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clarifications on global challengers, hegemonies, and past and future K-waves
by Tausch, Arno
26 April 2000 14:35 UTC
Folks,
over the Easter holidays I had the pleasure to dig through all that JWSR
stuff on future wars etc. Some essays are truely brilliant, others are
excellent scholarship but do not convince me at all. I think, Samir Amin is
right with his recent Al Ahram article that I posted days ago. It is always
good to sail across the cultures, and to be a real internaut. This Al Ahram
in English is truely fascinating.
To heat up the debate, my own vision below - I hope the printing comes out
somewhat nicely. If need be, change the fonts for the print-out.
Although I think that Putin, Saddam and others will perhaps enjoy the
predictions about Japanese US or German US wars in the future (Putin less so
- at least as an old intelligence officer he knows what the world is like
and what conflicts are like), the sad realities of the world system, the
hurricane-like consequences of capitalism on Russia after 1989 and the
desmembering of the former USSR will be the traumatic 'Weimar' experience
that will pitch inexorably Russia against the West. Add to this the truely
Africa 19th Century proportion scramble for the Caucasus and it's 150
billion gallons of oil.
Thanks to the stupidity of the ruling classes in the West, the chance for
peace after 1989 was not seized, and unequal exchange, suffered by China,
together with the internal and ecological contradictions of their dependent
socialism will push them into a Germany position of 1914. Add to this the
ever-growing conflicts over water in the Middle East, the absence of peace,
the possible surpression of a Palestinian declaration of independence later
on this year, and a Bush (i.e. neofordist, oil-sector driven) victory in the
US. What a nightmare. All the more so, we Europeans must start to act along
the lines, proposed by Samir Amin
Kindest regards
Arno Tausch
The Eastern part of Europe and the long Kondratieff wave: historical
evidence
Just as during the world depression of the 1930s, democracy could not
survive in the region (Polanyi, 1944), today the danger arises, that
instability and not democratization will triumph in the end especially on
the Balkans and in the countries of the former USSR in the long run. The
turning points in the long economic waves between the ascents and decline
phases (B-phases) were always the beginnings of political decay in the
region as well, while the ascent phases were associated with authoritarian
modernization; time-lags between the Western cycle and the Eastern
semi-periphery and periphery have to be admitted (Tausch, 1997). The
decisive-kairos-years are:
1509
1539
1575
1621
1689
1756
1835/42
1884
1933
1975/1982
Source: our own compilations from Goldstein and our own data interpretations
after 1740, based on Goldstein. It should be recalled, that there is another
tradition - based on Braudel - to view the cycle, that begins in 1689, as
ending in 1747, to be followed by a 1747 - 1790 cycle, and a 1790 - 1848
cycle (for a debate about these issues, see especially Amin, 1997).
The logic of the Kondratieff waves from 1756 onwards are given as follows:
Table 9.6: The logic of the Kondratieff waves in the world economy since
1756
social process cycle 1756-1835/41
basic project defeudalization
prosperity reform compulsory education,
conscription; American and
French Revolution;
Joseph II (Austria)
mid-cycle conflict wars of the French Revolution,
Napoleonic wars
Poland: 1807 Duchy of Warsaw
technological change
basic industrial steam engine (end 18th century)
projects 'Spinning Jenny' (J. Stargreave, 1770)
new technologies steam locomotive 'Puffing Billy'
emerging during (W. Hadley, 1813)
prosperity re-
cession
Unresolved problem freedom of association
crisis of the model revolution 1830
Poland: rebellion 1830/31
international regime
A-phase British naval
dominance (George III)
B-phase 'congress of Vienna'-regime
dominant economic
theory A. Smith, 1776
political economy of
world system D. Ricardo, 1817
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------
social process cycle 1835/42-83 1884-1932
1933-75/81
basic project freedom of market enlargement
welfare
and enterprise of participa-
state,
tion
corporatism
prosperity reform freedom of asso- social secu-
educational
ciation rity, parlia-
reform,
mentarism
civil
rights,
emancipation
of
women
mid-cycle conflict wars and civil Eastern Europe: Vietnam war,
wars Revolution
world student
Poland: revolution 1905
rebellion
1863/64 1968
strikes,
terrorism
Polish
Winter 1970
technological change
basic industrial railway, steel, oil,
inputs and steamship electricity,
synthetics,
technological electric
automobile
projects motor
new technologies steel petrochemicals chips
emerging during
prosperity re-
cession
unresolved prob-
lem enlargement relationship
basic income
of participation capital, la-
environment
bour, state
unequal
exchange
crisis of the
model revolution revolution
contestation
1871 1917 of
the model
Poland: Poland: from 1968
socialist strikes
onwards
movement peasant
1880s uprisings
Poland:
1936/37 Summer 1980
international regime
A-phase liberal mercantilism Bretton
world trade
Woods
B-phase -"- hypermercan- neo-
tilism
protectio-
nism
dominant eco-
nomic
theory J. St. Mill, A. Marshall, J.M.
Keynes,
1848 1890 1936
political economy
of
world system K. Marx, 1867 R. Hilferding, K.
Polanyi,
1910 1944
The danger is of course, that the Cold-War structure will be substituted by
a new power rivalry between the former members of the winning coalition of
World War II:
Hegemonic wars in the world system from 1495 onwards
Table 9.7: hegemonic cycles in the world economy since 1450
Role in War Thirty Years War Napoleonic WW
I+II
losing hegemonic
contender Hapsburgs France
Germany
new hegemony Netherlands Britain USA
newly emerging
challenger: eco-
nomically deci-
mated member of
winning coalition France Germany China+
Russia
past
contender for
systemic hegemony,
joining the war
effort of the
winning coalition Sweden Hapsburgs France
Portugal
The former hegemonic contenders slowly slide into an acceptance of their
status in the international system. The real power struggle erupts already
soon after the great hegemonic war, and through the ups and downs of the
history of the system evolves slowly into the hegemonic challenge. Seen in
such a way, not 1989, but Korea and Vietnam could become rather the
benchmarks of the future W-structure of conflict in the international arena.
For the foreign policies of the European Union, it is also important to
notice the following tendency: German-Russian alliances tend to happen
during depressions, and they break up during the economic upswings of the
world system, when, especially during waning hegemonies, conflicts over
spheres of influence set it (Amin, 1997, partially based on Bergesen):
Khol + Gorbi/Boris 1985 ff.
Rapallo 1922
Bismarck's Three Emperor Alliance 1873
Holy Alliance 1815
Alliance Russia-Germany 1764
Nordic War 1700-1721
The relationship of the Kondratieff and Kuznets cycles with Russian history
is the following:
Table 9.8: world economic cycles and internal instability in Russia since
Iwan the Terrible
Reforms
KONDRATIEFF Perestroika, Lenin's NEP,
OR KUZNETS Great Reforms 1861,
DOWNSWING Katharinas Assembly 1775
Nobility's Victory 1730,
Split of the State Church 1653,
Boris Godunow 1598-1605
Repressive Modernization
KONDRATIEFF Joseph Stalin,
OR KUZNETS Imperialistic Expansion
UPSWING and Repressive Industria-
lization at the end of 19. th
century
Nikolas the
Gendarme of Europe,
Elisabeth's expansionist
policy,
Peter the Great,
Michael III,
Iwan the Terrible
Reform Repression
<----------------------------------------------------------------->
1985 'Gorbi' <--------------> 1928 Stalin
57 Years
64 Years 47 Years
1921 NEP <--------------> Alexander III
40 Years
60 Years 56 Years
1861 Great Reforms <--------------> Nikolas I 1825
36 Years
86 Years 84 Years
1775 Constituent <--------------> Elisabeth's
expansionist rule
Assembly 34 Years 1741
45 Years 52 Years
1730 Victory of <--------------> Peter I 1689
Nobility 41 Years
77 Years 76 Years
Church Split 1653 <--------------> Michael III 1613
40 Years
55 Years 48 Years
Boris Godunow 1598 <--------------> Iwan's 'Oprichina'
1565
33 Years
Average periods of Russian history:
Perestroika <--------------> authoritarian
modernization
40 Years
64.5 Years 60.5 Years
_____________________________________________________
Seen in such a way, there is little that the West seems to be able to do to
stabilize democracy in Russia. However, the return of East Central Europe
towards a 'middle of the road' and sensible philosophy - whatever the color
of the government (Orenstein, 1996) - seems to be an urgent necessity, after
the ups and downs of central planning and 'the central market principle'.
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