Re: Hardt & Negri on Genoa

These are both good questions.  Certainly the framework as it is currently
outlined by N&H is incomplete, so answering these questions in terms of
their framework (by someone other than them) would involve some guesswork. 
It would be nice if they spent more time discussing the process of
transition between the older regime and the new one - i.e. included some
notion of overlapping cycles (like Arrighi does).  But let me try to take
a stab at these:

On Sun, 22 Jul 2001 Threehegemons@aol.com wrote:

>  "At the narrow pinnacle of the pyramid there is one superpower, the
>  United States, that holds the hegemony over the global use of force. . .
>  On a second level, still within this first tier, as the pyramid broadens
>  slightly, a group of nation-states control the primary global monetary
>  instruments and thus have the ability to regulate international
>  exchanges. 
>  
> I don't understand--how does one analyze the tensions between the US and 
> Europe--over Kyoto and missile defense, or the even more obvious tensions 
> between the US and Russia/China over the use of force etc with this 
> framework?  

I suppose one could say that such intra-tier tensions existed within all
historically existing empires (e.g. the imperial family, local magnates,
Praetorian Guard, etc. in the Roman Empire).  The existence of tensions
does not necessarily imply multipolarity.  In this case, it is important
not to overstate these tensions as well.  With regard to Kyoto, there were
already all kinds of concessions being offered to the US at Genoa, while
the other countries began scrambling to get a better deal for themselves
if the treaty is ratified without the US (making their carbon sinks count
for more, which as I recall, was the same argument being made by the US).
With regard to missile defence and the Russia/China reaction, it is
likewise not clear whether the response is a tempest in a teapot.
Obviously, the Bush administration has calculated that it is.  The
friendship treaty so far is toothless, especially because the US dangles
the expansion of trade in front of China (more than 10x as lucrative as
its trade with Russia), and possible future inclusion in NATO in front of
Russia.  

I happen to think that Bush is playing with fire, but even if the US
gets burned and begins to lose its status as the lone superpower, it will
simply become primus inter pares, thus leaving the pyramidal structure
largely intact.


>  Below the highest tier of unified global command is a second tier in
>  which command is distributed broadly across the world, emphasizing not
>  so much unification as articulation. (...) The singe and univocal
>  pinnacle of world command is thus articulated by the transnational
>  corporations and the organization of markets. ... Still on the second
>  tier, on a level that is often subordinated to the power of
>  transnational corporations, reside the general set of sovereign
>  nation-states that now consist essentially in local, territorialized
>  organizations. 
>  ... 
>  The third and broadest tier of the pyramid, finally, consists of groups
>  that represent popular interests in the global power arrangement."
>  (p.309-311)
> 
> Does that mean that, by definition, Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro are in the 
> second tier, and only those who do not operate through states constitute the 
> third?  But then how does one conceptualize the many popular movements that 
> also have electoral agendas (for example, the Workers Party in Brazil)?

Presumably a group's standing changes when it acquires state power
(despite some allegations to the contrary). The
model needs to become more flexible in order to deal comprehensively with
all these different cases, but I would note in passing that much the same
argument can be (and has in fact been) directed at the
core-periphery-semi-periphery model (why were the Soviet Union, Canada and
Turkey all semi-periphery?  did they have more commonalities than
differences?  Why were all the units nation-states?)

-- 
Boris Stremlin
bstremli@binghamton.edu