There are two sets of issues that I want to address.
First is China. I know your scenario of an anti-global China
being suppressed by NATO, but I see two problems. First, I see far less
opposition among the Chinese leadership to global capitalism than you do.
There is little daylight between Zhu Rongji's and Alan Greenspan's visions
of the future. The notion that Chinese political circles retain any
substantive commitment to a non-Western social model is a myth propagated
by the Chinese leadership itself--because ordinary Chinese might not be
entirely comfortable with an open shift to capitalism--and by the Western
leadership--which is either outdated in its understanding of China,
seeking a Huntington-style outlet for aggressive impulses, or
collaborating with the Chinese leadership by providing opportunities for
symbolic China-West conflict to distract the Chinese public from the
sell-out underway. My question to you, in light of this: _if_ Chinese
development continues (a very big if), is it not most plausible that China
can assume the role of global bully relatively smoothly, much as the
transfer from Britain to the USA occurred in the 1940s? What I do not
quite understand is why you assume 1) that the Chinese elite is hostile to
the world-system as a world-system, and does not wish simply to flourish
within it, and 2) that the interests NATO protects would not be prepared
to replace telephoning Washington in English with videophoning Beijing in
Mandarin whenever the unwashed brown masses misbehave. Zhu Rongji speaks
louder than Mao Zedong, and Alan Greenspan speaks louder than Ronald
Reagan.
Second, the geographic focus of the revolution:
> If it starts in the periphery, why wouldn't it be successfully suppressed
> through standard neocolonial measures?
With increasing global integration, it is not wholly inconceivable that
pan-Southern insurgency could destabilise the world-system sufficiently to
split the Northern leadership and weaken Northern popular support. The
population ratios of North and South are evolving even more in favour of
the latter, and transnational migrant communities in the North can become
a volatile Trojan horse when the crisis comes. Furthermore, there are
important constraints in exactly how violent the North can be and still
retain any hope of restoring order. Once Southern revolutionary
consciousness reaches that level, nothing can ever be the same again. The
harsher the TNC response, the greater their future vulnerability, and they
will realise that. This dynamic could go through a couple of
revolt-repression cycles before Goliath collapses, but Goliath _will_
collapse.
> And why would "enlightened national governments" necessarily involve
> "compromise and capitulation"? Why can that be avoided on a world scale
> but not on a national scale?
I am not sure how compelling I find my immediate response, and I would not
wish to be suspected of rational-choice leanings, but here it is anyway.
Once capitalist restoration occurs in any polity, it will tend to spread
to others. If restoration has a certain uniform probability of occurring,
having a greater number of polities will increase the chance that at least
a few of them will begin the process sooner rather than later, meaning
that the entire system reverts sooner than it typically would if n=1. On
the other hand, with a single global polity and a longer likely duration
before capitalist restoration, the greater the likelihood that enduring
structural and particularly sociocultural changes can be carried through,
such that the reversion probability declines steadily over time towards 0.
> If the core is reformed along revolutionary socialist lines (including
> the cessation of capitalist-driven neocolonialism), then the periphery
> would inevitably follow. In fact I also favor "world socialist
> revolution", but I think it can only be achieved by starting with
> socialist democratic revolution in core states.
> rkm
I find it wholly implausible that core populations would ever support
revolutionary socialism even within a national context after the
capitalist indoctrination of the last century. Furthermore, I think many
of the "revolutionary contingent" on the list would envision substantial
North-South redistribution as part of the world revolution. Expecting
Northern populations to submit to "an end to neocolonialism" without
Southern militia patrolling their streets is probably even less credible
than asking the top 10% of the US population to cheer pitchfork-wielding
masses marching on the New York Stock Exchange. Why do many who favour
revolution so persistently decline to make a hard and realistic assessment
of the side that most of the Northern citizenry will choose? It is
entirely appropriate to _hope_ for more mixed Northern opinion when the
time comes, and to cast the struggle in such a way that the minority of
Northerners who endorse it can be drawn into the project, but optimism
must not cloud our judgement.
Regards,
--AKW
===============================================================================
Adam K. Webb
Department of Politics
Princeton University
Princeton NJ 08544 USA
609-258-9028
http://www.princeton.edu/~akwebb