Re: Fw: Annan blames Ethiopia...

WSN,
To facilitate further discussion: The following is an article published in 
Oromia Quarterly Volume II Number 4 & Volume III Number 1  July-December 
1999.
Regards,
Thomas

The Political Aspects of Development
Problems: The Oromia Case

Temesgen Muleta- Erena

Introduction

The political rigor that tendered Oromia's history in the last century has 
continued to enfeeble the endeavors of its people towards national 
self-determination. In the early 1990s the old Amhara settler colonialism 
was substituted by Tigrean 'federal colonialism' the facet of exploitation 
seemed to take on new dimensions. In fact, the pattern of domination had 
remained the same since it instated century ago with the Berlin Conference 
of 1884-1885, which had approved the scramble for Africa among European 
colonial powers. It was a time when the Ethiopian Empire was given an 
ordinance of Christianizing and 'civilizing' the Oromos; though it is a 
historic derision how a backward and barbaric empire was to 'civilize' the 
society of high culture and social structure, the 'natives', whose 
development levels and potentials were diverse and by far advanced.
The very idea of Christianizing and civilizing was an external imposition 
often upheld by external protagonists. In the pre 1974 Ethiopia, this took 
the form of substantial military and economic aid from the US and Europe. 
During the cold War era, the mission of oppression of the Oromos maintained 
and supported by fresh military and economic aid from the then Soviet Union 
scheme of spreading its sphere of dominion and its ideology to Africa. In 
the contemporary 'new world disorder', the support has got new momentum in 
which the old Christian missionaries are replaced by an army of western 
neo-classical economists who peddle a 'free market' ideology, which they 
hope, will take care of the imprisoned market agents, in this case the 
Oromos.
According to the new Gospel, the Tigrean colonizers are given the mandate 
and the necessary financial backing to pursue 'economic liberalization' 
while keeping strict control that Oromia remains the Ethiopian colony. The 
liberalization agenda has served as a precursor of the making of Tigrean 
version of crony capitalism or more appropriately advanced feudalism in the 
age of globalization. It is alien to Adam Smith's invisible hand, social 
justice and the free-market ideals of relying on legal contracts, property 
rights, impartial regulations and transparency.  It is no wonder that the 
political and economic prescriptions that the Ethiopian colonial rules 
implemented and or pretend to implement are in line with the advice of the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and The US administration's 
The Horn of Africa Initiative all of which have exacerbated the problem of 
the Oromo nation. It has also betrayed the ideals of free market, social 
justice and human rights.
The sorrowing fact is that shared interest and solidarity between the West 
and the Ethiopian colonizers are impoverishing the people. Pretentious and 
ill-conceived measures are being taken in the name of free market and above 
all development. Currently, there are a number of regime-sponsored 
'associations' of this or that 'Region/State's Development'. Given this, 
the 
people's last resort is to defend their own interests is the exit option or 
to retreat from the colonizers. What has become more apparent than ever is 
the need to rely on the Oromo initiatives to solve the problems of the 
Oromo.  The Oromo poor need to defend themselves from the bogus free market 
 
crusaders and their  phony local allies. This is necessary, since, in the 
absence of property rights, social justice, individual and social freedom 
and  democracy, no free market economic gimmickry  is able to reserve the 
tragedy of the oppressed. It is within this context, that we discuss, how 
the Ethiopian colonial rule, in collaboration once with socialism and now 
with the global capitalism has impoverished one particular community in 
Africa, the Oromo nation.



Discerning Development
.
Development is discerned as the sustained rise of an entire society and 
social system  toward a better  and 'humane life'. What constitutes  a 
better and humane  life is an inquiry as old as humankind. Nevertheless,  
it 
must be regularly and systematically revised and answered over again in the 
unsteady milieu of the  human society. Economists have agreed on at least 
on 
three universal or core values as a  discernible and practical guidelines 
for understanding the gist of development (see Todaro, 1994; Goulet, 1971; 
Soedjatmoko, 1985; Owens, 1987).  These core- values  include:
(1) Sustenance, the ability to meet basic needs: food, shelter, health and 
protection. A basic function of all economic activity, thus, is to provide 
a 
means of overcoming the helplessness and misery emerging from a lack of 
food, shelter, health and  protection. The necessary conditions are 
improving the quality of life, rising per head income, the elimination of 
absolute poverty, greater employment opportunity and lessening income 
inequalities;
(2) self-esteem which includes possessing education, technology, 
authenticity, identity, dignity, recognition, honor, a sense of worth and 
self respect, of not being used as a tool by others for their own exigency;
(3) freedom from servitude, to be able to choose. Human freedom includes 
emancipation from alienating material conditions of life and from social 
servitude to other people, nature, ignorance, misery, institutions, and 
dogmatic beliefs. Freedom includes an extended range of choices for 
societies and their members and together with a minimization of external 
restraints in the satiation of some social goals. Human freedom embraces 
personal security,  the rule of law, freedom of  leisure, expression, 
political participation and equality of opportunity.
Sustained and accelerated increase and change in quantity and quantity of 
material goods and services (both in absolute and per capita), increase in 
productive capacity and structural transformation of production system 
(e.g. 
from agriculture to industry then to services and presently to knowledge 
based (new) economy), etc. hereinafter economic growth is a necessary if 
not 
a sufficient  condition for development.






Does Politics matter in Development and How?

Economists are inspired to point out the weight of political factors, 
couched in the term 'governance' and its role in economic development. 
Recently their concerns about political factors  in economic development is 
revitalized because  of the dearth of  economic development  reform and 
structural adjustment  programs to yield definite success and prosperity, 
particularly, in Africa. The main problem pointed  out is 'poor governance' 
(World Bank, 1989; Moore, 1992). There are three different aspects to the 
notion of governance that can be identified as:
(1) the form of political regime (independent, colonial government, 
multi-party democracy, authoritarian, etc.),
(2) The process by which authorities exercised in the management of the 
country's economic and  social resource; and'
(3) The willingness, the competence and the capacity of the government to 
design, formulate, and implement genuine development policies, and, in 
general to discharge development  and government functions.

As there is no antithesis concerning the conviction  that 'good' governance 
is an important and desirable  ingredient of development, scholars are 
cautious  not to attach  specific regime type and political reforms to  
good 
governance. Broadly, however, good governance  is legitimated by 
developmentalist  ideology  while poor governance is characterized by  
'state elite enrichment ' (Jackson and Rosberg, 1984), the 'rent seeking 
society' (Krueger, 1974) or 'politics of the belly' (Bayart, 1993;Tolesa, 
1995) such as Ethiopia, Nigeria and Zaire). The latter in fact are 
characterized by sclerotic behaviors and are obstacles to development.

Sclerotic to development: The Abyssinian Politics and Its Alliances

The Oromia's development problems are never going to be understandable to 
us, much less contain it, as long as  we persist to ponder it as a mere as 
an economic enigma. What is before us momentarily is  in essence a 
political 
enigma whose economic aftereffects are severe.
Not only the problem is innately political in character, it is also 
political in origin. It arose largely from Ethiopian imperial conquest and 
its associated political disposition, which is characterized  by reliance 
on 
sheer force, authoritarianism and violence.
The story goes back to the days of Menelik II (even far beyond who had 
seized the territory and resources of  the Oromia, making concerted 
aggression on the latter's history and culture in the name of civilizing 
the 
'non-believers.'
In the first millennium BC the Abyssinian group crossed the Red Sea from 
South Arabia (source: the Debtras records and   memories of Ethiopian high 
school history text book) to the present North East Africa to conquer and 
resettle the land occupied by endogenous Oromo and the other Cushitic 
people. Cleansing as a policy was initiated to conquer the Cushite 
territories. The territory they conquered was divided among numerous Abys 
chiefdoms that were as often at war with each other as with Oromo and the 
entire Cushite. The population of conquered territories were considered as 
dangerous thus; Abyssinian cleansing, up rooting, forced labor and killings 
of the vanquished were conducted as the means of crushing resistance, 
securing the conquered territories and even to expand their occupation 
further. Though the Abyssinian gained some territories and resettled in the 
northern highlands of the Oromo and other Cushitic regions among others 
Afar, Agew, etc., their expansion was checked for a long time in history by 
wars of  resistance and  liberation they encountered by the endogenous 
people. These wars of resistance led to a decisive victory for Oromo, Afar 
and Somali nations particularly from 14th to the second half of 19th 
century. As a result of such a defeat Abyssinians started to wage 
particularly anti-Oromo propaganda battles to alert themselves and  attract 
foreign support against the Oromo. The derogative name 'Galla' and the '16 
century Oromo igration' were all the Abyssinian fabrications and to serve 
the war against Oromo. In fact, the Oromo oral history shows that the 16th 
century was a massive Abyssinian  further southward migration and intensive 
campaign to entirely control Oromia and other territories. For the Oromo 
this period was characterized by political and military dynamism and at the 
same time it was a period of victory, massive dislocations, rehabilitation 
and  displaced communities returning home. According to M. Bulcha (see 
Oromo 
Commentary), it was only during the second part of the 19th century that 
the 
Abyssinians ultimately succeeded to make significant in roads into the 
Oromo 
territory. Tewodros (also known in different names Hailu, Kassa, Dejazmach, 
Ras, etc., as other Abyssinian  shiftas and and present woynes, is on 
record 
for his brutish hostility towards the Oromo nation. He was not the first or 
the last of his kind. They were many before and after him, for concrete 
evidence even today, this time and this second. All of them have been 
gangsters of very abnormal characters. The Abyssinans  remembered Tewodros 
and his type not only as the romanticized hero figures but also portrayed 
them as a modernisers. Tewodros declared and conducted a war of 
extermination against the Oromo. In order to help them to bargain for the 
western support, he and all his type including Yohannes, Menelik, Haile 
Sellasie, Mengistu and currently Meles declared anti- Islam and anti-muslim 
nations. They mobilized all their resources and the entire Abyssinia 
(Amhara 
&Tigre) against the Oromo to achieve their goal. Tewodros made every effort 
to obtain the European military support claiming his fictions of Christian 
identity and ideology ( the then dominant political ideology though he had 
not any bibilical ethics and values, not at all). Tewodros  is a symbol and 
an element of Abyssinian barbarism that was conducted at particular 
historical stage (1850-1868). Such barbarism has been conducted since the 
Axumite period (3000 years) but has never achieved its ultimate goal of 
elimination of the entire endogenous people of the North-East Africa. But 
it 
eliminated millions of and .It tewarted the civilisations of Cushite 
people. 
They have used all the devastating means the: Christian civilizing 
ideology, 
European army, settler colonialism, Soviet Socialism, Stalin 
collectivization, Mengistu's villegization, and America's structural 
adjustment, etc. They have always tried to change names after names for the 
same ugly & old expansionism, feudalism and empire ( The legendary land of 
Sheba, Ethiopia, Ethiopia first, socialist Ethiopia, republic, mother land, 
federal etc.). The very name Ethiopia is Hellenistic Greece. It was the 
name 
used in the ancient Greece occupation (before Romans) of North Africa 
people 
and southward expansion. This name was colonialism from the beginning and 
it 
has been, it is and it will be. It is not African in origin as the people 
who invented it. This name was adopted and maintanied to conquer the entire 
Cush and then the entire Africa in the shadow of christinization. It is a 
sinster name that has no boundary and ethnic identity. It is not only the 
conquered people of North-East Africa but also all Africanists that must 
understand, including its sinster philosophy. It was designed and adopted 
to 
deconstruct an endogenous African identity. Of course,all the Abyssinian 
sinister strategies have not worked. Alas, now back to their basics. They 
are confronting their own internal crisis (war and famine). But also, they 
are roaming to fight and kill us not only in the empire, in the Oromos 
northern terrotories (Wallo and Rayyaa) but also far beyond as far as 
Indian 
Ocean where they suspect Oromos have taken refuge. The present barbarism is 
 
Tewodros and Menilik ++ (the full text has been published on Oromia-net, 
16th may, 1999).
One implication of the doctrine of the 'civilizing mission'  of Menelik was 
that the Oromos needed to be ruled by Ethiopians  and could not responsibly 
be granted civil liberties. Authoritarian as it has always  been, the 
Ethiopian colonial rule in Oromia whether under Menelik II, Haile Selassie, 
Mengistu and currently under Meles has been characterized by the 'politics 
of the belly.' The underlying ethos remains self-aggrandizement and those 
elites are alien to growth whereas corruption, brutality, inefficiency and 
grotesque incompetence have tainted their politics. Time and again, they 
siphoned off Oromia's wealth and indulged in conspicuous consumption and 
stashing millions of dollars in remote secret accounts.

While the Ethiopian colonial settlers in Oromia do no want and support 
policies that promote development, they find military and other forms of 
support abroad to stay in power. In more than one time, this 
anti-development force has been strongly reinforced by external forces 
(Holcomb and Ibssa, 1990). Despite generous foreign assistance, this hardly 
commanded legitimacy  to mobilize  the colonized masses behind their rule. 
To the contrary, people who have waged legitimate struggle to reclaim their 
freedom, cultures and history has fiercely resisted their rule.
Oromos have their own political power, which was fully operational before 
they were colonized and incorporated into Ethiopia and brought under  the 
control of   Ethiopian empire state. Their political system  is based on 
Oromo democratic tradition known as the Gada system. The Gada system has 
been the foundation of Oromo civilization, culture and worldview (Jalata, 
1996). The Gada political practices  manifested the idea of real 
representative democracy with checks and balance, the rule of  law, social 
justice, egalitarianism, local and regional autonomy, the peaceful transfer 
of democratic power , etc. (Jalata, 1966). The Gada political system also 
facilitated  property rights, stability, the expansion of free trade, 
commerce, improved farm techniques and permanent settlements, gradual 
diversification of division of labor.
However, since the last decades of the nineteenth century, the Ethiopian 
colonial  class and its state disallowed  the Gada political system 
expropriated the Oromo basic means of subsistence, such as land  cattle 
while it established an Ethiopian system of rule over Oromia. The Oromo 
commerce and industrious activities were not only discouraged but also  
ridiculed and obtained the lowest social status. Productive relations were 
imposed through the process of commodity production and extraction between 
those who control or own the means of  duress, the state, and those who do 
not.  Those who control the means of coercion had the opportunity to 
reorganize productive relations through dispossession of the  colonized 
Oromos in order to expedite more product  extraction.
The process of dispossession  is multi-faceted and far-reaching. As the 
result of it, the Oromos have been denied power and access to  education, 
cultural, economic and political fields  while at the extremes, the 
Ethiopian colonialism  has been practiced through violence , mass killings, 
mutilations, cultural destruction, enslavement and property confiscation.  
Jalata(1993) sees the Ethiopian colonial domination as the negation of the 
historical process of structural and technological transformation. This is 
the case where the Ethiopian colonial class occupies an intermediate  
status 
in the global  political economy  serving its own interest and that of 
imperialists. The Oromos have been targeted to provide raw materials for 
local and foreign markets. Inside the empire, wherever they go, the 
Ethiopian colonial settlers built garrison towns as their political centers 
for practicing colonial domination through the monopoly of the means of  
compulsion and  wealth extraction.
The main mechanism of produce was tribute collection. Thus,  the Ethiopian 
colonial system was more cognated to a tributary system whereby the rulers 
extract tribute and labor from colonized lands. The Ethiopian farmers 
supported their households,  the state and the church  from what they 
produced. After its colonial expansion, Ethiopia maintained its tributary 
nature and established colonial political economy in Oromia and in the 
Southern nations. Although  the colonial state intensified land 
expropriation and produce extraction from colonized peoples, capitalist 
productive relations did not emerge. Gradually with the further integration 
of the Ethiopian empire into the capitalist world economy, semi-capitalist 
farms seemed to emerge by extracting their fruits mainly through tenancy, 
share-cropping and the use of forced-labor systems.
The colonial exploitation has been maintained under Mengistu's so-called 
socialist collectivization/ villegization campaigns and in the current 
Meles' regime under the mask of  structural adjustment and  'free' market 
economic system.
It should also mentioned that in addition to authoritarian and coercive 
rule, the Ethiopian colonialism depended on an Oromo collaborationist 
agents 
  that were essential to enforce Ethiopian colonialism. This second rate  
clique is merely an expandable appendage which devotes most of its energy  
to the scramble  for the spoils  of slavery, picking up the left-over in 
economic and political advantages. The main task of this class  is to 
ensure 
  the continuous  supply  of products and labor for the settlers. Of course 
this class was not always loyal to the Ethiopian state (Jalata, 1993). 
Broadly speaking, the state itself is a battle field for two exclusive 
claims to rule and political competition among the Ethiopian colonizers, 
the 
Amharas and Tigreans. In effect, this makes the Ethiopian colonizer 
politics 
effectively a zero-sum game and the very practice of politics become a 
negation of politics, i.e. politics are practiced with the inert ending of 
politics.
The Ethiopian rulers, who have inherited power used to believe that their 
interests were well served by depoliticizing, muting and suppressing the 
Oromos and the Southern peoples' quest for national-self determination 
under 
the guise of  maintaining the unity of the Ethiopian empire. So they 
convinced themselves and tried to convince others that there were no 
serious 
socio-political differences and no basis for political opposition. 
Apoliticism has been elevated to the level of ideology while the political 
structures become ever more monolithic and authoritarian.
The political structures and political ideologies, which have been used to 
effect depoliticization and suppression are all  too familiar. The process 
entailed political repression, which the Oromos endured and suffered for 
more than a century. The implication of depoliticization  is to deny the 
existence of differences, to disallow their legitimate  expression and, 
therefore, to deny collective  negotiation. Whatever the degree of 
repression, the process  did not remove  the differences  lest its  
systematically repressed them. The ensuing popular frustration and 
resistance has led to even more repression. That is how political 
repression 
has become the most characteristic feature of  the Ethiopian political life 
 
and domination as its salient political relationship. All this means that 
political power becomes particularly important; so the struggle for it gets 
singularly intense.
There are two major aspects in which this situation has severely thwarted 
Oromia's development. The first enigma  lies in the incompatibility between 
the pursuit of development and the crusade for survival, reproduction of 
the 
existing  forms of  social control and domination. The deleterious 
aftereffect of this  animosity is that it leads to misuse of human 
resources, inefficiency and corruption. Unquestionably, appointments  into 
the positions of power, even when they are positions, which demand 
specialized  knowledge, tend to be  made  by political criteria, 
particularly by regarding these appointments  as part of survival strategy. 
Each time such appointment is being made, the friction between  political 
survival, economic efficiency and development crops up.   The ruination to 
efficiency and development derives not only  from the performance criteria  
and likely incompetence of the persons so assigned but also from the 
general 
demoralization of the technically qualified and  competent people purveying 
under them who are often repressed and frustrated  by their subjection to 
the surveillance and regulations  of people who are powerful but inapt. 
Here 
lies the role of Ethiopian ministers and parastatals: incompetent personnel 
used to obstruct productive use of resources. Wasted are also competent 
people. They lose at both ends. In the midst of waste, the Oromos have been 
denied basic civil and political rights and the right to development. Alien 
leaders who channel the meager resources into unproductive uses imposed the 
related economic problem, the very rights over which the people are 
fiercely 
struggling.
Development projects were initiated for  wrong reasons; they may, on 
account 
of political considerations, be located in places where they are least 
beneficial both economically and socially. One could site familiar cases 
where important contracts and licenses have been given to politically 
significant people. Higher positions are created and new rule and 
regulations are established just  to  benefit  people whose political 
support is considered important. Oromia pays for all these disservice. The 
Ethio-crats are overpaid and creating demoralizing disparities between 
reward and effort. That is how, the persistence of Ethiopian imperial 
domination is imperil to the integral tenets of  development.
The burning question is, can the people of Oromia try to trade, farm, 
imitate and innovate then  develop their economy in this state of siege? 
The 
question is vital and congruous; but the answer is doubtful as it is 
impractical. Development strategies as such are comprehensive programs of 
social transformation. They call for a great  deal of ingenious management, 
confidence in the leadership and commitment. They require clarity of 
purpose 
for a society at large; they need social consensus especially on the 
legitimacy of the leadership. Yet these are not common features of an 
institution, which does not represent the society. Besides,  development is 
about change and that change may not work to the survival of the rulers. In 
this sense it runs against the instincts of the rulers whose preoccupation 
is to survive and maintain its dominant position. One of the most amazing 
things about development discourse in Ethiopian empire  is how readily  it 
is assumed that the rulers are interested in development particularly when 
they profess commitment to development and negotiate with international aid 
organizations for economic assistance. People making this assumption forget 
the primacy of maintaining colonial power and its conflict with other 
social 
and economic goals.
Why the Ethiopian rulers embark on  a course of  societal transformation 
just because  it is good for the nations under its  empire like Oromos if 
it 
is bad for their own survival? When we think of development, it is about 
society  at large and the paradox is that it is often the leader who are  
not in a position  to think  of the objective  interests of  the society. 
For thinking in this way entails profound democratic  commitment which 
cannot usually be expected of such leaders. By virtue of  their position, 
colonial rulers suffer  the disadvantage of confusing what maintains the 
existing social order, which they dominate, and they are tendentiously 
suspicious of change; it is all the more so when it comes to fundamental 
changes.
Finally, we need to remember some of the implications of development with 
respect to alien leaders. As it has already been mentioned, they have been 
more interested in taking advantage of the social  order inherited  from 
their  predecessors rather than in transforming it. To all appearances, 
they 
are colonial rulers.  Oromos have been oppressed and humiliated for over a 
century. The political history of the last hundred years  of colonial rule 
of Oromia has vividly indicted that the Oromos lacked freedom; it means 
that 
they did not have control over the products of their labor,  it means that 
their natural resources and environment were tarnished by others; and 
eventually it means that they witnessed chronic poverty, destitution, 
killing forces, the forces of abuse &  alienation, human misery and less 
and 
less of humane life.
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that where development is 
pursued in Oromia, if at all, it is  full of ambiguities and contradictions 
 
and it is just a mere posture. Even taking  these postures on the face 
value, in so far as we are  critical of  development strategies in Oromia, 
our criticism runs in the direction of  their sloppy conception and hence 
their failure to come to grips with sclerotic  of imperial domination.  If 
we raise the question of the contradiction  between political survival and 
social transformation, we commence to behold that it is doubtful and 
equivocal where development is, or it has ever been, on the colonizers' 
list 
for Oromia.
The other aspect of economic consequences of imperial domination has been 
militarism, which is but the outcome of over-valuing of political power. 
Associated with it is the intense struggle to obtain and keep it. 
Therefore, 
the politics of the empire is sustained by warfare and force than by 
consent. In this atmosphere , force is mobilized and deployed: the winners 
are anxious  to take absolute power into their hands while the losers  
forgo 
not only power but also lose liberty and even life.  As politics  relies 
solely on force, the vocabulary and organization advocates coercion. For 
that matter, the Ethiopian empire is a political formation of armies in 
action and this is in itself a serious development problem. In an 
institution in which the political formations are organized as warring 
armies, differences are too wide and far, the scope for co-operation too 
limited; there is too much distrust ; and life is too raw to nature 
commerce 
and industry in subject nations like Oromia. Currently, the militarism of 
life in general and politics in particular  has reached its logical 
culmination in Ethiopian military rule  and its negative consequences have 
wider regional implications.  This too hinders  the course of  development  
not only in Oromia but also in entire North East Africa.

Conclusion

What we have discussed in this brief paper are the political conditions 
prevailing in Oromia under the Ethiopian domination, which are well known. 
What is not so well known, and needs to be, is the enormous significance of 
this condition for development crisis. The Ethiopian colonial elites, in 
their feudal mentality,   view an Oromian economy  as a pie of  fixed size, 
hence they can cut  for themselves  a bigger piece  or all of it, but only 
by taking away a portion or all that originally  belonged to the Oromos. 
They have not even seen  the possibility that the size of the pie itself 
can 
be increased in fertile and potentially rich Oromia. To  achieve this  at 
least as a precondition cluster bombs  and the environmental and human 
consequences of militarism must be eluded. Then, under just social system 
and efficient system of resource management, with the application of   
improved industrial and farm  technology there can be a way for better 
humane life. With the just and efficient system, the fertile Oromo fields 
in 
the south and  west can supply the material needs  for better humane life 
not only for the 60 million people of  Ethiopian empire but also for more 
millions in  the entire North-East Africa. The Oromo farm lands and rives 
banks can  play much more  role for the North-East than what  the  Nile 
delta and Aswan high dam has played for Egypt. To realize this potential, 
it 
needs not  colonial control of Oromia but  it essentially needs the 
liberation of  this nation of  wealth  from the looting and misuse of 
Ethiopian militarism.
Moreover, the Oromo people are  the objects of development in every sense. 
If development means anything at all, it must mean the development of 
people's potentialities, but development is not  really possible by 
outsiders who have other conflicting intentions. Furthermore, whenever 
pursued, development should be participatory. If it is not, it can only be 
the development of alienation and domination. This is what happened in 
Oromia. The people who talk most about development and who make and 
implement 'development policies' are alien leaders, their agents and 
supporters. But these are not the people who understand the development 
needs of Oromia. Most importantly, the interests of these groups are at 
odds 
with those of the subordinate people.
Therefore, the development of Oromia should involve the liberation of 
Oromos 
from the conditions of deprivation and operation. Politics should not only  
be the cause of underdevelopment but can also be tamed to remedy the 
problems of development. In this context, the development of Oromia 
essentially requires freedom  as a prerequisite and that freedom involves, 
firstly, the national freedom  which is the ability of the Oromia citizens 
to determine their own future, and to govern themselves. Secondly, it is 
freedom from hunger, from disease and poverty. Thirdly, it involves 
personal 
freedoms; namely the right of the individual citizens to live in dignity 
and 
equality with others, freedom of speech, freedom to participate in 
decisions 
which affect their lives, freedom of making choices, freedom to control 
their own resources,  freedom to  education , freedom from servitude, and 
freedom from arbitrary arrests.  Freedom,  both  at national and  personal 
level is absolute and  positive freedom that Oromos enjoy as a people. It 
should expand in terms of  Sen (1985) argument that it makes  the ' minimum 
entitlement' and the  'minimum capabilities' that the  Oromo people must  
acquire to live in ways they have reason to value. It should not be 
measured 
in relative terms whether in comparison to other individual, society or 
nation. Thus, the above three conditions are absolute minimum entitlements 
and capabilities the Oromos need  in the process of expansion of  their 
positive freedom, material, technological and social development.
Thus, the people of Oromia should be left free to choose both their 
political and development destiny. History teaches us imperial conquest and 
domination whether 'the scramble for Africa' or 'the forward movement' in 
South East Asia  hardly brought development to its subject people  except 
depriving their liberty and plundering their resources. The Oromia's 
reality 
  is the reflection of  this historical reality. The Oromos should have 
their own political rule in order to tackle development problems in their 
own particular environment. What keeps the Oromos in development crisis  is 
their  powerlessness to remove predatory Ethiopian colonial rule. At the 
same time, since political and economic crises  are fused, it is futile to 
solve one without the other. Conceivably, the colonial settlers would not 
concede freedom and do not promote genuine development. Therefore, 
political 
independence is a primary and essential condition for Oromia to make 
sustainable  modern economic growth possible.




References

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----Original Message Follows----
From: Andrew Wayne Austin <aaustin@utkux.utcc.utk.edu>
Reply-To: aaustin@utkux.utcc.utk.edu
To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK <wsn@csf.colorado.edu>
Subject: Re: Fw: Annan blames Ethiopia...
Date: Sun, 9 Apr 2000 22:20:26 -0400 (EDT)

WSN,

Background to faciliate discussion

During the second half of the 19th century, the Horn of Africa was divided
among the imperial powers of France, Britain, and Italy. Ethiopia forged
alliances with European imperialists. These alliances made possible the
expansion of the Ethiopian empire and the subjugation of the peoples of
Oromia. The Oromo were the chief enemy of the Ethiopians. There are five
interrelated issues to be attended to if one is to understand these
relations and events: (1) the nature of European imperialism in the
region; (2) the development of the Ethiopian state and its linkages to the
capitalist world-economy; (3) the nature of the dependent relation between
Ethiopia and imperialism; (4) domination of the Oromo and the
transformation of the productive system into one predicated on export; (5)
the development of Ethiopian colonialism.

In 1840, the French and the British began supplying Ethiopian warlords
with weaponry. Christianity built a bridge between Europeans and
Ethiopians. The Oromo were characterized as pagans and savages. At first,
the Oromo prevented the Ethiopians from settling on their lands. Between
1855 and 1868, the Ethiopians began de-Oromoizating areas within their
control.

During the last couple of decades of the 19th century, two key figures
emerged: Yohannes IV and Menelik II. These two individuals and their
followers allied with the European imperial powers to expand their
territories and centralize their political rule. These activities laid the
foundation for the development of the Ethiopian state. Yohannes became
emperor of Ethiopia in 1872. Menelik allied with European forces and began
occupying Oromia. The Ethiopians defeated the Oromo between 1868 and
1900. Menelik forged deep linkages with the Europeans and worked to set up
a collaborative class in Oromia.

The European-Ethiopian alliance, the emergence of the Ethiopian Empire,
and the domination of the Oromo were deeply interrelated processes.
Obtaining European assistance and the expansion of territory through
colonization were integral processes of the incorporation of Ethiopia into
the capitalist world economy. These relations were commercial relations.
The Ethiopians were buying guns and other commodities and services, and
the thrust into Oromia was driven by a need to accumulate more wealth for
trade with Europeans. These activities demanded centralized state power.
There were two patterns of colonization in Oromia: conquest and
settlement. The Ethiopian colonial expansion resulted in mass killings,
destruction and expropriation of property, plundering, enslavement, and
cultural genocide. The Oromo became manual laborers, slaves, and servants.

The Oromo were exploited by multiple levels of ruling groups: (1) European
imperialists; (2) Yohannes (until 1889); (3) Menelik; and (4) Oromo
collaborators. The expansion and centralization of the Ethiopian state
was financed by expansion into the south. The system of wealth
accumulation was tributary and control of the slave trade. Between 1896
and 1910, a system of taxation replaced the tribute system. There was a
need to increase the productivity of labor. The nafxanya-gabbar
institution was instituted in these areas to extract production from
colonized farmers. Imperialism in the region did not transform the forces
of production (contrary to some Marxist theories). The commodities
produced by the farmers where linked to the international market through
non-African merchants.

Menelik became ruler of the Ethiopian Empire in 1889. In 1895-1896,
Ethiopia went to war against Italy, driving them out of the Empire
(Italy's claim to Eritrea was consolidated, however). France engaged
Ethiopia vigorously. Britain, France, and Italy signed an agreement
recognizing the legitimacy of the Ethiopian ruling class, that is,
preferring to pursue a course of imperialism rather than directly
colonizing Ethiopia. The European powers feared war and a loss of trade
routes.

There were five types of social relations that developed in Oromia. The
first type, the katamas, or garrison cities, were the "nerve centers" of
the colonial system. These garrison cities eventually developed into
commercial towns based on the exploitation of Oromo labor. Second, slaves
constituted the principal labor force of the Ethiopian ruling class.
Slaves were obtained by several methods, e.g., during military campaigns
or tribute payment. Third, the balabbat system was instituted. Balabbats
were Oromo intermediaries. This class was designed to facilitate Ethiopian
colonial rule. Fourth, the nafxanya-gabbar system involved nafxanya
(administrators and soldiers) exploiting colonized workers (gabbars). This
eventually became the dominant source of revenue in Oromia. Finally, the
colonial landholding system that emerged.

Menelik institutionalized the Ethiopian government in the first decade of
the 20th century. Menelik died in 1913. Iyasu succeeded to the throne, but
because of loyalties to Turkey and Germany was overthrown by Tafari, who
was supported by Britain, France, Britain, and Italy. Tafari took the
name of Selassie. Selassie continued Meneliks policies and strengthened
ties with imperial powers, as well as with governorships in Oromia and
other colonized areas.

Now I trace the development of colonialism in Ethiopia, from (fascist)
Italian colonialism, through British and U.S. hegemonism, and finally to
the restoration of the Ethiopian client state. Particular attention must
be paid to the way in which expansion and consolidation of the Ethiopian
Empire was facilitated by the presence of British and U.S. imperialism.
First, I present a history of imperialist occupation in the Horn of
Africa.

Fascist Italy colonized Eritrea and Somaliland in the Horn in the
mid-1930s. Italian elites began dismantling the old Ethiopian social
institutions and realigning the social system with their interests.
Between 1935 and 1941, the Italians destroyed the slavery and
nafxanya-gabbar system, freeing up labor for capital exploitation, and
introduced the wage-labor system, thus laying the foundation for colonial
capitalism. At first, the diminishment of the old Ethiopian Empire, in
part involving the restoration of Oromo lands (confiscated by Ethiopian
colonialists), temporary liberated colonized populations.

In 1941, the British forced the Italians out of the horn, establishing a
military government and occupied the region. They restored the Selassie
regime and created a client state. Selassie reconfiscated the Oromo's
land. By restoring the Selassie client government and crushing opposition
forces, Britain enabled the Ethiopian ruling class to implement its
economic and political policies in accordance with British interests.
Britain oversaw the sovereignty of Ethiopia and controlled the government
until 1951. During this period, the Selassie government expanded its
scope and consolidated its power.

Beginning in the 1940s, the U.S. began developing connections with the
Ethiopian ruling class, and in 1952 inherited Britain's position in the
empire. The U.S. aggressively sponsored Ethiopian colonialism in the
region. U.S. strategy to gain control of the region was part of a larger
neoimperialist strategy. Following WWII, the U.S., now the world hegemon,
used the carrot of decolonization and national sovereignty against the
other imperialist nations (the strategy pursued was the lines of
"democracy promotion" or what is more technically labeled "polyarchy," as
I have described in previous posts). The U.S. wanted Eritrea (upon the
British pullout) incorporated into Ethiopia, thereby aligning the
interests of U.S. and Ethiopian elites (Eritrea was eventually annexed by
Ethiopia under the aegis of the U.N. in the early 1960s). This was part of
a general pattern of the U.S.: filling the vacuum left by Britain in the
Horn of Africa. The U.S. had its eye on much of Africa. Believing this
region to be of vital strategic importance during the Cold War, the U.S.
in 1953 signed a mutual defense assistance agreement with Ethiopia that
remained in force until 1977. As the hegemonic power, the United States
had the responsibility to maintain client states such as Ethiopia in the
capitalist world economy.

In the 1960s, several events and trends (e.g., anticolonial movements,
radical student movement, attempted military coup, etc.) forced a change
in policy from the "democratic" approach to domination to the politics of
order. Despite its claim of democratic ideals, the United States helped
the Ethiopian colonial regime to stay in power by suppressing peoples of
the Horn of Africa. The U.S. trained and backed Ethiopian military forces.
The 1960s also saw the Soviet sphere of influence spread into Africa with
their alliance with the Somali state, which increased the intensity of
U.S. involvement in the region. The U.S. extended to Ethiopia the Point
Four program, a program claiming to be designed and implemented for
building up the socioeconomic conditions of the country. The covert
function was to consolidate the power of the Ethiopian ruling class.

I now turn to a history of the development of colonial capitalism in the
Horn of Africa. The development took the forms of agriculture and light
industry. Colonial agriculture in Oromo involved the coffee plantation,
increasing the expropriation of Oromo lands and influx of Ethiopian
settlers. The coffee produced in Oromo was mostly exported to the United
States. Sugar and cotton plantations were developed in the Awash Valley.
The Ethiopian government heavily invested in these industries. The British
invested heavily in the cotton industry, as well. The expansion of this
industry displaced tens of thousands of pastorialists and destroyed the
ecosystem, forcing many pastorialists into agricultural labor. In what is
called the "green revolution," constituted by a series of investment
packages, government agencies of core nations invested heavily in the
development and intensification of agrarian capitalism in the region.

With all this background laid out, we can explore class and national
contradictions. The central contradiction was between the Ethiopian
ruling class and the ruled. You will note that the development of colonial
capitalism did not change the nature of the Ethiopian state and its
archaic ideology. The ruling class legitimated their rule by a type of
divine right (the Solomonic dynasty) derived from Orthodox Christian
ideology. The new social forces that emerged from capitalist development
of the region began to challenge the legitimacy of the ruling class. We
may identify three major polarization processes: (1) the development of a
proletariat and an emerging bourgeoisie (although class consciousness
remained underdeveloped); (2) expropriation of agricultural lands, i.e.,
the contradiction of colonial rule; (3) social differentiation (students,
teachers, civil servants, armed forces, etc.). Polarization and
inequalities divided the populace and united the factions of the colonial
ruling class.... The ruling class was anchored by the throne and court,
themselves cushioned by the institutional arrangements of imperialism,
regional and international organizations, and transnational corporations.

In analyzing these contradictions, two important issues must be examined:
(1) Oromo and Ethiopia proper must be differentiated and compared; (2)
emphasis should be placed on the dominant role of the agricultural
economy. As settlers in Oromo began to consolidate their power, the local
ruling class in Oromo grew more powerful. Conditions grew worse in
Ethiopia proper, and many Ethiopians were forced to emigrate to Oromo.
This, and further intensification of Oromo agriculture, helped to diffuse
tensions in Ethiopia proper. The major contradiction in Oromo was the
nation-class.

In the 1960s and 1970s opposition to this state of affairs intensified
with the rise of several liberation movements. In Eritrea, there was the
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). In Oromo, farmers began to organize
rebellion and eventually the Oromo Liberation Front emerged (OLF). The
radical wing of the Ethiopian student movement began to make noise. Labor,
at first prevented from organizing officially, gained strength and
legitimacy from the ILO, forming the Confederation of Ethiopian Labor
Unions (CELU) in 1963. The response from the Selassie regime was to
intensify military domination over Ethiopia and its colonies.

Although the Selassie regime would be overthrown in the 1970s, replaced by
dictator Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, this did not free the peoples of
Ethiopia.

Synopsis of key chapters in Asafa Jalata's Oromia and Ethiopia:
State Formation and Ethnonational Conflict, 1868-1992.

Prepared by
Andrew Austin
Department of Sociology
University of Tennessee, Knoxville


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