Still "The Rise of China and WST"

Dear fellow memebers,

 

First of all, I wish to thank Richard Hutchinson and Steven Sherman for their posting on my comments. Haste was always a dangerous companion, as my initial message confirms. Now, having had the benefit of some wise comments and the time to do some more research, I would like to add some further comments and to answer to my (beningn) critics:

 

1) First of all, about Nation-States or regions as the essential units of analysis on WST. I do understand that Wallerstein's work puts some emphasis on the "multiple sovereignty" extant in the core region. However, for a systemic theory that seeks to analyse the historical trajectory and outcomes of a world-economy, to rely solely on Nation-states seems to me rather unyelding.

 

If the development of a historical capitalism and the ever crescent integration of a world economy have contributed to erode classical sovereignty; if the world-system today is characterized by extremely porous national economies; if supra-nationa,regional and transnational phenomena seem to be the driving forces of global events; then I guess that using regions (both supra and sub- national) would be valuable methodology indeed.

 

2) Richard Hutchinson asks me if the proposition of bub-nationsl structures of core-semiperiphery-periphery doesn't contradict the "orthodoxy" of WST. Quite honestly, I do not know, and I do not think that to be overly important. When one is analysing dynamic systems, one should use a dynamic theory.

 

I maintain the conviction that within some (maybe even most) of the National units - and certainly inChina - there is a "micro" replica of the "macro" structure of core--Semi-p--Periphery. A comparative analysis of industrial capacity, capital accumulation, investement and overall outputs of the several regions of China will confirm, i believe, this picture. The maisn difference between this "micro" level and the world system would perhaps be the lack of  a core divided into multiple sovereignties (see above).

 

Steven Sherman argues that this is indeed natural, and it happens in other countries, namely the US. Then he also argues that the defining characteristic for a core power, or a hegemonic one, is not living standards, but the capability of power projection (and capability of influencing international order). I am not too keen on abandonig the level of internal development as a measure - after all, beeing poor in the Midwest is not quite the same as being poor in the Tarim basin. And the socio-econmomic performance seems to me as important as the political-military capabilities.

 

AS for the power China might exercise as a global player... I am still divided on that. One should consider not only capabilities (swiflty augmenting for the last decade), but also intentions. Perhaps it is best suitable for China to use economic and diplomatic means before resorting to military solutions. For an exhaustive treatment of this, see the article by Scott M. Leeb, "China and the 21st Century".

 

3) Steve Sherman said that "China, unlike Latin America, is not integrated into the neoliberal consensus". Isn't it? I am more than willing to concede that i was blatantly mistaken while comparing Latin America and China on surplus appropriation or investment. But China IS integrated into the neoliberal consensus. Otherwise, how would you explain it being (according to FMI sources) the world's 10th larger exporter and importer in 1993 and the larger recipient of Foreign Direct Investment in the same period. China is now a member of the WTO, World bank, IMF; Asian Development Bank and a "dialogue partner" of ASEAN, being active in the APEC forum. We should make no mistake - for all the CCP's rethoric about a market socialism, China's economy is now essentially post-communist, fairly open, rather competitive and clearly integrated in the "neoliberal consensus", as Steve puts it.

 

As for the other issues raised by R. Hutchinson (the possibility/plausibility of China's involvement in a "core war" for hegemony and its implications) and S. Sherman (the inclusion of the chinese diaspora phenomenon in my analysis), I will post on that later. This will give me some more time to elaborate on some insights i must check against facts, and also to get your feedback on those issues already treated in the present posting.

 

Thank you so much for your comments and your attention. And I hope more of us will join this discussion, the first to seriously tackle a World systems's theory problematique in a long time. I would especially like to hear what Andre Gunder Frank has to say about it, and to hear Chris Chase-Dunn on the hegemonic transition issue - he has written a good paper on that.

 

Daniel Pinéu
danielfrp@hotmail.com

 

undergrad Pol Sci & International Relations
Universidade Nova de Lisboa