
convergence and organizational isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983; Meyer et al., 1997) has never specified how cultural and
organizational standards are actually transported across firm and
national boundaries.  Network analysis would provide the road map
through which one could trace policy preferences or legitimization
strategies.  Based on a nation's position within the global web,
we might then be able to predict the likelihood that it would adopt
certain practices or engage in particular forms of learned behavior.
In short, network methods would give the analysis of globalization
predictive power and the capacity to test its hypotheses.

NETWORKS OF WHAT AND BETWEEN WHOM?

If networks represent the best lenses with which to understand
globalization, what kind of data should we analyze with them?
The possibilities are endless, but we first need to be aware of
areas left unexplored.  That is, before discussing networks of
visible interactions, we need to be cognizant of the invisible set of
relationships helping to shape the external surface of our global map.
One area of concern is transactions that are not adequately measured
yet may play a significant role in the construction of international
networks.  Another issue is the unit of analysis that should be used
or the level at which we theorize international transactions taking
place.

With regard to the first, perhaps the most obvious missing data
concern illegal transfers (13).  One estimate of the globalized black
market suggests that it may represent $500 billion of transactions
a year (Castells, 1998, Vol. 3, p. 169).  In general, smuggling (writ
large) may be the oldest form of globalization.  It may also be the
purest expression of the phenomenon, if we think of globalization as a
global search for economic or social efficiency that explicitly seeks
to evade formal state authority.

What are some of these data-less transfers?  Although it is possible
to make some calculations based on international financial balances,
we obviously do not have a comprehensive idea of the undeclared
or illegal flows of money to and from different countries.
Money laundering may total the equivalent of 2% to 5% of global
Gross Domestic Product (United Nations Development Program [UNDP],
1999, p. 5).  Drugs may be one of the most important international
commodities, with important consequences for capital flows, transport
networks, and political complications.  One estimate places this trade
at $400 billion annually or 8% of world trade (UNDP, 1999, p. 5).
Small arms may also represent an important international commodity
whose flows are not well documented.  Prostitution alone is said to
be a $20 billion industry with an important international dimension
("Giving the Customer," 1998) (14).

Given that the movement of illegal migrants affects the most
underprivileged groups of societies, lacking information in
this domain prohibits us from gaining a clear understanding of
how globalization and social stratification interact.  Consider,
for example, the likely importance of illegal transfers to the
transnational communities that have received so much recent attention
in the social sciences (Portes, 1997).  Entry into such a community
may begin with an illegal migration.  Wage labor may be illegal or
occur in marginalized or even prohibited industries; remittances may
be unreported to both host and native countries.  The ties that bind
these communities across borders may thus elude us when defining our
new geography yet represent one of its most important components.

We also possess few data on computer links, transfers, and
relationships.  This is particularly important, given that so much
of globalization appears to be fueled by Internet connections and
information transacted across fiber-optic cables.  Unfortunately,
several aspects of the technology make it inherently impossible to
collect the type of relational data that would allow an analysis of
the communication networks underlying this traffic (15).  Despite
these difficulties, some have attempted to quantify Internet traffic
(OECD, 1998) by relying on the few clues we have of where data may
be residing, but the accuracies of such data are highly questionable.

Although it may be difficult to classify consumption as a network,
we might also consider the level of globalization that occurs by that
means.  It is quite clear that McDonald's and the Gap are all over
the globe and that the British Spice Girls and the Puerto Rican singer
Ricky Martin have touched teenage music fans' hearts everywhere (16).
However, it is less transparent how the consumption of such products
infiltrates into the rest of people's lives.  Although there is an
ongoing debate on how the diffusion of such cultural icons affects
local cultures (Ritzer, 1996; Watson, 1997), we have no information
on how many people are actually affected and what areas of their lives
are influenced, both directly and indirectly, through the exposure to
consumer items from other countries and cultures.

If much of the above is currently uncountable or untraceable, there
is, nonetheless, enough information out there to define the basic
shape of the global network.  Thanks to the institutional fascination
with data that have accompanied and supported globalization,
practically every legal transaction across borders is counted and
reported.  Telephone calls, plane arrivals, shipments of goods, and
receipts for services can all be used to trace the shape and dynamics
of the new international order (or to determine the extent to which
it is new).  These measures are often imperfect and certainly not
exhaustive, but they do provide an adequate first brush with the new
global geography.

There are equally difficult challenges with units of analysis.
International networks consist of millions and perhaps billions of
individuals making decisions and establishing contacts.  These operate
within millions of organizations of an infinite variety.  These,
in turn, tend to be concentrated in particular cities and regions.
Yet, much of the information available and certainly the majority
of the analysis emphasizes relationships between national societies.
This is partly a reflection of a nation-centric bias in much of social
science.  More important, it is a product of the very data-gathering
techniques and protocols on which international analysis depends.
This is particularly paradoxical given that a significant part of the
globalization literature predicts the withering away of the relevance
of the nation-state.

The new geography of globalization should begin to gather data at
levels of aggregation smaller than the nation-state.  Saskia Sassen
(1991) has demonstrated the critical importance of global cities in
maintaining the new international system.  On a larger scale, specific
regions within countries (e.g., Emilia-Romagna in Italy, Catalonia in
Spain, the American coasts) are much more integrated into the global
economy.  Cross-border zones are very much a part of globalization and
may account for a disproportionate share of relational links.  The new
geography should make every attempt to privilege these subunits, which
are increasingly more relevant than our nation-centric analytical
atlas.

IN THIS ISSUE

Having established a set of ambitious goals, we need to admit that
this special issue is but a start.  Given the constraints of global
network data availability highlighted above, this special issue
focuses on analyses of informational and commercial flows while
leaving other areas for future exploration.  The articles do not
resolve all the issues discussed above.  Some do not use formal
network methods.  Others continue to rely on national-level data.
We believe, however, that the articles represent a beginning or an
indication of the kind of work that will produce a more useful and
insightful analysis of globalization.  One clear bias deserves to
be acknowledged.  We have largely ignored the microfoundations on
which these relationships are based.  We speak of states, societies,
and organizations being linked, with only cursory attention paid to
the individuals who actually make up the web (Koku, Nazer, & Wellman,
2001 [this issue] being a prominent exception).  We can only hope that
a parallel project will analyze the human relationships that underlie
the global structures we have documented.

We begin with a section devoted to economic interactions, arguably
the foundation for all other connections.  Kick and Davis explore
world-system structure across two periods, 1960 to 1965 and 1970
to 1975.  The two authors assess the interplay between global and
national domains of analyses.  They also examine the national-level
consequences of strong, weak, and intermediate ties for the non-core
countries of the world.  When taken together, the dynamics studied
permit an examination of the central themes of world-system theory
and network approaches in general and identify future agendas for
sociological theorizing and research.

Sacks, Ventresca, and Uzzi continue assessing the effects of
country position in the global social structure of international
trade on economic performance.  Their first finding is the relative
insignificance of much-touted domestic factors such as savings rates
or education.  They demonstrate that relative position within a global
trade network is a significant factor in determining economic success.
The relationship is not simplistic, however.  Actors within the
world-trade network are differentially able to reap benefits based
on their position, and unique social structural conditions provide
different types of benefits to distinct kinds of actors.

Bergesen and Sonnett use Fortune magazine's Global 500 to analyze the
structure of the world economy and to speculate about the rise and
fall of hegemonic states.  They show that about half the global firms
are involved in basic production and the rest split between finance
and service industries; these are about equally divided among Asia,
Europe, and the United States.  In terms of the number of firms and
industries in which countries produce, the relative position of the
United States shows a clear decline, that of Japan has improved, and
Europe's has remained relatively stable.

Gary Gereffi's article examines how the commodity-chains framework
facilitates our understanding of the structure and dynamics of global
industries, as well as the development prospects for nations and firms
within them.  First, he introduces the seminal distinction between
producer-driven and buyer-driven commodity chains.  Second, he
identifies the main types of lead firms in the automobile and apparel
commodity chains.  Third, he illustrates how this approach can be used
to study multiple dimensions of development.

The second section of the special issue analyzes international
communications infrastructures.  George Barnett examines the
international telecommunications network and how it has changed
since the late 1970s.  The network may be described as one large
interconnected group of nations arrayed along a center-to-periphery
dimension.  Barnett then discusses the future of the international
communication structure and the implications for the development of
a universal culture.

David Smith and Michael Timberlake provide a parallel analysis of
shifts in the global infrastructure through their study of airline
traffic.  They highlight the shift in the global hierarchy of cities
reflecting many of the changes discussed in accompanying chapters.

The next three articles focus on the geography of the Internet.
Matthew Zook uses a combination of domain names and user counts to
provide an assessment of the global distribution of Internet content
creation at the national and urban level and the structure of the
supply and demand for this content at the national level.  This
article relies on the theories of export-based development to assess
the strengths and weaknesses of countries' Internet presence and the
ramifications of this for future development.

Anthony Townsend's article challenges assumptions regarding global
city dominance of telecommunications networks.  To illustrate global
cities' role in the deployment of Internet networks, the author
presents a comprehensive map of New York City's international
linkages.  By showing that the city is dependent on a broad group of
other metropolitan areas for international backbone connections - the
underlying infrastructure of the Internet - the author argues that the
network is both driving and reflecting broader trends toward far more
complex webs of interurban economic and communications flows than was
experienced previously.

In their article, Stanley Brunn and Martin Dodge analyze the
connections between nations, using data on the number of Web pages
and hyperlinks gathered from a commercial search engine in 1998.
They analyze and describe the geography of the hyperlinks between
nearly 200 nations, revealing the most and least connected regions
and nations, with a particular focus on African and Central Asian
countries.

The final two pieces focus on exchanges between scholars.  Thomas
Schott's article is a review describing findings in previous
studies of the global networks promoting and constraining the
global circulation of knowledge.  The cultivation of knowledge is
institutionalized around the world in the three social institutions
called education, science, and technology.  The article summarizes
what is known about these global webs, specifies what is unknown,
and proposes an agenda for mapping and analyzing these global webs.

Koku et al. (2001) consider how distance affects interpersonal
communication within scholarly communities.  The article serves as a
possible challenge to those who might see in globalization all things
made new again and reminds us of the importance of face-to-face
communication.  In a special issue devoted to globalization, this
article serves to highlight both the promise and the limitations of
this new geography.

CONCLUSION

So what does this bright new world look like?  The articles in this
special issue suggest that the new global geography will have two
critical characteristics.

First, almost all the authors make note of the nonlinear complexity
of the new global structure and how this helps determine economic,
political, and social outcomes.  Post-1980 globalization is not
simply a form of the 19th-century world economy at faster speed and
greater volume; it represents a substantive shift in the manner in
which individuals, organizations, and societies are interconnected.

Second, it is clear that globalization does not involve a flattening
of a global hierarchy.  Some countries are richer, have better
communications, and play a more central role.  Moreover, there are
clear benefits to be derived from this centrality.  As globalization
intensifies, these benefits might even increase, producing practically
insurmountable (if invisible) walls around the new empires.  More
specifically, practically all the studies point to the dominant
position of the United States in practically every international
network.  In many ways, globalization may be better understood as the
Americanization of the world.

The combination of global scale and complexity of relationships may
imply that models of international governance and domination borrowed
from earlier eras may no longer be relevant.  If this is true,
then students of globalization will have to begin laying down the
most essential foundation blocks of a new social scientific project.

NOTES

1. World exports are now $7 trillion a year or 21% of the global
product; various forms of foreign investment total $2.5 trillion;
foreign exchange activity is estimated at $1.5 trillion daily;
workers' remittances now total $58 billion and represent an important
part of the Latin American and Middle Eastern economies; and nearly
600 million international tourists travel each year (United Nations
Development Program [UNDP], 1999, p. 25).

2. See Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton (1999) for a summary of
positions of the continuing relevance of states.

3. The election flights to Israel are but one example.  Candidates for
national office in Santo Domingo campaign in New York.  As elections
become cleaner in Mexico and as citizenship rights are redefined, the
U.S.-based vote may become decisive.

4. Even here, however, globalization (broadly understood) plays
a role.  While Sierra Leone may be a perfect example of the global
underclass removed from the transnational arena, the existence of
an international diamond market has fueled that country's civil war.

5. For example, Germany exports 20 times more than Brazil per capita
and 85 times more than Kenya while importing 15 times more than Brazil
and 55 times more than Kenya (again, per capita).  Germany also has
6 times more telephones per capita than Brazil and 42 times more than
Kenya (No Limits Ventures Ltd., 1999).

6. But there may be significant and important exceptions.  For labor-
exporting countries, the working class may be as international as the
elite.

7. As we will explain later, due to limitations in the way data are
collected, most current analyses are restricted to investigations at
the national level.

8. The unequal international distribution of access to the Internet
also serves as an excellent indication of how the shape of the
infrastructure of globalization may determine the outcomes it produces
(Hargittai, 1998, 1999; International Telecommunication Union, 1997).
The United States, for example, has more computers than the rest of
the world's countries combined; it accounts for a large percentage
of the creation and distribution of Web content (Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, 1997); 80%of World Wide Web
content is in English.  The typical Internet user is a member of a
very elite minority (UNDP, 1999, Press Kit, pp. 1-2).

9. An illustrative tale follows: The typical international transaction
of 1900 was essentially linear.  The port of Buenos Aires might
include a ship loaded with wheat and meat destined for London, another
holding locomotive parts from Liverpool, and a third immigrants
from Naples.  The lines between origins and final destinations
were straight, and the contents only interacted in the sense that
one helped pay for the other.  Today, a plane landing from London
at Ezeiza Airport might include executives planning an investment
in Argentina for export to Brazil, a shipment of computer boards
that a local IBM subsidiary will transform prior to re-export to
Peru, a German student hoping that her improved Spanish will help
her find work in international banking, a Boston couple on their
round-the-world honeymoon, and a Bolivian doctor hoping to immigrate.
Moreover and most important, equivalent transactions and movements
will be occurring over a wider variety of media (other airlines, cars,
ships, phones, the Internet, etc.)

10. This would allow, for example, a much more precise articulation
of a country's position within a global system.  Core countries might
be characterized both by their centrality and by the consistency of
their relational position within a variety of transactional subwebs.
Peripheral societies would share this consistency but remain on the
margins of the system.  Semiperipheries would be characterized by
relatively high centrality on some measures (e.g., commercial trade)
but low centrality on others (e.g., cultural exports).

11. The theoretical model closest to this enterprise is the work of
Breiger (1981) on international interdependence.

12. It is important to clarify that we are using the term networks
in the "soft" sense of the word.  Networks are not necessarily self-
aware or even cohesive and exclusive.  We cannot speak of networks
for themselves or even in themselves.  Networks are, in many ways,
artificial groupings placed in a myriad of relationships by an
external observer.  The real point is not to discover hidden agents
in the formation of a new global order but to accurately reflect
social relations and patterns of power and influence.

13. Some legal transfers may also not be properly analyzed.
Intracompany transactions may represent a hidden world of
globalization.  Similarly, we need to be aware of what we might call
intranetwork transfers involving informal markets in bonds, currency,
and futures.  Data on capital/ communication flows may err on the
conservative side, given that such transfers often happen through
internal networks that often do not show up in official national
aggregate statistics.

14. Although there are popular accounts of the most common supplier
nations, it is less clear where these people end up; in general,
no precise data exist on such flows because some of the people are
transported officially through various visas whereas others are
smuggled across borders.

15. Internet data can get from Point A to Point B through various
channels.  This is precisely what made it so attractive for military
needs when it was being developed in the 1960s (Hafner & Lyon, 1996).
Unfortunately, information about the physical location of Points A
and B is often difficult to learn from electronic identification data.
An e-mail address such as name@server.com often implies no information
about the physical location of the user.

16. The first result of a Web search for Ricky Martin's picture on a
popular American search engine yields a link to a Hungarian teenager's
Web site (Lycos 1999 Web search, http://www.lycos.com/picturethis/).

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