East Asian geopolitics after the crash (fwd)

This piece from the Far Eastern Economic Review takes the position that
the EP-3 crisis was essentially orchestrated by the Chinese leadership in
order to continue the reconfiguration of the regional power structure in
China's favor.  Whether this result will indeed be the outcome remains to
be seen, though significantly, the deal struck yesterday (which agreed
to use language which the Chinese could parse as an apology and did not
make demands for the immediate return of the aircraft itself) was
negotiated by Ambassador Prueher (a Clinton holdover in the process of
being replaced by a Bush appointee) and Gen. Powell (a figure who looks
increasingly isolated in the Cheney-run security apparatus).   

-- 
Boris Stremlin
bstremli@binghamton.edu

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Thu, 12 Apr 2001 12:57:34 -0700 (PDT)
From: Boris Stremlin <Sabbataizevi@excite.com>
To: bstremli@binghamton.edu
Subject: East Asian geopolitics after the crash

U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS

Power Play In Hainan

Beijing appeared to have stumbled into crisis by holding the crew of an
American spy plane and demanding an apology from Washington. But the
decision was a tactical one, made by leaders keen to assert China's role as
the region's top power

------------------------------------------------------------------------
By Bruce Gilley/HONG KONG and David Murphy/BEIJING
Issue cover-dated April 19, 2001

------------------------------------------------------------------------
AT FIRST IT SEEMED that Beijing had blundered its way into a crisis when it
decided to hold the 24 crew members of an American EP-3 spy plane which
emergency-landed in Hainan province after colliding with a Chinese fighter
on April 1. 

But Beijing's decision to hold the crew and demand an apology from
Washington was much more calculated, according to sources informed about its
motives and analysts familiar with its long-term strategy.
The decision reflected a leadership in Beijing working mightily to assert
its role as the leading power of Asia. In short, Beijing used the incident
to assert to Washington and to Asian capitals its critical role as a
guarantor of regional, if not world, stability in the new century.

The costs and benefits of that strategy have yet to be totalled up.
Certainly the short-term damage to Sino-U.S. ties could be substantial. But
the long-term benefits for Beijing could begin to pay off after the Hainan
Foreign Affairs Office has returned to handing out coconut cocktails to
visiting foreign tourists.
It was just an aircraft sitting on a tarmac on the South China coast. Yet
there lay the outlines of a fundamental shift in power relations in Asia in
the new century, if Beijing had its way.

"The U.S. will have to come to terms with China's sense of unease and
aggrievement," at the significant American military power ranged around
China, says Kwa Chong Guan, the Singapore convener of the regional forum on
security organized under the non-official Council for Security Cooperation
in the Asia-Pacific. That will mean the U.S. must adjust its presence "to
play a role that Asia wants it to play."
According to high-level sources in Beijing, the Chinese leadership's tough
line was decided at a combined meeting of the Central Military Commission
(which sets military policy, is headed by President Jiang Zemin and includes
top defence officials) and the standing committee of the Politburo just
before Jiang departed for a 12-day sojourn to Latin America on April 4. U.S.
President George W. Bush had appeared in the Rose Garden to demand a return
of the crew on April 3. The dozen people at the meeting in the Zhongnanhai
complex in Beijing laid down the line that the U.S. crew and their aircraft
would not be released before Washington apologized to China.

Why the tough line? Certainly, it seems the military was not driving it. Its
attitude towards the U.S. military is probably much less belligerent than
often portrayed and it was clearly embarrassed by the crash of its fighter.
CMC Vice-Chairman Zhang Wannian, who missed the critical meeting because he
was visiting Australia and New Zealand, sounded a series of conciliatory
notes from the start. "Our friends don't have to worry. We believe a
resolution will be found through diplomatic channels," he said later.

Nor was rabid nationalism, another bogeyman frequently cited in Western
press reports, to blame. The few desultory youths who showed up at the U.S.
embassy in Beijing were quickly hustled away as if they were adherents of
the banned Falun Gong religious movement. Hainan's students were confined to
signing a petition in public. Most people on the streets didn't seem to
care.

Rather, analysts say, the hard line was part of a larger diplomatic strategy
Beijing has been preparing for several years. In short, it amounts to
weakening the U.S. security role in Asia so that China can play a larger
role. By pushing the incident, Beijing was making clear that it expects to
be respected in Asia and that it can bring the region to the brink of crisis
if that demand is not met.
"Power politics and Cold War mentality which run counter to the trend of the
times, remain active," in Asia, Beijing said in a submission to the Asean
regional security forum last year, making a clear reference to the U.S.
presence in the region. "The act of seeking absolute security in disregard
of other countries' security is bound to break international and regional
strategic equilibrium and stability."
The fact that the incident involved a U.S. spy plane which watches China's
missile build-up against Taiwan and its South China Sea deployments made it
the ideal case to highlight China's aim, analysts say. Wang Wei, the hot-dog
pilot whose F-8 fighter collided with the American EP-3, would become the
first hero of the new revolutionary struggle for China's enlarged role in
Asia.

"There are plenty of reasons to think the Chinese leadership would have
taken a hard line on this incident under any circumstance," says Joseph
Fewsmith of Boston University, an expert on leadership politics in China.
"The Chinese wanted to get something of a framework, implicit or explicit,
for Sino-U.S. relations over the coming years."
That same message was hammered home by Jiang as he moved through six
countries in Latin America, challenging U.S. power on its periphery just as
the
EP-3 had done to China. Speaking in Chile on April 6 using his newly
acquired Spanish, Jiang called for China and Latin America to build together
"a new international order" that would include "the promotion of world
multi-polarization," meaning an end to U.S. superpower status.

Jiang also pointedly applauded Latin American nations for their "battles to
safeguard the sovereignty of their states," including "their maritime rights
across the 200-mile limit," an obvious reference to China's claims that the
EP-3 had violated China's rights over its economic exclusion zone.

It remains far from certain that China's use of the incident to assert its
role in Asia will actually work. Damaged ties with the U.S. alone could
cause a regional reaction which strengthens the American presence in Asia.
Indeed, one of the first casualties of Beijing's tough line on the incident
could be its planned participation for the first time as an observer of the
annual Cobra Gold joint military exercise involving Thailand, the U.S. and
Singapore due to take place in Thailand in May (see article on page 24).

Meanwhile, congressional leaders like Henry Hyde, chairman of the House
International Relations Committee, also warned that Beijing's handling of
the incident might encourage lawmakers to push for sales of advanced radar
and ships to Taiwan (see article on page 20).
But other signs indicate that the gambit may pay off. Most immediately, the
incident is expected to add to pressure on the U.S. to avoid similar
incidents in the future. The EP-3 flights have been taking place at least
once a day for the past year and China has been complaining about their
growing proximity to its borders for just as long.

Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian, in his first public comments on the crisis
on April 9, warned that it showed the need for the U.S. and China to take
more confidence-building steps. "If this kind of incident occurred in the
Taiwan Strait it would be hard to imagine what would happen as a result," he
said.

The U.S., in a report on its ties to China to the Asean security group last
year, warned of the importance that "our military leaders are able to
clearly understand one another" so that they could work together in areas
"such as avoiding incidents at sea."
But the incident will put the onus on the U.S. to take steps, according to
Kwa. "The U.S. will need to take the initiative and be more open about the
frequency and nature of its surveillance flights," he says. "Then perhaps
the Chinese will understand the need for the flights and be more transparent
about their military's own tests and capabilities."

In the longer term, Beijing's handling has ensured that regional governments
will give it due consideration. Analysts of all stripes note how the
region's two most serious security threats aside from Taiwan--North Korea,
and India and Pakistan--depend heavily for their handling on a cooperative
approach by Beijing and Washington.
"It was only because China and the U.S. were united and acted together that
the 1998 India-Pakistan nuclear testing crisis was resolved," notes Chen
Hansheng of Zhengzhou University. "That is a clear example of how good
Sino-US relations are critical to Asia's stability."
With that in mind, most regional governments view Sino-U.S. wrestling as a
bad thing irrespective of who is to blame. Virtually every regional
government hastened to urge a speedy resolution of the conflict after it
occurred. The message: If China is unhappy, for whatever reason, the region
will be unstable. After the EP-3 and its crew have returned to the U.S. and
the yellow ribbons at Oak Harbour naval air base in Washington state are
taken down, that may be the most lasting legacy of Beijing's handling of an
incident that quite literally flew into its lap.

"The tough way China dealt with this raises its status in the area as a
power which knows what it wants and doesn't compromise its interests,
whether real or imagined," says G.P. Deshpande of the School of
International Studies of Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. "In Asia,
where states are quite fragile, most people will accept this."





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