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Re: positivism (was Re: "rise of china" and wst) by wwagar 06 March 2001 23:35 UTC |
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Up till now, I thought I understood what you were saying. None of your replies this time makes any real sense to me, so I abandon the field of discourse, letting you have the last word. Besides, I suspect our comrades on the WSN are getting bored (or were already bored?) with our dialogue. It was fun, and perhaps even relevant, while it lasted. Warren On Tue, 6 Mar 2001, Boris Stremlin wrote: > On Tue, 6 Mar 2001 wwagar@binghamton.edu wrote: > > > > Secondly, suppose someone tells you that their perception of reality is > > > grounded on divine truth (as revealed in a particular text, experience, > > > whatever). Since you don't believe in truth, on what other basis do you > > > deny the validity of their experience (and wouldn't a denial take us back > > > to the law of 3 stages?)? > > > > What do you mean by "validity"? If they had the experience, they > > had it. But I would not accept any truth claim based on it, any more than > > I would accept a truth claim based on natural law philosophy or > > evolutionary biology, which disposes of all three of Comte's stages. > > The answer to this question hinges on the definition of truth, which I > deal with below. > > > I identify with Ayer (and with Marx, for that matter), but I do > > not buy into every word he wrote. In this instance, I simply prefer not > > to use the term "truth," whether applied to logic or to empirical > > research. For me, truth is what an omniscient creature or creator would > > know, i.e., the way things really are, and were, and will be. In that > > sense, Ayer would say that truth is inaccessible and any statement > > purporting to represent "the" truth is cognitively meaningless. > > You are defining truth as an epistemological system derived from a > completely unhindered view of the world (assuming that such a view is > possible at all, an assumption that depends on the supposition of a > perfectly objective world observed by an omniscient observer; the > corollary to this definition is that since we can't have this view, > anything goes. I define truth as right conduct in a universe which we > participate in but don't control or even have a privileged perception of. > This is precisely why ethics, and not epistemology forms the basis of > philosophy (in its original sense, not in Ayer's diminished one). > > > > So what exactly is wrong with the > > > so-called dystopians (those whose utopias you happen to find distasteful), > > > especially if they come up with a way to create a consensus (by killing > > > off dissenters and engaging in bioengineering, e.g.?) Won't they be > > > justified before History (as they consistently claim)? How does one > > > adjudicate between utopias except on the basis of force? Given the > > > irreducibly complex (and ultimately inexplicable) origin of values, what > > > hope is there for an evolution of consensus? > > > > What do you mean by "wrong"? A utopia for me is a society that is > > radically better than our own according to my value judgments, which are > > neither "right" or "wrong" as a matter of cognition. Since my value > > judgments happen to be shared by millions of other people around the > > world--we're talking about democracy, a socialist system of relations of > > production, civil liberties, and more--I can hope that a global consensus > > will eventually form around these preferences. But obviously consensus by > > itself is not what I would call good. The Nazis had a fair amount of > > consensus going for them in the German Reich of 1939, and it was a > > consensus formed around preferences that I would call evil. Can I "prove" > > that the Nazis were "wrong"? Of course not. > > What I mean by "wrong" is that there simply isn't any basis under a > positivist system for interpreting qualitative statements. Your > differentiation between Nazism and socialism is senseless in terms of > positivist thought (Ayer would call it the "boo/hurrah theory of ethics"). > The supposition that one utopia is better than another rests on the ethics > of intention: what sacrifices are legitimate en route to the "better > utopia" is a meaningless question, since the supposition that the end > state is better than the present cannot be falsified (there's a positivist > concept!) An ethics of action, on the other hand, addresses the questions > of means and practicability. In my view, Wallerstein recognizes > this distinction , and for this very reason proposes to replace utopia > with what he calls "utopistics". > > > > I offer no assessment of your characterization of postmodernism, since I > > > can't really claim much familiarity with its corpus. In fact, the whole > > > issue is a red herring in this context: if you notice, I have not once > > > cited a name belonging to the postmodern canon in my argument. Instead, I > > > have cited world-systemists, Marx, Prigogine, and writers like Latour who > > > are very critical of postmodernism. My understanding of positivism is > > > also shaped by writers like Eric Voegelin, who is very much identified > > > with pre- (rather than post-) positivist currents of thought. I don't > > > think that the reduction of reality to text is superior to its reduction > > > to phenomena, and I don't think irony is a terribly good principle for the > > > organization of social life. > > > I agree that irony is a poor principle for the > > organization of social life, but who is propounding irony? Not I, sir. > > I didn't say you were. I was just denying that my critique of positivism > stemmed from a postmodern position, because I find both equally > problematic (though for different reasons). > > > I am simply attacking the tyranny implicit in any attempt by anybody > > to impose on others a vision of the good based on truth claims or based on > > cognition of sensory data. So I am a moral Marxist but not a scientific > > one. > > Since I see truth as a question of action and not not perception, I am not > tyrannizing anyone with my claims. When the form under which I try to > undertake that action is reduced to an epistemological dogma, THEN it > becomes tyranny. The absolute prohibition against the asking > of existential questions is a form of tyranny as well. > >
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