Premeditated mass murder (fwd)

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Date: Fri, 02 Jun 2000 00:54:13 -0400
From: Mine Aysen Doyran <mine25.1@netzero.net>
To: md7148@cnsvax.albany.edu
Subject: Premeditated mass murder

http://www.ahram.org.eg/weekly/2000/482/in1.htm

Al-Ahram Weekly
                                                       18 - 24 May 2000
                                                       Issue No. 482
           Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875





     Premeditated mass murder

     By Naom Chomsky*

                   For an understanding of NATO's resort to war, the
most important
                   period is the months leading up to the decision to
wage war on the
                   Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). And of course,
what NATO
                   knew about that period is a matter of critical
significance for any serious
                   attempt to evaluate the decision to bomb Yugoslavia
without Security
                   Council authorisation. Fortunately, that is the
period for which we have
                   the most detailed direct evidence: namely, from the
reports of the KVM
     monitors and other international observers. Unfortunately, the
Organisation for Security and
     Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) inquiry passes over these months
quickly, presenting little
     evidence and concentrating rather on the period after monitors were
withdrawn. A selection
     of KVM reports is, however, available, along with others by NATO
and independent
     international observers. These merit close scrutiny.

     The relevant period begins in December, with the breakdown of the
cease-fire that had
     permitted the return of many people displaced by the fighting.
Throughout these months, the
     monitors report that "humanitarian agencies in general have
unhindered access to all areas
     of Kosovo," with occasional harassment from Serb security forces
and Kosovo Liberation
     Army (KLA) paramilitaries, so the information may be presumed to be
fairly
     comprehensive.

     The "most serious incidents" reported by the International
Committee of the Red Cross
     (ICRC) in December are clashes along the FRY-Albanian border, and
"what appear to be
     the first deliberate attacks on public places in urban areas." The
UN Inter-Agency Update (24 December) identifies
     these as an attempt by armed Albanians to cross into Kosovo from
Albania, leaving at least 36 armed men dead, and
     the killing of six Serbian teenagers by masked men spraying gunfire
in a café in the largely Serbian city of Pec. The
     next incident is the abduction and murder of the deputy mayor of
Kosovo Polie, attributed by NATO to the KLA.
     Then follows a report of "abductions attributed to the KLA."

     The UN secretary-general's report (24 December) reviews the same
evidence, citing the figure of 282 civilians and
     police abducted by the KLA as of 7 December (FRY figures). The
general picture is that after the October
     cease-fire, "Kosovo Albanian paramilitary units have taken
advantage of the lull in the fighting to re-establish their
     control over many villages in Kosovo, as well as over some areas
near urban centres and highways ... leading to
     statements [by Serbian authorities] that if the [KVM] cannot
control these units the government would."

     The UN Inter-Agency Update on 11 January is similar. It reports
fighting between Serb security forces and the KLA.
     In addition, in "the most serious incident since the declaration of
the cease-fire in October 1998, the period under
     review has witnessed an increase in the number of murders
(allegedly perpetrated by the KLA), which have
     prompted vigorous retaliatory action by government security
forces."

     "Random violence" killed 21 people in the preceding 11 days. Only
one example is cited: a bomb outside "a café in
     Pristina, injuring three Serbian youths and triggering retaliatory
attacks by Serbian civilians on Albanians," the first
     such incident in the capital. The other major incidents cited are
the KLA capture of eight soldiers, the killing of a
     Serbian civilian and the reported killing of three Serbian police.
NATO's review of the period is similar, with further
     details: Yugoslav army shelling of civilian and KLA facilities with
"at least 15 Kosovo Albanians" killed, KLA killing of
     a Serb judge, police and civilians.

     Then comes the Racak massacre of 15 January, after which the
reports return pretty much to what preceded. The
     OSCE monthly report of 20 February describes the situation as
"volatile."

     Serb-KLA "direct military engagement ... dropped significantly,"
but KLA attacks on police and sporadic exchange of
     gunfire" continued, "including at times the use of heavy weapons by
the VJ." The "main feature of the last part of the
     reporting period has been an alarming increase in urban terrorism
with a series of indiscriminate bombing or raking
     gunfire attacks against civilians in public places in towns
throughout Kosovo." These are "non-attributable," either
     "criminally or politically motivated."

     Then follows a review of police-KLA confrontations, KLA abduction
of "five elderly Serb civilians" and the refusal of
     the KLA and Yugoslav army to comply with Security Council
resolutions. Five civilians were killed as "urban violence
     increased significantly," including three killed by a bomb outside
an Albanian grocery store. "More reports were
     received of the KLA 'policing' the Albanian community and
administering punishments to those charged as
     collaborators with the Serbs," as well as murder and abduction of
alleged Albanian collaborators and Serb police. The
     "cycle of confrontation can be generally described" as KLA attacks
on Serb police and civilians, "a disproportionate
     response by the FRY authorities" and "renewed KLA activity
elsewhere."

     In his monthly report of 17 March, the UN secretary-general reports
that clashes between Serb security forces and
     the KLA "continued at a relatively lower level," but civilians "are
increasingly becoming the main target of violent
     acts," including killings, executions, mistreatment and abductions.
The UNHCR "registered more than 65 violent
     deaths" of Albanian and Serb civilians (and several Roma) from 20
January to 17 March. These are reported to be
     isolated killings by gunmen and grenade attacks on cafés and shops.
Victims included alleged Albanian collaborators
     and "civilians known for open-mindedness and flexibility in
community relations." Abductions continued, the victims
     almost all Serbs, mostly civilians.

     The OSCE report of 20 March gave a similar picture, reporting
"unprovoked attacks by the KLA against the police"
     and an increase in casualties among Serb security forces, along
with "military operations affecting the civilian
     population," "indiscriminate urban terrorist attacks targeting
civilians," "non-attributable murders," mostly Albanians,
     and abduction of Albanian civilians, allegedly by a
"centrally-controlled" KLA "security force." Specific incidents are
     then reported.

     The last NATO report (16 January-22 March) cites several dozen
incidents, about half initiated by KLA-UCK, half
     by Serb security forces, in addition to half a dozen responses by
Serb security forces and engagements with the KLA,
     including "aggressive Serb attacks on villages suspected of
harbouring UCK forces or command centres." Casualties
     reported are mostly military, at the levels of the preceding
months.

     As a standard of comparison, one might consider the regular
murderous and destructive US-backed Israeli military
     operations in Lebanon when Israeli forces occupying southern
Lebanon in violation of Security Council orders, or their
     local mercenaries, are attacked by the Lebanese resistance. Through
the 1990s, as before, these have far exceeded
     anything attributed to the FRY security forces within what NATO
insists is their territory.

     Within Kosovo, no significant changes are reported from the
breakdown of the cease-fire in December until the 22
     March decision to bomb. Even apart from the (apparently isolated)
Racak massacre, there can be no doubt that the
     FRY authorities and security forces were responsible for serious
crimes. But the reported record also lends no
     credibility to the claim that these were the reason for the
bombing; in the case of comparable or much worse
     atrocities during the same period, the US and its allies either did
not react, or -- more significantly -- maintained and
     even increased their support for the atrocities. Examples are all
too easy to enumerate; East Timor in the same
     months, to mention only the most obvious one.

     The vast expulsions from Kosovo began immediately after the 24
March bombing campaign. On 27 March, the
     United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that
4,000 had fled Kosovo, and on 1 April, the
     flow was high enough for UNHCR to begin to provide daily figures.
Its Humanitarian Evacuation Programme began
     on 5 April. From the last week of March to the end of the war in
June, "forces of the FRY and Serbia forcibly
     expelled some 863,000 Kosovo Albanians from Kosovo," the OSCE
reports, and hundreds of thousands of others
     were internally displaced, while unknown numbers of Serbs, Gypsies
and others fled as well.

     The US and UK had been planning the bombing campaign for many
months and could hardly have failed to anticipate
     these consequences. In early March, Italian Prime Minister Massimo
D'Alema warned Clinton of the huge refugee
     flow that would follow the bombing; Clinton's National Security
Adviser Sandy Berger responded that in that case
     "NATO will keep bombing," with still more horrific results. US
intelligence also warned that there would be "a virtual
     explosion of refugees" and a campaign of ethnic cleansing,
reiterating earlier predictions of European monitors.

     As the bombing campaign began, US-NATO Commanding General Wesley
Clark informed the press that it was
     "entirely predictable" that Serb terror would intensify as a
result. Shortly after, Clark explained again that, "The
     military authorities fully anticipated the vicious approach that
Milosevic would adopt, as well as the terrible efficiency
     with which he would carry it out."

     Elaborating a few weeks later, he observed that the NATO operation
planned by "the political leadership ... was not
     designed as a means of blocking Serb ethnic cleansing. It was not
designed as a means of waging war against the
     Serb and MUP [internal police] forces in Kosovo. Not in any way.
There was never any intent to do that. That was
     not the idea." General Clark stated further that plans for --
Operation Horseshoe -- "have never been shared with
     me," referring to the alleged Serb plan to expel the population
that was publicised by NATO after the shocking Serb
     reaction to the bombing had become evident.

     The agency that bears primary responsibility for the care of
refugees is UNHCR. "At the war's end, British Prime
     Minister Tony Blair privately took the agency to task for what he
considered its problematic performance." Evidently,
     the performance of UNHCR would have been less problematic had the
agency not been defunded by the great
     powers. For this reason, the UNHCR had to cut staff by over 15 per
cent in 1998. In October, while the bombing
     plans were being formulated, the UNHCR announced that it would have
to eliminate a fifth of its remaining staff by
     January 1999 because of the budgetary crisis created by the
"enlightened states."

     In summary, the KVM monitors were removed and a bombing campaign
initiated with the expectation, quickly
     fulfilled, that the consequence would be a sharp escalation of
ethnic cleansing and other atrocities, after the
     organisation responsible for the care of refugees was defunded.
Under the doctrine of retrospective justification, the
     heinous crimes that ensued are now held to be, perhaps, "enough to
justify" the NATO bombing campaign.

     The person who commits a crime bears the primary responsibility for
it; those who incite him, anticipating the
     consequences, bear secondary responsibility, which only mounts if
they act to increase the suffering of the victims.
     The only possible argument for action to incite the crimes is that
they would have been even more severe had the
     action not been undertaken. That claim, one of the most remarkable
in the history of support for state violence,
     requires substantial evidence. In the present case, one will seek
evidence in vain -- even recognition that it is required.

     Suppose, nevertheless, that we take the argument seriously. It
plainly loses force to the extent that the subsequent
     crimes are great. If no Kosovo Albanians had suffered as a result
of the NATO bombing campaign, the decision to
     bomb might be justified on the grounds that crimes against them
were deterred. The force of the argument diminishes
     as the scale of the crimes increases. It is, therefore, rather
curious that supporters of the bombing seek to portray the
     worst possible picture of the crimes for which they share
responsibility; the opposite should be the case. The odd
     stance presumably reflects the success in instilling the doctrine
that the crimes incited by the NATO bombing provide
     retrospective justification for it.

     This is by no means the only impressive feat of doctrinal
management. Another is the debate over NATO's alleged
     "double standards," revealed by its "looking away" from other
humanitarian crises, or "doing too little" to prevent them.
     Participants in the debate must be agreeing that NATO was guided by
humanitarian principles in Kosovo -- precisely
     the question at issue. That aside, the Clinton administration did
not "look away" or "do too little" in the face of
     atrocities in East Timor, or Colombia, or many other places.
Rather, along with its allies, it chose to escalate the
     atrocities, often vigorously and decisively.

     Perhaps the case of Turkey -- within NATO and under European
jurisdiction -- is the most relevant in the present
     connection. Its ethnic cleansing operations and other crimes,
enormous in scale, were carried out with a huge flow of
     military aid from the Clinton administration, increasing as
atrocities mounted. They have also virtually disappeared
     from history. There was no mention of them at the 50th-anniversary
meeting of NATO in April 1999, held under the
     shadow of ethnic cleansing -- a crime that cannot be tolerated,
participants and commentators declaimed, near the
     borders of NATO; only within its borders, where the crimes are to
be expedited. With rare exceptions, the press has
     kept to occasional apologetics, though the participation of Turkish
forces in the Kosovo campaign was highly praised.
     More recent debate over the problems of "humanitarian intervention"
evades the crucial US role in the Turkish
     atrocities, or ignores the topic altogether.


--

Mine Aysen Doyran
PhD Student
Department of Political Science
SUNY at Albany
Nelson A. Rockefeller College
135 Western Ave.; Milne 102
Albany, NY 12222


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