Re: Hardt & Negri on Genoa

The dualism between world-economy and world-empire has not been one of the 
most fruitful for world-systems analysis in general.  Empires have always 
been central to capitalism.  Although the US 'informal' empire is often 
contrasted to the formal empire of the British, an argument has been made 
(even before the increased profile of the international institutions) that it 
is a continuation of the same by other means (see Jan Nederveens Pieterse, " 
Empire and Emancipation", I don't remember the chapter--its excellent).  Any 
future order seems likely to also have elements of an empire. The question 
is, under whose leadership? And with what combination of capitalism and 
socialism (the dualistic conception of which has also impeded analysis)?  
Will it only be contested at the highest reaches?

"Empire" is a hard book to find these days.  Based on analysis on this list, 
and writings about it and by the authors elsewhere, it appears they believe 
the only two options are some sort of dematerialized US leadership and the 
'multitude'.  In this way they repeat the error of the original socialist 
movement, which was never able to theorize the position of the US until well 
after its rise to power. East Asia today confounds efforts to understand the 
world in terms of North vs. South or Capitalism vs. Socialism, or Empire vs. 
Multitude.  

Incidentally, "Constructing World Culture" (ed. Boli and Thomas), which has 
received no attention on this list, offers an argument that in some ways 
parallels "Empire's" (I think, again, haven't had the opportunity to read it 
closely).  From a Weberian perspective, they believe that the culture of 
International Organizations and NGOs are creating an iron cage of rationalism 
on which will provide the exclusive terrain for future struggle.  They don't 
really believe there is a 'multitude' alternative, but, arguing from a 
liberal perspective, they claim that shared culture leads to intensified  
conflict, which isn't so different .

Regarding the hypothetical responses to my questions:  Presently the US is 
able to defer many conflicts through bribery, flattery, propaganda, etc...  
The question is, can it do so indefinitely, given its own internal political 
situation, the various tensions that are out there, and, above all, the fact 
that it actually has the least economic resources (albeit by far the most 
political ones) of the three centers of accumulation.  I would agree that one 
aspect of popular movements attaining state power is that they conform to and 
reinforce the world culture (a world systems point if ever there was one) but 
it by no means exhausts the significance of seizures (or aquisitions) of 
state power.

Steven Sherman