Re: I told you so => China [Griffiths]

2/19/2001, Thomas Griffiths wrote:
    > could you explain your argument a bit more? how is it
    plausible that China would be prepared to mount a military
    challenge to the US, but we should dismiss the possibility
    of any other challenge? you seem to be saying that the
    issues of the required military build up or US opposition
    don't apply in the case of China. on what basis? what is the
    evidence that China's current military development is more
    urgent or accelerated than other potential threats? which
    'think tank journals' do you refer to, and are you
    suggesting we should accept at face value their claims of a
    'China problem' (or are you making some point about the
    extent to which mainstream public thinking refers to this
    problem)? what is their evidence?

Dear Thomas,

The first thing to look at is the nature of the relationship
between the US and any particular other nation.

The relationship between the US and the leading EU powers is
one of deep and substantial collaboration, economically,
militarily, and diplomatically.  This collaborative
relationship was established right after 1945 and has been
systematically nurtured and reinforced over time under
Washinton's carrot-and-stick leadership.  The centerpiece of
that collaboration at present is the neoliberal project, and
the establishment of a global, TNC-dominated, economic
regime, in the form of the WTO, IMF, et al.  The US and the
EU dominate the global institutions and they are partners in
running the global economy.

As long as the collaborative relationship continues, these
nations will not see one another as potential threats, and in
fact they cooperate considerably in the sharing of
intelligence information, weapons technology, and weapons
development.  Perhaps you want to argue otherwise, but I
just can't see any sense in the US needing to radically
upgrade its already formidable arsenal due to concern about a
European 'threat'.

Now let's consider relatively small 'rogue' nations, like
Iraq, North Korea, or Libya, who might be able to build and
launch a missile targeted at the US.  Such  has certainly
been claimed by official sources as being among the primary
concerns behind the NMD.  I do not consider such claims to
have much credibility, because the US has too many cheaper
ways of dealing with such threats.  If North Korea actually
started readying missile silos, and had the warheads and
long-range missiles to put in them, the US would simply go
in and bomb the whole installation.  If it hadn't put a stop
to it some other way earlier.  We can debate this if you
want, but I think the US has made it clear by past actions
that it would not tolerate that kind of shift of
power-balance.  It would be percieved with the same urgency
as were Soviet missiles in Cuba. 

As for anthrax, and those other kinds of 'sneaky' threats
that can be delivered without strategic missiles, the NMD
has no relevance.

We could talk about India and Pakistan, but I think the only
threat there is that they might start a regional war (which
might spread further), not that either would launch an
attack out of the blue on the US.

By a process of elimination, the only nations whose
relationship with the US is questionable, and whose threat
warrants the expense of NMD, are China and Russia.  And
China and Russia would also be the 'pieces to cover' if a
war sprung up between India & Pakistan or Israel & the Arab
states.

From the perspective of defense, and covering reasonable
contingencies, Russia and China would seem to be the
strategic basis for NMD. NMD would reduce risk to the US if
a regional war sprung up, and it would deter or defend
against Russia or China initiating hostilities against the
US.

Russia has expressed increasing concern over US adventurism,
and has insisted that it is still a 'player' in the game of
nuclear deterrence.  Through misjudgement or radar errors or
whatever, there are certainly credible scenarios where
someone in Russia might think they should 'press the
button', and this must surely figure in NMD thinking.

---

China is a threat of a different character altogether.  In
the case of China, it is not just error and misjudgement
that might trigger conflict.  Between China and the US - or
more accurately between China and the new global order -
there is a fundamental conflict of interests and of
intentions.  A good background for this is provided by "The
China Threat, A Debate", Foreign Affairs, March/April 1997. 
I found the articles to be well argued and consistent with
other sources.

The articles describe an intensive project by China to
upgrade its strategic capability.  China is not expecting to
be able to win a war with the US, but rather to have a
sufficient deterrent so that they could create their own
Asian sphere, much as Japan set out to do in the 1930s - and
then expect the US to be restrained from interfering due
to mutual-assured-destruction.

These passages characterize the other main points:

    "China's sheer size and inherent strength, its conception of
    itself as a center of global civilization, and its eagerness
    to redeem centuries of humiliating weakness are propelling
    it toward Asian hegemony."    [ <-  ReORIENT ]
    
    They quote General Mi Zhenyu, vice-commandant of the Academy
    of Military Sciences in Beijing, speaking at an Academy
    function: "For a relatively long time it will be absolutely
    necessary that we quietly nurse our sense of vengeance. We
    must conceal our abilities and bide our time"
    
    "China's goal of achieving paramount status in Asia 
    conflicts with an established American objective: 
    preventing any single country from gaining an  overwhelming
    power in Asia.  The United States,  after all, has been in
    major wars in Asia three  times in the past half-century,
    always to prevent a single power from gaining ascendency."

With China we have a real live conflict situation, which
will need to be resolved in some way, sooner or later. 
Although other considerations might support the need for
NMD, it seems to me that China specifically, and the
play-out of its hegemonous ambitions, would be the
determining factor for the US, in terms of urgency, timing,
design, deployment, etc.

Since 1997, things have been unfolding pretty much according
to the analyses in those articles.  China's upgrade programs
are continuing, and a hard line has been maintained
regarding Chinese claims to Taiwaan.  The Chinese economy is
the world's fastest growing, in absolute terms, and will
surpass the US in absolute size in the near future.  What
the US faces, with China, is very close to an exact replay
of 1930s Japan -  a major Asian power, with a growing economy,
an authoritarian central regime, hegemenous ambitions, and,
eventually, with sufficient military clout to push its
ambitions.

There are no signs that China is wavering in its intentions.
 Their firm game plan seems to be to advance their
technology as rapidly as possible, until some kind of
weapon-systems breakthrough comes along that can effectively
neutralize US power in the region.  They can then move on to
phase 2, sphere-building itself.  They're still playing the
pre-1945 imperalist game - the last holdout.

The interesting question, in the face of all this, is: "What
is the US strategy vis a vis China and its ambitions?".

In this regard it is useful to look at the question of modus
operandi.  Consider, for example, the behavior of the US
with respect to 1930s Japan.  Just as with China now, there
was debate over 'engagement' vs. 'confrontation'.  In the
case of Japan, the US chose to pursue both in parallel.  The
US invested in Imperial Japan, traded with them, gave them
technologies, and generally profited as much as possible
from their buildup.  Meanwhile, the US carefully monitored
the progress of their adventures, began its own buildup, and
picked a line in the sand.  They decided, and this is on
record, that when Japan began to threaten Southeast Asia,
that would be the time to enter the confrontational phase. 
When Japan began to approach that line, the US promptly
arranged for Japan's oil supply to be cut off, in order to
provoke an attack by Japan and create an opportunity for US
entry into the war.  Japan, when the oil was cut off,
considered that to be an act of war, and Washington fully
anticipated that reaction.  

From all reports I've seen, the evidence seems to be
entirely consistent with the theory that the US is following
the same precise strategy again with China.  Engagement is
being pursued: trade, investments, profit-making, are
proceeding apace.  This despite considerable objections from
the public, on human rights grounds, and from those
political forces who perceive the China threat but who do
not appreciate the subtlety of the US strategy.  They, in
their Rambo simplicty, see engagment only as 'helping the
enemy'.

The implication of this line is that the US is in fact
preparing to engage China in full-on conflict.  Not as a
deterrent, or as a contingency, but as an actual plan which
is intended to be carried out, when the right time comes. 
It is either that, or accede to China's ambitions and return
to the era of pre-1945 competitve imperialism.  This latter
would not be, I suggest, Uncle Sam's cup of tea, and the
mention of three previous wars, above, is quite relevant.

This is where the NMD and the Space Command come in.  What
these technologies promise, re/China, is the kind of
'control of theater' that the US enjoyed during Desert
Storm.  Full information for our side, and jammed systems
for their side.  Their defense systems wiped out; our planes
and cruise missiles having free range.  Our strategic
weapons in reserve; theirs pinned down or destroyed. Instead
of general Armageddon, which is what China hopes to be able
to threaten, we would have Desert Storm writ large - and
that would play much better to American audiences.

The timing is critical in this scenario.  The US needs to
have the technology deployed and ready by the time China
reaches the point where it thinks it is strong enough to
make a move.  If China were to grab Taiwaan, for example,
the US could hardly wait five years to prepare its response.

best regards,
richard
http://cyberjournal.org