5) Problem number 2: Europe must come to terms with the
'new' social problems arising from the contradictions of the process
of the global environmental destruction, to which Europe as one
of the main regions of world industry and traffic, disproportionately
contributes, and Europe must find a proper way for gender empowerment
The amplification of the discourse of development theory, that still tends to be sometimes fixed towards such monetary dimensions as growth and distribution alone, might be somewhat surprising. Over recent years, there has emerged a new sub-field of development and transformation theory, that is sensitive to the concerns of 'the new social movements' around the globe (Bello, 1989; Friberg, 1988; UNDP, 1993, 1994; Woehlke, 1987, 1993). The situation of women and the situation of the environment emerge as one of the prime issues of development (Benard and Schlaffer, 1985; Betz and Bruene, 1995; L. R. Brown, 1992; Dubiel, 1993; Frank and Fuentes-Frank, 1990; Leggett, 1991; Saffioti, 1978; Seager and Olson, 1986). Cross-national analysis about economic and social preconditions and the quality of the environment are relatively new (Beckerman, 1992; Shafik and Bandyopadhyay, 1992).
It is hard to construct a single indicator of the environmental situation of a country. The following indicators are being used widely: the greenhouse index per 10 million people, energy consumption per capita, and the annual rate of deforestation. A fourth indicator, per capita carbon dioxide emissions, is also available. The greenhouse index measures the net emissions of three major greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide, methane and chlorofluorocarbons. The index weights each gas according to its heattrapping quality in carbon dioxide equivalents and expresses them in metric tonnes of carbon per capita. Energy consumption, on the other hand, refers to commercial forms of primary energy - petroleum (crude oil, natural gas liquids, and oil from non-conventional sources), natural gas, solid fuels (coal, lignite, and other derived fuels), and primary electricity (nuclear, hydroelectric, geothermal, and other) - all converted into oil equivalents. Energy consumption refers to domestic primary energy supply before transformation to other end-use fuels and is calculated as indigenous production plus imports and stock changes, minus exports and international marine bunkers. The use of firewood, dried animal excrement, and other traditional fuels, is not taken into account for lack of international comparative data. Energy consumption per capita can be considered as perhaps the most important single indicator of the factors, that lead to global environmental degradation. The two environmental indicators have a very high positive correlation with each other. The third indicator, annual rate of deforestation or total forest area (under proper consideration of arable land per total land), is connected with the first and the second process in a complex fashion. For the future of the world environment, deforestation is the most alarming contemporary process of environmental degradation. Forest burning directly leads to a greatly increased CO2 emission; deforestation reduces the world's future capacity to produce oxygen and to adapt to increasing CO2 levels. To put it into a drastic comparison with medicine: the patient suffers from cancer on the left lung (the green house-effect), and the doctors decide to extract the still functioning right lung (the world-wide CO2 --> O2 photosynthetic regenerative capacity of the world's tropical forests). Due to the destruction of the outer ozone-layer of the earth, this fatal process will still be increased. Each second, a rainforest area as large as a football field, is being demolished on purpose (Launer, 1992).
Among the factors, leading to deforestation, the export-oriented
economy, the use of tropical wood in the world paper and furniture
industry, and the burning of wood for cooking and heating purposes
are the three most commonly mentioned factors. A great number
of scholars, among them Leggett et al., 1991, tried to bring deforestation
rates systematically into a causal relationship with the kind
of dependent capitalist development, analysed amongst others by
Bornschier and Chase Dunn, 1985. The creation of large plantations
in Latin America for meat exports to the United States of America
is often causally linked in the literature to the problem of deforestation
(Launer, 1992). Brazil's supposed role is of special importance
here, because Brazil still has a share of 27.5% of the world's
tropical forests. Indonesia's year-long wood-export drive has
often been mentioned as the most paradigmatic case of the influence
of the capitalist world economy on the rapid disappearance of
the world's forests. The role of the peasantry in dependent capitalism
was also often mentioned in this context. Extensive tropical agriculture,
implanted by 500 years of dependent development, described by
the Peruvian Marxist José Carlos Mariateguí in his
classic '7 Essays', and later on analysed by Feder, 1972,
is thought to be one of the main factors leading to the alarming
rates of deforestation. Small scale peasants - the dependencia
argument runs - are evicted throughout the countries of Latin
America, Africa, Asia and the Pacific from their meagre holdings
by the land-hungry process of dependent agricultural capitalism
for the sake of export-oriented breeding for meat production and
tropical export crops. But what is already commonplace in the
former 'Third World' could become a rule of the day also in the
former 'Second World'. Forests are being cut down not only in
Indonesia and in Northern Borneo at an amazing speed, but also
in the Warmia region of the Mazurian lakes in Poland and
in other parts of Eastern Europe. Forest cutting for export purposes,
disregarding the social and ecological rights of the local populations,
could serve, a dependencia-minded argument could maintain,
the short-term profit interests of the old and new export-oriented
elites. In the former or continuously communist countries of Eastern
Europe and the USSR-successor-states, environmental quality poses
indeed one of the main concerns of development planning nowadays
(World Resources Institute, 1992). Eastern Europe's transformation
could be again seen as a testing ground for various development
paradigms and strategies. The globalisation argument would emphasise,
that, contrary to the optimistic expectations about an improvement
in the environmental situation due to the new presence of transnational
capital, the adoption of an energy-consuming 'US-style'- model
would mean a significant long-term increase of various emissions.
The global atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration increased
from 280 ppm in pre-industrial times to 315.8 in 1959, to stand
at 354 in 1990. World carbon dioxide emissions increased from
6002 millions of metric tons in 1950 to 21863 millions of metric
tons in 1989. Over the last 100 years, the earth's temperature
rose by 0.6 degrees; from 1970 to today, the rise was 0.3 degrees.
The earth's temperature will rise by a further 3 degrees until
2100, if contemporary emission trends continue (Stiftung, 1996).
Over the last 160000 years, there has been a close correlation
between carbon-dioxide concentrations and changes in the world
temperature (Gore, 1994; Leggett, 1991). Roughly, a change of
+- 100 ppm carbon dioxide historically led to a change of +- 12.5
degrees Celsius. From 1750 to today, carbon dioxide emissions
amount to 800 thousand million tons of CO2.. Although
the temperature change factor might be smaller, and a rise by
100 ppm CO2. might lead to a temperature rise of 1.1
degrees, the heating of the atmosphere in the coming decades will
be enormous:
Graph 5.1 Charles D. Keeling's data series from Mauna Loa - atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse and ozone-depleting gases, 1959-90,
and the trend for the next 60 years
our own calculations from Keeling's data, World Resources Institute,
1992, using the trend-line extrapolation of the EXCEL 5.0 programme
(3-order polynomial expression)
Desertification, storms, flooding in many parts of the world during the winter seasons, as well as famine and droughts during the summer months could be the results of these recent increases in carbon dioxide levels and are indeed already a reality in many parts of the world. There were 16 major disasters in the 1960s, 29 in the 1970s, and 70 in the 1980s. Since 1967, 1.3 million people died from droughts, 800000 in cyclones, 600000 in earth quakes and 300000 in floods (UNDP, 1994). The last time, that a carbon dioxide concentration as high as around 300 ppm was reached in the earth's history was around 130000 before our time; from that moment onwards, global temperatures and carbon dioxide concentration ratios fell to 20000 before our time, when a level of just 180 ppm was reached.
World pollution is even a clear statistical function of the ups
and downs of the longer swings in the world economy, most notably
the Kuznets cycle and the Kondratieff cycle. The World Resources
Institute has provided information on the basis of the Carbon
Dioxide Information Analysis Centre about CO2 emissions in the
world from 1950 onwards. The growth rates of CO2 consumption clearly
correspond to the Kondratieff and Kuznets cycle analysis about
economic growth, which we introduced in Chapter 3.
Graph 5.2: CO2 emissions and their growth rates from 1950 onwards
Legend: World CO2 emissions from fossil fuel consumption and cement
manufacture, 1950-89. Left hand scale: emissions in millions of
metric tons per year; right-hand scale: growth rates. The graph
shows also the polynomial expression (6th order) of the growth
rates, as calculated by EXCEL 5.0, as well as the gliding averages
on a 9-year basis. The dark line is the linear regression trend
of CO2 emissions, projected for 5 consecutive periods
It is clear, however, that some Western countries on the other
hand use technical and civilisational standards that indeed constitute
a significant improvement in terms of the environment compared
to the preceding regime. Table 5.1 now summarises the most important
environmental indicators for the region before or during the start
of the transformation process by international comparison:
Table 5.1: environmental quality in Eastern Europe and
the former USSR in comparison to the US, the UK, France, (West)
Germany, Sweden and Austria
Country Environmental degradation indicator
CO2 SO2 NOX % forest defoliation
per capita emissions (tons) (moderate to severe)
(in industry)
Albania 3.04 15.6 2.8 -
Bulgaria 11.87 114.6 16.7 24.9%
former CS 14.47 178.9 60.7 33.0%
East Germany - 313.3 42.6 16.4%
Hungary 6.05 115.2 24.5 12.7%
Poland 11.54 103.3 39.1 31.9%
Romania 9.16 8.6 16.8 -
former Yug. 5.61 69.6 8.0 22.6% (Slovenia)
former USSR - 32.4 14.6 35.0% (Kalinin-
grad oblast)
USA 19.68 83.2 79.6 -
UK 9.89 62.1 43.9 28.0%
France 6.38 27.1 30.1 -
W-Germany 10.48 24.2 48.4 15.9%
Sweden 7.0 25.9 35.4 12.9%
Austria 6.82 16.3 27.7 4.4%
Source: our own compilations from World
Resources Institute, 1992
Deforestation in Eastern Europe and the former USSR is already more severe than in most parts of Western Europe. What will happen to these forests in the course of world-market oriented development? To this we must add, that in a country like Poland environmental concerns do not receive the priority that they should receive. Only 34% of the population is served by waste water treatment plants (EU average 70%); municipal waste services reach only 55% of the population (EU average: 96%; our own compilations from UNDP, 1995). The basic argument of a globalisation-oriented explanation of environmental quality on a world scale (Launer, 1992; Woehlke, 1987) would run as follows: dependent development not only leads to social strains and imbalances, with all it's economic dynamics that it might initiate at the same time; it also means a further strain on the natural resources and the environment by the energy-, space-, forest- and individual-traffic intensive life-style that the world-wide market economy, especially in it's North American variety, brings about. Although some forest-, energy- and emission-saving might be the initial consequence of the introduction of more modern and western technologies, the basic problem of dependent and polarising development would remain on the agenda. Profit-oriented development between unequal partners will always, globalisation theory argues, lead to forms of 'unequal exchange'. Concretely, the world-wide market economy and the new international division of labour will (i) transfer energy and pollution intensive industries to the countries of the periphery and the semi-periphery (ii) industrial waste from the centres will be increasingly attempted to be deposited in those regions (iii) export-intensive industrialisation and the debt crisis will mean an almost reckless use of remaining natural resources, especially forest areas, for export purposes to earn badly needed foreign cash, or to destroy forests to gain land for tropical and sub-tropical export agriculture. International tourism (including it's 'soft-body'-component), air traffic, individual traffic and the 'western' lifestyle, that begins with the plastic bag, ranging over well-known soft drinks - preferably from the tin-can - to equally well-known western TV-serials, will in the end more than negatively compensate the initially positive contributions, that economic transformation, market mechanisms and the recession of the 1980s will have meant for the countries of the periphery and the semi-periphery of Eastern Europe and the countries of the South in terms of the environment. Poland produces today more waste per inhabitant already (1500 kg per year) than Spain, Italy, France, the UK or Germany (1021 kg) (Wprost, 20.09. 1995: 52; Tausch/de Boer, 1997). Poland might have new factories for paper recycling with western technology, but the raw material - old paper - is being imported from Western countries.
In addition, regional development authorities throughout Eastern Europe and in other semi-peripheral regions will hope to attract foreign buying power in exchange for local property rights in environmentally still undamaged regions. Insert here what you like: Caribbean island coasts, still untouched regions in Eastern Europe, like the Mazurian lakes, the Tatra mountains, et cetera. They will share the fate - dependency theory would tell us - of the sell-out at the Spanish Mediterranean coast, wide areas of the Austrian Alps and many other places in Europe. In other zones, unabated deforestation will develop, not unlike many Third-World countries. Unequal environmental exchange will increasingly affect (semi)peripheral regions in greater geographical distance from the centres; mass tourism to the tropical zones of the world will cause a tremendous increase in air-pollution from air-traffic that these 'island get-aways' bring about. For these reasons, environmental indicators are so negatively determined by transnational penetration. An important control variable in our analysis of the deforestation process is the percentage of total land, devoted to agriculture. At the one hand, it allows for the fact, that large regions of the world are affected by a growing desertification; on the other hand, this control variable duly considers the negative effect, that the expansion of world agriculture had on the world's woodlands in a historic perspective.
Europe must not only come to terms with the environmental destruction, to which it contributes disproportionately on a global scale, Europe must also lead the way in bringing about a lean and socially just state at the same time. Social justice, by and large, means gender justice today (UNDP, 1995). The eastward expansion of the Union will further increase this problem dimension.
Faced by the marginalisation of women on the labour markets due to the workings of globalisation, Europe is tempted to spend its way out to maintain their position in a global context. The eastward expansion of the Union will mean, that millions of up to now economically marginalised women will become citizens of the Union, whose fate has to be taken care of by Brussels at least in some way.
Aggregate societal data suggest that after the transformation,
the situation of women in Eastern and Central Europe did relatively
deteriorate in many ways (Cornia, 1993, 1994). Since Cornia's
very telling research results are easily available internationally,
it might suffice here to quote some aggregate UNDP data to further
illustrate our point. Our aggregate data show, how difficult a
relatively rapid integration of the more traditionalist, rural
and in many ways backward East into the European Union could become.
Only the Czech Republic is socially by any means on a comparable
level with the more highly developed countries of Western Europe:
Table 5.2: the marginalisation of women, social devastation
and decay in former communist countries of Central and Eastern
Europe in comparison to the European Union countries
Indicator CS H BUL PL ROM ALB EU
maternal mortality
per 100000 live births 14 21 40 15 210
100 9
sulphur and nitrogen
emissions per capita 239 141 - 141 -
- 74
Rapes per 100000
women 12 31 21 19 - - 17
homicides by men
per 100000 1.3 3.5 4.0 2.5 1.6
prisoners per
100000 inhabitants - 142 160 204 - -
59
suicides by men per
100000 30 58 23 24 13 - 19
total health expen-
diture as % of GDP 5.9 6.0 5.4 5.1 3.9
- 8.2
mean years of schooling
female population >25y. 8.6 9.9 6.4
7.8 6.7 5.2 9.9
mean years of schooling
male population >25y. 9.8 9.7 7.6
8.5 7.5 7.2 10.3
tertiary graduates as
% of population of nor-
mal graduate age 11.8 6.4 6.4 6.6 2.2
1.7 12.6
average age of women
at first marriage 22.2 22.4 21.1 22.8
21.1 20.4 25.1
% of seats in parlia-
ment occupied by
women 9% 7% 13% 9% 3% 6% 13%
human development index
rank on the world scale 27. 31. 48. 49. 72. 76. -
_____________________________________________________________
Source: our own compilations from UNDP
(HDR, 1994). The world rankings of the EU countries on the human
development index are:
Sweden 4.
France 6.
NL 9.
UK 10.
Germany 11.
Austria 12.
Belgium 13.
DK 15.
SF 16.
LUX 17.
IRE 21.
Italy 22.
Spain 23.
Greece 25.
Portugal 42.
Gender empowerment, as it is known, combines parliamentary seats,
held by women, the share of women in the total number of administrators
and managers in a country, the share of women in the professional
and technical workforce, and the share of women in earned income
(UNDP, 1996). Table 5.3 shows the performance of the transformation
countries in comparison to Western democracies:
Table 5.3: gender empowerment
CND 0.685
USA 0.645
Japan 0.445
NL 0.646
NOR 0.786
SF 0.710
France 0.437
SW 0.779
Spain 0.490
Australia 0.590
BLG 0.580
Austria 0.641
NZ 0.685
CH 0.594
UK 0.530
DK 0.718
GER 0.654
IRE 0.504
ITA 0.593
GRE 0.370
ISR 0.485
HUN 0.507
POL 0.431
BUL 0.486
Source: our own compilations from UNDP, 1996
Eastern Europe, finding itself at the absolute lower middle range of the continuum between backward and 'modern' societies, characterised by the values of education as an end in itself, self-realisation outside traditional role patterns, associated with child-bearing and the family, control of male aggressive behaviour and a developed social welfare system, socially belongs much more to the countries, still (semi-)characterized by traditional role patterns. In the industrialized world, countries as different as Japan, France, Israel and Greece also have a gender empowerment index lower than 0.500. They all have in common a certain secondary role of women in public life, as compared to the real world leaders in terms of emancipation, like the protestant democracies in Scandinavia, the Netherlands and Canada. The unquestionable advances in the relative role of women, that were evident throughout the region before the year 1989, came to a grinding halt after the transformation. With the background of the general poverty levels, sketched above, the socially disruptive dimension of this conflict becomes evident.
For the political economy of the world system, interesting research questions arise out of such tendencies. Does the market economy, especially in it's dependent variety, in the end really marginalise women furthermore, or does the (re)advent of full-fledged capitalism bring about a marked improvement in the social situation of women? There emerge very interesting results on the situation of women from our empirical investigations in Table 4.1.
Three measures are used to further test the relationship between globalisation and gender-related human development. One is maternal mortality, the second is the new UNDP gender-related development index, the third is the gender empowerment measure. The first and the third index are more distribution-oriented than the second indicator. Each year, 290 women per 100000 live births lose their lives in the moment of giving birth. What is the ultimate moment of happiness in a life for woman and man, to experience in togetherness the advent of a newly-born life, becomes the ultimate pain for millions of mothers around the world. They lose their lives due to the structural violence existing in the world system, they lose their lives in their ultimate moment of loneliness while giving birth, desolated and marginalised by a social order on the global level that produces more and more commodities, services and pollution but that forgets about the poor backyards, shanty towns and desolate clinics in the world poverty belts. In the industrialised countries of the OECD, maternal mortality is 11 per 100000. That is to say, at the global level there is an 'excess mortality' of 279 women per 100000 live births, considering the progress in medicine reached at the level of the western democracies. In Eastern Europe, maternal mortality already reaches 66 per 100000 live births, and in the developing countries, 420. All three indicators of the female situation de la vie are being significantly blocked by MNC penetration (see Table 4.1).
Our results indicate that dependency is by far the most important
determinant of maternal mortality, and that the two dependency-related
indicators: terms of trade and trade dependency
co-determine the process of maternal mortality in the world system.
Our results also indicate that gender empowerment and gender development
are significantly and negatively influenced by MNC penetration.
6) Problem number 3: Europe must come to terms with the
contradictions of world cultures and world cultural conflict,
global anarchy and global decay
Nationalism will continue to receive from the contradictions of
globalisation. One theory (Huntington) holds, that cultural dividing
lines increasingly achieve relevance; and even could threaten
to endanger the transformation project to build up a stable, market
oriented western democracy on the ruins of communism. To those,
accustomed to the dialogue about international politics as a 'dismal
science' it will be no surprise to learn about recent international
research results regarding genocide and mass murder in this century
(Rummel, 1994, 1995). 218 repressive regimes (141 state regimes
and 77 quasi-state and group regimes) from 1900 to 1987 have killed
nearly 170 million of their own citizens and foreigners - about
four times the number of people killed in domestic and international
wars during that same period. Power kills; democracy is the general
method of non-violence, says Rummel: but what happens, if democracy
and non-violence are seriously undermined by ethno-political conflict?
After the horrors of the Holocaust and the Second World War, the
following victimisation of mostly civilians stand out in contemporary
history:
Graph 6.1: War victims and victims of mass murder after 1945
Source: our own compilations from Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden,
1996, based on Rummel, 1994 and other sources, quoted there
Who will be the groups that most violently are going to challenge the logic of accumulation on a global scale? Does capitalist globalisation, that process of unequal and uneven development, in the end cause the cultural conflicts in the world system, as globalisation theories would maintain (Axtmann, 1995)? A research effort at global, cross-national analysis of social integration and disintegration did not lead very far, perhaps because the research design was centred around too many variables and the number of countries included in the analysis makes the research findings very dependent on outlying cases (Klitgaard and Fedderke, 1995). But what emerged at least was that there are different types of social disintegration in the world system, and that - as the authors contend - stagnation is more detrimental than growth to the issue of social stability. This hypothesis might be contested in the light of new research results; but at any rate, that recent essay opens the way for the debate of these issues anew.
Ethno-nationalistic conflicts, terrorism and war were to break out along the real 'earthquake line' in today's international system, the great dividing line between the cultures. That is at least what Samuel Huntington, Harvard professor of political science and for many years one the closest advisers of successive United States governments on matters of international security and military policy, has maintained in his recent contributions. Huntington tries to offer a socio-cultural explanation to the question, where Europe's frontier will be finally drawn. Are there clear empirically observable tendencies in development performance according to the classification, suggested by Huntington, of the basic underlying socio-cultural patterns of a given country?
Professor Huntington's thesis is not at all abstract and has - however we view it - a vital importance for the future of the European Union. From Marseilles to Algier, from Madrid to Rabat, from Rome to Tunis or Sofia, from Athens to Bucharest or Cairo, from Vienna to Kiev or Ankara or Teheran geographical distances are smaller or about equal as the distances from these European Union cities to the Canary Islands, the Irish Republic, northern Scotland or northern Scandinavia or other remoter parts of the already existing Union. The migration pressures from Eastern Europe and the population explosion on the southern rim of the Mediterranean and beyond has not yet been fully grasped to be a real problem. By the year 2025, that is to say, in only 30 years, the population balance on the southern rim of Europe will have dramatically shifted. The southern border of Europe already is and will even more so become a border between relatively wealthy developed societies and societies, that are threatened by overpopulation, scarcity of resources, and poverty. By the year 2000, 290 million people will live in the 19 countries of the Arab world alone. Today, less than three-fifths of the rural population have access to safe water, 80 million people are illiterate, 50 million of them females, 10 million people are underfed, 73 million Arabs live below the line of absolute poverty. Average life expectancy is still 61.9 years, 40 million people have no access to health services, while 50.4 thousand million $ were spent on armaments. Arms imports in the Arab world amounted to 3.5 thousand million $ in 1992 alone (our own compilation from UNDP, 1995).
The still existing high concentration of development problems
and population dynamics in the immediate vicinity of Europe over
the next 30 years will dramatically change the shape of international
politics, economics and migratory pressures in the region. A dependency-oriented
explanation of underdevelopment would hold, that the 'Huntington
factor' is in reality disappearing, whenever we control for MNC
penetration. The main result of our investigation will be that
the Huntington factor only plays a certain role when we do not
control for the amount of MNC penetration; however, if we do consider
MNC penetration properly, the effects become weaker or are even
the reverse.
The( in)validity of Huntington's culture conflict approach
on a world level
However forceful Huntington's theory might seem to be at first sight, we can consider it to be falsified by our investigations. While Lipset and Weede seem to be inclined to regard Confucianism as a growth precondition, Huntington's theory is more pessimistic and foresees a joint rising world cultural challenge against the dominant centres by Islam and Orthodoxy. The important element in the test of Huntington's theory seems to be the joint interaction of societies, classified under his index. The Huntington-Index might be thus the mere reflection of this underlying geographical and world economic peripherisation, that jointly affects the Orthodox and the Islamic world. This joint peripherisation would cast a large shadow on the prospects for market-economic reform in Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, and the 'Federal Republic of Yugoslavia'.
Enough of ideologies. Let the hard facts speak. Substituting 'UN
membership years' by the Huntington-index of the clash of civilisations
(Huntington-Index countries = 1, other countries = 0), we get
the following results on the level of world society from our Table
4.1:
Table 6.1: the influence of Huntington's index on development
performance at the level of world society
| MNC PEN73 | Govex | Trade Dep | social sec | Huntington-I | Women Parl | Women %LF | ln PCI | ln PCI^2 | ln(MPR+1) | Fertility Rate | Constant | |
| adjustment | -0,761 | -1,491 | 0,125 | -3,538 | 0,048 | -0,058 | 0,83 | 0,133 | 0,01 | -0,024 | -0,004 | 21,47 |
| 0,188 | 1,029 | 0,349 | 5,208 | 0,029 | 0,04 | 0,806 | 0,06 | 0,007 | 0,022 | 0,002 | 19,93 | |
| 0,301 | 2,649 | |||||||||||
| 4,341 | 111 | |||||||||||
| 335,1 | 779,1 | |||||||||||
| t-Test | -4,035 | -1,449 | 0,359 | -0,679 | 1,684 | -1,46 | 1,03 | 2,193 | 1,353 | -1,08 | -1,989 | |
| MNC PEN73 | Govex | Trade Dep | social sec | Huntington-I | Women Parl | Women %LF | social sec | ln PCI^2 | ln(MPR+1) | Fertility Rate | Constant | |
| growth | -0,944 | -0,625 | 0,167 | -4,228 | 0,021 | -0,084 | 0,209 | 0,138 | 0,015 | -0,038 | -0,003 | 26,73 |
| 0,165 | 0,9 | 0,305 | 4,558 | 0,025 | 0,035 | 0,706 | 0,053 | 0,007 | 0,02 | 0,002 | 17,45 | |
| 0,409 | 2,319 | |||||||||||
| 6,997 | 111 | |||||||||||
| 413,8 | 596,8 | |||||||||||
| t-Test | -5,723 | -0,694 | 0,546 | -0,928 | 0,844 | -2,426 | 0,296 | 2,616 | 2,311 | -1,956 | -1,645 | |
| LEX 1960 | 1 der e-funct | 1 der pi-func | MNC PEN73 | Viol Civ Rits | Trade Dep | Terms Trade | Huntington-I | Women Parl | Women %LF | ln(MPR+1) | Constant | |
| DYN | 0,811 | -0,025 | -0,038 | 0,984 | 0,013 | 0,001 | -0,049 | 2E-04 | -0,706 | -29,49 | -0,299 | 26,79 |
| LEX | 0,885 | 0,024 | 0,031 | 0,708 | 0,017 | 0,006 | 0,173 | 0,002 | 0,742 | 6,961 | 0,037 | 2,724 |
| 0,737 | 2,257 | |||||||||||
| 28,23 | 111 | |||||||||||
| 1582 | 565,3 | |||||||||||
| t-Test | 0,916 | -1,054 | -1,216 | 1,391 | 0,793 | 0,238 | -0,282 | 0,147 | -0,952 | -4,237 | -7,993 | |
| pol rights | MNC PEN73 | Govex | Trade Dep | social sec | Huntington-I | Women Parl | Women %LF | ln PCI | ln PCI^2 | ln(MPR+1) | Fertility Rate | Constant |
| violations | 0,536 | 1,045 | 0,079 | -1,473 | 0,02 | 0,06 | 1,002 | -0,103 | 0,004 | 0,009 | 5E-04 | 5,987 |
| 0,108 | 0,588 | 0,199 | 2,976 | 0,016 | 0,023 | 0,461 | 0,035 | 0,004 | 0,013 | 0,001 | 11,39 | |
| 0,576 | 1,514 | |||||||||||
| 13,68 | 111 | |||||||||||
| 344,9 | 254,4 | |||||||||||
| t-Test | 4,973 | 1,778 | 0,399 | -0,495 | 1,193 | 2,663 | 2,175 | -2,992 | 0,939 | 0,713 | 0,453 | |
| MNC PEN73 | Govex | Trade Dep | social sec | Huntington-I | Women Parl | Women %LF | ln PCI | ln PCI^2 | ln(MPR+1) | Fertility Rate | Constant | |
| civil rights | 0,354 | 1,21 | -0,015 | -0,074 | 0,002 | 0,037 | 0,571 | -0,087 | 8E-04 | -0,011 | -9E-04 | 3,205 |
| violations | 0,086 | 0,468 | 0,159 | 2,372 | 0,013 | 0,018 | 0,367 | 0,028 | 0,003 | 0,01 | 8E-04 | 9,077 |
| 0,586 | 1,206 | |||||||||||
| 14,28 | 111 | |||||||||||
| 228,7 | 161,5 | |||||||||||
| 4,121 | 2,582 | -0,093 | -0,031 | 0,177 | 2,027 | 1,554 | -3,15 | 0,244 | -1,115 | -1,041 | ||
| HDI | MNC PEN73 | Govex | Trade Dep | social sec | Huntington-I | Women Parl | Women %LF | ln PCI | ln PCI^2 | ln(MPR+1) | Fertility Rate | Constant |
| -0,095 | 0,173 | 0,006 | 0,02 | -5E-04 | -0,003 | -0,033 | 7E-04 | -2E-04 | 7E-04 | 6E-05 | 0,488 | |
| 0,008 | 0,043 | 0,015 | 0,217 | 0,001 | 0,002 | 0,034 | 0,003 | 3E-04 | 9E-04 | 8E-05 | 0,832 | |
| 0,871 | 0,111 | |||||||||||
| 67,9 | 111 | |||||||||||
| 9,137 | 1,358 | |||||||||||
| -12,04 | 4,018 | 0,392 | 0,092 | -0,38 | -1,72 | -0,986 | 0,26 | -0,598 | 0,736 | 0,808 | ||
| MNC PEN73 | Govex | Trade Dep | social sec | Huntington-I | Women Parl | Women %LF | ln PCI | ln PCI^2 | ln(MPR+1) | Fertility Rate | Constant | |
| -0,071 | 0,101 | -0,006 | 0,16 | 6E-04 | -0,002 | -0,032 | 0,002 | -1E-04 | 4E-04 | 8E-05 | 0,026 | |
| 0,006 | 0,031 | 0,011 | 0,159 | 9E-04 | 0,001 | 0,025 | 0,002 | 2E-04 | 7E-04 | 6E-05 | 0,608 | |
| 0,873 | 0,081 | |||||||||||
| 69,29 | 111 | |||||||||||
| 4,971 | 0,724 | |||||||||||
| Gender Development Index | ||||||||||||
| -12,38 | 3,232 | -0,609 | 1,008 | 0,692 | -2,021 | -1,311 | 1,096 | -0,58 | 0,568 | 1,401 | ||
| MNC PEN73 | Govex | Trade Dep | social sec | Huntington-I | Women Parl | Women %LF | ln PCI | ln PCI^2 | ln(MPR+1) | Fertility Rate | Constant | |
| -0,02 | 0,016 | 0,015 | -0,184 | 0,001 | 0,005 | -0,018 | 0,003 | -2E-04 | -6E-05 | 4E-05 | 0,866 | |
| 0,004 | 0,023 | 0,008 | 0,114 | 6E-04 | 9E-04 | 0,018 | 0,001 | 2E-04 | 5E-04 | 4E-05 | 0,437 | |
| 0,818 | 0,058 | |||||||||||
| 45,46 | 111 | |||||||||||
| 1,691 | 0,375 | |||||||||||
| Gender Empowerment Index | ||||||||||||
| MNC PEN73 | Govex | Trade Dep | social sec | Huntington-I | Women Parl | Women %LF | ln PCI | ln PCI^2 | ln(MPR+1) | Fertility Rate | ||
| -4,882 | 0,7 | 2,019 | -1,606 | 1,868 | 6,039 | -1,006 | 1,946 | -0,958 | -0,117 | 1,015 | ||
| MNC PEN73 | Govex | Trade Dep | social sec | Huntington-I | Women Parl | Women %LF | ln PCI | ln PCI^2 | ln(MPR+1) | Fertility Rate | %agland | Constant | |
| %forest | -0,391 | -1,834 | -5,294 | -2,078 | 28,24 | 0,334 | 0,689 | -10,99 | -0,366 | -0,082 | 0,107 | 0,008 | -63,58 |
| area | 0,128 | 1,408 | 7,606 | 2,559 | 38,26 | 0,211 | 0,293 | 5,918 | 0,46 | 0,055 | 0,164 | 0,014 | 146,8 |
| 0,313 | 19,45 | ||||||||||||
| 4,173 | 110 | ||||||||||||
| 18940 | 41610 | ||||||||||||
| t-Test | -3,043 | -1,303 | -0,696 | -0,812 | 0,738 | 1,584 | 2,353 | -1,856 | -0,797 | -1,495 | 0,654 | 0,564 | |
| MNC PEN73 | Govex | Trade Dep | social sec | Huntington-I | Women Parl | Women %LF | ln PCI | ln PCI^2 | ln(MPR+1) | Fertility Rate | %agland | Constant | |
| annual | 0,015 | 0,091 | -0,646 | -0,22 | 3,273 | 0,008 | 0,001 | 0,278 | -0,054 | 0,003 | -0,004 | 3E-04 | -11,53 |
| deforest | 0,006 | 0,07 | 0,377 | 0,127 | 1,898 | 0,01 | 0,015 | 0,294 | 0,023 | 0,003 | 0,008 | 7E-04 | 7,281 |
| 0,336 | 0,965 | ||||||||||||
| 4,643 | 110 | ||||||||||||
| 51,87 | 102,4 | ||||||||||||
| t-Test | 2,324 | 1,306 | -1,712 | -1,732 | 1,724 | 0,748 | 0,099 | 0,946 | -2,367 | 1,181 | -0,511 | 0,511 | |
| MNC PEN73 | Govex | Trade Dep | social sec | Huntington-I | Women Parl | Women %LF | ln PCI | ln PCI^2 | ln(MPR+1) | Fertility Rate | %agland | Constant | |
| ethno | 0,009 | 0,098 | 0,218 | -0,059 | 0,91 | 0,016 | 0,032 | 0,511 | -0,032 | -0,002 | -0,02 | -0,001 | -3,323 |
| warfare | 0,011 | 0,118 | 0,638 | 0,215 | 3,207 | 0,018 | 0,025 | 0,496 | 0,039 | 0,005 | 0,014 | 0,001 | 12,3 |
| 0,109 | 1,63 | ||||||||||||
| 1,116 | 110 | ||||||||||||
| 35,59 | 292,4 | ||||||||||||
| t-Test | 0,816 | 0,83 | 0,342 | -0,275 | 0,284 | 0,884 | 1,292 | 1,031 | -0,823 | -0,391 | -1,444 | -0,985 | |
| MNC PEN73 | Govex | Trade Dep | social sec | Huntington-I | Women Parl | Women %LF | ln PCI | ln PCI^2 | ln(MPR+1) | Fertility Rate | %agland | Constant | |
| destab./ | 0,002 | 0,029 | 0,073 | -0,033 | 0,535 | -6E-04 | -0,002 | -0,048 | -0,008 | -0,001 | -2E-04 | -4E-04 | -1,938 |
| war | 0,003 | 0,028 | 0,153 | 0,052 | 0,771 | 0,004 | 0,006 | 0,119 | 0,009 | 0,001 | 0,003 | 3E-04 | 2,959 |
| 0,095 | 0,392 | ||||||||||||
| 0,965 | 110 | ||||||||||||
| 1,78 | 16,92 | ||||||||||||
| t-Test | 0,885 | 1,02 | 0,477 | -0,633 | 0,693 | -0,151 | -0,28 | -0,399 | -0,883 | -1,078 | -0,049 | -1,55 | |
Legend: our own calculations with EXCEL 4.0 and 5.0
The Huntington Index, under control for MNC penetration, is even
significantly and positively related to adjustment and gender
empowerment; and the only negative significant effect is the influence
on deforestation. Traditional forms of globalisation are responsible
for the process of stagnation in the world periphery and semi-periphery.
In the countries falling under the Huntington-index, environmental
concerns should achieve greater attention in the future.
The return of dictatorship? Towards understanding the process
of ethno-political conflict and the world-wide refugee problem
In 1989 we heard the prophecy of the 'end of history'. Instead of talking about the end of history, we might be faced with the acceleration of history. Deadly ethno-political conflicts continue to beset the world. In the international system, wars are of course not new; 16 of all the 21 wars with more than a million deaths in history happened during the 20th century. From 1945 to 1992 more than 25 million people died in wars or as a direct consequence of wars (Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, 1993). Civilians have to pay an ever larger price for these wars; the tendency has been rising steadily and in 1990, already 90% of all war victims were civilians. The number of international refugees according to the most narrow definitions increased world-wide from 7.8 million in 1982 to 16.6 million according to the strictest criteria in 1991. To these numbers, one would have to add 3.4 million refugee-like situations of people in foreign countries and 23.5 million internal refugees. All together, there were at least 43 million refugees classified according to various categories around the world in 1991 (op. cit.: 184-185). But estimates of the real number of refugees reach as high as 500 million on a global scale (Datta, 1993). The 'official' data show furthermore, that according to UNHCR criteria, the number of refugees world-wide increased from 16.6 to 24 million people (Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, 1996).
Ethno-political conflicts are among the most vicious forms of international and domestic conflicts. Over 40% of the states of the world have more than 5 major ethnic groups within their borders, with at least one of them facing permanent discrimination (UNDP, 1994). There were 10 major ethnic conflicts in Europe, 6 in the Middle East, 28 in Asia, 23 in Africa, 3 in Latin America during the period 1993-94 (Gurr, 1994). These 50 lethal conflicts produced almost 4 million deaths and displaced 26.8 million people as refugees (Gurr, 1994: 351). It would be wrong, though, to assume that there are necessarily centrifugal tendencies in the international system as such that will still further extend these types of conflicts like bush-fires. Rather, Gurr in his far-reaching empirical work proposes to start from the hypothesis, that the collapse of the communist bloc is only partly to blame for the increase in ethno-political violence, since 54% of all ethno-political conflicts were started before 1987. Since the 1990s, already existing conflicts have tended to intensify, but the spreading of conflicts, Gurr argues, could be avoided. Contention for power, struggle for indigenous rights and ethno-nationalism were the main causes of these conflicts. Huntington's recent thesis about the clash of civilisations receives a considerable qualification from Gurr's empirical work: only 4 of the ethno-political conflicts correspond to the traditional left-right ideological struggle; while 18 are motivated by civilisational struggles (Gurr, 1994: 357). Although ethno-political conflict intensified after the end of the Soviet Union, it would be wrong to blame the first process on the second. The disintegration of the Soviet Union only increased an already existing tendency in world society. Power shifts, the emergence of new states, and revolutions still play an important role in the determination of conflict. But, according to Gurr, it would be wrong to assume, that the fragmentation tendency of the world system were to continue indefinitely. Rather, the most likely scenario will be an increase in communal contention about access to power in the weak and heterogeneous states in Africa. Secessionist conflicts outside Africa and the former communist bloc even declined in intensity over recent years (Gurr, 1994: 364).
Macroquantitative evidence on these processes is very difficult to construct and collect, as long as data collection and data reporting is so deficient in many of the new states of the East and continues to be so in the South as well. Thus, our model can be called only a preliminary test of the Deutsch/Huntington approach to ethno-political conflict and had to start with a few available data series that render themselves at least partially to the testing of the general patterns of the new realities of ethno-political conflict around the world. Our predictors included indicators of dependency (aggregate net transfers, that is to say, inflows that are greater than outflows due to international exploitation), of the liberal approach to development (political and human rights violations versus respect), and of the social-policy approach (mean years of schooling, adult literacy rate, human development index, the fertility rate and its change as an indicator of the process of demographic change). The Deutsch/Huntington school however regards alphabetisation as an indicator of social mobilisation, and hence as a threat to stability.
Our following analysis shows, that the threat to democracy in the semi-periphery and the periphery continues. Superficially, it seems to be, that similar conditions at different times produce similar theories and empirical results: during the emergence of the many new states in the 'Third World' in the early 1960s, more pessimistic versions of modernisation theory gained ground. With the contemporary problems of democracy in the former 'Second World', the stability question of the new recently emerged or liberated states cannot be separated from such modernisation theory dimensions anymore. In the model, that we propose, the chain of causation, underlying the empirical trends, is related to, but not completely patterned according to modernisation theories. For Huntington, instability always was determined by social mobilisation (SM), which works in the direction of instability (IST). This is at least the consistent interpretation, that Weede (1985) has proposed, and which we follow here.
Deutsch was even more radical than Huntington in expressing the idea that development is a threat to stability. His clearly formulated mathematical formula for political stability expects a positive trade-off between government sector size, income concentration and stability on the one hand and a negative trade-off between social mobilisation, level of development and stability on the other hand (Deutsch, 1960/66).
The tragedy in former Yugoslavia could be regarded in many ways as a paradigmatic case, to be explained at least in part by Deutsch's theory. The Deutsch/Huntington school would believe that, however legitimate the issue of transformation from the communist political and economic system in that country might have been, the strategy to cling to communist regional power while opening up the country to the world market was the real and final reason for the break-out of the conflict. In fact, Yugoslavia in the 1980s held many world or at least European records in economic and social policy, that seem to be forgotten more and more in the futile debate about early international recognition of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia as the alleged main cause for the subsequent tragedy. At first inspection, Yugoslavia should have become a real miracle of neo-liberal economic transformation in the 1980s after the ethno-heterogeneous state class model of the 1970s came to a grinding halt. Malicious social scientists might dig out some day these old journal and book contributions, praising the old leadership for what it had achieved in the name of the market, the international financial institutions, and in the name of economic theory. Amen. We refrain from that: errare humanum est. Yugoslavia attempted the most-far-reaching neo-liberal transformation strategy in the region; and for that reason alone its experience should be carefully studied elsewhere: (i) Yugoslavia had the most rapid urbanisation rate of all European countries from 1960 to 1990 (3.2% per annum). In fact, urban population doubled from 28% to 56% in just thirty years. This enormous potential and challenge of social mobilisation was coupled with (ii) a very rapid process of economic transformation and a disappearance of the central state. Yugoslavia recorded the highest rate of gross domestic investment of all countries of the world with complete World Bank WDR data for 1988 and also the highest gross domestic savings rate for the same year. With a savings rate of 2/5 of the national income, Yugoslavia should have been well underway towards self-sustained growth. At the same time, however, the central government in Belgrade reduced in accordance with many international advisors and in a very radical fashion (iii) its role in national economic affairs to almost non-existence. Yugoslavia again holds a world record here, this time for having trimmed down the size of the national total government expenditure as percentage of GNP from 1972 - from 21.1% to 7.5% in 1988. It was the most radical economic transformation from socialism to dependent regional nationalism ever to have been recorded throughout the period of the end of communism in the world; because in no former communist country had there been such a deliberate attempt to reduce the share of the federal government below the 10%-mark. Not even in Pinochet's Chile such a radical cure has been attempted. In both relative and in absolute terms, Yugoslavia was a megaperformer of a kind of regional post-communist IMF-adapted adjustment. The price of the strategy was very clear, but many will shrug their shoulders and ask: so what? The price of the medicine is well-known from many countries now and in a way was also paid in most of the other countries of the region: absolute poverty - according to World Bank World Development Report figures 1990 - increased in the crucial years between 1978 and 1987 from 17% of the population to 25% of the population, and earnings per employee fell by 1.4% annually from 1980 to 1987. Still, household income distribution (iv) was still relatively egalitarian, with the highest 20% controlling just 42.8% of total incomes, and thus not tying the rich closely enough to their political system, so that they would be prepared to fight and die for it, while at the same time impoverishing the poor in absolute terms. All the necessary preconditions for instability, as predicted by Karl Deutsch more than 30 years ago, were present: and to complete the checklist for an absolutely assured crash in the light of Deutsch's nation-building theory, the country had recorded a fairly rapid economic growth rate in the period preceding the stagnation and disaster course of the 1980s; GDP growth stood at 6.0% in the period between 1965 and 1980 and was again in fact the highest economic growth rate in Europe.
The present study on the basis of a sample of 99 countries with
complete data on transfers and ethno-political violence includes
countries of the periphery and the semi-periphery, and nearly
all newly-formed states of the former world of communism. There,
the Gurr-Index of ethno-political conflict (EP) is significantly
pushed upwards at the one hand by the degree of development of
the productive forces. Lamentably enough, adjusted per capita
income (PCI) increases, and not decreases ethno-political
conflict in world society. This result confirms Deutsch's approach
and rejects the still more optimistic vision of the trade-off
between stability and development level, expressed by Huntington.
The dialectic of the situation is further complicated by the fact,
that countries, in order to avoid the stability trap of ethno-political
conflict, have to undergo an early demographic and/or social and
cultural transition; without that, the tendency towards ethno-political
conflict even more increases. High fertility is related to high
income concentration, low fertility to low income concentration
(Tausch and Prager, 1993). With high fertility rates (FR)
- or plausibly, a poorly developed mass communication system -,
no reductions in the level of ethno-political conflict can be
achieved. Deutsch furthermore believed, that especially in a crisis
government sector size increases stability. Huge per capita aggregate
net transfers, that is to say, inflows that are greater than outflows,
decrease the level of ethno-political strife; while repressive
states (REPRESS) are less prone to ethno-political conflict
than full scale democracies. Thus stability-oriented 'Keynesianism'
in the periphery is today being substituted by the 'Tiananmen
formula': repression + capital inflows. There are some elements,
that further qualify Deutsch's theory further: social mobilisation
(alphabetisation) has no visible effect on instability:
Table 6.2: The determination of the Gurr-Index of ethno-political
conflict in the periphery and semi-periphery
Unstandardised regression t-value significant
coefficient at 5%-level
transfers per capita -0.74 -2.06 yes
political rights violations -0.60 -2.65 yes
human development index -0.51 -0.64 no
repressiveness of the security
apparatus +6.22 +0.59 no
population density^0.50 +0.04 +0.02 no
adult literacy rate -0.03 -0.87 no
mean years of schooling +0.02 +0.16 no
ln PCI +0.91 +3.65 yes
ln PCI^2 2.56 +0.25 no
historical fertility rate +0.34 +2.76 yes
failure of demographic
transition -0.00 -1.26 no
________________________________________________________________
n = 99 countries with complete data; R^2 = 32.5%; F = 3.81; 87
degrees of freedom. Legend: 32.5% of ethno-political strife is
being determined by our model. n = 99 periphery and semi-periphery
countries with complete World Bank data about aggregate net transfers,
that is to say, inflows that are greater than the outflows due
to international exploitation, and Gurr data about ethno-political
strife.
We should go back here once more to our Yugoslav example. Yugoslavia, by all its strenuous efforts to achieve a capitalist transformation, produced little in terms of real foreign capital inflows. Net private direct investments were 0 for the year 1988; while it relied - like Jordan and Egypt - to a heavy degree on the earnings of its labour force abroad. Although fertility rates were reasonably low by overall standards in the 1980s, Yugoslavia still was a relatively traditional society especially in terms of media exposure, thus still weakening the link between 'modernity' and the 'state' on the hand and 'the village' and later on the urban misery on the other hand, precisely at a time, when mass communication would have been necessary to hold society together. Again, Karl Wolfgang Deutsch predicted how important mass communication can become for stabilisation, and how dangerous it is to neglect it. There were only 197 TV-sets per 1000 people in 1988-89; and only a daily newspaper circulation rate of 100 per 1000 people at the end of the old Yugoslavia in 1988-89 was achieved. Thus, only Albania had a lower television density in Europe; and only Spain and Portugal had a worse newspaper circulation on the European continent. Combined, Yugoslavia had the worst media density in Europe. And do not forget, that the combined indices still hide the regional diversities between, say, Slovenia and the rural regions of Bosnia. Thus, traditional forms of communication were much stronger than the mass media, controlled by the party and the state, at a time, when great economic hardships hit the population and the state abandoned its role on the economic stage, thus unable to function politically in the end.
The frightening scenario emerging from this analysis is, that indeed a 'Yugoslavia' could re-appear at least under the following conditions in ethnically heterogeneous former communist countries
(i) a rapid urbanisation process preceding transformation
(ii) coupled with great efforts to redirect economic resources towards economic growth
(iii) under the condition of a neo-liberal programme to abolish large part of the former state economic influence on the economy
(iv) with little real resource flows coming in from the capitalist centres
(v) while at the same time, democracy only partially having been restored and
(vi) modern patterns of social behaviour and/or mass communication,
typical for a Western developed democracy, not yet fully developed
To make perhaps matters worse still, Yugoslavia, by not being a member of the European Union, could not send entire families of guest workers abroad for residence; and hundreds of thousands of youngsters - including the fighting generation - were raised by the grandparents instead, who still kept alive the memories of the atrocities of the Second World War and the immediate post-war-periods, both characterised by repression and mass-murder. Yugoslavia again holds a European record - it was the European society with the highest worker remittances from abroad. The guest-worker generation, who in many ways could communicate much better with the other fellow Yugoslav nationalities than their parents, left their children to be raised in the villages, saving for private new homes later being bombarded and burnt systematically to ruins. The children, raised by their grandparents, must have missed their parents, who worked even in such far away countries as Sweden, the Netherlands or Belgium very much, and the children perhaps began to hate them for having them deserted. 'Our son always wept so terribly when we departed after the holidays', an unnamed Yugoslav mother told us once, standing here for hundreds of thousands of Yugoslav parents. But you hardly will hate your own parents, rather, you will project the hatred against others - 'them', the 'opponents', the Albanians, the Bosnian Muslim, the Croats, the Serbs (named alphabetically), et cetera, who stand in the way to fully grasp the fruits of modernisation'. The preconditions for the disaster were thus already present; to make matters worse, the reforms of the regime came too late and never stopped short of steering a middle-course between guided democracy and repression. Thus, condition (vii) for the repetition of the Yugoslav tragedy anywhere else in the region could be a future migration regime of the European Union, that continues to separate migrants from their families and leaves children alone abroad.
This is the answer to the first question of 'country risk' analysis, the causes of instability. The lack of an early demographic transition (FAILURE DEM) and the degree of development (LN PCI) increase, while political rights violations and capital transfers significantly decrease the Gurr-Index of ethno-political conflict on a global level. Other indicators of social or political mobilisation however fail to support other aspects of either Huntington's or Deutsch's theory. It should be noted, that there are insignificant predictors whose direction of influence still cannot be explained by the conservative aspects of the Deutsch/Huntington tradition to explain instability and conflict: the human development index and adult literacy rate, ceteris paribus, even decrease the level of ethno-political conflict, while mean years of schooling slightly increase the level of ethno-political conflict. The velocity of change in fertility rates also has no significant influence on the Gurr index.
In order to stabilise the newly-formed countries of the semi-periphery
and the periphery, whose instability increases with the level
of development, and which initially makes, say, Laos less prone
to such conflicts as Russia or the Ukraine, the following significant
processes intervene then:
* the real transfers from the centres of the world-wide market economy
* the continuing or newly formed power monopoly of a dictatorial group
* an early demographic transition
China received 11 thousand million $ of net foreign direct investment in 1992 alone. In relation to the practically predetermined conditions of the historical fertility rate and the size of the per-capita-income, a government unfortunately seems to be able to respond to the threats of ethno-political conflict by only two processes nowadays: by trying to attract foreign capital inflows and by preventing a further political democratisation. In one word, the 'Tiananmen strategy'.
Aggregate net transfers, that is to say, inflows that are greater than the outflows due to international exploitation, are lowest in countries with civil rights violations very much in excess of political rights violations and in countries with a high human development index; a relatively repressive state machinery in an environment of already begun political reforms and a high human development index are conducive to low inflows or even real outflows of capital.
The trap for the countries of Eastern Europe and the former USSR could not be worse in this context: they are low priority areas for transnational capital, because political reform has begun decisively even in countries, where civil rights violations are much higher than political rights violations, and because human development and thus also social expectations to the investor are higher than in the communist rest of Asia and in other (non-communist) dictatorships. Nothing, what has been written by political scientists in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s has to be revoked in this context: semi-repressive regimes are much more prone to instability than full democracies and full dictatorships; and international capital flows react accordingly.
For the moment, the world economy seems to prefer the environment of low human development, where political repression is still high enough not to warrant any 'excess repressiveness' of the state security apparatus to control via infringements on the level of civil rights the destabilisation, brought about by the lowering of the rate of political repression in heterogeneous countries. Net transfers, that is to say, inflows that are greater than the outflows due to international exploitation, in turn nowadays determine to a large extent the chances of a country in the semi-periphery and periphery for social development. The empirical relationship is drastic enough to be mentioned here: life expectancy, that single, best, and most reliable indicator of the social situation of a country, is being determined by the well-known e/pi-function on the basis of real income in purchasing power, introduced in Chapter 3, and net transfers. Almost 4/5 of life expectancy in the (semi)periphery are thus being determined; net transfers are the predictor of life expectancy, whose unstandardised regression coefficient is 5 times bigger than the standard error of the estimate.
Further support to our interpretations is given by the last two regression equations in Table 4.1. Thus, the countries of the periphery and the semi-periphery today are at the mercy of transnational capital flows: they are at the mercy of transnational capital politically, because inflows of capital stabilise ethno-political conflict potential, and they are the mercy of transnational capital socially, because inflows determine to a large extent and directly the life expectancy of the populations - from Wladiwostock to Hanoi, from Riga to Tirana.
As far as these research results are concerned, they are rather
in the tradition of the gloomy description of the conditions of
democracy in the semi-periphery in the 1920s, written by Karl
Polanyi more than 50 years ago. Will - in contrast to then - the
world-wide market economy save Eastern European democracy?
Transnational crime as a global actor
A cynic could say: an economically realistic staging of a G-7
conference would have to invite today the cupolas of transnational
crime. In terms of world economic power, the international drug
traffic alone is more powerful than states like Spain, Russia,
or Canada (our own calculations from Raith, 1995, UNDP, 1994).
International illegal flight capital prefers certain economic
and social conditions; and in turn, it will contribute to changing
the socio-economic conditions of its host countries. To investigate
the effects of international capital flights on the host countries
concerned, we have developed a simple macro-quantitative model.
Using standard international economic indicators from Fischer
Weltalmanach, we understand money laundering to be roughly the
excess international currency reserves, which are unaccounted
for by the following data in a multiple regression equation:
(6.1) money laundering =
| population | GNP per capita | growth 80-93 | dyn food production | food imports | raw material exports | fertiliser consumption | curr account | debt service | terms of trade | dyn energy production | dyn energy consumption | constant | |
| prediction | 687,85 | 1,38 | -7,018 | -6,349 | -0,819 | 1,0837 | 1,7616 | -12,26 | 1058,8 | -98,17 | 1,6636 | 10,68 | -1245 |
| currency | 335,4 | 107,28 | 56,63 | 37,213 | 0,2119 | 1,0991 | 34,449 | 127,9 | 536,44 | 447,15 | 0,4484 | 4,5276 | 6542,9 |
| reserves | 0,7034 | 5130,4 | |||||||||||
| 9,8829 | 50 | ||||||||||||
| 3E+09 | 1E+09 | ||||||||||||
| t-test | 2,051 | 0,0129 | -0,124 | -0,171 | -3,86 | 0,986 | 0,0511 | -0,096 | 1,974 | -0,22 | 3,71 | 2,359 |
To assess, in turn, the effect of money laundering on growth,
we worked with the following data matrix:
Table 6.3: Money-laundering and its destructive effects on the
national economy:
| population | GNP per cap | growth 80-93 | dyn food prod | food imp | raw mat exp | fertiliser cons | curr account | debt service | terms trade | money laund | |
| Egyp | 56,4 | 660 | 2,8 | 1,3 | 24 | 67 | 3392 | 1566 | 14,9 | 99 | 6873,6 |
| Alger | 26,7 | 1780 | -0,8 | 1,2 | 29 | 97 | 123 | 361 | 76,9 | 95 | -1638,2 |
| Argen | 33,8 | 7220 | -0,5 | -0,3 | 5 | 68 | 78 | -7452 | 46 | 116 | -1256,7 |
| Ethio | 53,6 | 100 | -1,8 | -1,2 | 6 | 96 | 95 | -183 | 9 | 67 | -1857 |
| Bangla | 115,2 | 220 | 2,1 | -0,1 | 15 | 18 | 1032 | 243 | 13,5 | 94 | -3065 |
| Benin | 5,1 | 430 | -0,4 | 1,9 | 25 | 70 | 82 | -52 | 5,9 | 133 | 1949,3 |
| Boliv | 7,1 | 760 | -0,7 | 0,7 | 9 | 81 | 58 | -495 | 59,4 | 78 | -529 |
| Braz | 156,4 | 2930 | 0,3 | 1,2 | 10 | 40 | 608 | -637 | 24,4 | 97 | 22358,5 |
| Burun | 6 | 180 | 0,9 | -0,3 | 18 | 70 | 34 | -26 | 36 | 52 | -2734,3 |
| Chile | 13,8 | 3170 | 3,6 | 1,9 | 6 | 81 | 849 | -2093 | 23,4 | 104 | -524,2 |
| China | 1178,4 | 490 | 8,2 | 3 | 3 | 19 | 3005 | -11609 | 11,1 | 101 | -2670,6 |
| Costa R | 3,3 | 2150 | 1,1 | 0,7 | 8 | 67 | 2354 | -470 | 18,1 | 94 | -6627,4 |
| Cote Iv | 13,3 | 630 | -4,6 | -0,1 | 19 | 83 | 132 | -1229 | 29,2 | 79 | -790,3 |
| Dom Rep | 7,5 | 1230 | 0,7 | -0,9 | 16 | 47 | 694 | 161 | 12,1 | 130 | 381,3 |
| Ecuad | 11 | 1200 | 0 | 0,6 | 5 | 92 | 380 | -360 | 25,7 | 90 | -1905,8 |
| El Sal | 5,5 | 1320 | 0,2 | 0,7 | 15 | 52 | 1073 | -77 | 14,9 | 88 | -3019,4 |
| Gabon | 1 | 4960 | -1,6 | -1,4 | 17 | 97 | 11 | -269 | 6 | 106 | -6344,3 |
| Ghana | 16,4 | 430 | 0,1 | 0,3 | 10 | 77 | 38 | -572 | 22,8 | 65 | -1217,9 |
| Guatem | 10 | 1100 | -1,2 | -0,5 | 11 | 70 | 833 | -687 | 13,2 | 93 | -1290,6 |
| Hondu | 5,3 | 600 | -0,3 | -1,3 | 11 | 86 | 210 | -393 | 31,5 | 73 | 615,7 |
| India | 898,2 | 300 | 3 | 1,5 | 5 | 29 | 720 | -315 | 28 | 96 | -259,2 |
| Indon | 187,2 | 740 | 4,2 | 2,2 | 7 | 47 | 1147 | -2016 | 31,8 | 90 | 1351 |
| Jamaica | 2,4 | 1440 | -0,3 | 1 | 14 | 34 | 973 | -182 | 20,1 | 109 | -3438,7 |
| Camer | 12,5 | 820 | -2,2 | -1,9 | 15 | 86 | 30 | -638 | 20,3 | 77 | 702,1 |
| Kenya | 25,3 | 270 | 0,3 | -0,4 | 8 | 71 | 410 | 153 | 28 | 81 | -200,5 |
| Colom | 35,7 | 1400 | 1,5 | 1 | 8 | 60 | 1032 | -2220 | 29,4 | 68 | 246 |
| Congo | 2,4 | 950 | -0,3 | -1,5 | 19 | 97 | 118 | -507 | 10,8 | 98 | 437,9 |
| S-Korea | 44,1 | 7660 | 8,2 | 0,5 | 6 | 7 | 4656 | 384 | 9,2 | 100 | -693 |
| Laos | 4,6 | 280 | 2,1 | -0,2 | 33 | 96 | 42 | -13 | 9,6 | 90 | 387 |
| Madag | 13,9 | 220 | -2,6 | -1,5 | 11 | 81 | 25 | -167 | 14,3 | 68 | 1371,7 |
| Malaw | 10,5 | 200 | -1,2 | -4,2 | 8 | 94 | 434 | -143 | 22,3 | 86 | 4244,7 |
| Malay | 19 | 3140 | 3,5 | 4,3 | 7 | 35 | 1977 | -2103 | 7,9 | 99 | 9940,5 |
| Mali | 10,1 | 270 | -1 | -0,9 | 20 | 92 | 103 | -103 | 4,5 | 102 | 1200,2 |
| Maroc | 25,9 | 1040 | 1,2 | 2,3 | 17 | 43 | 326 | -525 | 31,7 | 114 | -1408,3 |
| Mauri | 1,1 | 3030 | 5,5 | 0 | 13 | 34 | 2512 | -92 | 6,4 | 108 | -6459,2 |
| Mex | 90 | 3610 | -0,5 | -0,9 | 8 | 47 | 653 | -23393 | 31,5 | 99 | -601,6 |
| Nep | 20,8 | 190 | 2 | 1,2 | 9 | 16 | 391 | -195 | 9 | 97 | -5203,7 |
| Nica | 4,1 | 340 | -5,7 | -2,7 | 23 | 93 | 246 | -457 | 29,1 | 94 | 1695 |
| Niger | 8,6 | 270 | -4,1 | -1,8 | 17 | 98 | 4 | -29 | 31 | 105 | 1819,7 |
| Nigeria | 105,3 | 300 | -0,1 | 2,1 | 18 | 98 | 175 | 2268 | 28,9 | 99 | 311,2 |
| Pak | 122,8 | 430 | 3,1 | 1,2 | 14 | 14 | 1015 | -3327 | 24,7 | 100 | -7258,4 |
| Pan | 2,5 | 2600 | -0,7 | -1,2 | 10 | 84 | 476 | 70 | 3,1 | 87 | -1382,5 |
| Pap | 4,1 | 1130 | 0,6 | -0,2 | 17 | 89 | 308 | 495 | 30,2 | 91 | -967,1 |
| Para | 4,7 | 1510 | -0,7 | 1,3 | 11 | 83 | 96 | -492 | 14,9 | 112 | -5875,9 |
| Peru | 22,9 | 1490 | -2,7 | -0,4 | 20 | 83 | 216 | -1768 | 58,7 | 90 | 2438,1 |
| Philip | 64,8 | 850 | -0,6 | -1,3 | 8 | 24 | 540 | -3289 | 24,9 | 117 | 1732,6 |
| Poland | 38,3 | 2260 | 0,4 | 0,7 | 11 | 40 | 811 | -3698 | 9,2 | 95 | -1086,5 |
| Port | 9,8 | 9130 | 3,3 | 2,6 | 12 | 17 | 813 | 947 | 19,3 | 104 | 3197 |
| Roman | 22,8 | 1140 | -2,4 | -2,4 | 14 | 24 | 423 | -1162 | 6,2 | 111 | 4733,1 |
| Zambia | 8,9 | 380 | -3,1 | -0,3 | 8 | 99 | 160 | -471 | 32,8 | 98 | 2707,6 |
| Zimb | 10,7 | 520 | -0,3 | -3 | 18 | 64 | 481 | -116 | 31,1 | 89 | 561,3 |
| Sri Lank | 17,9 | 600 | 2,7 | -1,8 | 16 | 28 | 964 | -381 | 10,1 | 86 | 2054,3 |
| Sudan | 26,6 | 400 | -0,2 | -2,2 | 19 | 99 | 72 | -1446 | 5,4 | 91 | -931,8 |
| Tans | 28 | 90 | 0,1 | -1,3 | 6 | 85 | 137 | -408 | 20,6 | 85 | 2134,4 |
| Thai | 58,1 | 2110 | 6,4 | 0 | 5 | 28 | 544 | -6928 | 18,7 | 103 | 10516 |
| Trinid | 1,3 | 3830 | -2,8 | -0,6 | 15 | 66 | 801 | 122 | 23,8 | 92 | -6794 |
| Tunes | 8,7 | 1720 | 1,2 | 1,5 | 8 | 25 | 223 | -912 | 20,6 | 100 | -5093,5 |
| Turk | 59,6 | 2970 | 2,4 | 0,3 | 6 | 29 | 702 | -6380 | 28,3 | 109 | -5097,7 |
| Ugan | 18 | 180 | 1,9 | 0,3 | 8 | 100 | 1 | -107 | 143,6 | 49 | -415,7 |
| Hung | 10,2 | 3350 | 1,2 | -0,7 | 6 | 32 | 292 | -4262 | 38,8 | 102 | 825,2 |
| Urug | 3,1 | 3830 | -0,1 | 0,3 | 8 | 57 | 608 | -227 | 27,7 | 114 | -4631,9 |
| Venez | 20,9 | 2840 | -0,7 | 0,2 | 11 | 86 | 874 | -2223 | 22,8 | 93 | 6139,1 |
| CAfriR | 3,2 | 400 | -1,6 | -1 | 19 | 56 | 5 | -21 | 4,8 | 91 | 0 |
| population | GNP per cap | growth 80-93 | dyn food prod | food imp | raw mat exp | fertiliser cons | curr account | debt service | terms trade | money laund |
This yielded the following results, explaining almost 65% of economic
growth:
(6.2) money laundering and economic growth
| dyn food prod | food imp | raw mat exp | fertiliser cons | curr account | debt service | terms trade | money laund | lnGNP | ln GNP^2 | constant |
| 0,160315 | -2,43436 | 1,86E-06 | -0,00958 | 0,004269 | -4,6E-05 | 0,001343 | -0,02796 | -0,02825 | 0,513553 | 11,36795 |
| 0,172427 | 2,366866 | 4,77E-05 | 0,01811 | 0,012305 | 6,88E-05 | 0,000313 | 0,010356 | 0,042082 | 0,164342 | 7,91605 |
| 0,6475 | 1,728365 | |||||||||
| 9,552412 | 52 | |||||||||
| 285,354 | 155,3368 | |||||||||
| 0,929751 | -1,02852 | 0,039072 | -0,52907 | 0,346949 | -0,66766 | 4,295231 | -2,69961 | -0,67126 | 3,124894 | t-test |
The Matthew's effect, terms of trade, and money laundering explain
significantly economic growth in the world periphery and semi-periphery
from the 1980 onwards. 64.8% of total variance is accounted for
by our model. Contrary to the myth, that - however morally detestable,
such a shadow economy is beneficial for economic growth, the opposite
holds.
7) Problem number 4: Europe must come to terms with the
contradictions between Europe, the developed centre, and its Eastern
European periphery, and the problems of political instability,
nationalism, and unequal development, that the present form of
interaction between the centre and the periphery bring about
For the Visegrad countries and Slovenia it will probably take about twenty more years at present growth rates to reach the average income levels of the European Union countries in 1994 (World Bank, WDR, 1996). Following the radical perspective, so brilliantly exposed by Claude Julien in Le Monde Diplomatique September 1996, the question cannot be how well countries like Poland adapted to a blueprint, (for example, contained in the famous White Paper of the European Commission (1995)), but what contradictions, cleavages and conflicts arose within Poland and between Poland and the old West European centres in the process of globalisation and the expansion of the market order into Eastern Europe after 1989. To put the problem in Osvaldo Sunkel's terms again: Eastern Europe saw a slow rise in the share of the gross product of foreign affiliates as a ratio to home country GDP (from 0.0% in 1982 to 1.3% in 1991), while the market-power of the transnational corporations saw to it, that the sales of foreign affiliates dominated an ever-growing share of the exports of goods and non-factor-services of the transition countries (the share went up from 0.9% in 1982 to 22.8% in 1993).
The famous Commission White Paper on the integration of the East European countries into the Union thus was an answer - but what was the question? The global economy approach is miles away from the current Union expansion optimism, prevailing in the debate about Poland. On the face of it, Poland has done remarkably well over recent years. But how often in history Poland saw spurts of growth, to be followed by conflict, stagnation and dependence from the Great Powers?
The gap between Poland and even the poorest European Union countries
in many areas is still considerable. The following overview from
UNDP HDR 1996 data (referring to 1993 for reasons of international
comparison) about the vulnerable position of Poland in world
society will quickly characterise the dimension of issues
which are still at stake. The social and ecological tasks are
simply enormous. And in addition, the expenditure of the state
apparatus is more government-consumption oriented already than
in the average EU countries, with too little emphasis on health
and human capital formation:
social policy dimension PL 1993 EU average or Polish rank
in world society in 1993
life expectancy 71.1 76.8
human development index 0.819 rank 56 from 174 countries
gender development index 0.802 rank 37 from 137 countries
gender empowerment index 0.431 rank 41 from 104 countries
maternal mortality rate 19 13
population per doctor 467 301
unemployment rate 16.4% 11.1%
inflation rate 31.1% 3.5%
prisoners per 100 000 inhab. 160 87
male adults who smoke 63% 44%
female adults who smoke 29% 25%
total health expenditure as %
of GDP 5.1% 7.5%
total education expenditure
as % of GDP 4.9% 5.4%
annual growth rate of real
earnings per employee 1980-
1992 -0.8% +2.8%
weekly real hours of work
per person in manufacturing 34 39
expenditure on labour market
programmes as % of GDP 2.3% 3.3%
female tertiary students per
100 000 people 1680 2698
share of the country in the
total industrial country GNP
world-wide 0.4% 37.0%
terms of trade 1993 (1987=100) 95 103
current account balance before
official transfers in US$ mill-
ions -5927 +38860
water resources per
capita (1000m3 per year) 1.3 3.2
GDP output per kg energy
consumption in US$ 0.9 5.4
energy import dependence:
commercial energy imports
as % of merchandise exports 20% 8%
thousands of tons of green-
house gas emissions p.a. 343210 3303230
hazardous waste production
in 1000 metric tons, 1991-94 3444 48220
population served by muni-
cipal waste services in % 55% 98%
percentage of people working
in agriculture ... 27% 6%
... receiving the following share
of total GDP 6% 3%
government consumption 22% 19%
gross domestic savings 13% 20%
exports per GDP 16% 22%
Source. our own compilation from UNDP Human Development Report,
1996
For the Commission of the European Union, these dimensions at
stake here were reduced to 13 questions in the field of Justice
and Home Affairs and - apart from statistical background-informations
- to the following number of questions in the field of Employment
and Social Affairs:
12 legal and institutional framework
19 employment and employment protection
19 conditions of work and pay
7 social dialogue
7 industrial disputes
15 equality of treatment
11 health and safety at work
26 immigration policy
5 social security for migrant workers
9 social protection
12 public health and health promotion
Important tasks were achieved, but others, like the reform
of the social security system, the migration law project,
an efficient law against money laundering, and a law that
would criminalise the possession of drugs, are either not
yet on the horizon (social security reform) or are threatened
to be delayed by early elections. An inter-ministerial 100 person
task force is currently drafting a national drug strategy and
should develop additional legislation to comply with the 1988
UN Drugs Convention, but again, internal political squabbles pose
at least a questionmark behind the proposed timetable. The successive
Governments of Poland have done a lot in the right directions,
but the framework of a semi-periphery country in the world economy
creates pressures and instabilities which largely co-determine
the social policy outcomes. Published social scientific evidence
(UNDP, 1996) suggests, that the following basic conditions for
Polish social policy still exist - the spurt of recent economic
growth notwithstanding ((i) to (ix) all UNDP data):
(i) the number of employed in Poland is still smaller by 2.4 million persons in comparison with the end of 1989
(ii) the growth of employment in the private sector did not yet fully compensate the job losses in the public sector after 1989
(iii) 800000 to 1.1 million Poles work in the 'hidden economy'
(iv) there is an alarming decline in the outflow from unemployment
to official work in relation to the total outflow, suggesting
that the hidden economy, illegal foreign labour, and other forms
of existence compensate for the losses:
Graph 7.1: unemployment in Poland - total outflows and outflows
to work, 1990-1995
(v) youth unemployment remains very high and is in fact over 30%
(vi) 280000 persons are totally discouraged from looking for any kind of work, a trend which is exacerbated by the ever more stringent requirements to receive unemployment benefits
(vii) hidden unemployment on the farms also amounts to a large number of affected people, in all 450000 to 690000 persons
(viii) both the Solidarity era and the post-communist governments are characterised by the 'equally marked absence' of a 'determined political will to reconstruct the social security system' (UNDP, 1996) social insurance benefits paid from the national budget consume now 1/6 of the total GDP. All three reform attempts - the one by the Senate in 1992 and 1993, the one by the Ministry of Labour between 1992 and 1993, and the Ministry of Finance Reform Project 1995 as yet did not become law, while the financial pressure on the state will increase with the upcoming changes in the age structure. With average pensions amounting to 75% of the average wage, the proposal of the Ministry of Labour to negotiate pension rises at the level in between pay rises (maximum) and price increases (minimum) does not sound convincing; rather, finance Minister Kolodko's proposal oriented on price increases sounded more logical. According to their own experts, the Ministry of Labour estimates that by 2000, in order to avoid a financial breakdown, the social security contribution level (paid in Poland exclusively by employers) should amount to 62.5% of gross wages, if present trends continue. By 2020, the number of pensioners will increase by yet another 3 million from 9 million persons to 12 million beneficiaries. The failure to initiate the breakthrough in 1996 will mean - especially after the political shake-up in the finance-ministry away from Kolodko in direction of the more populist PSL - that the reform of social security will be on the agenda in Poland beyond the year 2000
(ix) recent studies suggest, that the social policy frame of reference for the disabled persons in Poland is not satisfactory (UNDP, 1996). There are now 4376000 disabled persons in Poland. 60% of them only have the most basic educational level, making this group of people even more vulnerable on the labour market. The majority of disabled persons in Poland is professionally inactive. In 1995, the unemployment rate of disabled persons in the cities was 28.1%, while in the countryside it was only 6.2%. Young disabled male persons under 24 years of age have an unemployment rate of more than 50% (UNDP, 1996: 88). Almost 43% of the households of disabled persons assert that they can only afford the cheapest food and clothing. Over half are indebted and have difficulties with the repayment of debts. As many as 43% assert that they lack means for basic medicines and treatment. 85% of all disabled feel themselves excluded from the means of public transportation. The fund, created by the Polish government to care for the disabled, has often been quoted in the context of mismanagement. Pollution and low access to medical care in the countryside determine, that 39% of all disabled persons live in the villages. Alarmingly, the Polish press recently suggested, that the country's main fund-institution for the disabled, PFRON, was a hotbed of corruption and mismanagement.
Let us be realistic: with or without Union membership, Eastern
Europe will be faced by the aftermath's of its transformation
crisis for many years to come. Poverty and dependence have emerged
as one of the most basic issues of post-communist reconstruction.
The true extent of poverty is contested in the various countries
of East and Central Europe, with the fairest estimates being based
perhaps on recent research by the UN, the ILO and the World Bank:
Table 7.1: Poverty and peripherisation in (Eastern) Europe
a) social data
| % poor (EU-criteria) | life expectancy | PPP (purcha-sing power) | share of lowest 20% in total incomes | PPP$-income of lowest 20% | |
| Portugal | 24,50% | 74 | 43,8 | 9,20% | 4658,2176 |
| Italy | 21,10% | 77 | 76,7 | 6,80% | 6029,2336 |
| Greece | 18,70% | 77 | 34,6 | ||
| Spain | 16,90% | 77 | 57 | 8,30% | 5469,036 |
| Ireland | 15,70% | 75 | 52,2 | ||
| NL | 14,80% | 77 | 76 | 8,20% | 7204,192 |
| UK | 14,80% | 76 | 72,4 | 4,60% | 3849,9424 |
| France | 14,70% | 77 | 83 | 5,60% | 5373,088 |
| Poland | 12,80% | 70 | 21,1 | 9,20% | 2244,0272 |
| Luxembourg | 11,10% | ||||
| FRG | 9,10% | 76 | 89,1 | 7,00% | 7209,972 |
| Belgium | 8,60% | 76 | 78,5 | 7,90% | 7168,934 |
b) world economic position
| trade balance.92-95 | debt 95 | FDI | current account 94-97 | |
| Czech R | -5813 | 14000 | 5275 | -6650 |
| Hungary | -10562 | 32491 | 8361 | -9611 |
| Poland | -17696 | 44244 | 2098 | -10944 |
| Slovakia | -931 | 4800 | 681 | 542 |
| Slovenia | -854 | 2685 | 504 | 809 |
| Bulgaria | -1742 | 10363 | 332 | -225 |
| Romania | -6084 | 4727 | 884 | -3728 |
| Croatia | -4495 | 3152 | 224 | -2397 |
| 8 reform states | -48177 | 116462 | 18359 | -32204 |
Source: OMRI Economic Digest, 21. week., 1996 (Poland, column
1); World Bank World Development Report 1995 (column 2-5), Stiftung
Entwicklung und Frieden, 1996 (column 1, all values except Poland);
Vienna Institute for International Economic Comparisons, February
1996
On a world level, the available data show, that Eastern Europe
very much belongs to the countries of the periphery and the semi-periphery:
Table 7.2: Poverty on a world scale
| country | real GDP PPP | share of lowest 40% | HDI | PPP$ income of the poorest 40% | trend value, calculated from HDI |
| CND | 20520 | 17,5 | 0,95 | 8977,5 | 13000,14113 |
| USA | 23760 | 15,7 | 0,937 | 9325,8 | 9748,340977 |
| Jap | 20520 | 21,9 | 0,937 | 11234,7 | 9748,340977 |
| NL | 17780 | 21,3 | 0,936 | 9467,85 | 9547,701142 |
| SF | 16270 | 18,4 | 0,934 | 7484,2 | 9163,773431 |
| NOR | 18580 | 19 | 0,932 | 8825,5 | 8801,656129 |
| F | 19510 | 17,4 | 0,93 | 8486,85 | 8459,867797 |
| SP | 13400 | 22 | 0,93 | 7370 | 8459,867797 |
| SWE | 18320 | 21,2 | 0,929 | 9709,6 | 8296,165775 |
| AUSL | 18220 | 15,5 | 0,927 | 7060,25 | 7982,342057 |
| BLG | 18630 | 21,6 | 0,926 | 10060,2 | 7831,917437 |
| CH | 22580 | 16,9 | 0,925 | 9540,05 | 7685,625428 |
| GER | 21120 | 18,8 | 0,921 | 9926,4 | 7139,116224 |
| DK | 19080 | 17,4 | 0,92 | 8299,8 | 7011,530461 |
| NZ | 14990 | 15,9 | 0,919 | 5958,525 | 6887,32833 |
| UK | 17160 | 14,6 | 0,916 | 6263,4 | 6533,954863 |
| ITA | 18090 | 18,8 | 0,912 | 8502,3 | 6103,997561 |
| ISR | 14700 | 18,1 | 0,907 | 6651,75 | 5624,92576 |
| HUN | 6580 | 25,7 | 0,856 | 4227,65 | 2921,305573 |
| POL | 4830 | 23 | 0,855 | 2777,25 | 2891,893373 |
| BUL | 4250 | 24,3 | 0,796 | 2581,875 | 1813,602592 |
| HONG | 20340 | 16,2 | 0,905 | 8237,7 | 5449,488888 |
| CRIC | 5480 | 13,1 | 0,883 | 1794,7 | 3982,388689 |
| SKOR | 9250 | 19,7 | 0,882 | 4555,625 | 3931,55495 |
| CHIL | 8410 | 10,5 | 0,88 | 2207,625 | 3833,129873 |
| SING | 18330 | 15 | 0,878 | 6873,75 | 3738,838794 |
| VEN | 8520 | 14,3 | 0,859 | 3045,9 | 3012,969789 |
| PAN | 5600 | 8,3 | 0,856 | 1162 | 2921,305573 |
| MEX | 7300 | 11,9 | 0,842 | 2171,75 | 2555,102336 |
| COLO | 5480 | 11,2 | 0,836 | 1534,4 | 2424,160023 |
| THAI | 5950 | 15,5 | 0,827 | 2305,625 | 2251,235007 |
| MALA | 7790 | 12,9 | 0,822 | 2512,275 | 2165,701829 |
| BRAZ | 5240 | 7 | 0,804 | 917 | 1907,79939 |
| BOTSW | 5120 | 10,5 | 0,763 | 1344 | 1517,011192 |
| TUNI | 5160 | 16,3 | 0,763 | 2102,7 | 1517,011192 |
| JOR | 4270 | 16,8 | 0,758 | 1793,4 | 1481,838888 |
| ALG | 4870 | 17,9 | 0,732 | 2179,325 | 1327,452726 |
| JAM | 3200 | 15,9 | 0,721 | 1272 | 1273,580079 |
| PERU | 3300 | 14,1 | 0,709 | 1163,25 | 1220,745498 |
| DOMR | 3280 | 12,1 | 0,705 | 992,2 | 1204,32718 |
| SRIL | 2850 | 22 | 0,704 | 1567,5 | 1200,307847 |
| PHIL | 2550 | 16,6 | 0,677 | 1058,25 | 1102,78266 |
| INDNS | 2950 | 20,8 | 0,637 | 1534 | 986,4808145 |
| CHINA | 1950 | 17,4 | 0,594 | 848,25 | 883,6034386 |
| GUAT | 3300 | 7,9 | 0,591 | 651,75 | 876,9849307 |
| BOL | 2410 | 15,3 | 0,588 | 921,825 | 870,4239262 |
| HOND | 2000 | 8,7 | 0,578 | 435 | 848,9405082 |
| MORO | 3370 | 17,1 | 0,554 | 1440,675 | 799,4488133 |
| ZIMB | 1970 | 10,3 | 0,539 | 507,275 | 769,7212024 |
| PAK | 2890 | 21,3 | 0,483 | 1538,925 | 664,4802797 |
| GHAN | 2110 | 18,3 | 0,482 | 965,325 | 662,6656565 |
| KENYA | 1400 | 10,1 | 0,481 | 353,5 | 660,8529474 |
| LESO | 1060 | 9,3 | 0,473 | 246,45 | 646,4186041 |
| INDIA | 1230 | 21,3 | 0,439 | 654,975 | 586,2995811 |
| ZAMB | 1230 | 15,2 | 0,425 | 467,4 | 562,0730941 |
| COTE | 1710 | 19,2 | 0,369 | 820,8 | 467,9859332 |
| BANGLA | 1230 | 22,9 | 0,364 | 704,175 | 459,799976 |
| MAUR | 1650 | 14,2 | 0,359 | 585,75 | 451,6492905 |
| NEPAL | 1170 | 22 | 0,343 | 643,5 | 425,8058487 |
| SEN | 1750 | 10,5 | 0,34 | 459,375 | 421,0010423 |
| RWA | 710 | 22,8 | 0,332 | 404,7 | 408,2519759 |
| UGA | 860 | 20,6 | 0,329 | 442,9 | 403,4951384 |
| GUINB | 820 | 8,6 | 0,293 | 176,3 | 347,4633236 |
| ETHIO | 330 | 21,3 | 0,227 | 175,725 | 250,151321 |
Column 1: GDP per capita in real PPP (UNDP, World Bank, 1994, 1995)
Column 2: income share poorest 40% (see above)
Column 3: human development index, UNDP, 1995 (see above)
Column 4: real income of the poorest 40% (column 1 * (column 2/40))
Column 5: trend value for column 4 on the basis of a non-linear
regression, explaining the real incomes of the poorest 40% by
the human development index
There is a clear trade-off between the size of the UNDP Human
Development Index and the absolute income of the poorest sections
in society:
Graph 7.2: human development and human poverty
Our calculations were based on 65 countries of the world with
complete data about real purchasing power, the income share of
the poorest 40% and the human development index. The rectangular
dots correspond to the estimated real income of the poor in international
standards (income in PPP * (income shares of the poorest 40%/40)),
the trend line is the non-linear trend estimate, according
to VARIATION in the EXCEL programme, using as variables the human
development index ^10 and the human development index ^0,10. The
trend line corresponds to an equation, that explains 89 % of
total variance. The lower graph shows the results for countries,
which are the transformation countries or which are on a similar
or higher level of achieved human development.
The values of the UNDP Human Development Index in the region are,
by international comparison:
NL 0.936 (world rank 4.)
SF 0.934
F 0.930
Spain 0.930
SWE 0.929
B 0.926
AUT 0.925
GER (incl. new B.) 0.921
DK 0.920
UK 0.916
IRE 0.915
ITA 0.912
GRE 0.907
LUX 0.893
PORT 0.874 (world rank 36.)
CZECH 0.872 (world rank 38.)
ESTON 0.862
LATV 0.857
HUNG 0.856
POL 0.855
BUL 0.796
LITHU 0.769
ALB 0.739
ROM 0.703 (world rank 98.)
Although few would challenge the diagnosis, there is of course a wide and ample debate about how to cure the ills of the region. In terms of hard cross-national evidence, the World Bank (WDR, 1996) has proposed economic liberalisation, foreign direct investment inflows, savings mobilisation, wage flexibility, government credibility and privatisation as the main pillars of it's strategy.
But the debate about Eastern European reconstruction seems to be dominated by several fallacies. The first fallacy would concern the famous hypothesis about the 'market economy without adjective nouns' as an engine of a successful transformation process. Following the logic, already proposed by Adamczyk, 1992; Angresano, 1994 and Jenkins, 1987, a de-facto policy of mass demand maintenance might be better adapted to survive the transformation shocks and might - in the end - even prove more profitable for large-scale TNC investment than the real 'shock therapy strategies'. The Czech Republic, whose prime minister - as a brilliant academic - is the most outspoken champion of the idea about 'markets without adjective nouns', is not only one of the most successful cases of liberal transformation, but also has the aspect of a bureaucratic, almost Keynesian welfare-state that survived the ups and downs of politics in the 20th century and was already practising that system before the breakdown of the Hapsburg Empire in 1918. We have for a long time advanced this point; M. Orenstein has taken up the issue in transnational research as well (Orenstein, 1996). It is certain, that the Czech Republic, even on an aggregate level before partition from its poorer cousin, Slovakia, verbally the most radical proponent of neo-conservative economic strategies in Central Eastern Europe, had a very high share of social security benefits per GDP; the level of health expenditures was way above the other reform countries; and even before partition, the human development index - in marked contrast to Poland, Albania, Romania, and Bulgaria, - was more acceptable to international standards of human capital policy. The Czech government did even intervene in less than neo-conservative economic sainthood into the workings of the labour markets. The intervention, worth 1% of GDP, was targeted to a much smaller number of unemployed persons than in Poland, Hungary and other reform nations with high unemployment. The Czech Republic, even before partition from its poorer Slovak cousin, was practically the uncontested overall social policy record holder in Eastern Europe.
The second fallacy concerns the workings of foreign capital in the region and in the development process. Simple macro-economic reasoning would already demonstrate, that a sound economy, based on dynamic export-growth and huge positive trade and service balances, tends to be an overall capital exporter and not a capital importer. The macro-economic need for high net foreign investment, hence the predominance of foreigners investing at home as compared to the investments of nationals abroad on the enterprise level precisely arises, when either export-led growth is insufficient or import-substitution strategies are in force or both. Everything that has been said over the last thirty years about globalisation can also be interpreted in terms of a radical neo-classic critique of import-substitution policies and insufficient export-oriented strategies (Ernst, 1973). In terms of the effects of globalisation on the South and the East, it should be stressed that there is a growing competition between the East and the South in terms of the 'world market for capital'. This competition makes studies, that look into the determinants of growth and development for the present time period all the more important. International development aid for the South amounted to 0.33% of OECD-countries in 1991, while funds for the East were 0.04% of OECD GNP. Accumulated foreign direct investments from the 7 biggest investors in the developed countries (US, Japan, UK, FRG, NL, France, Canada), which, in turn, control about 80% of all FDI, now amount to 1395 thousand million $, with a dramatic doubling having taken place since around 1985. In 1976, the 7 biggest investors had just invested 239 thousand million $ abroad, i.e. their foreign capital increased almost 5.8-fold since 1976. 80% of this capital is being invested in the countries of the developed hemispheres. This also says something in terms of the old debate about stability versus low labour costs as the prime determinants for the site of transnational investments. The East, hoping to attract foreign capital to the detriment of the relative share of the developed countries must ask itself, whether or not low labour costs are a necessary let alone sufficient condition to attract foreign capital.
The new debts incurred in the region (without the CIS) after the
transformation were 5 thousand million $ just in 1993 alone. The
right wing in Poland contends, that the left which governes Poland
since 1993, has incurred a trade balance deficit to the tune of
22 billion $ since taking power. In fact, one could even argue
that there was no such thing as Western aid to the East at the
early stages of the transformation, especially to some transformation
economies in Europe. Regimes that received real net transfers
were the (former) 'real socialist' regimes of various Marxist
or 'real socialist' denominations in the South and in the (former)
USSR, but not all the transformation economies of Eastern Europe.
Western protectionism and monopoly practices are to be held partially
responsible for the fact, that aggregate net transfers to the
East (after due consideration of interests paid for Western Banks,
donors and profits, paid out to investors) were sometimes negative,
as the following table shows in the context of the precarious
social conditions, governing the lives of hundreds of millions
of human beings in the former or continuously communist nations
of the world and in the other (former) left-wing oriented countries
in the South.
Table 7.3: the position of the East and the (former) 'de-linking'
South in the new world system
a) savings mobilisation, investment, export performance and growth
in Eastern Europe according to Vienna Institute for International
Economic Comparisons data
| savings/GDP | I/GDP | E/GDP | GDP 1989=100 | Year | |
| 26 | 30,4 | 0,5 | 90,9 | Bulgaria | 1990 |
| 26,9 | 22,6 | 4,3 | 80,3 | 1991 | |
| 14,1 | 19,9 | -5,8 | 74,4 | 1992 | |
| 7,7 | 15,3 | -7,6 | 73,3 | 1993 | |
| 12,5 | 13,1 | -0,6 | 74,6 | 1994 | |
| 29,9 | 28,6 | 1,3 | 98,9 | Czech | 1990 |
| 36,7 | 29,9 | 6,8 | 84,7 | 1991 | |
| 27,4 | 27,1 | 0,4 | 79,3 | 1992 | |
| 20,2 | 18 | 2,2 | 78,6 | 1993 | |
| 20,1 | 20,5 | -0,4 | 80,6 | 1994 | |
| 28 | 25,4 | 2,6 | 96,5 | Hungary | 1990 |
| 19,5 | 20,5 | -1 | 85 | 1991 | |
| 15,8 | 16,1 | -0,3 | 82,4 | 1992 | |
| 11,8 | 20 | -8,2 | 81,9 | 1993 | |
| 15,7 | 22,2 | -6,5 | 84,3 | 1994 | |
| 32,8 | 25,6 | 7,1 | 88,4 | Poland | 1990 |
| 18 | 19,9 | -1,9 | 82,3 | 1991 | |
| 16,7 | 15,2 | 1,5 | 84,4 | 1992 | |
| 16,5 | 15,6 | 1 | 87,6 | 1993 | |
| 16,9 | 15,9 | 1 | 92,1 | 1994 | |
| 20,8 | 30,3 | -9,5 | 94,4 | Romania | 1990 |
| 24,1 | 28 | -3,9 | 82,2 | 1991 | |
| 23 | 31,4 | -8,4 | 75,1 | 1992 | |
| 24 | 29 | -5 | 76,1 | 1993 | |
| 24,9 | 26,9 | -2,1 | 79,1 | 1994 | |
| 23,3 | 26,5 | -4,5 | 77,9 | Slovak R | 1992 |
| 16,4 | 21,9 | -6 | 75,1 | 1993 | |
| 19,4 | 17,1 | 6,1 | 78,7 | 1994 | |
| 34 | 16,8 | 15,7 | 95,3 | Slovenia | 1990 |
| 29,5 | 15,6 | 12,2 | 87,6 | 1991 | |
| 27,5 | 17,1 | 9,1 | 82,9 | 1992 | |
| 24,1 | 19,1 | 3 | 83,9 | 1993 | |
| 27,8 | 20,7 | 5 | 88,4 | 1994 |
b) aggregate net transfers received in b $ in 1992
Mozambique 1.060
Ethiopia 1.033
Lao PDR 0.104
Nicaragua 0.718
China 19.783
Tajikistan 0.010
Myanmar 0.087
Armenia 0.002
Kyrgyz R. 0.022
Georgia 0.0
Uzbekistan 0.056
Romania 1.056
Moldova 0.012
Lithuania 0.121
Bulgaria 0.062
Kazakstan 0.116
Ukraine 0.221
Poland -0.027
Latvia 0.114
Russian Fed. 13.895
Albania 0.375
Mongolia 0.149
Estonia 0.178
Belarus 0.182
Hungary -0.392
Source: our own compilations from Vienna Institute for International
Economic Comparisons; World Bank, WDR (1994) and HDR UNDP, 1994
Although most recent data (World Bank, WDR, 1996) seem to suggest a certain reversal in the trends of the international division of labour within Europe, it is pretty certain that the whole region, from 1990 to 1995, received only 15% of all total inflows to the developing and transition countries to the tune of $1640 thousand million in the entire world economy (World Bank, WDR, 1996). The World Development Report 1996 clearly states:
'One might have expected huge imports of capital, both private and official, to participate in financing the costly economic and political transformation (...) However, except for the former East Germany (i.e. $700 thousand million), CEE and the NIS have not absorbed a great deal of foreign capital - either private investment flows or official external assistance (...) Between them the countries of CEE and the NIS absorbed 15 percent of total capital flows to developing and transition countries (...) Net resource inflows are much lower and even negative to some countries, once debt service and capital flight are taken into account. Capital flight from Russia alone has been estimated at some $50 billion (i.e. thousand million) for 1992-95, although part of this represented capital exported through Russia from other NIS (...) In 1994, FDI to CEE and the NIS was only $6.5 billion (i.e. thousand million), equivalent to the total received by Malaysia and Thailand (...) The Visegrad countries received fully three-quarters of the total, whereas many other countries in the region are still all but untouched by foreign investment (...) All in all, then, transition has not absorbed a large slice of global capital flows (...) Aid under the Marshall Plan after World War II averaged 2.5 percent of the incomes of the recipient countries at the time. Total official disbursements to the CEE economies, which have generally progressed furthest in their reforms, accounted on average for about 2.7 of their combined GDP in 1991-93. Under-recording of GDP in these economies may bias this ratio upward, but on this measure Marshall Plan disbursements were not materially larger (...) The Marshall Plan did, however, embody a larger grant element, and it was much more generous relative to the donor economy's income, at 1.5 percent of U.S. GDP.' (World Bank, World Development Report, 1996: 136 and 10)
With the opening-up of Eastern Europe to transnational capital, a very interesting social scientific experiment got underway. What are the effects of foreign direct investment on a newly penetrated economy? The UNDP HDR 1995 for Poland, drawing upon the knowledge of the Polish Central Statistical Office, mentions even a human development index of 0.801 for the whole country for 1992, which would mean world rank 53 - together with Armenia. The poorest Polish provinces in terms of the HDI - like Suwalki in the far Northeast of the country with a value of 0.707 - would be ranking 78th on the world scale - in the vicinity of countries like Albania, Grenada, Tunisia and Surinam. Little is known about the social effects of transnational penetration in Eastern Europe as yet: the penetration of Eastern Europe by direct foreign investments is a relatively new phenomenon. Although earlier studies, among them Chase-Dunn, 1982, Szlajfer, 1977 and Tausch, 1985, already stressed the world-market dependent character of 'real socialism', the flow of direct foreign investments increased significantly only after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Russia and Hungary received the lion's share of western capital flows to the East. Foreign capital in the Polish economy, that perennial testing ground for beliefs of all sort over the last millennium, is now estimated to amount to $ 7.389 thousand million (UNCTAD, 1996); the inflows are small however, compared to the massive flows of TNC capital to countries like China. The FDI stock as percentage of GDP in 1994 was already 5.1%, while in Brazil it was 8.0%. In 1992, Poland received new investments to the tune of only 678 million $, while 11 thousand million $ went to China in the same year (World Bank, WDR, 1994). Poland even paid aggregate net transfers to the West during the Solidarity years. And here, the third fallacy about post-1989 reconstruction arises: some Eastern countries were at the crucial time of the political transition in an increasingly precarious position vis-à-vis the centres of the transnational economy, just like the predecessor regimes in the region in the 1920s and 1930s and the countries of the periphery today. Aggregate net transfers are understood as aggregate net resource flows minus interest payments on long-term loans and remittance of all profits. Aggregate net resource flows are the sum of net flows on long-term debt (excluding use of IMF credit), plus official grants (excluding technical assistance) and net foreign direct investment. That is to say, Poland (just as Hungary), in reality, were de-capitalised by the world economy, when the new elites in power would have needed Western support most urgently (World Bank, WDR, 1994). As we will show below, the workings of the transnational economy did probably contribute to the political cleavages and to the downfall of the Solidarity government in 1993. The yearly de-capitalisation amounted to 27 million $. The share of foreign investment per total GDP, i.e. the value of the index, what Bornschier and Mueller (1988) call 'foreign property', is now 8.5% for the overall Polish economy. In terms of the employment effects, one finds that transnational capital now controls the most important modern, dynamic consumer goods sectors; 2.7% of the total labour force and 6.8% of all workers and employees in industry work for international firms. The private sector is dominated to a still larger degree by foreign firms; 16% of the labour force in private industry in fact works for foreign firms.
The fourth fallacy concerns the effects of 'dependent development' on the host countries. The employment effects of transnational investments were over- the socially polarising effects of transnational investments underestimated. Regional concentration of development increases, and with that the political cleavages of a basically still semi-peripheral society. Even for the case of China, the World Bank WDR 1996 states:
'FDI to China was $33.8 billion (i.e. thousand million) in
1994, second only to flows to the United States. However, a substantial
portion consisted of domestic funds recycled as foreign investment
to take advantage of fiscal concessions' (World Bank, WDR, 1996:
136)
A Polish case study
Poland's position in the world is first of all confronted by the fact, that since 1989 all her neighbours have changed - only the Baltic seacoast has remained the same. East Germany to the East has disappeared and has been reunited with West Germany, Czechoslovakia to the South has separated into the Czech and the Slovak Republics, and to the East, the USSR dissolved - leaving the Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, and Kaliningrad oblast, still pertaining to Russia, behind. The development effort of the West in such a world politically highly sensitive region - and especially TNC investment - is concentrated around the rich centres of Poland, like Warsaw, Gdansk, Katowice, Krakow, Poznan and Wroclaw. A similar picture arises from the other transformation countries. The poor rural regions of Poland are almost totally neglected by foreign capital; some run-away industries are growing up in the western regions, bordering the Federal Republic of Germany.
The transformation after 1989 destroyed more than 3 million jobs
in the public sector and more than 150 000 jobs in private agriculture;
in comparison to that, the performance of private national and
or foreign capital in creating jobs has been more than modest:
| 1989 | 1994 | growth/decl. | |
| public sector | 9277,8 | 5878,4 | -3399,4 |
| private agric. | 3898,7 | 3744,9 | -153,8 |
| foreign cap. | 130,4 | 228,1 | 97,7 |
| other priv sec. | 4082,5 | 4881,8 | 799,3 |
Source: our own calculations from G.U.S. Rocznik Statystyczny
Pracy 1995
Latest statistics from the current Polish press indicate the following
distribution of foreign direct investment in Poland:
Graph 7.3: MNC investments in the Polish economy
In April 1996, 2 million and 726 000 people were out of work.
Foreign capital penetration did not significantly contribute to
alleviating unemployment on a regional basis. It is also noteworthy,
that political influence of the SLD and PSL parties biased the
unemployment record of Polish regions 1993 - 1995, just as -
ceteris paribus - the 'Walesa' and right-wing regions seemed
to have been castigated by post-1993 regional development. Regional
human capital formation, measured by the Human Development Index,
contributed towards a better employment record over time of a
region:
Graph 7.4: unemployment in Poland - regional aspects
The multiple regression to explain the residuals from the above
Graph works with the following variables:
religious practice
external migration per total population
voting for the Peasant Party PSL in 1993
private land per total land
big estates per total land
voting for the post-communist SLD in 1993
real GDP per capita
human development index
employment in foreign capital enterprises per total employment
employment in mixed enterprises per total employment
voting for Lech Walesa in the second round of the 1995 presidential
election
(7.1) the rise or fall of unemployment in Poland 1993/96 (regression
residuals, Graph 7.4):
| -0,005 | 0,33 | -2,422 | 0,649 | 4E-05 | 0,126 | -0,097 | 0,05 | -0,033 | -0,083 | -0,002 | 0,076 | -0,501 |
| 0,047 | 0,603 | 0,979 | 10,43 | 5E-04 | 0,088 | 0,036 | 0,048 | 0,018 | 0,067 | 0,006 | 0,043 | 8,071 |
| 0,45 | 1,177 | |||||||||||
| 2,453 | 36 | |||||||||||
| 40,82 | 49,91 | |||||||||||
| -0,105 | 0,547 | -2,47 | 0,062 | 0,079 | 1,429 | -2,71 | 1,04 | -1,91 | -1,244 | -0,378 | 1,756 | constant |
| religious pract | ext migr/pop | PSL | private land | peasants | big estates | SLD | real gdp pc | HDI-index | for cap pen | mixed cap pen | 2tour Lech Walesa | |
Note: as in all EXCEL 5.0 outprints, first rows are unstandardised
regression coefficients, second rows are standard errors of the
estimate, the third row shows the value for R^2 of the whole equation
and the standard deviation of the estimate for y; the fourth row
are the F-value and the degrees of freedom of the whole equation;
the fifth row shows the sum of squares of the regression and the
sum of square of the residuals.
Among the major problems of future Polish future development are
the unemployment situation (see Graph below) and the huge influx
of foreign currency reserve (already over $20 thousand million,
although the balance on current account officially is still negative).
The current monthly unemployment figures are compared here with
the 5 - month trend line
Graph 7.5: unemployment in Poland - the time series
The percentage of women in the industrial labour-force is higher in foreign-owned firms than in national private or state firms, and exceeds also the percentage in joint-venture firms. This process might be a two-fold process: exploitation of low-paid and low-skilled female labour in typical 'sweat-shops', and the recruitment of clerical and bureaucratic staff for the command, control and communications branches of multinational corporations in Poland.
The distribution of the labour force in the industrial sector
is as follows:
57.3% state capital
35.9% national private capital
2.6% foreign capital
4.2% joint ventures
The employment statistics, published by the Polish Central Statistical Office (Zatrudnenia w Gospodarce Narodowje 1994), also allow an assessment about the more indirect effects of TNC investment in Poland on the social system, especially on employment at the voivodship level. The multivariate data about regional development, which were analysed for this work, are all Central Statistical Office of the Polish Republic data, the list of variables is mentioned in the variable list at the end of this contribution. Our analysis determines the effects of foreign capital penetration on four societal variables: sexist discrimination, political cleavages, employment and life expectancy.
The following sources were used: C.S.O. 'Rocznik Statystyczny Wojewodztw', 1993 and UNDP, 1995; upward residuals from the regression line are interpreted as excess mortality for girls. The electoral performance for the political parties in Poland, autumn 1993 (SLD, PSL, UD, KPN, UP, BBW and parties not represented in the Sejm), was calculated from East European Politics and Society data, based on Monitor Polski. In addition, see the quoted sources of C.S.O. statistical data about Poland after the transformation. Some of our variables must be explained here in greater detail: by excess mortality we understand the simple residual values from the bivariate regression of female infant mortality rates on male infant mortality rates (C.S.O. 'Rocznik Statystyczny Wojewodztw', 1993; upward residuals from the regression line are interpreted as excess mortality for girls). This process of female excess infant mortality is significantly related in our multivariate equations with only one variable: religious practice as an indicator of religious traditionalism.
Under inclusion of party preference, our equation explains around 1/3 of the excess mortality rates in Poland. The regions with a preference for the liberal Freedom Union are relatively immune from the phenomenon. Regions with a high vote for the former communists and their peasant allies also perform badly on this indicator. Foreign capital penetration - ceteris paribus - even slightly increases excess mortality rates. The totalitarian heritage and the Catholic counterpart to what Benazir Bhutto once called 'this backwardness of women (which is) rooted in male prejudice and non-religious cultural taboos' seem to be related with traditional social patterns that neglect girls and their nutritional and health needs during their first year of life.
It is also interesting to see, how foreign capital penetration
and structural variables pattern the political landscape in Poland,
1993. The following matrix of significant influences of foreign
capital on the political process in Poland (elections of fall
1993) is to be observed:
Table 7.4a: The 1993 elections in Poland
Explanatory variable
of/for the explains ceteris paribus the electoral perfor-
region mance for the following political parties
in Poland, 14th of September, 1993:
explanatory
variable SLD PSL UW KPN
Catholicism - +
migration -
ecological crisis -
private land + +
traditional
employment in
agriculture + -
big landholding + - -
patriarchical
structures + - - -
real GDP
human development i. +
foreign capital
penetration -
mixed capital
penetration - -
R^2 68% 92% 68% 59%
Source: Our own calculations (EXCEL 4.0 multiple regression IBM
PS 2 notebook N51 SX) from C.S.O. and East European Politics
and Society data, based on Monitor Polski; election results
1995: Rzeczpospolita. The following abbreviations are
used: SLD (post-communists), PSL (Polish Peasant Party, former
ally of the communists), UW (Freedom Union, the main post-Solidarity
party), KPN (Confederation for an Independent Poland, right wing-nationalist),
UP (Union of Labour, the left wing of the former Solidarity movement),
BBW (non-partisan Block for Reform, a party formed by former President
Lech Walesa), others (right-wing parties not represented in the
Sejm)
Only by including the control variable 'foreign capital penetration' into the empirical regression equations, we can show the character of the Peasant Party as a typical agrarian party, characteristic of regions with high private agriculture and low urbanisation. The post-communist SLD clearly emerged in the period 1993-95 as a party in regions with a high amount of environmental damage, in rural regions with low industrialisation and excessive sexist patterns of mortality. The post-communists clearly lost in terms of electoral support from a higher penetration of a region by foreign capital. The Unia Wolnoscy (UW) and the Unia Pracy (UP) as the liberal middle and the democratic left among the Post-Solidarnosc parties are especially weak in the regions with run-away factories owned by joint ventures. That is to say: the promises of western-induced modernisation could not be delivered; the liberal and the left sectors of Solidarity had to bear the brunt. The Freedom Alliance was still especially successful in regions with a stable and wealthier - and culturally more progressive catholic - peasantry, and was especially weak in regions with a minifundio-type of small-scale agriculture. The abyss between the town and the city, cultivated on both sides of the great divide, bodes ill for the chances of the UW to win back in 1997 at the elections the flat countryside, especially in the regions without a richer private peasantry; the 'urban and or Poznan' character of the Freedom Alliance emerges very clearly from the multivariate analysis. Thus, the democratic middle might be losing politically in a long-term perspective.
The radical right, not represented in parliament, is especially strong in regions of low urbanisation, industrialisation and high external, poverty-driven migration. In 1997, this potential certainly will still increase. Both the left and the right were, in 1993-95, the parties of the losers of the modernisation process, while the modernisation winners voted for the laic wing of the post-solidarity movement. In addition, both main post-Solidarity parties, UW and UP, were especially weak in regions with the typical run-away-industries dominated by mixed capital. The nationalistic, right-wing KPN had all the characteristics of a middle-class, far-right wing movement, associated with the urbanised regions of the country. The rise of the right-wing ROP, substituting the KPN, and Solidarity as a right-wing worker movement for the elections in 1997 as a protest movement of the workers in declining industries clearly are characterised again by this political cleavage between the modernisation winners and losers, already present in 1993-95.
The clear drifting-apart of the country and the loss of a middle-centre has indeed something to do with the kind of dependent development, that is so typical of the world-wide market economy in the periphery: the economic power of the transnational corporation in a country like Poland interacts with the unequal structure of a typical semi-periphery, and in turn leads to the 'creative destruction' of national capital on the existing markets. The share of women in total manufacturing employment is much higher in the 100% foreign-owned firms (54.4%), while national private capital, mixed enterprises and national state capital all employ only from 30% to 40% women. The high female share in foreign-dominated manufacturing mainly seems to be connected with the high percentage of investments in the textile industry.
Our analysis also shows the dilemmas, that do exist for the self-declared pro-Western, pro-market oriented leadership of the post-communists. Increases in the power of the transnationals in the country will increase the polarisation between the haves and the have-nots, and with it, the electoral acceptance of the post-communists as a typical protest party will shrink. The SLD is the only major political party in Poland, that showed a significant negative regression coefficient with foreign capital penetration. Paradoxically, today, it is the leadership of the SLD and the Unia Wolnosci, which are most favourably inclined towards foreign capital.
Our analysis also can show, which regions in Poland - in the end
- prove sufficiently attractive enough to attract a significant
amount of foreign investment. The traditionally poor regions of
the country are even not able to attract run-away industries of
the joint venture type to any significant degree. The Polish presidential
elections of November 5 and November 19 repeated the tendencies
analysed above, and show, how the political cleavages interacted
with the world economic penetration mechanisms:
Table 7.4b: The 5th of November 1995
elections in Poland
Explanatory variable
of/for the explains ceteris paribus the electoral perfor-
region mance for the following political parties
in Poland, fall 1993:
explanatory
variable Kwas Walesa Lead Kwasn. Increase
niewski over Walesa Kwasn./SLD
1993/95
Catholicism - + - -
migration
ecological crisis
private land +
traditional
employment in
agriculture +
big landholding + - +
patriarchical
structures
real GDP -
human development i.+ - +
foreign capital
penetration - + - -
mixed capital
penetration - + - -
R^2 71.7% 72.3% 72.5% 71.2%
Source: Our own calculations (EXCEL 4.0 multiple regression IBM
PS 2 notebook N51 SX) from C.S.O. and East European Politics
and Society data, based on Monitor Polski; election results
1995: Rzeczpospolita. The following abbreviations are
used: SLD (post-communists), PSL (Polish Peasant Party, former
ally of the communists), UW (Freedom Union, the main post-Solidarity
party), KPN (Confederation for an Independent Poland, right wing-nationalist),
UP (Union of Labour, the left wing of the former Solidarity movement),
BBW (non-partisan Block for Reform, a party formed by former President
Lech Walesa), others (right-wing parties not represented in the
Sejm)
Urban, less traditionally catholic, and less private-peasantry
and less big landholding areas are far more attractive to transnational
capital than the traditional Polish countryside, while joint ventures
prefer urban low-wage areas of Poland, also characterised by the
absence of a numerically strong private (and conservative) peasantry.
President Walesa lost the election of 1995 mainly due to the following
two effects (i) the weakness of the Catholic church under the
present circumstances in Poland and (ii) the geography of transnational
capital penetration:
Table 7.4c: The 19th of November 1995 elections in Poland
Explanatory variable
of/for the explains ceteris paribus the electoral perfor-
region mance for the following presidential
candidates in Poland, 19th of November
1995:
explanatory
variable Kwas Walesa
niewski
Catholicism - +
migration
ecological crisis
private land
traditional
employment in
agriculture
big landholding
patriarchical
structures
real GDP
human development i.+ -
foreign capital
penetration - +
mixed capital
penetration - +
R^2 72.4% 72.4%
Source: Our own calculations (EXCEL 4.0 multiple regression IBM
PS 2 notebook N51 SX) from C.S.O. and East European Politics
and Society data, based on Monitor Polski; election results
1995: Rzeczpospolita.
71% of TNC employment and 38% of joint venture employment per
total employment is explained by our equations:
Table 7.5: the political ecology of foreign capital attraction
to the different regions in Poland, 1993
Explan. Var. employment for multinat. Joint ventures
corporations
of/ explains (ceteris paribus)
region 1993:
employment in TNCs joint ventures
wage level -
Catholicism -
migration
ecological crisis
private land - -
traditional
employment in
agriculture
big landholding -
patriarchical
structures
industrial
employment
urbanisation + +
R^2 71% 38%
Source: Our own calculations (EXCEL 4.0 multiple regression IBM
PS 2 notebook N51 SX) from C.S.O. data
Unemployment, on the other hand, is a typical phenomenon of low-wage regions with either high pollution or high agricultural employment. Foreign capital does contribute to a somewhat better employment record, but the effect is not significant. The effect on life expectancy is even negative, although not significant. We again use the standard functions for life expectancy determination, used in Chapter 3.
Thus, the societal expectations created by globalisation are not
met:
(7.2a) unemployment in Poland = 26.02 - 4.18 * wage
level - 1.50 * religious practice - 0.06 * outward migration
+ 0.24 * industrial waste - 0.00 private land
+ 0.58 * employment in agriculture - 0.08 * big estates +
0.04 * excess mortality + 0.00 * industrial employment - 0.02
urbanisation - 0.15 * foreign capital employment (t-value
1.5911) - 0.003 mixed capital employment
R2 = 73.39%; F = 8.27; df. = 36; alpha (one-tailed) 5% > 1.69
Life expectancy is being negatively determined by foreign capital penetration. The negative trade-off, so well known from cross-national policy planning and development research, is shown to be existing for the transformation country Poland, although the long-term negative effects of mass foreign migration on the health situation of the population in the 'guest worker export periphery' Poland are stronger than those of the direct foreign capital penetration. Here we should recall, how a guest-worker economy, in the end, can destroy the social fabric of the sender-country.
Environmental decay is related to the general life expectancy situation in Poland, but the directly observable statistical effect is weak and below the usual significance levels, because the other intervening variables, like the social and biological stress of a guest-worker economy, are stronger. It will be expected, that especially cardeo-vascular diseases increase under the pressure of migration and family separation. The typical urban/rural cleavages, so well-known from policy planning and development research about the capitalist periphery (Lipton, 1977), again emerge to be relevant also for the post-communist capitalist periphery. Urbanisation is a positive significant determinant of life expectancy; the functions, introduced in Chapter 3 for the purpose of this contribution, hold again.
At the time of the writing of this analysis - July 1996 - a coalition between the right-wing political parties and the peasants might well be the most probable final outcome for Poland in 1977, making the business of the westward integration of Poland - in the economic sense - certainly harder, because these groupings will have to take into account the economic interests of the Polish periphery.
Again, it is being confirmed that the world-wide market economy creates growth and employment only to some extent, but that its effects on the social sphere are contradictory. Ceteris paribus, the control of foreign capital over overall employment is even slightly negatively related to life expectancy at the voivodship level. Our results about Poland should also be seen in the more general context of our results about the transformation dynamic of Eastern Europe.
Up to now, the leading elites did not question the basic principles
of Western integration of the country. Constellations might arise
now, which will be more nationalistic in orientation, reflecting
the peripheral role that Poland still plays in the world economy.
The Eastern part of Europe and the long Kondratieff wave: historical
and macroquantitative evidence
Just as during the world depression of the 1930s, democracy could
not survive in the region (Polanyi, 1944), today the danger arises,
that instability and not democratisation will triumph in the end,
especially in countries like those of the former USSR. The turning
points in the long waves between the ascents and decline phases
(B-phases) were always the beginnings of political decay in the
region as well, while the ascent phases were associated with authoritarian
modernisation; time-lags between the Western cycle and the Eastern
semi-periphery and periphery have to be admitted. The decisive-kairos-years
are:
1509
1539
1575
1621
1689
1756
1835/42
1884
1933
1982
The logic of the Kondratieff waves from 1756 onwards are given
as follows:
social process cycle 1756-1835/41
basic project defeudalization
prosperity reform compulsory education,
conscription; American and
French Revolution;
Joseph II (Austria)
mid-cycle conflict wars of the French Revolution,
Napoleonic wars
Poland: 1807 Duchy of Warsaw
technological change
basic industrial steam engine (end 18th century)
projects 'Spinning Jenny' (J. Stargreave, 1770)
new technologies steam locomotive 'Puffing Billy'
emerging during (W. Hadley, 1813)
prosperity re-
cession
Unresolved problem freedom of association
crisis of the model revolution 1830
Poland: rebellion 1830/31
international regime
A-phase British naval
dominance (George III)
B-phase 'congress of Vienna'-regime
dominant economic
theory A. Smith, 1776
political economy of
world system D. Ricardo, 1817
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
social process cycle 1835/42-83 1884-1932 1933-81
basic project freedom of market enlargement welfare
and enterprise of participa- state,
tion corporatism
prosperity reform freedom of asso- social secu- educational
ciation rity, parlia- reform,
mentarism civil
rights,
emancipation
of women
mid-cycle conflict wars and civil Eastern Europe: Vietnam war,
wars Revolution world student
Poland: revolution 1905 rebellion
1863/64 1968
strikes,
terrorism
Polish
Winter 1970
technological change
basic industrial railway, steel, oil,
inputs and steamship electricity, synthetics,
technological electric automobile
projects motor
new technologies steel petrochemicals chips
emerging during
prosperity re-
cession
unresolved prob-
lem enlargement relationship basic income
of participation capital, la- environment
bour, state unequal
exchange
crisis of the
model revolution revolution contestation
1871 1917 of the model
Poland: Poland: from 1968
socialist strikes onwards
movement peasant
1880s uprisings Poland:
1936/37 Summer 1980
international regime
A-phase liberal mercantilism Bretton
world trade Woods
B-phase -"- hypermercan- neo-
tilism protectio-
nism
dominant eco-
nomic
theory J. St. Mill, A. Marshall, J.M. Keynes,
1848 1890 1936
political economy
of
world system K. Marx, 1867 R. Hilferding, K. Polanyi,
1910 1944
from E. de Boer and Arno Tausch 'The Imperative of Social Transformation'
The danger is of course, that the Cold-War structure will be substituted
by a new power rivalry between the former members of the winning
coalition of World War II:
Hegemonial wars in the world system from 1495 onwards
Role in War Thirty Years War Napoleonic WW I+II
losing hegemonic
contender Hapsburgs France Germany
new hegemon Netherlands Britain USA
newly emerging
challenger: eco-
nomically deci-
mated member of
winning coalition France Germany China+
Russia
past
contender for
systemic hegemony,
joining the war
effort of the
winning coalition Sweden Hapsburgs France
Portugal
The former hegemonic contenders slowly slide into an acceptance
of their status in the international system. The real power struggle
erupts already soon after the great hegemonic war, and through
the ups and downs of the history of the system evolves slowly
into the hegemonic challenge. Seen in such a way, not 1989, but
Korea and Vietnam could become rather the benchmarks of the future
W-structure of conflict in the international arena. For the foreign
policies of the European Union, it is also important to notice
the following tendency: German-Russian alliances tend to happen
during depressions, and they break up during the economic upswings
of the world system:
Khol + Gorbi/Boris 1985 ff.
Rapallo 1922
Bismarck's Three Emperor Alliance 1873
Holy Alliance 1815
Alliance Russia-Germany 1764
Nordic War 1700-1721
The relationship of the Kondratieff and Kuznets cycles with Russian
history is the following:
Reforms
KONDRATIEFF Perestroika, Lenin's NEP,
OR KUZNETS Great Reforms 1861,
DOWNSWING Katharinas Assembly 1775
Nobility's Victory 1730,
Split of the State Church 1653,
Boris Godunow 1598-1605
Repressive Modernisation
KONDRATIEFF Joseph Stalin,
OR KUZNETS Imperialistic Expansion
UPSWING and Repressive Industria-
lisation at the end of 19. th century
Nikolas the
Gendarme of Europe,
Elisabeth's expansionist
policy,
Peter the Great,
Michael III,
Iwan the Terrible
Reform Repression
<----------------------------------------------------------------->
1985 'Gorbi' <--------------> 1928 Stalin
57 Years
64 Years 47 Years
1921 NEP <--------------> Alexander III
40 Years
60 Years 56 Years
1861 Great Reforms <--------------> Nikolas I 1825
36 Years
86 Years 84 Years
1775 Constituent <--------------> Elisabeth's expansionist rule
Assembly 34 Years 1741
45 Years 52 Years
1730 Victory of <--------------> Peter I 1689
Nobility 41 Years
77 Years 76 Years
Church Split 1653<--------------> Michael III 1613
40 Years
55 Years 48 Years
Boris Godunow 1598 <--------------> Iwan's 'Oprichina' 1565
33 Years
Average periods of Russian history:
Perestroika <--------------> authoritarian modernisation
40 Years
64.5 Years 60.5 Years
_____________________________________________________
Seen in such a way, there is even little that the West seems to be able to do to stabilise democracy in Russia. However, the return of the East Europeans towards a more 'middle of the road' and sensible philosophy - whatever the colour of the government (Orenstein, 1996) - seems to be an urgent necessity, after the ups and downs of central planning and 'the central market principle'.
It is now time to look at the transformation success or failure
using methods of cross-national development research. Such studies
are relatively scarce and are only now just beginning to emerge,
with the World Bank World Development Report (1996) leading the
field. Our data selection from the world of transformation shows,
that a rapid privatisation is not in itself a precondition of
a more rapid socio-economic development, and that a policy oriented
towards human development and democracy will be successful, while
extreme egalitarianism has certain growth limits in the region:
Table 7.6: The transformation success or failure 1989-95
| gdp(1989=100) | privatisation | Pol Rights Violations 1991 | urbanisation | ln (GNP) | ln(GNP)^2 | HDI | |
| CS | 85 | 70 | 2 | 65 | 7,9047039 | 62,484344 | 0,872 |
| SLOK | 84 | 60 | 2 | 57 | 7,5755847 | 57,389483 | 0,872 |
| H | 86 | 60 | 2 | 63 | 8,1167156 | 65,881073 | 0,856 |
| PL | 97 | 60 | 2 | 63 | 7,7231201 | 59,646584 | 0,855 |
| RU | 81 | 40 | 5 | 54 | 7,0387835 | 49,544474 | 0,703 |
| BUL | 75 | 45 | 2 | 69 | 7,0387835 | 49,544474 | 0,796 |
| ALB | 75 | 60 | 4 | 36 | 5,8289456 | 33,976607 | 0,739 |
| EST | 74 | 65 | 2 | 72 | 8,0326849 | 64,524026 | 0,862 |
| LAT | 54 | 60 | 2 | 72 | 7,60589 | 57,849563 | 0,857 |
| LIT | 42 | 55 | 2 | 70 | 7,185387 | 51,629787 | 0,769 |
| ARM | 37 | 45 | 5 | 68 | 6,4922398 | 42,149178 | 0,715 |
| AZE | 35 | 25 | 5 | 55 | 6,5930445 | 43,468236 | 0,696 |
| BRU | 54 | 15 | 4 | 68 | 7,9620673 | 63,394516 | 0,866 |
| GEO | 17 | 30 | 6 | 57 | 6,3630281 | 40,488127 | 0,709 |
| KAZ | 44 | 25 | 5 | 58 | 7,3524411 | 54,05839 | 0,798 |
| KYR | 43 | 40 | 5 | 39 | 6,7452363 | 45,498213 | 0,717 |
| MOL | 42 | 30 | 5 | 49 | 6,9660242 | 48,525493 | 0,755 |
| RUS | 49 | 55 | 3 | 75 | 7,7579062 | 60,185109 | 0,849 |
| TAD | 40 | 15 | 5 | 32 | 6,1527327 | 37,85612 | 0,643 |
| TUR | 63 | 15 | 6 | 45 | 7,237059 | 52,375023 | 0,731 |
| UKR | 43 | 35 | 3 | 69 | 7,7007478 | 59,301517 | 0,842 |
| UZB | 82 | 30 | 6 | 41 | 6,8772961 | 47,297201 | 0,706 |
| privatisation | Pol Rights | urbanisation | ln (GNP) | ln(GNP)^2 | HDI |
Sources: Osteuropa-Institute Munich, Working Paper 186
(GDP growth, privatisation); Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden
(Political Rights Violations, based on Freedom House); UNDP, 1995
(urbanisation, Human Development Index); Fischer Weltalmanach
(GNP per capita)
The multiple regression results from the above Table are given
in Table 6.2:
Table 7.7: The determinants of economic growth in the transformation
countries
| privatisation | Pol Rights | urbanisation | ln (GNP) | ln(GNP)^2 | HDI | Constant | |
| econ growth | -23,53855 | -2,007199 | 51,691191 | -1,265286 | -2,739098 | 0,6255463 | -132,3854 |
| 145,43797 | 10,124597 | 139,62757 | 0,4348674 | 5,155963 | 0,346291 | 514,0504 | |
| 0,594606 | 16,348397 | ||||||
| 3,666841 | 15 | ||||||
| 5880,2214 | 4009,0513 | ||||||
| t-test | -0,161846 | -0,19825 | 0,3702076 | -2,90959 | -0,531249 | 1,806418 |
Note: as in all EXCEL 5.0 outprints, first rows are unstandardised
regression coefficients, second rows are standard errors of the
estimate, the third row shows the value for R^2 of the whole equation
and the standard deviation of the estimate for y; the fourth row
are the F-value and the degrees of freedom of the whole equation;
the fifth row shows the sum of squares of the regression and the
sum of square of the residuals. The sixth row is the t-test, calculated
from row (1) and (2)
59.5% of growth are explained by our equation. Thus, it emerges
that the best strategy to avoid stagnation is a policy of thorough-going
reform, that assures a high human development index and a fair
amount of political and civil liberties. However, the region
seems to be beset by an excessive amount of egalitarianism, that
becomes a stumbling block against long-run economic growth, when
the share of the top income earners in total incomes falls below
35%, when taxes - compared to development level - are very high,
and when the social services consume a percentage of total expenditures,
that is comparable to the most advanced welfare states in the
world. The share of the richest 20% in total incomes in the region,
with the notable exception of Russia, is even lower than the respective
share in most developed welfare democracies, like Sweden, Finland,
the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway, or - for that matter - in
the market 'tiger economies' of Asia. Tax rates per total income
in Eastern Europe skyrocket and savings are generally low, as
the following materials from the World Bank WDR, 1996 for the
former or continuously communist countries show by international
comparison. Up to a certain point, social security expenditures
of the state stabilise mass demand and contribute to economic
growth. High inequality rates, like in Brazil, where the top income
earners received 67.5% of total incomes in 1989, are certainly
growth-inhibiting as well (Tausch/Prager, 1993). But when income
differentiation is below a certain limit - as in some countries
of Eastern Europe and the former USSR - also negative consequences
arise:
Table 7.8a: Inequality, savings, taxes, and social expenditure.
Evidence from Eastern Europe by cross-national comparison
Share of the top 20% dom. savings rate tax revenue % expenditures
in total incomes per GDP per GNP social services
transformation countries:
Lao PDR 40.2% - - -
China 43.9% 44% 2.6% 3.3%
Moldova 41.5% 0% - -
Kazakstan 40.4% 20% - -
Bulgaria 39.3% 21% 29.3% 36.3%
Romania 34.8% 25% 26.5% 46.9%
Lithuania 42.1% 11% 18.3% -
Ukraine 35.4% - - -
Belarus 32.9% 27% 30.8% 57.2%
Slovak R 31.4% 23% - -
Latvia 36.7% 25% 25.3% 52.8%
Poland 36.6% 17% 37.9% -
Russia 53.8% 29% 19.1% 54.1%
Estonia 46.3% 28% 29.1% 56.4%
Czech R. 37.4% 20% 38.0% 60.6%
Hungary 36.6% 15% - -
Slovenia 37.9% 25% - -
by comparison:
Austria - 26% 33.7% 70.1%
Finland 37.6% 20% 29.6% 59.3%
Netherlands 36.9% 24% 44.7% 69.3%
Sweden 36.9% 17% 31.7% 56.8%
Norway 36.7% 26% 37.0% 55.6%
Denmark 38.6% 21% 33.3% 53.5%
Japan 37.5% 32% 17.8% 59.2%
Indonesia 40.7% 30% 16.3% 14.4%
Thailand 52.7% 35% 17.0% 35.4%
Hong Kong 47.0% 33% - -
Singapore 48.9% 51% 17.1% 35.9%
Source: our compilations from World Bank, 1996, WDR
Graph 7.6 shows furthermore materials based on recent World Bank
(WDR, 1996) research on the Gini-Index of inequality and economic
growth. Table 7.8 lists the raw data, together with background
data on political and civil rights violations. Equation 7.3 again
shows that political repression is incompatible with transformation,
while Graph 7.6 analyses the bivariate relationship between inequality
and growth:
Table 7.8b: Gini-Index of income inequality in the formerly socialist
or quasi-socialist countries
| Country | GINI inequality | pol rights violations | civil rights violations | GNP per capita | growth 85-94 |
| Tanzania | 0,381 | 6 | 5 | 140 | 0,8 |
| Vietnam | 0,357 | 7 | 7 | 200 | |
| G-Bissau | 0,562 | 6 | 5 | 240 | 2,2 |
| Lao PDR | 0,304 | 7 | 6 | 320 | |
| Nicaragua | 0,503 | 4 | 5 | 340 | -6,1 |
| China | 0,376 | 7 | 7 | 530 | 7,8 |
| Moldova | 0,344 | 5 | 5 | 870 | |
| Kazakstan | 0,327 | 6 | 4 | 1160 | -6,5 |
| Bulgaria | 0,308 | 2 | 2 | 1250 | -2,7 |
| Romania | 0,255 | 4 | 4 | 1270 | -4,5 |
| Lithuania | 0,336 | 1 | 3 | 1350 | -8 |
| Algeria | 0,387 | 7 | 6 | 1650 | -2,5 |
| Ukraine | 0,257 | 4 | 4 | 1910 | -8 |
| Belarus | 0,216 | 5 | 4 | 2160 | -1,9 |
| Slovak R | 0,195 | 3 | 4 | 2250 | -3 |
| Latvia | 0,27 | 3 | 3 | 2320 | -6 |
| Poland | 0,272 | 2 | 2 | 2410 | 0,8 |
| Russia | 0,496 | 3 | 4 | 2650 | -4,1 |
| Estonia | 0,395 | 3 | 2 | 2820 | -6,1 |
| Turkmenistan | 0,358 | 7 | 7 | ||
| Czech R | 0,266 | 1 | 2 | 3200 | -2,1 |
| Hungary | 0,27 | 1 | 2 | 3840 | -1,2 |
| Slovenia | 0,282 | 1 | 2 | 7040 | |
| Country | GINI inequality | pol rights violations | civil rights violations | GNP per capita | growth 85-94 |
| Country | GINI inequality | pol rights violations | civil rights violations | FCAPPen |
| Tanzania | 0,381 | 6 | 5 | 1,3 |
| Vietnam | 0,357 | 7 | 7 | 1,9 |
| G-Bissau | 0,562 | 6 | 5 | 6 |
| Lao PDR | 0,304 | 7 | 6 | 12,1 |
| Nicaragua | 0,503 | 4 | 5 | 10,8 |
| China | 0,376 | 7 | 7 | 17,9 |
| Kazakstan | 0,327 | 6 | 4 | 3 |
| Bulgaria | 0,308 | 2 | 2 | 0,6 |
| Romania | 0,255 | 4 | 4 | 1,8 |
| Lithuania | 0,336 | 1 | 3 | 1,7 |
| Algeria | 0,387 | 7 | 6 | 2,9 |
| Slovak R | 0,195 | 3 | 4 | 3,2 |
| Latvia | 0,27 | 3 | 3 | 8,5 |
| Poland | 0,272 | 2 | 2 | 5,3 |
| Estonia | 0,395 | 3 | 2 | 26,5 |
| Czech R | 0,266 | 1 | 2 | 9,9 |
| Hungary | 0,27 | 1 | 2 | 15,6 |
| Country | GINI inequality | pol rights violations | civil rights violations | GNP per capita | FCAPPen | Unemployment |
| Bulgaria | 0,308 | 2 | 2 | 1250 | 0,6 | 10,4 |
| Romania | 0,255 | 4 | 4 | 1270 | 1,8 | 7,1 |
| Lithuania | 0,336 | 1 | 3 | 1350 | 1,7 | 7 |
| Moldova | 0,344 | 5 | 5 | 870 | 1,5 | 1,6 |
| Ukraine | 0,257 | 4 | 4 | 1910 | 0,7 | 1 |
| Belarus | 0,216 | 5 | 4 | 2160 | 0,2 | 3,7 |
| Slovak R | 0,195 | 3 | 4 | 2250 | 3,2 | 12,1 |
| Latvia | 0,27 | 3 | 3 | 2320 | 8,5 | 7 |
| Poland | 0,272 | 2 | 2 | 2410 | 5,3 | 14,3 |
| Russia | 0,496 | 3 | 4 | 2650 | 0,9 | 3,6 |
| Estonia | 0,395 | 3 | 2 | 2820 | 26,5 | 2,2 |
| Slovenia | 0,282 | 1 | 2 | 7040 | 2,2 | 13,2 |
| Czech R | 0,266 | 1 | 2 | 3200 | 9,9 | 2,8 |
| Hungary | 0,27 | 1 | 2 | 3840 | 15,6 | 10,6 |
| Slovenia | 0,282 | 1 | 2 | 7040 | 2,2 | 13,2 |
Source: our own compilations from UNDP, 1996; World Bank, WDR,
1996; UNCTAD, 1996; Stiftung (1996, for the Freedom House data
series); Polish Central Statistical Office, Poland Quarterly Statistics,
4, 2, 1996: 52 (unemployment figures)
Our analysis now shows, that on the world level, even assuming
a polynomial expression of the third order, inequality - especially
at the lower and middle stages - does not benefit economic growth,
and only some outlying cases push the curve upward again at the
extremes. On the level of the transformation countries, the story
is different, though:
Graph 7.6: inequality and economic transformation on a world level
and in the transformation countries
a) UNDP data on the difference between the top and the bottom
20% income earners and economic growth on the world level, 1980-92
b) data on the transformation countries
For the countries with complete data, the following equations
emerge. It shows, that the egalitarianism of such movements as
Solidarnosc might have its deep roots in East European
history, but that economically, it is counter-productive. Inequality
is positively related to economic growth in the transformation
regions, and it lowers unemployment; while transnational investment
dependence brings about higher inequality and - ceteris paribus
- it does not alleviate unemployment due to the capital intensity
of most investments. For Eastern Europe, the choice is not the
one between Latin American inequality rates (towards which Russia
seems to be heading) and the former communist egalitarianism;
rather the choice is the one between continuing present rates
of egalitarianism (like in Belarus) at the price of stagnation
or to opt for distribution and growth patterns like in the more
egalitarian developing countries of East Asia.
Equation (7.3a): economic growth =
Gini inequality political repr. civil rights ln (GNP) (ln(GNP))^2 constant
violations
| 10,91358546 | -162,8188826 | -0,722897795 | 0,116576987 | -11,0941545 | 607,4708743 |
| 2,711016139 | 39,90219401 | 0,98220757 | 0,764921232 | 10,11245772 | 148,4162944 |
| 0,6951136 | 2,732458439 | ||||
| 4,103838325 | 9 | ||||
| 153,2030379 | 67,19696207 | ||||
| 4,025643853 | -4,080449376 | -0,735992897 | 0,152403911 | -1,097077962 | t-test |
Gini inequality political repr. civil rights ln (GNP) (ln(GNP))^2 constant
violations
Equation (7.3b): GINI income inequality =
| pol rights violations | civil rights violations | FCAPPen | lnGNPpc | lnGNP^2 | constant |
| -0,018992718 | 0,176971676 | 0,004611249 | -0,020469912 | 0,006726173 | 0,061751233 |
| 0,025122747 | 0,324494352 | 0,002916141 | 0,028052902 | 0,020223575 | 1,016901378 |
| 0,504766872 | 0,0779586 | ||||
| 2,24235225 | 11 | ||||
| 0,068139965 | 0,066852977 | ||||
| -0,755996872 | 0,545376754 | 1,581284635 | -0,729689648 | 0,332590687 | |
| pol rights violations | civil rights violations | FCAPPen | lnGNPpc | lnGNP^2 |
Equation (7.3c): unemployment rate =
| GINI inequality | pol rights violations | civil rights violations | GNP per capita | FCAPPen | constant |
| -0,218971053 | 0,000392913 | -1,528791364 | -0,907559915 | -17,56078807 | 19,53812103 |
| 0,183471851 | 0,000686046 | 2,166180602 | 1,418759587 | 14,50565314 | 6,935047266 |
| 0,56989396 | 3,83321918 | ||||
| 2,385014466 | 9 | ||||
| 175,2218765 | 132,2421235 | ||||
| -1,193485827 | 0,572720543 | -0,705754341 | -0,639685485 | -1,210616847 | T-test |
| GINI inequality | pol rights violations | civil rights violations | GNP per capita | FCAPPen |
Source: our own calculations from the above Tables with EXCEL
5.0 multiple regression routine.
There is little, that foreign aid will be able to do to maintain
growth in the more advanced countries of the region or to shorten
the transformation recession in the laggard countries of Eastern
Europe. Aid dependence - beyond a certain point - rather seems
to contribute to the stagnation path of the laggard countries.
However surprising this might sound, the empirical evidence from
the World Bank WDR, 1996, is the following:
Table 7.9: foreign aid, aggregate resource flows per GNP and economic
growth in the transformation countries
| Aid 94 | Growth 95 | Resource flow | |
| Albania | 7,8 | 6 | 9,1 |
| Bulgaria | 1,6 | 3 | 0,1 |
| Croatia | 2 | 0,3 | |
| Czech R. | 0,4 | 5 | 7,8 |
| Hungary | 0,5 | 2 | 7,3 |
| Macedonia | -4 | -2,4 | |
| Poland | 2 | 7 | 3,8 |
| Romania | 0,5 | 7 | 4,3 |
| Slovak R | 0,6 | 7 | 6,6 |
| Slovenia | 5 | 2,4 | |
| Armenia | 6,9 | 7 | 7 |
| Azerbaijan | 4 | -17 | 3,7 |
| Belarus | 0,6 | -12 | 1,6 |
| Estonia | 0,9 | 4 | 5,5 |
| Georgia | 8,4 | -5 | 9 |
| Kazakstan | 0,3 | -9 | 4,4 |
| Kyrgyz R | 5,8 | -6 | 5,9 |
| Latvia | 0,9 | 1 | 5,2 |
| Lithuania | 1,4 | 3 | 1,8 |
| Moldova | 1,4 | 2 | 5,1 |
| Russia | 0,5 | -4 | 0,8 |
| Tajikistan | 3,2 | -12 | 11,5 |
| Turkmenistan | 0,1 | -5 | 1 |
| Ukraine | 0,4 | -12 | 0,9 |
| Uzbekistan | 0,1 | -2 | 0,2 |
| China | 0,6 | 10,2 | 9,6 |
| Mongolia | 22,5 | 6,3 | 14,4 |
| Vietnam | 5,2 | 9,5 | 6,5 |
Legend: our own compilations from World Bank, WDR, 1996
This results in the following scatterplots with the trendlines:
Graph 7.7a: foreign aid and economic growth in the transformation
countries
Legend: economic growth (y-axis) depending on official development
assistance in % of the GNP
Graph 7.7b: foreign aid per capita and economic growth on a world
level
Legend: UNDP, HDR, 1994 and 1995 data on aid per capita and economic
growth 1980-92. The countries with a negative aid per capita are
the donors.
Graph 7.7c: resource flows and economic growth in the transformation
countries
Legend: economic growth (y-axis) depending on aggregate net resource
flows in % of the GNP. The graph shows three possible scenarios
for the bivariate effects of resource flows on growth in the region
of CEE and the former USSR.
Eastern Europe cannot be 'saved' by external means or by external
means alone. The mobilisation of savings and exports, a clear-cut
policy of human capital formation and technology, and various
other reforms would achieve much more lasting effects than transfers
even on a scale like in East Germany. Our cross-national evidence,
up to now, did not take into consideration the influence of 'internal'
reform policy variables vis-à-vis the workings of
the other variables. The World Bank has developed a liberalisation
index, which measures the extent to which policies supporting
liberalised markets and entry of new firms prevailed. The index
is a weighted average of estimates of liberalisation of domestic
transactions (price liberalisation and abolition of state trading
monopolies), external transactions (elimination of export controls
and taxes, substitution of low to moderate import duties for import
quotas and high tariffs, current account convertibility), and
the entry of new firms (World Bank, WDR, 1996). The weights on
these components are 0.3, 0.3, and 0.4, respectively.
Table 7.10 now summarises our data base, which we used - in addition
to Table 7.6 - to determine the transformation success or failure
of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union:
Table 7.10: The external conditions of the transformation and
the World Bank's liberalisation index:
| net flows per GNP | development assistance per GNP | present value of external debt per GNP | liberalisation Index | |
| 7,8 | 0,4 | 28 | 9,3 | CS |
| 6,6 | 0,6 | 30 | 8,5 | SLOK |
| 7,3 | 0,5 | 66 | 9 | H |
| 3,8 | 2 | 37 | 9 | PL |
| 4,3 | 0,5 | 17 | 7,1 | RU |
| 0,1 | 1,6 | 100 | 6 | BUL |
| 9,1 | 7,8 | 45 | 7,5 | ALB |
| 5,5 | 0,9 | 4 | 9,3 | EST |
| 5,2 | 0,9 | 6 | 8,2 | LAT |
| 1,8 | 1,4 | 7 | 8,5 | LIT |
| 7 | 6,9 | 8 | 6 | ARM |
| 3,7 | 4 | 3 | 4,5 | AZE |
| 1,6 | 0,6 | 5 | 4,8 | BRU |
| 9 | 8,4 | 56 | 6 | GEO |
| 4,4 | 0,3 | 14 | 5,9 | KAZ |
| 5,9 | 5,8 | 13 | 8,3 | KYR |
| 5,1 | 1,4 | 12 | 6,8 | MOL |
| 0,8 | 0,5 | 23 | 6,9 | RUS |
| 11,5 | 3,2 | 25 | 3,8 | TAD |
| 1 | 0,1 | 1 | 2,1 | TUR |
| 0,9 | 0,4 | 6 | 5,9 | UKR |
| 0,2 | 0,1 | 5 | 5,3 | UZB |
| NET FLOWS | DEV ASS | NET DEBT | Liberalisation |
Source: our own compilations from World Bank, WDR, 1996
Equation (7.4) now summarises our final research results about
the transformation success/failure in Eastern Europe and the former
USSR:
(7.4) economic recovery in Eastern Europe and the former USSR:
| privatisation | Pol Rights Violations | ln (GNP) | ln(GNP)^2 | HDI | NET FLOWS | DEV ASS | Liberalisation | Constant |
| 0,536737 | -6,757594 | -0,988263 | -4,253716 | 18,634372 | -274,6279 | 4,6616276 | 0,932771 | 1024,9646 |
| 5,2836872 | 2,9991756 | 1,9402744 | 167,95219 | 13,84864 | 197,52304 | 5,844472 | 0,6182559 | 727,345 |
| 0,5709663 | 18,06576 | |||||||
| 2,1625809 | 13 | |||||||
| 5646,4411 | 4242,8317 | |||||||
| privatisation | Pol Rights Violations | ln (GNP) | ln(GNP)^2 | HDI | NET FLOWS | DEV ASS | Liberalisation | |
| 0,1015838 | -2,253151 | -0,509342 | -0,025327 | 1,3455741 | -1,390359 | 0,7976131 | 1,5087134 | |
Source: our calculations from the above Tables on the basis of
the EXCEL 5.0 multiple regression programme
The indicators, which affect transformation in a significant and positive direction (10% error probability) are liberalisation and the freedom from political repression. Thus it has been established again, how important it is for the transformation countries to carry on with political transformation and reform. Our results, by and large, confirm the conventional UNDP wisdom on the transformation process, already expressed in the UNDP 1992 and 1993 Human Development Report. The 'constitution of liberty' in the economic sphere demands the constitution of liberty in the political sphere. Confronted with the 'market frenzy' of the early transformation years, our results do not explicitly contradict, but they do correct much of the conventional neo-conservative wisdom prevailing at that time. Measures aimed at maintaining and building up democracy and human development are just as important as the fight against local monopolies, expressed in the liberalisation index. Privatisation, external development assistance and capital inflows, under due consideration of these factors, are not so important as these, more immediate goals, which find their ultimate aim, above all, in the rule of law.
Our analysis of the trajectory of the transformation countries should be concluded by an assessment of the realistic possibilities for EU-eastward expansion. At the one hand, Western Europe should avoid illusions about its own weak position in the world economy, especially regarding the European Southern periphery. Extending the Union eastward, would mean first and foremost adding another group of countries whose official current account balance is structurally negative. In 1994, the only European Union countries with a very favourable current account balance were the Netherlands, Italy and France, while Germany's balance was only +$2.3 thousand million.
Germany's tragedy always seems to be a 'sandwich' position between the dominant centres of martime capitalist accumulation and the temptation to squeeze the East European 'hinterland' in order to be able to challenge the world hegemonic leaders (Arrighi, 1995). Germany's current account balance after German unification can only increase at the expense of the East European current account balance - a potential of economic nationalism and conflict in the new European house after 1989.
Secondly, the environmental strains, already existing in the Union,
will increase. But thirdly, and above all, eastward expansion
of the Union will be first and foremost a test of Europe's ability
to stand by it's commitment towards democracy on the European
continent. A well-designed policy of Eastern European integration
into the Union, that stresses the elements of democracy, savings
mobilisation, liquidation of local monopolies (also for the sake
of the environment!) and early market access for the East Europeans
in all labour intensive and in the agricultural sectors, could
be successful; however, this policy would imply, that the European
centre itself adapts rapidly to the contemporary challenges.
Seen in such a way, the overall picture, emerging from our comparison,
is not too negative for the East Europeans:
Table 7.11: EU-eastward expansion - a synopsis of the conditions,
prevailing in the European periphery:
| current account balance per GNP 1994 | CO2 emissions in millions of tons 1994 | government surplus or deficit per GNP 1994 | political repression 1993 | civil rights violations 1993 | |
| Greece | -6,3 | 73,9 | -15,6 | 1 | 3 |
| Portugal | -1,9 | 47,2 | -2,2 | 1 | 1 |
| Spain | -1,5 | 223,2 | -4,8 | 1 | 2 |
| Ireland | 2,3 | 25,1 | -2,3 | 1 | 2 |
| Italy | 2,5 | 407,7 | -10,6 | 1 | 3 |
| Bulgaria | 1,9 | 54,4 | -4,5 | 2 | 2 |
| Romania | -1 | 122,1 | -2,5 | 4 | 4 |
| Lithuania | 22 | 1 | 3 | ||
| Slovak R | 5,8 | 37 | 3 | 4 | |
| Latvia | 14,8 | -4,4 | 3 | 3 | |
| Poland | -3,1 | 341,9 | -2,4 | 2 | 2 |
| Croatia | 0 | 16,2 | 1,7 | 4 | 4 |
| Estonia | -1,7 | 20,9 | 1,2 | 3 | 2 |
| Czech R | 0 | 135,6 | 0,9 | 1 | 2 |
| Hungary | -9,4 | 59,9 | 1 | 2 | |
| Slovenia | 3,9 | 5,5 | 1 | 2 |
Sources: (1), (2), (3) World Bank, WDR, 1996; (4) and (5) Stiftung
Entwicklung und Frieden, 1996, based exclusively on Freedom House
Graph 7.8: the weighted averages of the economic and political
indicators of European periphery countries
Legend: columns, left-hand scale: average of the 'double deficits'
in the current account and in the budget; right-hand scale, dotted
line: average of political and civil rights violations. Best value:
- 1; worst value: - 7.
Eastern Europe's case during the negotiations with Brussels will
be, that at present, its performance is not worse than that of
the European Union periphery. Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia
have still both a relatively favourable economic record, and the
democracy scores in 1993 were as good as those in Italy and Greece.
The question is, however, how many more European peripheries the
Union can reasonably afford.
8) Problem number 5: Europe must come to terms with the
contradictions of the process of the ageing of democracies, especially
phenomena which one might term sclerosis bruxelliana and sclerosis
Europea
The political project of transformation from communism in Europe is not only endangered by the contradictions, globalisation creates in its host countries, it is also threatened by negative developments in the European 'anchor economy'. It would be a fatal conceit to try to disconnect the trajectory of the centres from the tendencies of globalisation and destabilisation, which we have discussed above. Up to now, we studied the logic of world and East European development after 1980 on the level of global society, on the level of the less developed countries and on the level of the transformation countries. It is now time to turn our attention to the logic of development on the level of the developed capitalist democracies. Why is there a real danger of a European failure? In terms of the foreign policy choices on the European continent, there is no alternative to the Union of western democracies, now comprising 15 historically relatively stable Western democracies. The process of the unification of the European continent gathered momentum with the recent expansion of membership to Austria, Finland and Sweden, three countries, characterised by traditional world political neutrality and a social welfare state system. Among the Western European countries, only neutral Switzerland, the NATO-countries Iceland and Norway, and the small-states Andorra, Monaco, San Marino, the Vatican, Malta and Cyprus are now still left out from the Union. But with the upcoming European Union Government Conference in 1996, important decisions not only on the international political role of Europe in the world, but on the socio-economic future of the European Union itself will have to be taken. The problem is of course which Union. We concentrate here on these issues, which have a long-term strategic and theoretical relevance for the policy formulation in the new Europe. In order to provide a valid strategy to its member countries, the Union has to be an association of world economic ascent and not a club for joint world economic decline. The fundamental question, why some nations are performing differently from the others, is applied here to the Western industrialised democracies.
Very early on, a group of European policy planning and development researchers, headed by the late Dudley Seers, challenged head-on the reigning visions of the development strategy of the Commission in Brussels towards the Third World and towards the European periphery (Seers, 1978; de Bandt et al., 1980). This theoretical challenge, still worthwhile reading today, was the first real and systematic question mark behind the policies of the Commission since 1958. The authors of that critique were a European-wide group of committed students of development and committed Europeans at the same time. Its leader, Dudley Seers, as one of the doyen of development and distribution theory among the world-wide profession of economists, having influenced the course of Keynesian economics over the whole post-war years in Britain, took up the issue of the centre-periphery relationship that characterises the South, Northwest and eastbound relationship of the Union (Seers, 1978). Several authors, most notably Inotai and Malcolm, developed these arguments from a later, liberal perspective. With its emphasis on structural protection, Inotai maintains, the Union increases rather than decreases the long-term cleavages between the centres and the peripheries inside and outside the boundaries of Europe. Today, it is no secret, that 90% of all EU expenditure, union-wide, must be categorised as subventions. With each expansion to semi-peripheral regions, the protective element increases. Simple, as the diagnosis might sound, it strikes at the very heart of the conventional Union wisdom on matters of external economic relations. A good part of professional economists the world over, liberal and radical social scientists alike, have later taken up this theme. They maintain that the Union, by its market protecting arrangements with the outer rim of its orbit of influence leads to a secular negative balance of trade of the periphery regions with the Union, and thus prolongs structural underdevelopment (amongst others such divergent authors as Hickman, 1994; Inotai, 1993; Kennedy, 1993; Amin, 1994). The arguments of such Union critics cannot be dismissed a-priori and out of hand. Western Europe loses in terms of world market shares vis-à-vis the countries of the Pacific; the dynamics of growth in the world economy seem to work to the detriment of the old European centres. The European Union shortcomings vis-à-vis the Pacific in terms of world export markets for manufactured goods, in terms of comparative labour costs, in terms of technological and scientific development and in terms of employment are all too obvious and were described in recent literature in all detail (Inotai, 1993; Kennedy, 1993; Tausch and Prager, 1993). The fundamentals of the European Union still reflect the realities of the late 1950s and still comprise the following sectors (i) the coal and steel community (ii) agricultural self-sufficiency (iii) the customs union. The new international division of labour, that characterises the world economy since the late 1960s, is the prime challenge to the logic of the Union, built around and evolving from the Franco-German alliance of the late 1950s (Inotai, 1993). Precisely these sectors are most seriously affected by world economic and technological changes. The annual cost of the common agricultural policy of the Union is now estimated to be $ 45 thousand million, more than 10% of this is believed to be paid to criminal channels (Malcolm, 1995: 57). It dominates the Union's external trade policy, distorting the world market and preventing the poor countries from exporting.
Our dire prediction in the context of the theory of globalisation
is, that the Union, as it is now structured, is not a strategy
of world capitalist ascent, but rather a strategy for the acceleration
of world economic decline of the European countries. A major problem,
which has to resolved first and foremost, is Germany's apparent
inability to comprehend and play its role as a highly developed
Mexico in the world economy. Similar in population size to that
of Mexico, and with a share of roughly only 8% of world GNP, Germany's
first and foremost role would be that of a highly specialised
trade and current account surplus economy in the heart of a Europe,
oriented towards the West and towards the Atlantic and the Pacific,
still and increasingly the major centres of the world economy.
But Germany is estimated to have spent $ 14 thousand million alone
to prop up in vain the Italian Lira recently. In 1993 alone, Germany
poured another 9.1 thousand million $ down another sink - this
time German aid to Russia. Insiders estimate, that only 10% of
Western aid to Russia reaches its targets. How Germany projected
(once again in history) in vain her dreams to become a 'Weltmacht'
(world power) is to be judged from the fact, that a country with
the mere population size of Mexico and a share in world GNP of
only 8.1% took over 43.7% of the burden of reconstruction of former
communism - from Frankfurt at the Oder to Wladiwostock during
the period 1990-1993. Germany's official and private flows amounted
to 32.7 thousand million $, out of a total of 74.8 thousand million
$ (our own compilations from OECD, GD (95) 41: 'Aid and other
resource flows to the Central and Eastern European countries and
the new independent states of the former Soviet Union in 1992
and 1993', Paris 1995). But the foundations of Germany's dreams
to become a Weltmacht are shaky indeed, as the meagre position
of Germany's transnational corporations vis-à-vis
their international competitors, and the losses of even companies
like Mercedes-Daimler-Benz to the tune of more than 1 thousand
million $ and the recent strikes at Volkswagen, Wolfsburg, all
too clearly show. For the transformation countries nearer to the
European centre, such economic mismanagement means lost opportunities
to stabilise democracy at a vital moment of world history: the
Polish GNP amounted to just 75 thousand million $ in 1992 (UNDP,
1995; Malcolm, 1995). Germany with its current account balance
of just + 2327 million $ in 1994 is in a too weak position to
be the European 'growth engine' anymore:
Graph 8.1: current account balances in the world system, 1994, in millions of $
Current Account Balances above + 10000 million $ and below - 10000
million $, 1994. Compiled from Fischer Weltalmanach, 1996
Regional concentration in the West of Eastern Europe should have been the aim of G-24-aid to Eastern Europe from the outset. Limited resources allow only limited aid activities. Economic stagnation and unemployment will significantly rise due to rent-seeking that is enhanced by the way European institutions are built at the present. In terms of the environment, government subventions to declining productive branches will increase technological backwardness and preserve transport intensity, and hence, pollution. Economic inequalities threaten to increase with such a structure, and in turn will form a block of its own against world economic ascent. The expenditure for research and development in the Union budget 1994 was just 3.6%; general and professional education received only 0.8% of the total Union expenditures; the energy sector, EURATOM and the environment another meagre 0.2%; while expenditure for agricultural subventions consumes 53.5%, and structural policies for regions, for agriculture, traffic systems and fisheries another 30.7% of the total budget (our own compilations from Fischer Weltalmanach, 1995). Not only the internal problematic needs urgent reform, also the relationship to the outside world.
Inexorably, the centres of gravity of the world economy are shifting
towards the LDCs, here most notably the countries of the Pacific.
Graph 8.2 shows the tendencies of world-wide investment from the
end of the last Kondratieff cycle onwards, while Graph 8.3 projects
these data up to the year 2000:
Graph 8.2: the world-wide recipients of transnational investment,
1984 - 1995
Graph 8.3: projections of the inflows of world-wide investments
until 2000
Graph 8.4: Triad fortresses? The share of intra-regional trade, trade with the other parts of the triad and with the rest of the world in a time-perspective
Graph 8.4: for the world economy, triad protectionism indeed might
be an abyss...
Legend: our own calculations and projections from Stiftung Entwicklung,
1996, and Hallett, 1994
The effect of the Europe-agreements between the EU and the countries of Eastern Europe seem to repeat the experience of Lomé and can be summarised in one word: a massive positive balance of trade in favour of the Union and to the detriment of the partners in the East, that leads to political and economic friction (Hickman, 1994; Inotai, 1993). It is shown in this chapter, that Lomé indeed is such a negative experience on the level of the LDCs. A growing number of academic critics of present Union economic policy maintain that the EU-approach to foreign trade and relations with the semi-periphery and the periphery is based on two fatally erroneous assumptions. First, the gradualism of trade liberalisation; second, the protectionist answer to the current economic malaise in Western Europe. The transformation process of the East would be supported efficiently only, if the East could expand rapidly its exports in those areas where the East has a comparative advantage - agriculture, steel, textiles and clothing. But precisely such sectors are protected by the EU. The agreements reached up to now reflect the outdated and orthodox EU trade policy, designed in the late 1950s. The situation of the East is made all the more difficult, because there is no Western European willingness to make major concessions in other areas, most notably migration, partly a consequence of deteriorating external economic relations, partly a consequence of rising internal inequalities.
Samir Amin (1994) puts a heavy blame on the Europeans for prolonging
the underdevelopment and stagnation of their own 'backyards'.
A look at the UNDP 1996 data about the European inner and outer
periphery in comparison to the European leading economy Germany
confirms this dire hypothesis. Germany is under a desperate pressure
to redress the negative current account balance, and to have high
export surpluses again:
Sub-Sah- Arab Eastern Germany
ran Africa States Europe
+ CIS
life expectancy 50.9 62.1 69.2 76.1
real GDP in $ PPP 1288 4513 4164 18840
human development index 0.379 0.633 0.773 0.920
gender related devel. index 0.366 0.513 - 0.883
gender empowerment index 0.366 0.513 - 0.654
millions without health s. 205 36 - -
illiterate adults in millions 121 59 2 -
million malnourished chil-
dren under 5 years 22,5 3,1 0,475 -
% low birth-weight infants 16% 12% 7% -
terms of trade 90 98 99 100
current account balance be-
fore official transfers in
millions of $ -8022 -10937 -12413 -1222
arms exports/imports in
millions of $ - -3844 -59 +462
government consumption 18% 25% 18% 20%
Source: our own compilations from UNDP, 1996
But what, then, Eastern Europeans should do? Western Europe's barriers to Eastern trade will only increase the pressure towards migration, towards the 'second economy' and towards political instability in the East.
The experience of East and Southeast Asia has precisely shown, that ceteris paribus three conditions for successful capitalist development now hold (i) the existence of a reliable anchor economy (ii) substantial net transfers (iii) free market access to exports (Inotai, 1993). The failure to realise such a strategy vis-à-vis the CEFTA-countries results in the growing trade balance problems of the transformation region (Hickman, 1994). By enlarging the Union to the South, the protective tendencies precisely in those sectors, which are also important for the semi-periphery and the periphery, have grown. The effect of this is a growing world economic inefficiency (Nuscheler, 1993). The most visible result of this is the high unemployment in many Union countries at the beginning of the 1990s: in 1993, France had a 11.6% unemployment rate; Finland 17.7%; Denmark 12.4%; Ireland 15.6%; Italy 11.5%; Spain 22.6%. The entire European Union now has over 17.3 million people out of work (10.9% unemployment rate); in Eastern Europe, willing to join the Union early on, another 6.6 million unemployed persons would have to be provided with jobs, if the foreign policy objective of the eastward expansion of the Union should become in any way realistic. The recent new Union members, Austria, Finland and Sweden, which joined the Union on January 1st 1995, are not free from employment problems themselves and have to adapt to the new Europe with a stock of 932000 unemployed persons, that is to say, almost another million, within their own borders. Most notably, unemployment in Finland is very high and reaches 17.7%. To put the proportions of unemployment in even more drastic words: the unemployed workers of the EU - excluding their families - would already be the 6th biggest state in the Union - bigger than the 10 smaller European Union countries. The unemployed workforce in the former GDR is still excluded from most international statistics, so that in reality, the country of the EU-unemployed would be still having more inhabitants.
Including the GDR-unemployed, and including the families of the unemployed workers, the up to 40 million persons, affected by unemployment, probably would form the 5th biggest state in Western Europe, only surpassed in size by Germany, the UK, France, and Italy. With around 40 million inhabitants like Spain, this 'country' should play a major role in the EU and should one day be in a position to take up at least the EU-Presidency...
To expect, that a further rapid expansion of the European Union would solve even only half the problems that it will create, is already an illusion: the developing world made important headway in social performance over the last 30 years and some countries have now absolutely overtaken Eastern Europe regarding the human development index. Israel, Hong Kong, South Korea, Uruguay, Trinidad, Bahamas, Argentina, Costa Rica, and Malta have a better human development index value than Portugal, the poorest European Union country in terms of human development; these Third World countries together with Singapore, Brunei, Venezuela, and Panama are socially more advanced than Bulgaria and Poland according to the HDI-index. Colombia, Kuwait, Mexico, Thailand, Antigua, Qatar, Malaysia, Bahrain, Fiji, Mauritius, the United Arab Emirates, Brazil, Dominica, Jamaica, Saudi Arabia, Saint Vincent, Saint Kitts could claim to become a member of the European Union with pretty much the same human development index justification - or even a superior one - than Romania; and Syria and Ecuador rank higher on the HDI-index than Albania, number 76 in the 173 nation list, calculated by the UNDP in 1994. Thus, the poverty curtain, now separating Europe, is as high in terms of the human development index as in the case of other pairs of developed and developing contiguous countries in the world system. San Diego is everywhere, San Diego is the future of Europe, and especially Frankfurt at the Oder, Goerlitz and Drasenhofen will become the European San Diego, once the Schengen accords become full reality.
Globalisation affects to a differing degree the 20 most developed
and still relatively stable long-term democracies of the world,
Sweden, Israel, Iceland, Finland, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Austria,
New Zealand, Norway, Australia, Italy, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands,
Switzerland, Canada, Japan, France, and the United States of America.
Of course, the term 'stable democracy' is only relative, since
the increase of new populist or neo-fascist parties in Europe
is a significant phenomenon, while old parties disappear. On average,
populists drum up 7.4% of West European votes; neo-fascists 2.2%.
Countries with well-known populist phenomena are Austria (23%),
Denmark (16%), Italy (21%) and Norway and France (both at 12%),
while neo-fascists are strongest in Italy (14%) (Taggart, 1995:
45).
The efficiency of the European Union at the level of 20 stable
western democracies
We now start our multivariate analysis of the basic problems of
the European Union (as to the variables used, see Appendix, Variable
List). The basic equation, already described in Chapter 2 of this
study, can be expanded in the following fashion:
(7.1) stagnation and development blocks in western democracies
(lack of economic growth; inflation; lack of human development;
unemployment) = constant + b1 * age of democracy + b2 *
state sector influence (like state sector expenditures
per GDP) + b3 * years of European Union membership (like
state sector expenditures per GDP)
The empirical results show the alarming and significant effects
of years of European membership on growth, inflation, human development
and unemployment. Results, which are significant at the level
of 10% (one-tailed t-test) are printed in bold type. The reform
needs of the Union are omnipresent in the light of these politometric
results for the 1980s and beyond. Each important economic performance
indicator, growth, inflation, human development and unemployment,
is influenced in a fatal and significant way by years of membership
in the European Union. The longer you stay inside, the more rent-seeking,
stagnant, inflation and unemployment-prone and the more lacking
in terms of human development your economy and society could become
in comparison to the other Western democracies:
(7.2) Growth, inflation, human development
and unemployment. The effects of years of European union membership,
age of democracy and central government expenditures
Dependent variable
Independent Variable growth inflation
HDI unemployment
years of European -0.022 +0.68 -0.00 +0.16
Union membership (1.55) (1.59)
(2.25) (1.91)
age of democracy -0.013 -0.22 +0.00 +0.06
(2.20) (1.25) (0.18) (1.69)
central government +0.003 -0.68 +0.00 +0.03
expenditures
(0.35) (2.20) (0.13) (0.53)
_____________________________________________________________
constant 3.29 2.53 0.94 -0.52
statistical
indicators
R^2 29.4% 27.5% 30.9% 29.3%
F 2.22 2.03 2.39 2.21
df. 16 16 16 16
_______________________________________________________________
df. = 16; p < .05 = 1.746; p <
.10 = 1.337. Significant coefficients at the 5% level are printed
in bold type; significant coefficients at the 10% level are printed
in bold indented type. Cells in parenthesis are t-values. UNDP
data 1994
Government expenditures lose their significant negative effect
on development indicators, once we introduce years of European
Union membership into the equations. Years of Union membership
significantly affect all four vital development indicators in
a clear-cut and detrimental way. They decrease growth, human development,
and they increase inflation and unemployment. The basic reason
for such unpleasant results is the emergency support philosophy
of the Commission, that strengthens euro-wide a rent-seeking mentality.
The most important reason, why the North America-Pacific triangle
is gaining ground in the world market is the pattern of specialisation
based on co-operation with less-developed partners that significantly
cuts production costs (Inotai, 1993).
Globalisation, East European reconstruction and the fatal conceit
of euro-centrism
The most basic process of change in our time is the shift of gravity in the world economy away from the old industrial regions of Europe towards the Pacific. 29 countries with a Pacific coast now already control over 53% of the world GNP, and the Pacific rim-lands tend to be the countries with the highest growth-rates in the world economy.
This 'earthquake' has set free powerful forces of change on the European landmass, both East and west of the Iron Curtain, while the power of the world depression during the 1980s and beyond brought new centres of gravity of the world economy to the fore. At the same time and by the very same process, the new international division of labour restructures the old industrial centres and creates new conflicts. The share of the industrial labour force in total employment in East Asia (excluding China) is now 34% and is thus higher than in the established industrial countries.
The moment of victory over communism in Europe becomes the moment of the fundamental weakness of both Europe and North America in a changing world economy. The current account balance of the European Union in 1992 was - 42.9 thousand million $, that of Canada and the United States - 70.4 thousand million $, while Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and China achieved a joint surplus of + 132.6 thousand million $ during the same year (our own compilations from UNDP, 1995). Faced with a growing trilateral competition between economic power blocs (Japan + Pacific/USA/Europe), that could even one day become a bilateral competition between the Pacific and an expanded Europe, the danger arises, that the losers in the trilateral economic power struggle are unable to provide their 'spheres of influence' with the kind of advantageous economic relationships, that would be necessary to be able to break the deadlock of semi-peripherisation and partial underdevelopment in regions like Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe. Mexico and Argentina alone now have a joint negative current account balance of 31.3 thousand million $, while Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe and the former USSR, the main peripheries and semi-peripheries in the European orbit, had to suffer a combined negative current balance of 17.9 thousand million $. For Europe, faced with the danger to fall behind, the temptation is great to increase unequal exchange with its own 'backyard' in Africa and Eastern Europe (Amin, 1994). Even Germany, the biggest economy in Europe, had a negative current account balance to the tune of - 1.2 thousand million $ in 1992, a far shot away from 1988, the year before the Berlin Wall fell, when the then old Federal Germany had still a surplus of 60.3 thousand million $. These data also testify to the economic decline of Europe in general, whose leading economy should be expected at least to have large current account balance surplus, if the project of a future strong role of Europe in the world economy were to be realistic in any way.
If we roughly divide the world market into the following zones
with available UNDP data for 1992 (UNDP, 1995):
European Union
NAFTA (USA, Canada, Mexico)
Central Eastern Europe (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia)
Russia
Japanese co-prosperity zone (Japan, China, Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea)
Rest of the world economy
we again grasp the total uselessness of an exclusively 'Eastern' option for the new democracies of Eastern Europe. Even an exclusively West European option is doomed to failure, because in between them, NAFTA and the Japanese co-prosperity zone partition already more than half of the world market. To this we must add the march of the Japanese multinational corporations and multinational banks towards control of large sections of the most dynamic industries around the globe and their success in those 14% of the 'rest' of the world economy that comprises huge markets like Brazil (432.2 thousand million $, thus greater than Russia's 418 thousand million $), Argentina (205.9 thousand million $), and India (274.2 thousand million $). Germany, the main anchor economy of Eastern European transformation, has an approximate share of only 8% in total world product.
In the transformation countries themselves, Poland, Romania and Russia were among the main losers of international exchange. The negative trends in the current account balance continued after 1992 especially in Poland and in Hungary. In the Czech Republic, too, the world economic tide of current account development seems to have turned definitely against the new democracy. According to our calculations on the basis of recent estimates and projections by the country risk department of Austria's largest bank, Bank Austria (East-West-Report, August 1995), Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary, the most hopeful candidates for European Union membership and democratic stabilisation, will have lost 12.9 thousand million $ on their current account balance from 1992 onwards through to the end of 1995.
In studies published as far back as 1991, it could be shown that for the political project of a united Europe that is economically under the leadership of Germany, many dangers could arise out of such a constellation (Balibar, 1991; Tausch, 1991a). The capitalist world economy, we have already remarked above, is seen to be of a cyclical nature, and in the depressive B-phases of the world economy, under the weight of the world depressions, there have always been reform attempts in Russia and in Eastern Europe going all the way back to the times of Boris Godunow. Since the Nordic War of 1700 such periods always were German-Russian alliances. But whenever there was an upswing in the world economy, and the Russian regimes hardened - as could be observed in all world economic upswings - these alliances between Russia and Germany, that were a result of the depression, broke apart, with Germany and Russia clashing over their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Europe.
Secular negative trends in the current account balances of nations
are seen to be very strong motivations for international conflict.
The rise of nationalism, anti-Westernism and anti-Germanism could
receive a powerful ammunition by the ongoing post-transformation
economic performance of the reform countries of Eastern Europe,
dominated by the inability to find a (legal) export-oriented growth
model, which is the underlying cause of the official negative
current account balance. The balance of trade of the reform countries
will be by the end of 1995:
Table 7.1: trade balances in Eastern Europe
a) 1995
Poland - 4000 million $
Slovakia - 800 million $
Slovenia - 500 million $
Czech Republic - 4000 million $
Hungary - 3270 million $
Total - 12570 million $
All too often, the shadow economy balances such trends. From 1992 onwards through to the end of 1995, these 5 transformation countries will have a cumulative trade balance of 33.5 thousand million $. No tigers are thus in sight in this part of the world.
The present author agrees with the general perspective, provided by students of the present international political economy, like Joshua Goldstein: the underlying logic of the capitalist world economy is a logic of conflict, intrinsically linked to the mechanisms of unequal exchange between the power centres of the world economy, and if the next 25 years are not being used for the creation of durable peace on earth, we could be threatened by a repetition of the same long-term cataclysms, that already led to the Thirty Years War, the Napoleonic Wars and the World Wars of this century.
Even the integration of the 'Near European East' - that is to say, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia, will be a painful process. For a long time to come, the balance of trade and the balance on current account will be negative, a powerful force in the motivation of economic and political nationalism against the West. The 'extractive economy' (Tausch and Prager, 1993) is a term used to describe a situation, when exorbitant energy consumption is used to produce a shrinking or stagnating, or at least not very rapidly growing amount of welfare. Our hypothesis is that Poland and other former or continuously communist countries play precisely such an 'extractive role' in the emerging cycle of the world economy.
The East, unable to reap the benefits of technical progress and
being forced to export what there is, is thrown back to the old
patterns of the extractive economy. No major advances in the energy/income
balance are in sight. We witness a heavy or even increased reliance
of the export sector on the extractive branches of the economy,
and the inability to change the price mechanism, partially because
losses in the terms of trade and the 'scissors' of lagging (legal)
exports and rising imports dictate that the urban and rural poor
cannot pay higher energy bills. The result is one more reason
for the rising tide of nationalism:
Table 7.2: The extractive economy on
a world scale. Poland by international comparison
Economic region Energy consumption in kg oil
equivalent per 100 $ GDP
1965 1991
-----------------------------------------------------------
World - 36
All developing countries 142 80
among them:
Sub-Saharan Africa 166 59
Latin America + Car. 119 43
China 195 187
Algeria - 154
Industrial Countries - 27
among them:
North America 180 36
Japan 145 13
EU 165 19
Poland - 155
Bulgaria - 403
Romania - 254
_____________________________________________________________
Source: our own compilations from UNDP,
1995
Research and technology should be at the centre of the development
path, together with savings creation and (legal) exports.
Savings and (legal) exports in Eastern Europe are small compared
to the 'tigers' of Asia. Poland, whose struggle contributed so
much to the downfall of communism, found itself left alone in
a peripheral position in the hour of victory. This is at least,
what nationalists will assert, and hard economic and social data
about societal development in the post-1989 world unfortunately
have to support their lamentable assertion.
9) Transnational Integration and National Disintegration
- A Synthesis
Arrighi wrote in (1995):
'Partial as the current revival of a self-regulating world market has actually been, it has already issued unbearable verdicts. Entire communities, countries, even continents, as in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, have been declared 'redundant', superfluous to the changing economy of capital accumulation on a world scale. Combined with the collapse of the world power and territorial empire of the USSR, the unplugging of these 'redundant' communities and locales from the world supply system has triggered innumerable, mostly violent feuds over 'who is more superfluous than whom', or, more simply, over the appropriation of resources that were made absolutely scarce by the unplugging' (Arrighi, 1995: 330)
On the other hand, it is clear that nations like
had a GNP growth rate of 5% or more per annum during 1980-93.
What tendencies, then, do emerge from the multivariate analysis
of international development in the post-1980/1989 world in 134
countries with fairly consistent and complete data?
First, we mention our database:
Final model: the database
% labor force participation ratio (UNDP, 1996)
% of the labour force in agriculture (UNDP, 1996; Fischer Weltalmanach, 1996)
% of the labour force in industry (see: labour force agriculture)
absolute GNP (UNDP, 1996)
agricultural share in GDP (UNDP, 1996; Fischer Weltalmanach, 1996)
average population growth (UNDP, 1996)
economic growth 80-93, p.c. and year (UNDP, 1996)
EU membership years (Fischer Weltalmanach, 1995, 1996)
FDI per GDP (UNCTAD, 1996; Business Central Europe, 1996)
human development index (UNDP)
inflation 93 (UNDP, 1996)
main telephone lines per 100 population (UNDP, 1996)
mean years of schooling, population aged >25y
military expenditures per GDP (UNDP, 1996)
state sector size (government expenditures per GDP; UNDP 1996; Weltalmanach, 1995, 1996; World Resources Institute)
structural heterogeneity (labour force share in agriculture divided by product share of agriculture; see labour force data)
total fertility rate (UNDP, 1996)
UN membership years (Weltalmanach, 1996, 1995)
violation of political rights (1, democracy, to 7, dictatorship) (Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, 1996, based on Freedom House)
violations of civil rights (see political rights)
years of communist rule (Autorenkollektiv; Weltalmanach)
The variables of the final model:
| absolute GNP | |||
| growth 80-93 | |||
| inflation 93 | |||
| FDI per GDP | |||
| UN membership years | |||
| mean years of schooling | |||
| absolute GNP | |||
| FDI per GDP | |||
| Years of Communist Rule | |||
| population growth | |||
| state sector size | |||
| % labor force participation | |||
| % labour force agric. | |||
| % lf industry | |||
| agr. share in GNP | |||
| MILEX | |||
| HDI | |||
| violation of political rights | |||
| violation of human rights | |||
Is Arrighi's hypothesis about the 'deregulatory logic' of post-1980 capitalism confirmed by the data? Under inclusion of the world of former 'real' socialism, the curve-linear effect of the development level on subsequent economic growth is partially taken over by variables, pertaining to the employment structure. Again, only the statistically significant effects, that cannot be explained by simple random, are being taken into account. Countries with a large labour force participation ratio, and hence, a relatively smaller industrial de-facto reserve army of employment, grow slower than countries at the middle income level with a still larger industrial reserve army outside agriculture and a relatively abundant supply of labour on the labour market. Our results from Chapter 4 about the (female) reserve army are again confirmed here, now on a more general level. One plausible reason for this shift in predictive power away from the Matthew's effect to the employment structure is the still preliminary character of income data from Eastern Europe. Wage flexibility in the urban sector seems to be another of the main underlying processes here. But on the other hand, predominantly rural societies at the present stage of globalization are being negatively affected by the ongoing urban bias in world development. Hence also the negative effect of agricultural employment on growth. The international system indeed seems to work like a single, huge, distribution coalition. Economic growth disproportionately favours countries with a long-established record of UN-membership. Participation in the distribution coalition allows for a better access to the distributed goods, while the predominantly rural societies of the 'Fourth' and 'Fifth' World are being excluded from the benefits.
The human capital effort indeed pays off in terms of economic growth, and also state sector size affects growth in a way, as predicted by conventional economic theory. The size of the military sector significantly and negative affects economic growth. Again, our results from Chapter 4 are confirmed here.
Former communist countries often stagnate, because their human capital effort is too low, because their state is still too big, because their wage flexibility is too low, because their military burden rate is still too high, and because their rural populations are being discriminated against. But per se, the tendencies of world society after 1980 during the new cyclical set-up seem to suggest, that a world political experience as a former communist nation does not block against subsequent economic growth. Also, the argument, that smaller nations with a low absolute GNP find it more difficult in world society, does not apply anymore, when we look into the whole set of determining conditions for 134 capitalist and post-communist societies in the world. By contrast: absolute market size is not a precondition of subsequent economic growth anymore, as successful island nations like Mauritius, show impressively. Our equation determines 46.6% of economic growth from 1980 onwards; the F-statistic for the whole equation is 8.05, with 120 degrees of freedom.
Human development, on the other hand, is positively determined
by a high agricultural share, and hence the absence of
what Michael Lipton once called the 'urban bias of world development'
is being negatively determined by a high ratio of foreign direct
investment penetration. These two statements are very well
compatible with the essence of dependency theories. A development,
that is dependent to a large extent on foreign capital, is socially
polarising and regionally exclusive. The rural regions stagnate
relatively, while the rich urban centres are receiving disproportionate
shares of the newly created wealth. But ceteris paribus,
it also emerges, that the human capital formation effort (mean
years of schooling) is negatively related to the human development
index, mainly because highly repressive totalitarian communist
regimes - in the past - had a relatively good quantitative record
in the education sector, that was connected with severe deficits
in other areas of social policy.
| GROWTH | |||||||||||||
| 10,213 | 0,27658 | -0,0449 | -0,0038 | 0,04683 | 0,04623 | -0,0412 | -0,9458 | -0,0299 | -0,0034 | 1E-04 | -0,372 | -0,0035 | -4,1729 |
| 2,44484 | 0,09678 | 0,02556 | 0,03757 | 0,02002 | 0,03517 | 0,01661 | 0,25246 | 0,01213 | 0,01112 | 0,0003 | 0,13 | 0,01406 | 3,1815 |
| 0,466 | |||||||||||||
| 8,04862 | 120 | ||||||||||||
| 4,177 | 2,858 | -1,755 | -0,1006 | 2,339 | 1,31457 | -2,481 | -3,746 | -2,463 | -0,308 | 0,33523 | -2,861 | -0,2517 | |
| UN memb.y | mean y scho | absoluteGNP | FDI per GDP | Years of Comm | population gr | state sector | %labor force | %lf agric. | %lf industry | agr.shareGP | MILEX | HDI | constant |
| HUMAN DEVELOPMENT | |||||||||||||
| UN memb.y | mean y scho | absoluteGNP | FDI per GDP | Years of Comm | population gr | state sector | %labor force | %lf agric. | %lf industry | agr.shareGP | MILEX | ||
| -0,0017 | -0,0042 | -6E-05 | -0,003 | -0,0018 | -0,0002 | -0,0134 | 0,00027 | 0,00053 | -7E-06 | 0,02086 | -0,0001 | 0,86611 | |
| 0,0036 | 0,00087 | 0,0014 | 0,00069 | 0,0013 | 0,00062 | 0,00931 | 0,00045 | 0,00041 | 1,1E-05 | 0,00445 | 0,00052 | 0,08829 | |
| 0,88 | |||||||||||||
| 74,1983 | 121 | ||||||||||||
| -0,4828 | -4,78 | -0,0435 | -4,383 | -1,3488 | -0,3169 | -1,4343 | 0,59058 | 1,29988 | -0,6638 | 4,691 | -0,2103 | ||
| UN memb.y | mean y scho | absoluteGNP | FDI per GDP | Years of Comm | population gr | state sector | %labor force | %lf agric. | %lf industry | agr.shareGP | MILEX | ||
| mean y scho | absoluteGNP | FDI per GDP | Years of Comm | population gr | state sector | viol hum rites | %lf agric. | %lf industry | agr.shareGP | MILEX | ||
| employm | -0,9723 | -0,2063 | 0,06753 | 0,13692 | 2,14696 | 0,05062 | 1,33109 | -0,2628 | -0,2096 | 4,1E-05 | 2,07067 | 18,7369 |
| 0,63941 | 0,14877 | 0,2391 | 0,11011 | 1,10838 | 0,10571 | 1,61876 | 0,07624 | 0,06768 | 0,00188 | 0,73014 | 12,7789 | |
| 0,293 | ||||||||||||
| 4,60169 | 122 | |||||||||||
| -1,5206 | -1,387 | 0,28244 | 1,2435 | 1,93703 | 0,47887 | 0,82229 | -3,4465 | -3,0963 | 0,02195 | 2,836 | ||
| mean y scho | absoluteGNP | FDI per GDP | Years of Comm | population gr | state sector | viol hum rites | %lf agric. | %lf industry | agr.shareGP | MILEX |
Source: our EXCEL 5.0 calculations from UNDP and other data sources,
quoted above. As to the footnotes about the outprint, see Chapter
4.
In terms of employment policy and labour force participation rates,
Europe is not in a very lucky constellation right now: low population
growth, high overall educational levels, combined with a high
employment share of industry and a run-down of military expenditures
all would suggest a still future lowering of the labour force
participation rates, while in some European countries there is
still a high agricultural employment share, which works as an
additional constraint against a higher labour force participation
ratio.
Europe thus faces three very important decisions about the future:
east-ward expansion of the European Union, European monetary union,
and the structural internal reform of the Union. Faced with these
decisions, an intellectual battle rages across the continent between
euro-sceptics and integrationists, between federalists and nationalists,
between centralists and regionalists. World systems research and
development research provides radical, fascinating and novel answers
to these old controversies.
What is the evidence of cross-national quantitative research?
(i) The process of globalisation did not level-off the differences
in wealth and well-being between the different regions of the
world, especially between Europe and the Mediterranean southern
periphery of Europe. Far from granting a real free trade regime,
Europe has petrified existing patterns of the division of labour
between the centres and the peripheries. Poverty, unemployment,
homelessness and other negative social phenomena become more and
more relevant, not just for periphery and semi-periphery countries,
but for the former centres in Europe themselves. We are evidencing
a peripherization of the European landmass, while the countries
of the Western Pacific and the Eastern Indian Ocean are the future
centres of world capitalist development.
(ii) Europe is characterized by the very mix of conditions, which, on a world-wide scale, block against rapid economic growth. Too little national savings, privileged home-markets for idle and saturated European transnational corporations and the European continental powerful banks, migration instead of innovation, excessive government consumption, political distribution coalitions - also regarding gender conflict lines - which try to get via political means what they cannot achieve on the world markets anymore, the continued practising of traditional patterns of national defence, based on conscription, are precisely the mix that explains 44.2% of stagnation from 1980 world-wide, without resorting to capital investments and other intra-economic explanations of growth. The 134 nation study on growth in world society, mentioned above, again underlines these points. What would be the answer against this process what in the Dutch languages has been so aptly termed as Verluderung?
A slim, socially just state, which enhances savings, deters distribution
coalitions, subjects the European transnationals to the discipline
of the market, instead of pouring down the sink billions of ECU's
in terms of subvention money, ending up more often than not in
the pockets of the shadow economists of our times, would be among
the pre-requisites of a real reform of the European Union member
states and an adequate answer to the question about the place
of Europe in the world. 15 of the most important 19 development
dimensions in the world system are being negatively determined
nowadays by MNC penetration. The capitalist world economy is in
addition characterized by strong 20 year cycles (Kuznets cycles)
and 50-60 year longer waves (Kondratieff waves), which again are
shown to be relevant in this work on the basis of new calculations,
based on Joshua Goldstein's previous research. They, and not so
much grand designs of conference diplomacy, will determine the
future place of Europe in the world economy. Precisely, because
the Union is presently a protective club shielding away market
influences from European transnationals, banks, and distribution
coalitionists, Europe's upswing is belated, and the Maastricht-induced
stagflation threatening to coincide with the next major Kuznets
cycle trough, to be expected in 2002 or 2003, will make our stagnation
even worse. Political stability, under such circumstances, in
the Mediterranean and in other countries becomes a question mark.
European foreign policy, blinded by the fall of the Berlin Wall
in 1989, overlooks the intrinsic conflict structure of the world
economy, that is shaped like a 'W' and that threatens future intensified
conflicts on the borderlines of world instability.
(iii) Subventions, mass migration and distribution coalitions
mean structural conservation and environmental decay at the same
time. Since environmental strain cycles coincide with world economic
swings, it is to be expected that any real future European recovery
will increase the environmental problems on the European continent,
still increased by the transport-intensity of EU-development patterns,
connected with the subvention system. Physical mobility of labour
is the key de-facto concept of the past policies of the Commission
in Brussels, while information mobility is being hindered by local
and national telephone monopolies, and the absence of privatisation
in transport, especially roads.
(iv) The eastward expansion of the Union will have to face up
to the dilemmas of modernization in the environment of past rapid
urbanisation (what world system scholars have termed the urban
bias in world development), little efficient state-directed mass
communication and belated demographic transitions in much of the
Balkans and the former Soviet Union, if not the former Warsaw
Pact in general. Modernization and structural adjustment in the
post-1989 set-up is bound to fail in the East if it is not accompanied
by a massive real inflow of foreign resources. The semi-democratization
in much of the region, that set in after 1989, from the viewpoint
of political stability, is much more dangerous than the full rule
dictatorship or full democracy. Money laundering and fluctuations
in the terms of trade are additional important determinants of
the growth prospects of the reform countries.
(v) Modernization, globalization, and East-ward expansion of the
Union might increase existing cleavages in the countries of the
East, if they are not accompanied by a deep structural change
in favour of the up to now underprivileged sectors and strata.
Many of the lessons of neo-classical economists about Southeast-Asia
can be repeated here in an East European context. The discrimination
against exports by import substitution strategies, effective currency
overvaluations, privileges and wage inflexibility in the monopolistic
sectors, and finally and overarching all these phenomena, a conspicuous
contempt of urban elites against the countryside and a deep urban
bias of development have created a structure, where the political
and social divisions between the different parts of countries
have increased. It is shown in this study with regional multivariate
analyses from Polish election data 1993 and 1995, that electoral
results are heavily determined by these regional and world economic
aspects, while other theories fail to capture the dynamics of
socio-political cleavages in the new democracies of the East.
(vi) Euro-sclerosis at the heart of the Union of presently 15
nations is a reality. Take any indicator of economic illness in
the relatively stable Western democracies today - unemployment,
lack of economic growth, insufficient human development: it will
be neatly determined by just three variables:
- age of democracy within world politically guaranteed boundaries
- size of the state sector, like central government expenditures per GDP
- years of membership in the European Union
Instead of causing stable long-term economic growth, the Union
rather causes what might be termed 'the Belgium syndrome'.
Relatively young democracies, like Poland or the Czech Republic,
Hungary or Slovenia, will still benefit for a few years from the
positive effects of early membership; but the positive initial
effects will disappear with the workings of the really existing
Union in the long run.
So, what then is the prescription? For Arrighi (1995), there seems to emerge the imperative of organizing the international community anew around the dynamic axis of the East Asian/North American archipellago, implicitly hoping for democratization spin-offs along this dynamic axis. The Japanese trasnational bank and the Japanese transnational corporation overseas seem to be the most dynamic element of world capitalism nowadays. Arrighi seems to advance the viewpoint that such a 'world community' controlled capitalism would still be better than the rule of chaos and war. For us, Europeans, the lectures of the empirical study of contemporary changes in world capitalism are twofold: one is more medium-term, the other long-term: the upgrading of the European Parliament ('no taxation without representation'), a more slender and socially just state in the member countries, free trade, again and again, and also more decisive efforts in human capital formation (in the framework of privatisation of Universities and other institutions of higher learning) would be a proper European step in the right direction in the short-and medium term. To learn form the East Asian Space-of Flows (Arrighi, 1995) above all suggests that heeding the advice of contemporary economics, learning its lessons from East Asia in such areas as corporate strategy, labour market organization, international trade and migration, would be more advantageous than to be trapped again by the fatal conceit of a thinking along the lines of the territorial control, the Lebensraum. And Germany, in particular, at the decisive time, seems to forget that the main imperatives of world system ascent are economic and not territorial - now in the wider, European Union sense. Such advice unheeded, eastward European Union expansion could dismally fail, made all the worse by the negative effects of ongoing Maastricht austerity. Thus the time is ripe for a socio-liberal alternative to orthodox etatism and neo-conservatism alike.
On a long-term basis, though, only a socio-liberal world state
will be able to overcome the intrinsic instabilities of the capitalist
nation system, that has (un)governed the world since 1450. Today's
problems are too global to be left to a (supra)national state.
And at any rate, transnational capitalism rings the bell to all
attempts at national regulation for the next 50 or 100 years.
So, our predictions for Europe are dire: Sunkel's scenario, at
least in part, offers a key to our future. Capitalist globalization
can only be answered by global democratisation strategy.
Samples and data
List of variables
The general model
Indicators of globalisation:
aid dependency (UNDP, 1994) net per capita aid in $. Donor countries are listed according to their donations per capita and are recorded as (-)
export processing zones (Bailey et al., 1993). The variable codes the number of export processing zones per country at the beginning of the 1990s
migration dependency (UNDP, 1993) net worker remittances per GNP/GDP at the beginning of the 1990s
MNC penetration index: penetration by transnational capital, weighted by population and capital stock, mid-1970s (Bornschier/Heintz, 1979, based on OECD)
share of outward FDI stock in gross domestic product in 1985 (UNCTAD, 1996. For a very small number of countries, regional averages had to be taken to substitute for the few, missing values)
terms of trade index 1987-90 (UNDP, 1994, Weltalmanach, 1994, based on UN)
trade dependency index: exports plus imports as % of GDP 1990 (UNDP, 1993/94)
vulnerability of a nation in terms of the expansion
of the new international division of labour, 1990 (share
of women in the national labour force) (UNDP, 1993/94)
Indicators for the institutional environment:
ethno-linguistic fractionalisation index, mid-1960s (Bornschier/Heintz, 1979, based on Taylor/Hudson). Ethnic discrimination is thought to be the purest form of a 'distribution coalition'
government consumption per GDP, 1990 (UNDP, 1993/94)
government expenditures per GNP, 1991 (UNDP, 1993/94; UNICEF, Regional Monitoring Report, 1, 11, 1993, see Cornia, 1993; World Resources Research Institute)
public investment in the preceding Kondratieff cycle (Bornschier/Heintz)
total area in thousands of square kilometres (World Bank, WDR, 1994. This variable measures the role, that territory and resources could play for attracting foreign capital)
violation of civil rights, 1991 (Stiftung, 1993/94, based on Freedom House, combining freedom of religion, the press, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of trade unions, the right to property and equality before the law)
violation of political rights index, 1991 (Stiftung, 1993/94, based on Freedom House, combining free elections, role of the elected parliament in political decision making, party competition, protection of minorities)
world political threats to a country, to be measured by the percentage of armed forces per population. Some neo-liberals maintain that world political threats increase the growth potential of a nation. Due to the skewness of the indicator, the natural logarithm ln (MPR+1) has to be taken (calculated from UNDP, 1993/94; see also: Weede, 1985)
years of membership in the United Nations
(coded from Weltalmanach, 1995)
Indicators for the social policy approach:
human development index (UNDP, 1994) as an indicator for the quality of past social policy
increase/decrease of fertility rates 1960-90 (UNDP, 1993/94)
life expectancy at birth as an indicator for the quality of past social policy, 1990 (UNDP, 1993/94 and World Bank, WDR, 1994)
share of women in the membership of national legislature (lower house) (UNDP, 1993/94)
social security benefits expenditure as % of GDP in the era of the evolving contemporary Kondratieff cycle, 1985-90 (UNDP, 1994). Social security benefits expenditures include here the compensations for the loss of income for the sick and the temporarily disabled; payments to the elderly, the permanently disabled and the unemployed; they also include family, maternity and child allowances and the cost of welfare services. The UNDP data collection is based on ILO sources
total fertility rate (most recent estimate) (UNDP, 1993/94)
total number of inhabitants, divided by the surface area of a country (population density). Due to the skewness of the indicator, the squared root (population density^.50) had to be taken (calculated from UNDP, 1993/94)
violation of civil rights, 1991 (Stiftung, 1993/94, based on Freedom House)
violation of political rights
index, 1991 (Stiftung, 1993/94,
based on Freedom House)
The dependent variables of the general model
adjustment 1965/80-90/93(calculated from UNDP, 1993/94/96) - dimension growth
capability poverty measure (CPM-value) (UNDP, 1996. The measure weights unattended births, underweight children, and female illiteracy. It is regarded by the UNDP as a direct measure of absolute poverty)
deforestation rate (UNDP, 1993-95; World Bank, 1995; World Resources Research Institute). The index measures annual rates of deforestation in the 1980s in %. Because of missing data, a number of countries had to be coded by the LDC average or the OECD average
destabilisation index (coded according to Weltalmanach, 1995. The indicator codes all those countries as '1' (destabilised), that have entries about serious armed internal or external conflict in 1994. The rest is coded as '0'
employment (UNDP, 1994) labour force as % of total population
ethno-warfare (Gurr, 1994) magnitude of ethno-political conflict. The scores are country sums of the squared roots of the deaths (in 10s of thousands) from ethno-political conflict 1993-94 plus refugees (in 100s of thousands). Countries with no entries according to Gurr's main research results, 1994, are coded as '0'
forest area per total land area (UNDP, 1993-95). In contrast to the above indicator, that measures flows, this measure rather captures stocks of already existent forest destruction. Agricultural land per total land area has to be taken into consideration as an independent variable, because else the regression equations would be biased by a desert-factor
gender empowerment measure (UNDP, 1995. The index weights seats held by women in parliament, the percentage share of women and managers, the share of women in the professional and technical workforce, and the share of women in total earned income
gender-related development index (GDI) (UNDP, 1995) - dimension female life chances. This index was developed by the UNDP especially for the 1995 women's conference in Beijing. The index weights the share of earned income for females and males, the gender-specific life expectancies, the gender-specific adult literacy rates, and the gross primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratios. It ranges theoretically from 0.0 to 0.999, with Sweden (0.919) at the top of the international scale, and Afghanistan (0.169) at the bottom. Since there unfortunately no were no data for Dominica, Grenada, Antigua, Seychelles, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, Saint Kits, Belize, South Africa, Oman, Jordan, Gabon, Solomon Islands, Sao Tome, Congo, Rwanda, Bhutan, Angola, Mauritania, Somalia, Gambia, Germany and Israel, we had to substitute these missing values with averages for the socio-economic groups concerned: a) the industrialised democracies (gender development index average 0.87) b) developing countries with a Human Development Index above 0.6 (in our 123 nations analysis: Barbados to Tunisia, gender development index average 0.721) c) developing countries with a Human Development Index from 0.599 to 0.389 (Oman to Egypt, gender development index average 0,542) d) developing countries with a Human Development Index under 0.388 (except for the very least developed countries; Kenya to Sierra Leone; gender development index average 0.33) and e) the very least developed countries Benin, Guinea Bissau, Chad, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Sierra Leone with a gender development index of 0.2. This procedure can be regarded only as a first approximation and should be substituted in future research
GNP per capita growth (1965-1980 and 1980-90/1980-92, 1980-93) (UNDP, 1993/94/95/96; Fischer Weltalmanach) - dimension growth
greenhouse index, 1989 (greenhouse index per 10 million people, UNDP, 1994. The greenhouse index measures the net emissions of three major greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide, methane and chlorofluorocarbons. The index weights each gas according to it's heattrapping quality in carbon dioxide equivalents and expresses them in metric tonnes of carbon per capita) - dimension environmental quality/degradation
human development index (HDI) (UNDP, 1994)
income distribution (Moaddel, 1994. The measure focuses on the share of the top 20% in total incomes in over 80 countries. Wherever possible, Moaddel's data were updated by World Bank WDR, 1994 and 1995)
increase in life expectancy 1960-90 (calculated from UNDP, 1993/94 via a regression procedure, predicting 1990 life expectancy on 1960 life expectancy, and then taking the residuals as growth rates) - dimension redistribution and human development
mean years of schooling of the population aged 25 and > (UNDP, 1993 and 1994)
violation of civil rights, 1991 (Stiftung, 1993/94, based on Freedom House) - dimension democracy
violation of political rights index,
1991 (Stiftung, 1993/94, based on Freedom House) - dimension democracy
The final model
% labor force participation ratio (UNDP, 1996)
% of the labour force in agriculture (UNDP, 1996; Fischer Weltalmanach, 1996)
% of the labour force in industry (see: labour force agriculture)
absolute GNP (UNDP, 1996)
agricultural share in GDP (UNDP, 1996; Fischer Weltalmanach, 1996)
average population growth (UNDP, 1996)
economic growth 80-93, pc. and year (UNDP, 1996)
EU membership years (Fischer Weltalmanach, 1995, 1996)
FDI per GDP (UNCTAD, 1996; Business Central Europe, 1996)
human development index (UNDP)
inflation 93 (UNDP, 1996)
main telephone lines per 100 population (UNDP, 1996)
mean years of schooling, population aged >25y
military expenditures per GDP (UNDP, 1996)
state sector size (gov. expenditures per GDP; UNDP 1996; Weltalmanach, 1995, 1996; World Resources Institute)
structural heterogeneity (labour force share in agriculture divided by product share of agriculture; see labour force data)
total fertility rate (UNDP, 1996)
UN membership years (Weltalmanach, 1996, 1995)
violation of political rights (1, democracy, to 7, dictatorship) (Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, 1996, based on Freedom House)
violations of civil rights (see political rights)
years of Commist Rule (Autorenkollektiv; Weltalmanach)
Data about the position of societies in the world
system
| Adjustment | GNP gro80-92 | Viol Pol Rits | Viol Civ Rits | PopDens*0,5 | Terms Trade | MNC PEN73 | Govcons | Trade Dep | social sec | UNmemby. | Women Parl |
| Barb | 0,35898 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 77,4597 | 107 | 115,4 | 10 | 63 | 0,9 | 29 | 4 | ||||||
| Hong | 3,29846 | 5,5 | 3,6 | 3,5 | 241,083 | 100 | 208,91 | 8 | 187 | 2,7 | 0 | 8 | ||||||
| Urug | -1,5112 | -1 | 1 | 2 | 13,3417 | 104 | 30,35 | 13 | 38 | 7,5 | 50 | 6 | ||||||
| Trinid | -6,8691 | -2,6 | 1 | 1 | 49,3862 | 110 | 565,39 | 16 | 70 | 2,1 | 33 | 17 | ||||||
| Baham | 1,73353 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 16,1245 | 107 | 115,4 | 10 | 63 | 0,5 | 22 | 4 | ||||||
| Korea | 6,22566 | 8,5 | 2 | 3 | 66,5958 | 108 | 20,7 | 10 | 57 | 2,7 | 4 | 2 | ||||||
| Costa | -0,3551 | 0,8 | 1 | 1 | 24,6982 | 114 | 174,71 | 18 | 61 | 6,3 | 50 | 12 | ||||||
| Sing | 2,59584 | 5,3 | 4 | 4 | 211,901 | 100 | 295,3 | 11 | 327 | 7,1 | 30 | 5 | ||||||
| Arg | -2,0673 | -0,9 | 1 | 3 | 10,9545 | 112 | 72,62 | 5 | 18 | 2,7 | 50 | 5 | ||||||
| Ven | -2,5252 | -0,8 | 1 | 3 | 14,9666 | 164 | 198,6 | 9 | 49 | 1,1 | 50 | 10 | ||||||
| Domi | 3,8072 | 4,6 | 2 | 1 | 30,9839 | 107 | 115,4 | 10 | 63 | 3,3 | 17 | 17 | ||||||
| Kuw | -1,9945 | -4,3 | 6 | 5 | 34,2199 | 77 | 115,4 | 10 | 56 | 2,7 | 32 | 8 | ||||||
| Mex | -1,984 | -0,2 | 4 | 4 | 21,2603 | 110 | 48,59 | 11 | 23 | 1,5 | 50 | 12 | ||||||
| Maurit | 4,27301 | 5,6 | 1 | 2 | 76,6159 | 114 | 115,4 | 12 | 134 | 5,6 | 27 | 7 | ||||||
| Malay | 0,94319 | 3,2 | 5 | 4 | 23,6854 | 94 | 167,94 | 13 | 138 | 0,5 | 38 | 5 | ||||||
| Gren | 5,52036 | 3,8 | 1 | 2 | 51,7301 | 101 | 115,4 | 12 | 38 | 3,3 | 21 | 8 | ||||||
| Antig | 5,76509 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 38,7298 | 101 | 115,4 | 12 | 38 | 3,3 | 14 | 8 | ||||||
| Colom | -0,027 | 1,4 | 2 | 4 | 17,7764 | 92 | 51,96 | 10 | 30 | 1,5 | 50 | 8 | ||||||
| Seych | 0,98617 | 3,2 | 6 | 6 | 51,2835 | 101 | 115,4 | 12 | 38 | 1,7 | 19 | 16 | ||||||
| Sur | -6,9007 | -3,6 | 4 | 4 | 5,2915 | 101 | 115,4 | 12 | 38 | 0,6 | 20 | 16 | ||||||
| UAE | -6,9945 | -4,3 | 6 | 5 | 13,9642 | 101 | 115,4 | 12 | 38 | 3,3 | 24 | 0,4 | ||||||
| Pan | -2,7402 | -1,2 | 4 | 2 | 18,0278 | 138 | 1289,73 | 22 | 39 | 9,4 | 50 | 8 | ||||||
| Jamai | 0,10633 | 0,2 | 2 | 2 | 47,4974 | 88 | 478,22 | 15 | 76 | 1,2 | 33 | 5 | ||||||
| Braz | -1,6445 | 0,4 | 2 | 3 | 13,3791 | 123 | 97,11 | 16 | 13 | 4,6 | 50 | 6 | ||||||
| Fiji | -1,7419 | 0,3 | 6 | 4 | 20,025 | 101 | 115,4 | 12 | 38 | 0,6 | 25 | 8 | ||||||
| Saint L | 3,50283 | 4,4 | 1 | 2 | 47,0425 | 101 | 115,4 | 12 | 38 | 3,3 | 16 | 0,4 | ||||||
| TRK | 1,91599 | 2,9 | 2 | 4 | 27,258 | 98 | 14,19 | 14 | 37 | 4,5 | 50 | 1 | ||||||
| Thai | 4,17214 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 32,9242 | 99 | 24,45 | 10 | 70 | 3,3 | 49 | 4 | ||||||
| Saint V | 6,07738 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 52,6213 | 101 | 115,4 | 12 | 38 | 3,3 | 15 | 8 | ||||||
| Saint K | 4,74407 | 5,7 | 1 | 1 | 34,1614 | 101 | 115,4 | 12 | 38 | 3,3 | 12 | 7 | ||||||
| Syria | -3,8287 | 0 | 7 | 7 | 26,3818 | 87 | 7,49 | 14 | 45 | 3,3 | 50 | 8 | ||||||
| Belize | 1,50196 | 2,6 | 1 | 1 | 9,21954 | 101 | 115,4 | 12 | 38 | 3,3 | 14 | 0,4 | ||||||
| Saudi | -5,3945 | -3,3 | 7 | 6 | 8,48528 | 95 | 129,48 | 12 | 68 | 1,4 | 50 | 0 | ||||||
| South A | -1,8121 | 0,1 | 5 | 4 | 17,8326 | 93 | 94,05 | 19 | 46 | 3,3 | 50 | 8 | ||||||
| Sri L | 1,65985 | 2,6 | 4 | 5 | 51,9423 | 90 | 30,89 | 9 | 64 | 2 | 40 | 5 | ||||||
| Liby | -8,9945 | -5,4 | 7 | 7 | 5,19615 | 97 | 268,04 | 12 | 38 | 3,3 | 40 | 8 | ||||||
| Ecu | -2,6577 | -0,3 | 2 | 3 | 19,7484 | 109 | 106,26 | 8 | 42 | 1,6 | 50 | 6 | ||||||
| Para | -2,5989 | -0,7 | 3 | 3 | 10,5357 | 110 | 52,72 | 6 | 39 | 3,3 | 50 | 6 | ||||||
| Phil | -2,4121 | -1 | 3 | 3 | 46,2601 | 93 | 41,99 | 9 | 50 | 0,7 | 50 | 9 | ||||||
| Tune | -0,6568 | 1,3 | 5 | 5 | 23,0217 | 99 | 78,61 | 16 | 81 | 3,6 | 39 | 4 | ||||||
| Oman | 3,69497 | 4,1 | 6 | 6 | 8,60233 | 101 | 115,4 | 12 | 40 | 3,3 | 24 | 0 | ||||||
| Peru | -1,8805 | -2,8 | 3 | 5 | 13,1149 | 78 | 84,71 | 6 | 18 | 3,3 | 50 | 6 | ||||||
| Domin | -1,57 | -0,5 | 2 | 3 | 38,8973 | 98 | 156,4 | 7 | 38 | 0,5 | 50 | 8 | ||||||
| Jord | -5,9296 | -5,4 | 4 | 4 | 21,587 | 112 | 17,1 | 24 | 114 | 0,4 | 40 | 0,4 | ||||||
| China | 6,60108 | 7,6 | 7 | 7 | 35,426 | 111 | 0 | 8 | 32 | 3,4 | 50 | 21 | ||||||
| Iran | -1,5831 | -1,4 | 6 | 5 | 19,1311 | 72 | 35,63 | 11 | 24 | 3,3 | 50 | 2 | ||||||
| Botsw | 2,50813 | 6,1 | 1 | 2 | 4,69042 | 101 | 115,4 | 12 | 38 | 3,3 | 29 | 5 | ||||||
| Guya | -3,0375 | -5,6 | 5 | 4 | 6,40312 | 101 | 115,4 | 12 | 38 | 0,8 | 29 | 37 | ||||||
| Alger | -1,6419 | -0,5 | 4 | 4 | 10,3923 | 99 | 28,01 | 18 | 61 | 3,3 | 33 | 2 | ||||||
| Indon | 2,32828 | 4 | 6 | 5 | 32,187 | 111 | 35,21 | 9 | 44 | 3,3 | 45 | 12 | ||||||
| Gabon | -4,5436 | -3,7 | 4 | 3 | 6,78233 | 96 | 115,4 | 20 | 68 | 2 | 35 | 8 | ||||||
| El Sal | -0,7814 | 0,2 | 3 | 4 | 50,4876 | 114 | 62,6 | 11 | 32 | 1 | 50 | 8 | ||||||
| Mald | 6,28967 | 6,8 | 6 | 5 | 85,6329 | 97 | 115,4 | 13 | 40 | 3,3 | 30 | 4 | ||||||
| Guat | -2,9261 | -1,5 | 3 | 5 | 29,5466 | 102 | 77,37 | 7 | 37 | 0,8 | 50 | 7 | ||||||
| Hond | -1,2095 | -0,3 | 2 | 3 | 21,7715 | 104 | 157,11 | 15 | 82 | 3,3 | 50 | 12 | ||||||
| Swaz | -0,027 | 1,6 | 6 | 5 | 21,166 | 97 | 115,4 | 13 | 40 | 3,3 | 27 | 7 | ||||||
| Solom | 1,71425 | 3,3 | 1 | 1 | 10,8628 | 97 | 115,4 | 13 | 40 | 0,6 | 17 | 0,4 | ||||||
| Moroc | 0,90283 | 1,4 | 5 | 5 | 24 | 86 | 36,01 | 16 | 44 | 1,5 | 39 | 0,4 | ||||||
| Lesoth | -3,3594 | -0,5 | 6 | 4 | 24,2899 | 97 | 115,4 | 24 | 40 | 0,6 | 29 | 7 | ||||||
| Zimbab | -1,0673 | -0,9 | 5 | 4 | 16,2788 | 97 | 73,1 | 26 | 40 | 0,1 | 15 | 12 | ||||||
| Boliv | -2,8673 | -1,5 | 2 | 3 | 8,24621 | 97 | 35,21 | 15 | 37 | 2,3 | 50 | 7 | ||||||
| Egypt | 1,35985 | 1,8 | 5 | 5 | 23,2164 | 76 | 5,19 | 10 | 40 | 1,1 | 50 | 2 | ||||||
| Sao T | -5,1551 | -3 | 2 | 3 | 35,4965 | 97 | 115,4 | 13 | 40 | 0,6 | 20 | 11 | ||||||
| Congo | -0,8972 | -0,8 | 6 | 4 | 8,18535 | 99 | 115,4 | 19 | 59 | 0,6 | 35 | 7 | ||||||
| Kenya | -0,5691 | 0,2 | 6 | 6 | 20,6882 | 103 | 53,34 | 18 | 42 | 0,6 | 32 | 1 | ||||||
| Madag | -1,6647 | -2,4 | 4 | 4 | 14,5945 | 102 | 67,82 | 9 | 30 | 0,6 | 35 | 7 | ||||||
| Papua | -0,2945 | 0,6 | 2 | 3 | 9,38083 | 75 | 495,73 | 24 | 74 | 0,6 | 20 | 0,4 | ||||||
| Zambia | -1,9209 | -3,1 | 2 | 3 | 10,6301 | 97 | 92,75 | 15 | 40 | 0,6 | 31 | 5 | ||||||
| Ghana | 0,2072 | -0,1 | 6 | 6 | 25,9422 | 75 | 111,95 | 8 | 31 | 0,6 | 38 | 7 | ||||||
| Pak | 2,58967 | 3,1 | 4 | 5 | 39,6989 | 95 | 19,61 | 15 | 37 | 0,6 | 48 | 1 | ||||||
| Camer | -0,8682 | -1,5 | 6 | 6 | 15,9687 | 91 | 125,1 | 12 | 22 | 0,6 | 35 | 14 | ||||||
| India | 3,01862 | 3,1 | 3 | 4 | 53,8702 | 96 | 7,13 | 12 | 16 | 0,5 | 50 | 7 | ||||||
| Cote | -4,4402 | -4,7 | 6 | 4 | 19,7737 | 80 | 142,33 | 18 | 62 | 0,5 | 35 | 5 | ||||||
| Haiti | -2,2235 | -2,4 | 7 | 7 | 49,0102 | 97 | 72,68 | 9 | 15 | 0,6 | 50 | 7 | ||||||
| Tanz | -0,5805 | 0,1 | 6 | 5 | 17,4356 | 108 | 20,62 | 10 | 60 | 0,6 | 34 | 11 | ||||||
| Comor | -0,5945 | -1,3 | 4 | 3 | 50,2892 | 97 | 115,4 | 13 | 40 | 0,6 | 20 | 0,4 | ||||||
| Zaire | -0,4779 | -1,8 | 6 | 5 | 13,0384 | 163 | 97,26 | 13 | 25 | 0,6 | 35 | 5 | ||||||
| Lao | 0,90545 | 1,8 | 6 | 7 | 13,7113 | 97 | 11,53 | 12 | 40 | 0,6 | 40 | 9 | ||||||
| Nigeria | -4,3419 | -0,4 | 5 | 4 | 35,0856 | 100 | 156,15 | 11 | 56 | 0,6 | 35 | 7 | ||||||
| Togo | -1,9673 | -1,8 | 6 | 5 | 25,8844 | 114 | 133,85 | 19 | 62 | 0,8 | 35 | 4 | ||||||
| Ugan | 0,60895 | 1,8 | 6 | 6 | 30,133 | 88 | 7,03 | 7 | 22 | 0,6 | 33 | 12 | ||||||
| Bangl | 1,59229 | 1,8 | 2 | 3 | 94,5833 | 95 | 6,5 | 9 | 23 | 2,1 | 21 | 10 | ||||||
| Rwanda | -2,4244 | -0,6 | 6 | 6 | 54,2863 | 98 | 44,97 | 18 | 18 | 0,3 | 33 | 17 | ||||||
| Ethi | -0,9086 | -1,9 | 6 | 5 | 21,6102 | 84 | 16,12 | 26 | 25 | 1,4 | 50 | 7 | ||||||
| Malaw | -1,0121 | -0,1 | 7 | 6 | 32,573 | 93 | 66,37 | 15 | 60 | 0,6 | 31 | 10 | ||||||
| Burun | 0,73178 | 1,3 | 7 | 6 | 46,9574 | 70 | 53,02 | 15 | 31 | 0,7 | 33 | 7 | ||||||
| CAfricR | -1,1805 | -1,5 | 6 | 5 | 7,07107 | 109 | 140,57 | 14 | 25 | 0,6 | 35 | 4 | ||||||
| Mozam | -3,8945 | -3,6 | 6 | 4 | 13,6015 | 97 | 38,9 | 20 | 40 | 0,6 | 20 | 16 | ||||||
| Bhut | 7,60545 | 6,3 | 6 | 5 | 18,303 | 97 | 115,4 | 20 | 40 | 0,6 | 24 | 0,4 | ||||||
| Angol | 6,30545 | -0,9 | 6 | 4 | 4,47214 | 97 | 118,94 | 13 | 55 | 0,6 | 19 | 15 | ||||||
| Maure | -1,2937 | -0,8 | 7 | 6 | 4,47214 | 107 | 443,05 | 10 | 75 | 0,6 | 34 | 7 | ||||||
| Benin | -0,4077 | -0,7 | 2 | 3 | 20,7605 | 97 | 58,93 | 11 | 32 | 0,6 | 35 | 6 | ||||||
| GuiBis | 3,32386 | 1,6 | 6 | 5 | 18,7083 | 97 | 115,4 | 13 | 40 | 0,6 | 21 | 7 | ||||||
| Chad | 4,58 | 3,4 | 6 | 6 | 6,7082 | 97 | 39,94 | 23 | 59 | 0,6 | 35 | 7 | ||||||
| Somal | -1,2937 | -2,3 | 7 | 7 | 11,9164 | 111 | 31,14 | 13 | 55 | 0,6 | 35 | 7 | ||||||
| Gamb | -0,8252 | -0,2 | 2 | 2 | 29,7321 | 97 | 115,4 | 13 | 40 | 0,6 | 30 | 8 | ||||||
| Mali | 0,76072 | -2,7 | 6 | 4 | 8,83176 | 97 | 11,21 | 10 | 40 | 0,5 | 35 | 7 | ||||||
| Niger | -2,9621 | -4,3 | 6 | 5 | 7,93725 | 77 | 48,68 | 13 | 26 | 0,3 | 35 | 5 | ||||||
| Burki | 1,13265 | 1 | 6 | 5 | 18,3848 | 100 | 31,64 | 13 | 21 | 0,4 | 35 | 7 | ||||||
| Sierr | -1,3375 | -1,4 | 6 | 5 | 24,3926 | 80 | 79,49 | 10 | 34 | 0,6 | 34 | 7 | ||||||
| Jap | 1,77126 | 3,6 | 1 | 2 | 57,3934 | 91 | 6,08 | 9 | 18 | 11 | 39 | 2 | ||||||
| Can | 1,44494 | 1,8 | 1 | 1 | 5,38516 | 109 | 388,5 | 20 | 42 | 18,8 | 50 | 13 | ||||||
| Norw | 1,61599 | 2,2 | 1 | 1 | 11,7898 | 91 | 91,53 | 21 | 58 | 17,6 | 50 | 36 | ||||||
| Switz | 1,51862 | 1,4 | 1 | 1 | 41,2432 | 100 | 168,03 | 13 | 59 | 13,3 | 0 | 14 | ||||||
| Swe | 1,40371 | 1,5 | 1 | 1 | 14,4568 | 101 | 47,09 | 27 | 49 | 33,7 | 49 | 38 | ||||||
| USA | 1,88967 | 1,7 | 1 | 1 | 16,5831 | 100 | 25,19 | 18 | 16 | 12,6 | 50 | 6 | ||||||
| Austral | 1,21774 | 1,6 | 1 | 1 | 4,79583 | 115 | 180,39 | 18 | 26 | 8 | 50 | 7 | ||||||
| Fran | 0,57301 | 1,7 | 1 | 2 | 32,187 | 102 | 62,41 | 18 | 37 | 26,1 | 50 | 6 | ||||||
| NL | 0,70283 | 1,7 | 1 | 1 | 66,6108 | 102 | 130,26 | 15 | 92 | 28,7 | 50 | 21 | ||||||
| UK | 2,10371 | 2,4 | 1 | 2 | 48,8057 | 105 | 91,01 | 20 | 42 | 17 | 50 | 6 | ||||||
| Ger | 1,37389 | 2,4 | 1 | 2 | 47,8121 | 97 | 74,69 | 18 | 50 | 23 | 22 | 20 | ||||||
| DK | 1,61774 | 2,1 | 1 | 1 | 34,8569 | 104 | 114,62 | 25 | 51 | 27,8 | 50 | 33 | ||||||
| SF | 2,01599 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 12,8062 | 98 | 22,77 | 27 | 51 | 22,2 | 40 | 39 | ||||||
| Aus | 0,74407 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 30,5941 | 92 | 52,61 | 18 | 58 | 22,5 | 40 | 22 | ||||||
| Blg | 0,11599 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 57,28 | 96 | 138,15 | 14 | 43 | 19,8 | 50 | 9 | ||||||
| NZ | 0,33265 | 0,6 | 1 | 1 | 11,3137 | 99 | 99,27 | 17 | 43 | 14,3 | 50 | 17 | ||||||
| Israel | 0,37301 | 1,9 | 2 | 2 | 48,949 | 103 | 40,78 | 29 | 51 | 13,2 | 46 | 7 | ||||||
| Ire | 0,35985 | 3,4 | 1 | 1 | 22,5167 | 95 | 142,63 | 16 | 105 | 19,9 | 40 | 8 | ||||||
| Ital | 1,28792 | 2,2 | 1 | 1 | 44,3058 | 97 | 76,59 | 17 | 32 | 21,6 | 40 | 13 | ||||||
| Spa | 1,40108 | 2,9 | 1 | 1 | 27,9464 | 106 | 60,98 | 15 | 29 | 13,4 | 40 | 15 | ||||||
| Gree | -0,7998 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 27,8568 | 105 | 54,75 | 21 | 48 | 11,9 | 50 | 5 | ||||||
| Hun | -0,2287 | 0,2 | 2 | 2 | 33,7787 | 87 | 0 | 11 | 42 | 18,2 | 40 | 7 | ||||||
| Port | 0,88617 | 3,1 | 1 | 1 | 32,7567 | 105 | 88,05 | 13 | 73 | 10,4 | 40 | 8 | ||||||
| Adjustment | GNP gro80-92 | Viol Pol Rits | Viol Civ Rits | PopDens*0,5 | Terms Trade | MNC PEN73 | Govcons | Trade Dep | social sec | UNmemby. | Women Parl | |||||||
continuation
| Women %LF | ln PCI | ln PCI^2 | ln(MPR+1) | Fertility Rate | pub invest | Dyn Fert6091 | ethno-fract | UN entry | UN memby | country |
| 48 | 8,1441 | 66,3263 | 0,33647 | 1,7 | 41,6 | 39 | 0,4 | 1966 | 29 | Barb |
| 36 | 7,75061 | 60,072 | 0,33647 | 1,4 | 41,6 | 28 | 0,02 | 0 | Hong | |
| 31 | 8,38959 | 70,3852 | 0,63127 | 2,4 | 23,7 | 82 | 0,2 | 1945 | 50 | Urug |
| 27 | 8,46674 | 71,6857 | 0,14842 | 2,8 | 22,5 | 54 | 0,56 | 1962 | 33 | Trinid |
| 47 | 6,85646 | 47,0111 | 0,33647 | 2,1 | 41,6 | 54 | 0,4 | 1973 | 22 | Baham |
| 34 | 6,85646 | 47,0111 | 0,91228 | 1,7 | 25,8 | 30 | 0,4 | 1991 | 4 | Korea |
| 29 | 7,67786 | 58,9496 | 0 | 3,2 | 21,7 | 46 | 0,07 | 1945 | 50 | Costa |
| 39 | 7,78697 | 60,6369 | 1,14422 | 1,7 | 47,3 | 32 | 0,42 | 1965 | 30 | Sing |
| 21 | 8,12593 | 66,0307 | 0,22314 | 2,8 | 35,3 | 91 | 0,31 | 1945 | 50 | Arg |
| 22 | 8,26848 | 68,3677 | 0,23902 | 3,2 | 41,6 | 50 | 0,11 | 1945 | 50 | Ven |
| 42 | 6,85646 | 47,0111 | 0,33647 | 2,5 | 41,6 | 53 | 0,4 | 1978 | 17 | Domi |
| 14 | 6,85646 | 47,0111 | 0,59333 | 3,8 | 41,6 | 52 | 0,4 | 1963 | 32 | Kuw |
| 31 | 7,96207 | 63,3945 | 0,14842 | 3,3 | 37,5 | 49 | 0,3 | 1945 | 50 | Mex |
| 35 | 7,65586 | 58,6123 | 0,33647 | 2 | 41,6 | 35 | 0,4 | 1968 | 27 | Maurit |
| 31 | 7,48605 | 56,041 | 0,53063 | 3,7 | 39,1 | 55 | 0,72 | 1957 | 38 | Malay |
| 49 | 6,85646 | 47,0111 | 0,33647 | 4,9 | 41,6 | 47 | 0,4 | 1974 | 21 | Gren |
| 39 | 6,85646 | 47,0111 | 0,33647 | 1,7 | 41,6 | 47 | 0,4 | 1981 | 14 | Antig |
| 41 | 7,53583 | 56,7887 | 0,19885 | 2,7 | 21,9 | 41 | 0,06 | 1945 | 50 | Colom |
| 42 | 6,85646 | 47,0111 | 0,33647 | 2,6 | 41,6 | 47 | 0,4 | 1976 | 19 | Seych |
| 39 | 7,71155 | 59,468 | 0,33647 | 2,8 | 41,6 | 42 | 0,4 | 1975 | 20 | Sur |
| 6 | 6,85646 | 47,0111 | 1,37624 | 4,6 | 41,6 | 66 | 0,4 | 1971 | 24 | UAE |
| 27 | 7,33498 | 53,802 | 0,19885 | 3 | 23,9 | 50 | 0,28 | 1945 | 50 | Pan |
| 31 | 7,51152 | 56,423 | 0,07696 | 2,5 | 41,6 | 46 | 0,05 | 1962 | 33 | Jamai |
| 35 | 7,24708 | 52,5202 | 0,19062 | 2,9 | 26,5 | 47 | 0,07 | 1945 | 50 | Braz |
| 19 | 7,76387 | 60,2777 | 0,35066 | 3 | 41,6 | 48 | 0,4 | 1970 | 25 | Fiji |
| 39 | 6,85646 | 47,0111 | 0,33647 | 3,3 | 41,6 | 47 | 0,4 | 1979 | 16 | Saint L |
| 33 | 7,41998 | 55,0561 | 0,81093 | 3,6 | 52,5 | 56 | 0,25 | 1945 | 50 | TRK |
| 47 | 6,89264 | 47,5085 | 0,39204 | 2,3 | 32,5 | 36 | 0,66 | 1946 | 49 | Thai |
| 39 | 6,85646 | 47,0111 | 0,33647 | 2,6 | 41,6 | 47 | 0,4 | 1980 | 15 | Saint V |
| 39 | 6,85646 | 47,0111 | 0,33647 | 2,5 | 41,6 | 47 | 0,4 | 1983 | 12 | Saint K |
| 15 | 7,48829 | 56,0745 | 1,53256 | 6,3 | 37,5 | 87 | 0,22 | 1945 | 50 | Syria |
| 33 | 6,85646 | 47,0111 | 0,33647 | 4,5 | 41,6 | 47 | 0,4 | 1981 | 14 | Belize |
| 7 | 8,93748 | 79,8786 | 0,46373 | 6,5 | 46,4 | 90 | 0,06 | 1945 | 50 | Saudi |
| 33 | 8,00102 | 64,0163 | 0,25464 | 4,2 | 42 | 64 | 0,88 | 1945 | 50 | South A |
| 37 | 7,23634 | 52,3646 | 0,12222 | 2,5 | 33,9 | 48 | 0,47 | 1955 | 40 | Sri L |
| 9 | 6,85646 | 47,0111 | 1,05082 | 6,5 | 33,6 | 92 | 0,23 | 1955 | 40 | Liby |
| 30 | 7,28688 | 53,0986 | 0,31481 | 3,8 | 39,8 | 55 | 0,53 | 1945 | 50 | Ecu |
| 41 | 7,09008 | 50,2692 | 0,35767 | 4,4 | 22,9 | 65 | 0,14 | 1945 | 50 | Para |
| 37 | 7,07581 | 50,0671 | 0,16551 | 4 | 13,4 | 59 | 0,74 | 1945 | 50 | Phil |
| 13 | 7,23993 | 52,4166 | 0,43825 | 3,6 | 73,8 | 50 | 0,16 | 1956 | 39 | Tune |
| 8 | 6,85646 | 47,0111 | 0,97456 | 6,8 | 41,6 | 96 | 0,4 | 1971 | 24 | Oman |
| 33 | 7,66388 | 58,735 | 0,43825 | 3,7 | 17,8 | 54 | 0,59 | 1945 | 50 | Peru |
| 15 | 7,11233 | 50,5852 | 0,27003 | 3,5 | 32,8 | 47 | 0,04 | 1945 | 50 | Domin |
| 10 | 7,19143 | 51,7167 | 1,13462 | 5,8 | 38,5 | 76 | 0,05 | 1955 | 40 | Jord |
| 43 | 6,58341 | 43,3413 | 0,26236 | 2,3 | 41,6 | 40 | 0,12 | 1945 | 50 | China |
| 18 | 7,59337 | 57,6593 | 0,81978 | 6,1 | 38,2 | 85 | 0,76 | 1945 | 50 | Iran |
| 35 | 6,16121 | 37,9605 | 0,23111 | 5,2 | 41,6 | 76 | 0,4 | 1966 | 29 | Botsw |
| 21 | 7,39634 | 54,7058 | 0,41211 | 2,6 | 41,6 | 41 | 0,4 | 1966 | 29 | Guya |
| 4 | 7,42417 | 55,1182 | 0,54812 | 5 | 65,7 | 69 | 0,43 | 1962 | 33 | Alger |
| 40 | 6,85646 | 47,0111 | 0,14842 | 3,2 | 38,9 | 58 | 0,76 | 1950 | 45 | Indon |
| 38 | 7,22475 | 52,1971 | 0,24686 | 5,2 | 41,6 | 129 | 0,4 | 1960 | 35 | Gabon |
| 45 | 7,17396 | 51,4657 | 0,66783 | 4,2 | 24,1 | 61 | 0,17 | 1945 | 50 | El Sal |
| 20 | 6,85646 | 47,0111 | 0,33647 | 6,3 | 41,6 | 90 | 0,4 | 1965 | 30 | Mald |
| 26 | 7,41878 | 55,0383 | 0,38526 | 5,5 | 23,1 | 80 | 0,64 | 1945 | 50 | Guat |
| 18 | 6,80351 | 46,2877 | 0,30748 | 5,1 | 21 | 71 | 0,16 | 1945 | 50 | Hond |
| 40 | 7,07496 | 50,0551 | 0,33647 | 5 | 41,6 | 77 | 0,4 | 1968 | 27 | Swaz |
| 26 | 6,85646 | 47,0111 | 0,33647 | 5,5 | 41,6 | 86 | 0,4 | 1978 | 17 | Solom |
| 20 | 6,74993 | 45,5616 | 0,63127 | 4,5 | 63,2 | 63 | 0,53 | 1956 | 39 | Moroc |
| 44 | 5,84644 | 34,1808 | 0,33647 | 4,8 | 41,6 | 82 | 0,4 | 1966 | 29 | Lesoth |
| 35 | 6,84268 | 46,8223 | 0,42527 | 5,5 | 44,4 | 73 | 0,54 | 1980 | 15 | Zimbab |
| 24 | 7,04054 | 49,5692 | 0,35066 | 4,7 | 50,5 | 70 | 0,68 | 1945 | 50 | Boliv |
| 11 | 6,32257 | 39,9748 | 0,63658 | 4,2 | 91,8 | 60 | 0,04 | 1945 | 50 | Egypt |
| 26 | 6,36303 | 40,4881 | 0,18232 | 5,4 | 41,6 | 87 | 0,4 | 1975 | 20 | Sao T |
| 39 | 6,99577 | 48,9407 | 0,39878 | 6,3 | 41,6 | 107 | 0,4 | 1960 | 35 | Congo |
| 40 | 6,45362 | 41,6493 | 0,05827 | 6,4 | 28,6 | 81 | 0,83 | 1963 | 32 | Kenya |
| 40 | 6,92067 | 47,8957 | 0,17395 | 6,6 | 39,4 | 100 | 0,06 | 1960 | 35 | Madag |
| 39 | 7,03527 | 49,495 | 0,10436 | 5 | 69,2 | 79 | 0,42 | 1975 | 20 | Papua |
| 29 | 7,06647 | 49,935 | 0,19062 | 6,5 | 39,8 | 98 | 0,82 | 1964 | 31 | Zambia |
| 40 | 6,95559 | 48,3803 | 0,07696 | 6,1 | 41,6 | 88 | 0,71 | 1957 | 38 | Ghana |
| 11 | 6,7093 | 45,0148 | 0,35767 | 6,3 | 49,4 | 92 | 0,64 | 1947 | 48 | Pak |
| 30 | 6,60123 | 43,5762 | 0,11333 | 5,8 | 34,4 | 101 | 0,89 | 1960 | 35 | Camer |
| 26 | 6,42487 | 41,2789 | 0,14842 | 4 | 43,9 | 67 | 0,89 | 1945 | 50 | India |
| 34 | 6,92854 | 48,0046 | 0,05827 | 7,4 | 38,3 | 103 | 0,86 | 1960 | 35 | Cote |
| 40 | 6,82546 | 46,5869 | 0,12222 | 4,9 | 41,6 | 77 | 0,01 | 1945 | 50 | Haiti |
| 48 | 5,6058 | 31,425 | 0,14842 | 6,8 | 38,2 | 100 | 0,93 | 1961 | 34 | Tanz |
| 41 | 6,36303 | 40,4881 | 0,18232 | 7,1 | 41,6 | 104 | 0,4 | 1975 | 20 | Comor |
| 36 | 5,93754 | 35,2543 | 0,07696 | 6,7 | 31,6 | 112 | 0,9 | 1960 | 35 | Zaire |
| 45 | 6,36303 | 40,4881 | 0,90826 | 6,7 | 41,6 | 109 | 0,6 | 1955 | 40 | Lao |
| 20 | 7,03262 | 49,4578 | 0,08618 | 6,6 | 37,4 | 96 | 0,87 | 1960 | 35 | Nigeria |
| 37 | 6,01859 | 36,2235 | 0,17395 | 6,6 | 39,4 | 100 | 0,71 | 1960 | 35 | Togo |
| 41 | 5,9162 | 35,0014 | 0,11333 | 7,3 | 36,9 | 106 | 0,9 | 1962 | 33 | Ugan |
| 7 | 6,43133 | 41,362 | 0,09531 | 4,8 | 65,8 | 73 | 0,4 | 1974 | 21 | Bangl |
| 48 | 6,28786 | 39,5372 | 0,07696 | 8,5 | 49,6 | 113 | 0,14 | 1962 | 33 | Rwanda |
| 42 | 5,56834 | 31,0065 | 0,54812 | 7 | 41,6 | 104 | 0,69 | 1945 | 50 | Ethi |
| 42 | 6,04737 | 36,5707 | 0,06766 | 7,6 | 66,9 | 110 | 0,62 | 1964 | 31 | Malaw |
| 26 | 6,1591 | 37,9345 | 0,13103 | 6,8 | 79,4 | 100 | 0,04 | 1962 | 33 | Burun |
| 46 | 6,69208 | 44,784 | 0,13976 | 6,2 | 30,3 | 110 | 0,69 | 1960 | 35 | CAfricR |
| 48 | 7,22111 | 52,1444 | 0,19885 | 6,5 | 41,6 | 103 | 0,65 | 1975 | 20 | Mozam |
| 32 | 6,36303 | 40,4881 | 0,26236 | 5,9 | 41,6 | 98 | 0,4 | 1971 | 24 | Bhut |
| 39 | 7,17625 | 51,4986 | 0,45108 | 6,5 | 41,6 | 100 | 0,78 | 1976 | 19 | Angol |
| 22 | 6,83518 | 46,7197 | 0,58779 | 6,5 | 35 | 100 | 0,33 | 1961 | 34 | Maure |
| 24 | 6,98008 | 48,7215 | 0,08618 | 7,1 | 62,7 | 103 | 0,62 | 1960 | 35 | Benin |
| 42 | 6,36303 | 40,4881 | 0,18232 | 5,8 | 41,6 | 114 | 0,4 | 1974 | 21 | GuiBis |
| 17 | 6,66568 | 44,4313 | 0,27763 | 5,9 | 74,5 | 99 | 0,83 | 1960 | 35 | Chad |
| 39 | 6,79234 | 46,1359 | 0,66783 | 7 | 41,6 | 100 | 0,08 | 1960 | 35 | Somal |
| 41 | 6,01859 | 36,2235 | 0,12222 | 6,2 | 41,6 | 97 | 0,4 | 1965 | 30 | Gamb |
| 16 | 6,29342 | 39,6071 | 0,18232 | 7,1 | 41,6 | 100 | 0,78 | 1960 | 35 | Mali |
| 47 | 6,40357 | 41,0058 | 0,04879 | 7,1 | 41,6 | 100 | 0,73 | 1960 | 35 | Niger |
| 49 | 6,36303 | 40,4881 | 0,10436 | 6,5 | 52,4 | 102 | 0,68 | 1960 | 35 | Burki |
| 33 | 6,76964 | 45,8281 | 0,07696 | 6,5 | 35,2 | 104 | 0,77 | 1961 | 34 | Sierr |
| 40 | 7,90138 | 62,4318 | 0,18232 | 1,7 | 25,6 | 81 | 0,01 | 1956 | 39 | Jap |
| 40 | 8,95648 | 80,2185 | 0,28518 | 1,8 | 29,6 | 47 | 0,75 | 1945 | 50 | Can |
| 43 | 8,60209 | 73,9959 | 0,63658 | 1,9 | 28,6 | 68 | 0,04 | 1945 | 50 | Norw |
| 37 | 9,13917 | 83,5244 | 0,27003 | 1,6 | 41,6 | 67 | 0,5 | 0 | Switz | |
| 47 | 8,77694 | 77,0347 | 0,58779 | 2 | 40,7 | 89 | 0,08 | 1946 | 49 | Swe |
| 42 | 9,20864 | 84,799 | 0,63658 | 2 | 18,3 | 58 | 0,5 | 1945 | 50 | USA |
| 38 | 8,88239 | 78,8969 | 0,35767 | 1,9 | 35,9 | 57 | 0,32 | 1945 | 50 | Austral |
| 37 | 8,58373 | 73,6804 | 0,6831 | 1,8 | 33,5 | 65 | 0,26 | 1945 | 50 | Fran |
| 35 | 8,6282 | 74,4458 | 0,55389 | 1,7 | 35 | 53 | 0,1 | 1945 | 50 | NL |
| 40 | 8,75935 | 76,7263 | 0,44469 | 1,9 | 44,2 | 70 | 0,32 | 1945 | 50 | UK |
| 38 | 8,70583 | 75,7914 | 0,58779 | 1,5 | 16,5 | 62 | 0,03 | 1973 | 22 | Ger |
| 40 | 8,68271 | 75,3894 | 0,45108 | 1,7 | 24,9 | 64 | 0,05 | 1945 | 50 | DK |
| 44 | 8,45914 | 71,5571 | 0,52473 | 1,8 | 37,5 | 66 | 0,16 | 1955 | 40 | SF |
| 39 | 8,40649 | 70,669 | 0,54812 | 1,5 | 37,2 | 56 | 0,13 | 1955 | 40 | Aus |
| 37 | 8,55776 | 73,2352 | 0,65233 | 1,6 | 12,3 | 63 | 0,55 | 1945 | 50 | Blg |
| 39 | 8,88489 | 78,9412 | 0,3293 | 2,1 | 39,1 | 55 | 0,37 | 1945 | 50 | NZ |
| 35 | 8,28349 | 68,6163 | 1,4422 | 2,9 | 32,2 | 75 | 0,2 | 1949 | 46 | Israel |
| 27 | 8,07527 | 65,21 | 0,3293 | 2,2 | 21,3 | 56 | 0,04 | 1955 | 40 | Ire |
| 31 | 8,38366 | 70,2858 | 0,51879 | 1,3 | 12,7 | 54 | 0,04 | 1955 | 40 | Ital |
| 27 | 7,90138 | 62,4318 | 0,60977 | 1,4 | 25,5 | 50 | 0,44 | 1955 | 40 | Spa |
| 31 | 7,5438 | 56,909 | 1,12817 | 1,5 | 28,1 | 67 | 0,1 | 1945 | 50 | Gree |
| 42 | 6,85646 | 47,0111 | 0,69315 | 1,8 | 89 | 91 | 0,1 | 1955 | 40 | Hun |
| 41 | 7,38895 | 54,5965 | 0,50078 | 1,5 | 20,6 | 49 | 0,01 | 1955 | 40 | Port |
| Women %LF | ln PCI | ln PCI^2 | ln(MPR+1) | Fertility Rate | pub invest | Dyn Fert6091 | ethno-fract | UN entry | UN memby | country |
continuation
| DYN LEX | LEX 1960 | 1 der e-funct | 1 der pi-func | Viol Pol Rits | Viol Civ Rits | PopDens*0,5 | Terms Trade | MNC PEN73 | Govcons |
| Barb | 6,7 | 64,3 | 0,01007 | 2,1591 | 1 | 1 | 77,4597 | 107 | 115,4 | 10 | |
| Hong | 6,7 | 66,2 | 0,00405 | 2,5141 | 3,6 | 3,5 | 241,083 | 100 | 208,91 | 8 | |
| Urug | 2,8 | 67,7 | 0,00321 | 2,61428 | 1 | 2 | 13,3417 | 104 | 30,35 | 13 | |
| Trinid | 5,2 | 63,5 | 0,00069 | 3,37767 | 1 | 1 | 49,3862 | 110 | 565,39 | 16 | |
| Baham | 5,4 | 63,2 | 0,01007 | 2,1591 | 2 | 3 | 16,1245 | 107 | 115,4 | 10 | |
| Korea | 11,4 | 53,9 | 0,00881 | 2,20781 | 2 | 3 | 66,5958 | 108 | 20,7 | 10 | |
| Costa | 8,5 | 61,6 | 0,00798 | 2,24486 | 1 | 1 | 24,6982 | 114 | 174,71 | 18 | |
| Sing | 6 | 64,5 | 0,00128 | 3,04893 | 4 | 4 | 211,901 | 100 | 295,3 | 11 | |
| Arg | 3,9 | 64,9 | 0,0026 | 2,70769 | 1 | 3 | 10,9545 | 112 | 72,62 | 5 | |
| Ven | 7,1 | 59,5 | 0,00123 | 3,06944 | 1 | 3 | 14,9666 | 164 | 198,6 | 9 | |
| Domi | 14,3 | 51,8 | 0,01007 | 2,1591 | 2 | 1 | 30,9839 | 107 | 115,4 | 10 | |
| Kuw | 9,1 | 59,5 | 0,00022 | 4,0875 | 6 | 5 | 34,2199 | 77 | 115,4 | 10 | |
| Mex | 8,7 | 57 | 0,00393 | 2,52699 | 4 | 4 | 21,2603 | 110 | 48,59 | 11 | |
| Maurit | 7,1 | 59,1 | 0,01242 | 2,0845 | 1 | 2 | 76,6159 | 114 | 115,4 | 12 | |
| Malay | 11,4 | 53,9 | 0,00695 | 2,2971 | 5 | 4 | 23,6854 | 94 | 167,94 | 13 | |
| Gren | 13,1 | 51,8 | 0,01007 | 2,1591 | 1 | 2 | 51,7301 | 101 | 115,4 | 12 | |
| Antig | 15,5 | 51,8 | 0,01007 | 2,1591 | 3 | 3 | 38,7298 | 101 | 115,4 | 12 | |
| Colom | 8,6 | 56,5 | 0,00548 | 2,39031 | 2 | 4 | 17,7764 | 92 | 51,96 | 10 | |
| Seych | 13,7 | 51,8 | 0,01007 | 2,1591 | 6 | 6 | 51,2835 | 101 | 115,4 | 12 | |
| Sur | 6,2 | 60,2 | 0,01007 | 2,1591 | 4 | 4 | 5,2915 | 101 | 115,4 | 12 | |
| UAE | 12,4 | 53 | 0,01527 | 2,01366 | 6 | 5 | 13,9642 | 101 | 115,4 | 12 | |
| Pan | 7,7 | 60,7 | 0,00097 | 3,19588 | 4 | 2 | 18,0278 | 138 | 1289,73 | 22 | |
| Jamai | 6,7 | 62,7 | 0,00345 | 2,5825 | 2 | 2 | 47,4974 | 88 | 478,22 | 15 | |
| Braz | 8 | 54,6 | 0,00752 | 2,2673 | 2 | 3 | 13,3791 | 123 | 97,11 | 16 | |
| Fiji | 4,1 | 59 | 0,01007 | 2,1591 | 6 | 4 | 20,025 | 101 | 115,4 | 12 | |
| Saint L | 14,3 | 51,8 | 0,01007 | 2,1591 | 1 | 2 | 47,0425 | 101 | 115,4 | 12 | |
| TRK | 11,4 | 50,1 | 0,00822 | 2,23374 | 2 | 4 | 27,258 | 98 | 14,19 | 14 | |
| Thai | 10,2 | 52,3 | 0,02214 | 1,89228 | 6 | 4 | 32,9242 | 99 | 24,45 | 10 | |
| Saint V | 13,7 | 51,8 | 0,01007 | 2,1591 | 1 | 2 | 52,6213 | 101 | 115,4 | 12 | |
| Saint K | 13,1 | 51,8 | 0,01007 | 2,1591 | 1 | 1 | 34,1614 | 101 | 115,4 | 12 | |
| Syria | 12,4 | 49,7 | 0,00974 | 2,17115 | 7 | 7 | 26,3818 | 87 | 7,49 | 14 | |
| Belize | 11,8 | 51,8 | 0,01007 | 2,1591 | 1 | 1 | 9,21954 | 101 | 115,4 | 12 | |
| Saudi | 16,9 | 44,4 | 0,00156 | 2,94908 | 7 | 6 | 8,48528 | 95 | 129,48 | 12 | |
| South A | 10 | 49 | 0,00157 | 2,94543 | 5 | 4 | 17,8326 | 93 | 94,05 | 19 | |
| Sri L | 5,8 | 62 | 0,01773 | 1,96391 | 4 | 5 | 51,9423 | 90 | 30,89 | 9 | |
| Liby | 12,2 | 46,7 | 0,00936 | 2,18568 | 7 | 7 | 5,19615 | 97 | 268,04 | 12 | |
| Ecu | 9,4 | 53,1 | 0,01229 | 2,08825 | 2 | 3 | 19,7484 | 109 | 106,26 | 8 | |
| Para | 2,2 | 63,8 | 0,02168 | 1,89889 | 3 | 3 | 10,5357 | 110 | 52,72 | 6 | |
| Phil | 8,5 | 52,8 | 0,01256 | 2,08071 | 3 | 3 | 46,2601 | 93 | 41,99 | 9 | |
| Tune | 14 | 48,3 | 0,01179 | 2,10287 | 5 | 5 | 23,0217 | 99 | 78,61 | 16 | |
| Oman | 21,6 | 40,1 | 0,10209 | 1,46514 | 6 | 6 | 8,60233 | 101 | 115,4 | 12 | |
| Peru | 12,1 | 47,7 | 0,00569 | 2,37577 | 3 | 5 | 13,1149 | 78 | 84,71 | 6 | |
| Domin | 11 | 51,8 | 0,01517 | 2,01597 | 2 | 3 | 38,8973 | 98 | 156,4 | 7 | |
| Jord | 15,4 | 46,9 | 0,00571 | 2,37403 | 4 | 4 | 21,587 | 112 | 17,1 | 24 | |
| China | 17,3 | 47,1 | 0,01133 | 2,11691 | 7 | 7 | 35,426 | 111 | 0 | 8 | |
| Iran | 12,6 | 49,5 | 0,00445 | 2,47496 | 6 | 5 | 19,1311 | 72 | 35,63 | 11 | |
| Botsw | 11,9 | 45,5 | 0,01066 | 2,13862 | 1 | 2 | 4,69042 | 101 | 115,4 | 12 | |
| Guya | 5,9 | 56,1 | 0,01007 | 2,1591 | 5 | 4 | 6,40312 | 101 | 115,4 | 12 | |
| Alger | 14,1 | 47 | 0,00921 | 2,19134 | 4 | 4 | 10,3923 | 99 | 28,01 | 18 | |
| Indon | 17,4 | 41,2 | 0,02023 | 1,92102 | 6 | 5 | 32,187 | 111 | 35,21 | 9 | |
| Gabon | 10,9 | 40,8 | 0,01291 | 2,07105 | 4 | 3 | 6,78233 | 96 | 115,4 | 20 | |
| El Sal | 10,6 | 50,5 | 0,01394 | 2,0446 | 3 | 4 | 50,4876 | 114 | 62,6 | 11 | |
| Mald | 15,6 | 43,6 | 0,03949 | 1,71764 | 6 | 5 | 85,6329 | 97 | 115,4 | 13 | |
| Guat | 14,3 | 45,6 | 0,01313 | 2,06512 | 3 | 5 | 29,5466 | 102 | 77,37 | 7 | |
| Hond | 14,5 | 46,5 | 0,01704 | 1,97706 | 2 | 3 | 21,7715 | 104 | 157,11 | 15 | |
| Swaz | 15 | 40,2 | 0,01007 | 2,1591 | 6 | 5 | 21,166 | 97 | 115,4 | 13 | |
| Solom | 14 | 50,3 | 0,01007 | 2,1591 | 1 | 1 | 10,8628 | 97 | 115,4 | 13 | |
| Moroc | 12,3 | 46,7 | 0,01548 | 2,009 | 5 | 5 | 24 | 86 | 36,01 | 16 | |
| Lesoth | 12,6 | 42,9 | 0,03949 | 1,71764 | 6 | 4 | 24,2899 | 97 | 115,4 | 24 | |
| Zimbab | 11,9 | 45,3 | 0,00517 | 2,41396 | 5 | 4 | 16,2788 | 97 | 73,1 | 26 | |
| Boliv | 10,6 | 42,7 | 0,0127 | 2,07688 | 2 | 3 | 8,24621 | 97 | 35,21 | 15 | |
| Egypt | 11,7 | 46,1 | 0,00695 | 2,2971 | 5 | 5 | 23,2164 | 76 | 5,19 | 10 | |
| Sao T | 11,2 | 51,8 | 0,03949 | 1,71764 | 2 | 3 | 35,4965 | 97 | 115,4 | 13 | |
| Congo | 11,1 | 41,6 | 0,02043 | 1,91795 | 6 | 4 | 8,18535 | 99 | 115,4 | 19 | |
| Kenya | 12,6 | 44,7 | 0,01717 | 1,97447 | 6 | 6 | 20,6882 | 103 | 53,34 | 18 | |
| Madag | 12,7 | 40,7 | 0,0474 | 1,66591 | 4 | 4 | 14,5945 | 102 | 67,82 | 9 | |
| Papua | 13,1 | 40,6 | 0,03079 | 1,79067 | 2 | 3 | 9,38083 | 75 | 495,73 | 24 | |
| Zambia | 11,7 | 41,6 | 0,00495 | 2,43178 | 2 | 3 | 10,6301 | 97 | 92,75 | 15 | |
| Ghana | 8,7 | 45 | 0,02364 | 1,87159 | 6 | 6 | 25,9422 | 75 | 111,95 | 8 | |
| Pak | 12,7 | 43,1 | 0,01439 | 2,03387 | 4 | 5 | 39,6989 | 95 | 19,61 | 15 | |
| Camer | 13,7 | 39,2 | 0,02637 | 1,83775 | 6 | 6 | 15,9687 | 91 | 125,1 | 12 | |
| India | 12,8 | 44 | 0,01865 | 1,94742 | 3 | 4 | 53,8702 | 96 | 7,13 | 12 | |
| Cote | 13,4 | 39,2 | 0,01849 | 1,95023 | 6 | 4 | 19,7737 | 80 | 142,33 | 18 | |
| Haiti | 12,1 | 42,2 | 0,06646 | 1,57428 | 7 | 7 | 49,0102 | 97 | 72,68 | 9 | |
| Tanz | 12,5 | 40,5 | 0,04406 | 1,68642 | 6 | 5 | 17,4356 | 108 | 20,62 | 10 | |
| Comor | 11,2 | 42,5 | 0,03949 | 1,71764 | 4 | 3 | 50,2892 | 97 | 115,4 | 13 | |
| Zaire | 10,8 | 41,3 | 0,02392 | 1,868 | 6 | 5 | 13,0384 | 163 | 97,26 | 13 | |
| Lao | 9 | 40,4 | 0,06406 | 1,58401 | 6 | 7 | 13,7113 | 97 | 11,53 | 12 | |
| Nigeria | 11,5 | 39,5 | 0,0474 | 1,66591 | 5 | 4 | 35,0856 | 100 | 156,15 | 11 | |
| Togo | 13,8 | 39,3 | 0,05786 | 1,61124 | 6 | 5 | 25,8844 | 114 | 133,85 | 19 | |
| Ugan | 8,3 | 43 | 0,04511 | 1,67975 | 6 | 6 | 30,133 | 88 | 7,03 | 7 | |
| Bangl | 11,7 | 39,6 | 0,03949 | 1,71764 | 2 | 3 | 94,5833 | 95 | 6,5 | 9 | |
| Rwanda | 6,8 | 42,3 | 0,16563 | 1,35115 | 6 | 6 | 54,2863 | 98 | 44,97 | 18 | |
| Ethi | 10,2 | 36 | 0,13656 | 1,3955 | 6 | 5 | 21,6102 | 84 | 16,12 | 26 | |
| Malaw | 10,5 | 37,8 | 0,06184 | 1,5934 | 7 | 6 | 32,573 | 93 | 66,37 | 15 | |
| Burun | 7 | 41,3 | 0,24867 | 1,2623 | 7 | 6 | 46,9574 | 70 | 53,02 | 15 | |
| CAfricR | 10,9 | 38,5 | 0,06906 | 1,56419 | 6 | 5 | 7,07107 | 109 | 140,57 | 14 | |
| Mozam | 10,5 | 37,3 | 0,02238 | 1,88893 | 6 | 4 | 13,6015 | 97 | 38,9 | 20 | |
| Bhut | 11,8 | 38,7 | 0,02637 | 1,83775 | 6 | 5 | 18,303 | 97 | 115,4 | 20 | |
| Angol | 11,8 | 37,3 | 0,01665 | 1,9847 | 6 | 4 | 4,47214 | 97 | 118,94 | 13 | |
| Maure | 12,4 | 35,3 | 0,03518 | 1,75116 | 7 | 6 | 4,47214 | 107 | 443,05 | 10 | |
| Benin | 12,8 | 35 | 0,0719 | 1,55369 | 2 | 3 | 20,7605 | 97 | 58,93 | 11 | |
| GuiBis | 9,7 | 34 | 0,03949 | 1,71764 | 6 | 5 | 18,7083 | 97 | 115,4 | 13 | |
| Chad | 12,6 | 34,8 | 0,11665 | 1,43281 | 6 | 6 | 6,7082 | 97 | 39,94 | 23 | |
| Somal | 10,7 | 36 | 0,12576 | 1,41488 | 7 | 7 | 11,9164 | 111 | 31,14 | 13 | |
| Gamb | 13,4 | 32,3 | 0,03949 | 1,71764 | 2 | 2 | 29,7321 | 97 | 115,4 | 13 | |
| Mali | 11,2 | 34,8 | 0,10209 | 1,46514 | 6 | 4 | 8,83176 | 97 | 11,21 | 10 | |
| Niger | 11 | 35,3 | 0,16563 | 1,35115 | 6 | 5 | 7,93725 | 77 | 48,68 | 13 | |
| Burki | 12,4 | 36,2 | 0,1859 | 1,32529 | 6 | 5 | 18,3848 | 100 | 31,64 | 13 | |
| Sierr | 12,5 | 31,5 | 0,01731 | 1,97186 | 6 | 5 | 24,3926 | 80 | 79,49 | 10 | |
| Jap | 6,4 | 67,9 | 0,00182 | 2,87459 | 1 | 2 | 57,3934 | 91 | 6,08 | 9 | |
| Can | 3,5 | 71 | 0,00054 | 3,52277 | 1 | 1 | 5,38516 | 109 | 388,5 | 20 | |
| Norw | 2,1 | 73,4 | 0,00067 | 3,39461 | 1 | 1 | 11,7898 | 91 | 91,53 | 21 | |
| Switz | 3,6 | 71,2 | 0,00115 | 3,10319 | 1 | 1 | 41,2432 | 100 | 168,03 | 13 | |
| Swe | 2,5 | 73,1 | 0,00074 | 3,34057 | 1 | 1 | 14,4568 | 101 | 47,09 | 27 | |
| USA | 3,6 | 69,9 | 0,0005 | 3,56599 | 1 | 1 | 16,5831 | 100 | 25,19 | 18 | |
| Austral | 3,4 | 70,7 | 0,00091 | 3,22839 | 1 | 1 | 4,79583 | 115 | 180,39 | 18 | |
| Fran | 3,6 | 70,3 | 0,00117 | 3,09723 | 1 | 2 | 32,187 | 102 | 62,41 | 18 | |
| NL | 2,3 | 73,2 | 0,00095 | 3,2062 | 1 | 1 | 66,6108 | 102 | 130,26 | 15 | |
| UK | 3 | 70,6 | 0,00087 | 3,25557 | 1 | 2 | 48,8057 | 105 | 91,01 | 20 | |
| Ger | 3,3 | 69,7 | 0,00116 | 3,09905 | 1 | 2 | 47,8121 | 97 | 74,69 | 18 | |
| DK | 2,2 | 72,1 | 0,00101 | 3,17213 | 1 | 1 | 34,8569 | 104 | 114,62 | 25 | |
| SF | 4,3 | 68,4 | 0,00127 | 3,0527 | 1 | 1 | 12,8062 | 98 | 22,77 | 27 | |
| Aus | 3,8 | 68,6 | 0,00136 | 3,01728 | 1 | 1 | 30,5941 | 92 | 52,61 | 18 | |
| Blg | 3 | 70,2 | 0,00127 | 3,05468 | 1 | 1 | 57,28 | 96 | 138,15 | 14 | |
| NZ | 2,6 | 70,9 | 0,00111 | 3,12448 | 1 | 1 | 11,3137 | 99 | 99,27 | 17 | |
| Israel | 4,4 | 68,6 | 0,00172 | 2,90203 | 2 | 2 | 48,949 | 103 | 40,78 | 29 | |
| Ire | 3 | 69,6 | 0,00179 | 2,88299 | 1 | 1 | 22,5167 | 95 | 142,63 | 16 | |
| Ital | 4,1 | 69,2 | 0,00173 | 2,89936 | 1 | 1 | 44,3058 | 97 | 76,59 | 17 | |
| Spa | 4,8 | 69 | 0,00279 | 2,67693 | 1 | 1 | 27,9464 | 106 | 60,98 | 15 | |
| Gree | 4,4 | 68,7 | 0,00388 | 2,53299 | 1 | 2 | 27,8568 | 105 | 54,75 | 21 | |
| Hun | 1,7 | 68,1 | 0,00151 | 2,96485 | 2 | 2 | 33,7787 | 87 | 0 | 11 | |
| Port | 6,8 | 63,3 | 0,00459 | 2,46247 | 1 | 1 | 32,7567 | 105 | 88,05 | 13 | |
| DYN LEX | LEX 1960 | 1 der e-funct | 1 der pi-func | Viol Pol Rits | Viol Civ Rits | PopDens*0,5 | Terms Trade | MNC PEN73 | Govcons |
continuation
| Growth 65-80 | Growth 80-90 | Predicted Growth | Adjustment | gender development index | Life Expectancy 1990 | SIPE-Index | gender power index | human development index | gender development index | mean yearsof schooling |
| Barb | 3,5 | 1,4 | 1,04102 | 0,35898 | 0,878 | 75,1 | 101 | 0,545 | 0,928 | 0,878 | 8,9 |
| Hong | 6,2 | 5,5 | 2,20154 | 3,29846 | 0,854 | 77,3 | 101 | 0,391 | 0,913 | 0,854 | 7 |
| Urug | 2,5 | -0,9 | 0,6112 | -1,5112 | 0,802 | 72,2 | 157 | 0,361 | 0,881 | 0,802 | 7,8 |
| Trinid | 3,1 | -6 | 0,8691 | -6,8691 | 0,786 | 71,6 | 101 | 0,533 | 0,877 | 0,786 | 8 |
| Baham | 1 | 1,7 | -0,0335 | 1,73353 | 0,828 | 71,5 | 101 | 0,533 | 0,875 | 0,828 | 6,2 |
| Korea | 7,3 | 8,9 | 2,67434 | 6,22566 | 0,78 | 70,1 | 32 | 0,255 | 0,872 | 0,78 | 8,8 |
| Costa | 3,3 | 0,6 | 0,95506 | -0,3551 | 0,763 | 74,9 | 101 | 0,474 | 0,852 | 0,763 | 5,7 |
| Sing | 8,3 | 5,7 | 3,10416 | 2,59584 | 0,822 | 74 | 61 | 0,424 | 0,849 | 0,822 | 3,9 |
| Arg | 1,7 | -1,8 | 0,26735 | -2,0673 | 0,768 | 71 | 140 | 0,415 | 0,832 | 0,768 | 8,7 |
| Ven | 2,3 | -2 | 0,52524 | -2,5252 | 0,765 | 70 | 82 | 0,391 | 0,824 | 0,765 | 6,3 |
| Domi | -0,8 | 3 | -0,8072 | 3,8072 | 0,721 | 72 | 101 | 0,391 | 0,819 | 0,721 | 4,7 |
| Kuw | 0,6 | -2,2 | -0,2055 | -1,9945 | 0,716 | 73,4 | 101 | 0,241 | 0,815 | 0,716 | 5,4 |
| Mex | 3,6 | -0,9 | 1,08401 | -1,984 | 0,741 | 69,7 | 104 | 0,399 | 0,805 | 0,741 | 4,7 |
| Maurit | 3,7 | 5,4 | 1,12699 | 4,27301 | 0,722 | 69,6 | 101 | 0,35 | 0,794 | 0,722 | 4,1 |
| Malay | 4,7 | 2,5 | 1,55681 | 0,94319 | 0,768 | 70,1 | 63 | 0,384 | 0,79 | 0,768 | 5,3 |
| Gren | 0,1 | 5,1 | -0,4204 | 5,52036 | 0,721 | 70 | 101 | 0,391 | 0,787 | 0,721 | 4,7 |
| Antig | -1,4 | 4,7 | -1,0651 | 5,76509 | 0,721 | 74 | 101 | 0,391 | 0,785 | 0,721 | 4,6 |
| Colom | 3,7 | 1,1 | 1,12699 | -0,027 | 0,72 | 68,8 | 98 | 0,435 | 0,77 | 0,72 | 7,1 |
| Seych | 4,6 | 2,5 | 1,51383 | 0,98617 | 0,721 | 71 | 101 | 0,391 | 0,761 | 0,721 | 4,6 |
| Sur | 5,5 | -5 | 1,90066 | -6,9007 | 0,699 | 69,5 | 101 | 0,348 | 0,751 | 0,699 | 4,2 |
| UAE | 0,6 | -7,2 | -0,2055 | -6,9945 | 0,674 | 70,5 | 101 | 0,239 | 0,738 | 0,674 | 5,1 |
| Pan | 2,8 | -2 | 0,74015 | -2,7402 | 0,765 | 72,4 | 106 | 0,43 | 0,738 | 0,765 | 6,7 |
| Jamai | -0,1 | -0,4 | -0,5063 | 0,10633 | 0,71 | 73,1 | 53 | 0,391 | 0,736 | 0,71 | 5,3 |
| Braz | 6,3 | 0,6 | 2,24452 | -1,6445 | 0,709 | 65,6 | 162 | 0,358 | 0,73 | 0,709 | 3,9 |
| Fiji | 4,2 | -0,4 | 1,3419 | -1,7419 | 0,722 | 64,8 | 101 | 0,314 | 0,73 | 0,722 | 5,1 |
| Saint L | 2,7 | 4,2 | 0,69717 | 3,50283 | 0,721 | 72 | 101 | 0,391 | 0,72 | 0,721 | 3,9 |
| TRK | 3,6 | 3 | 1,08401 | 1,91599 | 0,744 | 65,1 | 83 | 0,234 | 0,717 | 0,744 | 3,5 |
| Thai | 4,4 | 5,6 | 1,42786 | 4,17214 | 0,798 | 66,1 | 18 | 0,373 | 0,715 | 0,798 | 3,8 |
| Saint V | 0,2 | 5,7 | -0,3774 | 6,07738 | 0,721 | 71 | 101 | 0,347 | 0,709 | 0,721 | 4,6 |
| Saint K | 4 | 6 | 1,25593 | 4,74407 | 0,721 | 70 | 101 | 0,347 | 0,697 | 0,721 | 6 |
| Syria | 5,1 | -2,1 | 1,72874 | -3,8287 | 0,571 | 66,1 | 48 | 0,285 | 0,694 | 0,571 | 4,2 |
| Belize | 3,4 | 2,5 | 0,99804 | 1,50196 | 0,721 | 68 | 101 | 0,369 | 0,689 | 0,721 | 4,6 |
| Saudi | 0,6 | -5,6 | -0,2055 | -5,3945 | 0,514 | 65,5 | 39 | 0,347 | 0,688 | 0,514 | 3,7 |
| South A | 3,2 | -0,9 | 0,91208 | -1,8121 | 0,721 | 61,7 | 144 | 0,347 | 0,673 | 0,721 | 3,9 |
| Sri L | 2,8 | 2,4 | 0,74015 | 1,65985 | 0,66 | 70,9 | 56 | 0,288 | 0,663 | 0,66 | 6,9 |
| Liby | 0,6 | -9,2 | -0,2055 | -8,9945 | 0,534 | 61,8 | 51 | 0,347 | 0,658 | 0,534 | 3,4 |
| Ecu | 5,4 | -0,8 | 1,85768 | -2,6577 | 0,641 | 66 | 138 | 0,375 | 0,646 | 0,641 | 5,6 |
| Para | 4,1 | -1,3 | 1,29892 | -2,5989 | 0,628 | 67,1 | 102 | 0,343 | 0,641 | 0,628 | 4,9 |
| Phil | 3,2 | -1,5 | 0,91208 | -2,4121 | 0,625 | 64,2 | 79 | 0,435 | 0,603 | 0,625 | 7,4 |
| Tune | 4,7 | 0,9 | 1,55681 | -0,6568 | 0,641 | 66,7 | 98 | 0,254 | 0,6 | 0,641 | 2,1 |
| Oman | 9 | 7,1 | 3,40503 | 3,69497 | 0,542 | 65,9 | 101 | 0,347 | 0,598 | 0,542 | 0,9 |
| Peru | 0,8 | -2 | -0,1195 | -1,8805 | 0,631 | 63 | 117 | 0,4 | 0,592 | 0,631 | 6,4 |
| Domin | 3,8 | -0,4 | 1,16997 | -1,57 | 0,59 | 66,7 | 94 | 0,412 | 0,586 | 0,59 | 4,3 |
| Jord | 5,8 | -3,9 | 2,02961 | -5,9296 | 0,542 | 66,9 | 40 | 0,23 | 0,582 | 0,542 | 5 |
| China | 4,1 | 7,9 | 1,29892 | 6,60108 | 0,578 | 70,1 | 86 | 0,474 | 0,566 | 0,578 | 4,8 |
| Iran | 2,9 | -0,8 | 0,78313 | -1,5831 | 0,611 | 66,2 | 92 | 0,237 | 0,557 | 0,611 | 3,9 |
| Botsw | 9,9 | 6,3 | 3,79187 | 2,50813 | 0,696 | 59,8 | 101 | 0,407 | 0,552 | 0,696 | 2,4 |
| Guya | 0,7 | -3,2 | -0,1625 | -3,0375 | 0,584 | 64,2 | 101 | 0,461 | 0,541 | 0,584 | 5,1 |
| Alger | 4,2 | -0,3 | 1,3419 | -1,6419 | 0,508 | 65,1 | 143 | 0,266 | 0,528 | 0,508 | 2,6 |
| Indon | 5,2 | 4,1 | 1,77172 | 2,32828 | 0,591 | 61,5 | 52 | 0,362 | 0,515 | 0,591 | 3,9 |
| Gabon | 5,6 | -2,6 | 1,94365 | -4,5436 | 0,542 | 52,5 | 101 | 0,347 | 0,503 | 0,542 | 2,9 |
| El Sal | 1,5 | -0,6 | 0,18138 | -0,7814 | 0,533 | 64,4 | 86 | 0,397 | 0,503 | 0,533 | 4,1 |
| Mald | 1,8 | 6,6 | 0,31033 | 6,28967 | 0,522 | 62,5 | 101 | 0,294 | 0,497 | 0,522 | 4,5 |
| Guat | 3 | -2,1 | 0,82611 | -2,9261 | 0,481 | 63,4 | 61 | 0,39 | 0,489 | 0,481 | 4,1 |
| Hond | 1,1 | -1,2 | 0,00946 | -1,2095 | 0,524 | 64,9 | 47 | 0,406 | 0,472 | 0,524 | 3,9 |
| Swaz | 3,7 | 1,1 | 1,12699 | -0,027 | 0,508 | 56,8 | 101 | 0,357 | 0,458 | 0,508 | 3,7 |
| Solom | 5 | 3,4 | 1,68575 | 1,71425 | 0,542 | 69,5 | 101 | 0,198 | 0,439 | 0,542 | 1 |
| Moroc | 2,7 | 1,6 | 0,69717 | 0,90283 | 0,45 | 62 | 102 | 0,271 | 0,433 | 0,45 | 2,8 |
| Lesoth | 6,8 | -0,9 | 2,45943 | -3,3594 | 0,466 | 57,3 | 101 | 0,339 | 0,431 | 0,466 | 3,4 |
| Zimbab | 1,7 | -0,8 | 0,26735 | -1,0673 | 0,512 | 59,6 | 101 | 0,398 | 0,398 | 0,512 | 2,9 |
| Boliv | 1,7 | -2,6 | 0,26735 | -2,8673 | 0,519 | 54,5 | 106 | 0,344 | 0,398 | 0,519 | 4 |
| Egypt | 2,8 | 2,1 | 0,74015 | 1,35985 | 0,453 | 60,3 | 90 | 0,237 | 0,389 | 0,453 | 2,8 |
| Sao T | 3,3 | -4,2 | 0,95506 | -5,1551 | 0,33 | 67 | 101 | 0,27 | 0,374 | 0,33 | 2,3 |
| Congo | 2,7 | -0,2 | 0,69717 | -0,8972 | 0,33 | 53,7 | 101 | 0,206 | 0,372 | 0,33 | 2,1 |
| Kenya | 3,1 | 0,3 | 0,8691 | -0,5691 | 0,471 | 59,7 | 45 | 0,27 | 0,369 | 0,471 | 2,3 |
| Madag | -0,4 | -2,3 | -0,6353 | -1,6647 | 0,432 | 54,5 | 85 | 0,27 | 0,327 | 0,432 | 2,2 |
| Papua | 0,6 | -0,5 | -0,2055 | -0,2945 | 0,487 | 54,9 | 101 | 0,228 | 0,318 | 0,487 | 0,9 |
| Zambia | -1,2 | -2,9 | -0,9791 | -1,9209 | 0,403 | 54,4 | 49 | 0,271 | 0,314 | 0,403 | 2,7 |
| Ghana | -0,8 | -0,6 | -0,8072 | 0,2072 | 0,46 | 55 | 54 | 0,313 | 0,311 | 0,46 | 3,5 |
| Pak | 1,8 | 2,9 | 0,31033 | 2,58967 | 0,36 | 57,7 | 49 | 0,153 | 0,311 | 0,36 | 1,9 |
| Camer | 2,4 | -0,3 | 0,56822 | -0,8682 | 0,462 | 53,7 | 75 | 0,339 | 0,31 | 0,462 | 1,6 |
| India | 1,5 | 3,2 | 0,18138 | 3,01862 | 0,401 | 59,1 | 88 | 0,226 | 0,309 | 0,401 | 2,4 |
| Cote | 2,8 | -3,7 | 0,74015 | -4,4402 | 0,341 | 53,4 | 95 | 0,157 | 0,286 | 0,341 | 1,9 |
| Haiti | 0,9 | -2,3 | -0,0765 | -2,2235 | 0,354 | 55,7 | 39 | 0,349 | 0,275 | 0,354 | 1,7 |
| Tanz | 0,8 | -0,7 | -0,1195 | -0,5805 | 0,359 | 54 | 46 | 0,27 | 0,27 | 0,359 | 2 |
| Comor | 0,6 | -0,8 | -0,2055 | -0,5945 | 0,402 | 55 | 101 | 0,157 | 0,269 | 0,402 | 1 |
| Zaire | -1,3 | -1,5 | -1,0221 | -0,4779 | 0,372 | 53 | 66 | 0,201 | 0,262 | 0,372 | 1,6 |
| Lao | 0,6 | 0,7 | -0,2055 | 0,90545 | 0,405 | 49,7 | 30 | 0,27 | 0,246 | 0,405 | 2,9 |
| Nigeria | 4,2 | -3 | 1,3419 | -4,3419 | 0,383 | 51,5 | 58 | 0,198 | 0,246 | 0,383 | 1,2 |
| Togo | 1,7 | -1,7 | 0,26735 | -1,9673 | 0,38 | 54 | 63 | 0,182 | 0,218 | 0,38 | 1,6 |
| Ugan | -2,2 | -0,8 | -1,409 | 0,60895 | 0,316 | 52 | 35 | 0,27 | 0,194 | 0,316 | 1,1 |
| Bangl | -0,3 | 1 | -0,5923 | 1,59229 | 0,334 | 51,8 | 101 | 0,287 | 0,189 | 0,334 | 2 |
| Rwanda | 1,6 | -2,2 | 0,22437 | -2,4244 | 0,33 | 49,5 | 43 | 0,27 | 0,186 | 0,33 | 1,1 |
| Ethi | 0,4 | -1,2 | -0,2914 | -0,9086 | 0,217 | 45,5 | 14 | 0,205 | 0,172 | 0,217 | 1,1 |
| Malaw | 3,2 | -0,1 | 0,91208 | -1,0121 | 0,315 | 48,1 | 30 | 0,255 | 0,168 | 0,315 | 1,7 |
| Burun | 2,4 | 1,3 | 0,56822 | 0,73178 | 0,274 | 48,5 | 46 | 0,337 | 0,167 | 0,274 | 0,3 |
| CAfricR | 0,8 | -1,3 | -0,1195 | -1,1805 | 0,35 | 49,5 | 90 | 0,205 | 0,159 | 0,35 | 1,1 |
| Mozam | 0,6 | -4,1 | -0,2055 | -3,8945 | 0,229 | 47,5 | 101 | 0,35 | 0,154 | 0,229 | 1,6 |
| Bhut | 0,6 | 7,4 | -0,2055 | 7,60545 | 0,33 | 50,8 | 101 | 0,27 | 0,15 | 0,33 | 0,2 |
| Angol | 0,6 | 6,1 | -0,2055 | 6,30545 | 0,33 | 48,9 | 101 | 0,278 | 0,143 | 0,33 | 1,5 |
| Maure | -0,1 | -1,8 | -0,5063 | -1,2937 | 0,33 | 47 | 90 | 0,163 | 0,14 | 0,33 | 0,3 |
| Benin | -0,3 | -1 | -0,5923 | -0,4077 | 0,314 | 47 | 84 | 0,271 | 0,113 | 0,314 | 0,7 |
| GuiBis | -2,7 | 1,7 | -1,6239 | 3,32386 | 0,276 | 42,5 | 101 | 0,327 | 0,09 | 0,276 | 0,3 |
| Chad | -1,9 | 3,3 | -1,28 | 4,58 | 0,26 | 46,5 | 79 | 0,27 | 0,088 | 0,26 | 0,2 |
| Somal | -0,1 | -1,8 | -0,5063 | -1,2937 | 0,2 | 46,1 | 39 | 0,27 | 0,087 | 0,2 | 0,2 |
| Gamb | 2,3 | -0,3 | 0,52524 | -0,8252 | 0,2 | 44 | 101 | 0,315 | 0,086 | 0,2 | 0,6 |
| Mali | 2,1 | 1,2 | 0,43928 | 0,76072 | 0,195 | 45 | 94 | 0,237 | 0,082 | 0,195 | 0,3 |
| Niger | -2,5 | -4,5 | -1,5379 | -2,9621 | 0,196 | 45,5 | 64 | 0,27 | 0,08 | 0,196 | 0,1 |
| Burki | 1,7 | 1,4 | 0,26735 | 1,13265 | 0,214 | 48,2 | 95 | 0,28 | 0,074 | 0,214 | 0,1 |
| Sierr | 0,7 | -1,5 | -0,1625 | -1,3375 | 0,195 | 42 | 35 | 0,27 | 0,065 | 0,195 | 0,9 |
| Jap | 5,1 | 3,5 | 1,72874 | 1,77126 | 0,896 | 78,6 | 143 | 0,442 | 0,983 | 0,896 | 10,7 |
| Can | 3,3 | 2,4 | 0,95506 | 1,44494 | 0,891 | 77 | 131 | 0,655 | 0,982 | 0,891 | 12,1 |
| Norw | 3,6 | 2,7 | 1,08401 | 1,61599 | 0,911 | 77,1 | 186 | 0,752 | 0,979 | 0,911 | 11,6 |
| Switz | 1,5 | 1,7 | 0,18138 | 1,51862 | 0,852 | 77,4 | 169 | 0,513 | 0,978 | 0,852 | 11,1 |
| Swe | 2 | 1,8 | 0,39629 | 1,40371 | 0,919 | 77,4 | 187 | 0,757 | 0,977 | 0,919 | 11,1 |
| USA | 1,8 | 2,2 | 0,31033 | 1,88967 | 0,901 | 75,9 | 127 | 0,623 | 0,976 | 0,901 | 12,3 |
| Austral | 2,2 | 1,7 | 0,48226 | 1,21774 | 0,901 | 76,5 | 183 | 0,568 | 0,972 | 0,901 | 11,5 |
| Fran | 3,7 | 1,7 | 1,12699 | 0,57301 | 0,898 | 76,4 | 200 | 0,433 | 0,971 | 0,898 | 11,6 |
| NL | 2,7 | 1,4 | 0,69717 | 0,70283 | 0,851 | 77,2 | 195 | 0,625 | 0,97 | 0,851 | 10,6 |
| UK | 2 | 2,5 | 0,39629 | 2,10371 | 0,862 | 75,7 | 189 | 0,483 | 0,964 | 0,862 | 11,5 |
| Ger | 3 | 2,2 | 0,82611 | 1,37389 | 0,87 | 75,2 | 180 | 0,561 | 0,957 | 0,87 | 11,1 |
| DK | 2,2 | 2,1 | 0,48226 | 1,61774 | 0,904 | 75,8 | 182 | 0,683 | 0,955 | 0,904 | 10,4 |
| SF | 3,6 | 3,1 | 1,08401 | 2,01599 | 0,918 | 75,5 | 159 | 0,722 | 0,954 | 0,918 | 10,6 |
| Aus | 4 | 2 | 1,25593 | 0,74407 | 0,882 | 74,8 | 186 | 0,61 | 0,952 | 0,882 | 11,1 |
| Blg | 3,6 | 1,2 | 1,08401 | 0,11599 | 0,852 | 75,2 | 200 | 0,479 | 0,952 | 0,852 | 10,7 |
| NZ | 1,7 | 0,6 | 0,26735 | 0,33265 | 0,868 | 75,2 | 196 | 0,637 | 0,947 | 0,868 | 10,4 |
| Israel | 3,7 | 1,5 | 1,12699 | 0,37301 | 0,87 | 75,9 | 101 | 0,561 | 0,938 | 0,87 | 10 |
| Ire | 2,8 | 1,1 | 0,74015 | 0,35985 | 0,813 | 74,6 | 190 | 0,469 | 0,925 | 0,813 | 8,7 |
| Ital | 3,2 | 2,2 | 0,91208 | 1,28792 | 0,861 | 76 | 198 | 0,585 | 0,924 | 0,861 | 7,3 |
| Spa | 4,1 | 2,7 | 1,29892 | 1,40108 | 0,795 | 77 | 196 | 0,452 | 0,923 | 0,795 | 6,8 |
| Gree | 4,8 | 0,8 | 1,59979 | -0,7998 | 0,825 | 76,1 | 165 | 0,343 | 0,902 | 0,825 | 6,9 |
| Hun | 5,1 | 1,5 | 1,72874 | -0,2287 | 0,836 | 70,9 | 169 | 0,506 | 0,887 | 0,836 | 9,6 |
| Port | 4,6 | 2,4 | 1,51383 | 0,88617 | 0,832 | 74 | 152 | 0,435 | 0,853 | 0,832 | 6 |
| Growth 65-80 | Growth 80-90 | Predicted Growth | Adjustment | gender development index | Life Expectancy 1990 | SIPE-Index | gender power index | human development index | gender development index | mean yearsof schooling |
the state sector and the issue of privatization
Country code %public investment government expenditure
per GDP
| Barb | 41,6 | 34 | |
| Hong | 41,6 | 18 | |
| Urug | 23,7 | 24,8 | |
| Trinid | 22,5 | 33,4 | |
| Baham | 41,6 | 18 | |
| Korea | 25,8 | 16,7 | |
| Costa | 21,7 | 24,5 | |
| Sing | 47,3 | 34,5 | |
| Arg | 35,3 | 15,3 | |
| Ven | 41,6 | 21,5 | |
| Domi | 41,6 | 30 | |
| Kuw | 41,6 | 51,3 | |
| Mex | 37,5 | 19,8 | |
| Maurit | 41,6 | 26,7 | |
| Malay | 39,1 | 29 | |
| Gren | 41,6 | 30 | |
| Antig | 41,6 | 30 | |
| Colom | 21,9 | 15,2 | |
| Seych | 41,6 | 30 | |
| Sur | 41,6 | 51,7 | |
| UAE | 41,6 | 13,3 | |
| Pan | 23,9 | 28,7 | |
| Jamai | 41,6 | 32,2 | |
| Braz | 26,5 | 24,1 | |
| Fiji | 41,6 | 25,8 | |
| Saint L | 41,6 | 30 | |
| TRK | 52,5 | 22,8 | |
| Thai | 32,5 | 15,5 | |
| Saint V | 41,6 | 30 | |
| Saint K | 41,6 | 30 | |
| Syria | 37,5 | 27,8 | |
| Belize | 41,6 | 29,3 | |
| Saudi | 46,4 | 30 | |
| South A | 42 | 30,2 | |
| Sri L | 33,9 | 29,5 | |
| Liby | 33,6 | 54,8 | |
| Ecu | 39,8 | 13,3 | |
| Para | 22,9 | 9 | |
| Phil | 13,4 | 15,6 | |
| Tune | 73,8 | 35,2 | |
| Oman | 41,6 | 46,7 | |
| Peru | 17,8 | 16,6 | |
| Domin | 32,8 | 18,9 | |
| Jord | 38,5 | 37 | |
| China | 41,6 | 30 | |
| Iran | 38,2 | 17,5 | |
| Botsw | 41,6 | 36,4 | |
| Guya | 41,6 | 65,7 | |
| Alger | 65,7 | 40,7 | |
| Indon | 38,9 | 19,6 | |
| Gabon | 41,6 | 38,7 | |
| El Sal | 24,1 | 10,3 | |
| Mald | 41,6 | 30 | |
| Guat | 23,1 | 11,6 | |
| Hond | 21 | 19,4 | |
| Swaz | 41,6 | 25,4 | |
| Solom | 41,6 | 37,7 | |
| Moroc | 63,2 | 28 | |
| Lesoth | 41,6 | 54,4 | |
| Zimbab | 44,4 | 46,6 | |
| Boliv | 50,5 | 14,5 | |
| Egypt | 91,8 | 40 | |
| Sao T | 41,6 | 23 | |
| Congo | 41,6 | 26,1 | |
| Kenya | 28,6 | 28,6 | |
| Madag | 39,4 | 14,4 | |
| Papua | 69,2 | 28,3 | |
| Zambia | 39,8 | 38,1 | |
| Ghana | 41,6 | 13,6 | |
| Pak | 49,4 | 23,3 | |
| Camer | 34,4 | 27,5 | |
| India | 43,9 | 17,6 | |
| Cote | 38,3 | 31,6 | |
| Haiti | 41,6 | 18,2 | |
| Tanz | 38,2 | 28,7 | |
| Comor | 41,6 | 43,7 | |
| Zaire | 31,6 | 34,2 | |
| Lao | 41,6 | 23 | |
| Nigeria | 37,4 | 23,6 | |
| Togo | 39,4 | 31,3 | |
| Ugan | 36,9 | 12,7 | |
| Bangl | 65,8 | 12,5 | |
| Rwanda | 49,6 | 22,7 | |
| Ethi | 41,6 | 34,9 | |
| Malaw | 66,9 | 26,7 | |
| Burun | 79,4 | 21,5 | |
| CAfricR | 30,3 | 27,6 | |
| Mozam | 41,6 | 14,9 | |
| Bhut | 41,6 | 41 | |
| Angol | 41,6 | 23 | |
| Maure | 35 | 33,4 | |
| Benin | 62,7 | 21,7 | |
| GuiBis | 41,6 | 72,5 | |
| Chad | 74,5 | 9,4 | |
| Somal | 41,6 | 25,4 | |
| Gamb | 41,6 | 30,6 | |
| Mali | 41,6 | 29,8 | |
| Niger | 41,6 | 21,3 | |
| Burki | 52,4 | 15,7 | |
| Sierr | 35,2 | 16,5 | |
| Jap | 25,6 | 16,3 | |
| Can | 29,6 | 22,2 | |
| Norw | 28,6 | 43,4 | |
| Switz | 41,6 | 21 | |
| Swe | 40,7 | 41,3 | |
| USA | 18,3 | 23,5 | |
| Austral | 35,9 | 27,5 | |
| Fran | 33,5 | 43,7 | |
| NL | 35 | 53,9 | |
| UK | 44,2 | 35,6 | |
| Ger | 16,5 | 30,4 | |
| DK | 24,9 | 38,3 | |
| SF | 37,5 | 30 | |
| Aus | 37,2 | 39,1 | |
| Blg | 12,3 | 50,1 | |
| NZ | 39,1 | 44,7 | |
| Israel | 32,2 | 48 | |
| Ire | 21,3 | 52,4 | |
| Ital | 12,7 | 46,8 | |
| Spa | 25,5 | 33,6 | |
| Gree | 28,1 | 40,1 | |
| Hun | 89 | 56,1 | |
| Port | 20,6 | 41,9 | |
| public investments in the preceeding Kondratieff cycle | Government expenditures | ||
economic growth and the environment
growth greenhouse index
1980-92
| Barb | 1 | 0 |
| Hong | 5,5 | 0,14 |
| Urug | -1 | 0,16 |
| Trinid | -2,6 | 0,63 |
| Baham | 1 | 0 |
| Korea | 8,5 | 0,17 |
| Costa | 0,8 | 0,25 |
| Sing | 5,3 | 0,4 |
| Arg | -0,9 | 0,18 |
| Ven | -0,8 | 0,27 |
| Domi | 4,6 | 0 |
| Kuw | -4,3 | 0,57 |
| Mex | -0,2 | 0,23 |
| Maurit | 5,6 | 0 |
| Malay | 3,2 | 0,39 |
| Gren | 3,8 | 0 |
| Antig | 5 | 0 |
| Colom | 1,4 | 0,42 |
| Seych | 3,2 | 0 |
| Sur | -3,6 | 0,23 |
| UAE | -4,3 | 1,08 |
| Pan | -1,2 | 0,24 |
| Jamai | 0,2 | 0,12 |
| Braz | 0,4 | 0,26 |
| Fiji | 0,3 | 0,14 |
| Saint L | 4,4 | 0 |
| TRK | 2,9 | 0,07 |
| Thai | 6 | 0,27 |
| Saint V | 5 | 0 |
| Saint K | 5,7 | 0 |
| Syria | 0 | 0,08 |
| Belize | 2,6 | 0 |
| Saudi | -3,3 | 0,37 |
| South A | 0,1 | 0,27 |
| Sri L | 2,6 | 0,06 |
| Liby | -5,4 | 0,25 |
| Ecu | -0,3 | 0,44 |
| Para | -0,7 | 0,42 |
| Phil | -1 | 0,12 |
| Tune | 1,3 | 0,06 |
| Oman | 4,1 | 0,24 |
| Peru | -2,8 | 0,21 |
| Domin | -0,5 | 0,05 |
| Jord | -5,4 | 0,09 |
| China | 7,6 | 0,08 |
| Iran | -1,4 | 0,1 |
| Botsw | 6,1 | 0,15 |
| Guya | -5,6 | 0,12 |
| Alger | -0,5 | 0,08 |
| Indon | 4 | 0,09 |
| Gabon | -3,7 | 0,4 |
| El Sal | 0,2 | 0,04 |
| Mald | 6,8 | 0 |
| Guat | -1,5 | 0,15 |
| Hond | -0,3 | 0,24 |
| Swaz | 1,6 | 0,1 |
| Solom | 3,3 | 0 |
| Moroc | 1,4 | 0,04 |
| Lesoth | -0,5 | 0 |
| Zimbab | -0,9 | 0,1 |
| Boliv | -1,5 | 0,19 |
| Egypt | 1,8 | 0,06 |
| Sao T | -3 | 0 |
| Congo | -0,8 | 0,17 |
| Kenya | 0,2 | 0,04 |
| Madag | -2,4 | 0,31 |
| Papua | 0,6 | 0,05 |
| Zambia | -3,1 | 0,1 |
| Ghana | -0,1 | 0,07 |
| Pak | 3,1 | 0,04 |
| Camer | -1,5 | 0,25 |
| India | 3,1 | 0,05 |
| Cote | -4,7 | 0,73 |
| Haiti | -2,4 | 0,01 |
| Tanz | 0,1 | 0,04 |
| Comor | -1,3 | 0 |
| Zaire | -1,8 | 0,09 |
| Lao | 1,8 | 1,5 |
| Nigeria | -0,4 | 0,12 |
| Togo | -1,8 | 0,03 |
| Ugan | 1,8 | 0,02 |
| Bangl | 1,8 | 0,04 |
| Rwanda | -0,6 | 0,01 |
| Ethi | -1,9 | 0,03 |
| Malaw | -0,1 | 0,17 |
| Burun | 1,3 | 0 |
| CAfricR | -1,5 | 0,13 |
| Mozam | -3,6 | 0,06 |
| Bhut | 6,3 | 0 |
| Angol | -0,9 | 0,12 |
| Maure | -0,8 | 0,09 |
| Benin | -0,7 | 0,06 |
| GuiBis | 1,6 | 0,5 |
| Chad | 3,4 | 0,1 |
| Somal | -2,3 | 0,06 |
| Gamb | -0,2 | 0,11 |
| Mali | -2,7 | 0,04 |
| Niger | -4,3 | 0,05 |
| Burki | 1 | 0,06 |
| Sierr | -1,4 | 0,05 |
| Jap | 3,6 | 0,38 |
| Can | 1,8 | 0,61 |
| Norw | 2,2 | 0,49 |
| Switz | 1,4 | 0,23 |
| Swe | 1,5 | 0,25 |
| USA | 1,7 | 0,7 |
| Austral | 1,6 | 0,64 |
| Fran | 1,7 | 0,27 |
| NL | 1,7 | 0,34 |
| UK | 2,4 | 0,38 |
| Ger | 2,4 | 0,55 |
| DK | 2,1 | 0,35 |
| SF | 2 | 0,36 |
| Aus | 2 | 0,28 |
| Blg | 2 | 0,37 |
| NZ | 0,6 | 0,43 |
| Israel | 1,9 | 0,27 |
| Ire | 3,4 | 0,37 |
| Ital | 2,2 | 0,28 |
| Spa | 2,9 | 0,24 |
| Gree | 1 | 0,29 |
| Hun | 0,2 | 0,24 |
| Port | 3,1 | 0,21 |
| country code | GNP gro80-92 | greenhouse |
data for the final model
| Country Code | absolute GNP (UNDP, 1996) | economic growth 80-93, pc. and year (UNDP, 1996) | inflation 93 (UNDP, 1996) | FDI per GDP (UNCTAD, 1996; Business Central Europe, 1996) | UN membership years (Weltalmanach, 1996, 1995) |
| Canada | 575 | 1,4 | 1,2 | 18,5 | 1945 |
| USA | 6388 | 1,7 | 2 | 4,6 | 1945 |
| Japan | 3903 | 3,4 | 0,8 | 0,4 | 1956 |
| NL | 320 | 1,7 | 1,6 | 19,5 | 1945 |
| NOR | 112 | 2,2 | 1 | 13,8 | 1945 |
| SF | 98 | 1,5 | 2,3 | 2,5 | 1955 |
| France | 1293 | 1,6 | 2,2 | 6,4 | 1945 |
| Iceland | 7 | 1,2 | 2,9 | 7,8 | 1945 |
| Swed | 215 | 1,3 | 2,6 | 5 | 1946 |
| Spain | 536 | 2,7 | 4,4 | 5,4 | 1955 |
| Australia | 308 | 1,6 | 1,1 | 15,6 | 1945 |
| Belgium | 218 | 1,9 | 4,4 | 10,6 | 1945 |
| Austria | 185 | 2 | 3,6 | 9,4 | 1955 |
| NZ | 44 | 0,7 | 0,9 | 9 | 1945 |
| CH | 252 | 1,1 | 2,1 | 10,8 | 1997 |
| UK | 1046 | 2,3 | 3,4 | 14 | 1945 |
| DK | 137 | 2 | 1,2 | 6,2 | 1945 |
| GER | 1903 | 2,1 | 3,9 | 6 | 1973 |
| IRE | 46 | 3,6 | 3,6 | 24,5 | 1955 |
| ITA | 1133 | 2,1 | 4,4 | 4,5 | 1955 |
| GRE | 78 | 0,9 | 12,6 | 24,9 | 1945 |
| ISR | 73 | 2 | 11 | 4,7 | 1949 |
| LUX | 15 | 2,8 | 6,2 | 10,6 | 1945 |
| MAL | 3 | 3,2 | 3,3 | 28,2 | 1964 |
| POR | 88 | 3,3 | 7,4 | 6,5 | 1955 |
| HUNG | 36 | 1,2 | 21,5 | 15,6 | 1955 |
| LATV | 6 | -0,6 | 74,2 | 8,5 | 1991 |
| POL | 86 | 0,4 | 31,1 | 5,3 | 1945 |
| RUS | 346 | -1 | 873,5 | 1,70520231 | 1945 |
| BELR | 29 | 2,4 | 1428,7 | 0,29310345 | 1945 |
| BULG | 10 | 0,5 | 57,5 | 0,6 | 1955 |
| EST | 4 | -2,2 | 81,2 | 26,5 | 1991 |
| KAZ | 24 | -1,6 | 1255,5 | 3 | 1992 |
| ROM | 26 | -2,4 | 225,9 | 1,8 | 1955 |
| UKR | 114 | 0,2 | 3691,2 | 0,96491228 | 1945 |
| LITH | 5 | -2,8 | 342,7 | 1,7 | 1991 |
| ARM | 3 | -4,2 | 1480,7 | 0,73333333 | 1992 |
| UZB | 22 | -0,2 | 914,5 | 1,30454545 | 1992 |
| AZER | 5 | -3,5 | 714,5 | 5,52 | 1992 |
| KYR | 4 | 0,1 | 792,2 | 0,3 | 1992 |
| GEO | 3 | -6,6 | 45 | 3,06666667 | 1992 |
| ALB | 1 | -3,2 | 105,7 | 10 | 1955 |
| TAJ | 2 | -3,6 | 1251,7 | 1,45 | 1992 |
| Hong Kong | 110,3 | 5,4 | 8,8 | 10,5 | 1997 |
| Cyprus | 7,5 | 4,9 | 2,9 | 21,5 | 1960 |
| Barbados | 1,6 | 0,5 | 1,9 | 10,3 | 1966 |
| Bahamas | 3,1 | 1,4 | -1,8 | 12,7 | 1973 |
| S-Korea | 337,9 | 8,2 | 4,6 | 1,9 | 1991 |
| Argentina | 245,5 | -0,5 | 7,2 | 7,4 | 1945 |
| Costa Rica | 7 | 1,1 | 11,6 | 24,4 | 1945 |
| Uruguay | 12,5 | -0,1 | 45,2 | 16,2 | 1945 |
| Chile | 43,8 | 3,6 | 12,1 | 14,1 | 1945 |
| Singapore | 56,2 | 6,1 | 4 | 73,6 | 1965 |
| Trinidad | 4,9 | -2,8 | 9,9 | 23,3 | 1962 |
| Bahrein | 4,3 | -2,9 | -1,1 | 7,7 | 1971 |
| Antigua | 0,4 | 5,2 | 1,5 | 54,2 | 1981 |
| Panama | 6,6 | -0,7 | 3,5 | 10,8 | 1945 |
| Venezuela | 59,3 | -0,7 | 32,4 | 2,6 | 1945 |
| Saint Kitts | 0,2 | 5,4 | 2,3 | 40,5 | 1983 |
| Fiji | 1,7 | 0,5 | 8,8 | 34,4 | 1970 |
| Mexico | 335,8 | -0,5 | 9,7 | 10,5 | 1945 |
| Colombia | 49,5 | 1,5 | 21,9 | 6,4 | 1945 |
| Thailand | 122,7 | 6,4 | 3,4 | 5,1 | 1946 |
| Malaysia | 59,9 | 3,5 | 1,8 | 27,2 | 1957 |
| Mauritius | 3,3 | 5,5 | 9 | 3,5 | 1968 |
| Brazil | 458 | 0,3 | 2207,9 | 11,3 | 1945 |
| Seychelles | 0,5 | 3,4 | -0,1 | 51,7 | 1976 |
| Dominica | 0,2 | 4,6 | 1,6 | 5,7 | 1978 |
| Belize | 0,5 | 2,9 | 5,2 | 5 | 1981 |
| Algeria | 47,4 | -0,8 | 13,9 | 2,2 | 1962 |
| Botswana | 3,9 | 6,2 | 9 | 45,3 | 1966 |
| Saint Vincent | 0,2 | 5 | -0,7 | 7,5 | 1980 |
| Suriname | 0,4 | -2 | 136,3 | 10,7 | 1975 |
| Saint Lucia | 0,5 | 4,4 | 0 | 105,5 | 1979 |
| Grenada | 0,2 | 3,8 | 1,6 | 11 | 1974 |
| Tunesia | 15 | 1,2 | 4,5 | 17,2 | 1956 |
| Oman | 10,6 | 3,4 | -7,1 | 9,9 | 1971 |
| Turkey | 177,1 | 2,4 | 67,7 | 0,7 | 1945 |
| Paraguay | 7,1 | -0,7 | 18,7 | 6,5 | 1945 |
| Jamaica | 3,5 | -0,3 | 34,6 | 22,7 | 1962 |
| Dominican R | 9,3 | 0,7 | 4,2 | 5,2 | 1945 |
| Sri Lanka | 10,7 | 2,7 | 8,2 | 8,6 | 1955 |
| Peru | 34 | -2,7 | 46,5 | 6,7 | 1945 |
| Philippines | 55,2 | -0,6 | 6,8 | 4,2 | 1945 |
| South Africa | 118,2 | -0,2 | 11,3 | 19,8 | 1945 |
| Indonesia | 140,2 | 4,2 | 19,3 | 28,6 | 1950 |
| Guyana | 0,4 | -3 | 16,8 | 3,1 | 1966 |
| Egypt | 37,2 | 2,8 | 10,4 | 12 | 1945 |
| Maldives | 0,2 | 7,2 | 14,9 | 3,8 | 1965 |
| China | 577,4 | 8,2 | 12,3 | 1,2 | 1945 |
| Swaziland | 1 | 2,3 | 11,7 | 55 | 1968 |
| Bolivia | 5,4 | -0,7 | 7,6 | 14,7 | 1945 |
| Guatemala | 11 | -1,2 | 13,8 | 0,6 | 1945 |
| Mongolia | 0,7 | 0,2 | 332,4 | 2,5 | 1961 |
| Honduras | 3,2 | -0,3 | 8,9 | 4,7 | 1945 |
| El Salvador | 7,3 | 0,2 | 14,1 | 3,2 | 1945 |
| Namibia | 2,8 | 0,7 | 7,4 | 151,7 | 1990 |
| Nicaragua | 1,4 | -5,7 | 20,2 | 4,1 | 1945 |
| Gabon | 5 | -1,6 | 1 | 22,7 | 1960 |
| Cape Verde | 0,3 | 3 | 5,9 | 0,8 | 1975 |
| Morocco | 26,6 | 1,2 | 3,8 | 4,3 | 1956 |
| Zimbabwe | 5,6 | -0,3 | 36,2 | 66,6 | 1980 |
| Congo | 2,4 | -0,3 | -4,3 | 22,1 | 1960 |
| Papua NG | 4,9 | 0,6 | 3,2 | 31,1 | 1975 |
| Cameroon | 10,3 | -2,2 | 1,1 | 13,8 | 1960 |
| Kenya | 6,6 | 0,3 | 24,5 | 6 | 1963 |
| Ghana | 7 | 0,1 | 25,2 | 4,9 | 1957 |
| Lesotho | 1,3 | -0,5 | 10,6 | 6,2 | 1966 |
| Equatorial G | 0,2 | 1,2 | -1,5 | 6,4 | 1968 |
| Pakistan | 54 | 3,1 | 8,6 | 3,3 | 1947 |
| India | 263 | 3 | 8,1 | 0,5 | 1945 |
| Zambia | 3,3 | -3,1 | 180 | 4,4 | 1964 |
| Nigeria | 29 | -0,1 | 24,9 | 5,4 | 1960 |
| Comoros | 0,3 | -0,4 | 1,4 | 0,2 | 1975 |
| Togo | 1,4 | -2,1 | -2,8 | 28,7 | 1960 |
| Bangladesh | 25,6 | 2,1 | 0,2 | 0,7 | 1974 |
| Tanzania | 2,5 | 0,1 | 22,5 | 1,1 | 1961 |
| Cote d'Ivoire | 8,4 | -4,6 | -0,4 | 7,9 | 1960 |
| C African R | 1,3 | -1,6 | 1,5 | 11 | 1960 |
| Mauritania | 1,1 | -0,8 | 4,9 | 4,8 | 1961 |
| Madagascar | 3 | -2,6 | 13 | 1,7 | 1960 |
| Nepal | 4 | 2 | 10,3 | 0,1 | 1955 |
| Rwanda | 1,6 | -1,2 | 9,7 | 7,8 | 1962 |
| Benin | 2,2 | -0,4 | 1,6 | 3,1 | 1960 |
| Malawi | 2,1 | -1,2 | 21,8 | 12,2 | 1964 |
| Guinea-Biss. | 0,2 | 2,8 | 53,5 | 0,8 | 1974 |
| Gambia | 0,4 | -0,2 | -1,5 | 9,4 | 1965 |
| Chad | 1,3 | 3,2 | 0,6 | 27,9 | 1960 |
| Burundi | 1,1 | 0,9 | 7,7 | 2 | 1962 |
| Mozambique | 1,4 | -1,5 | 46,5 | 0,7 | 1975 |
| Burkina F. | 2,9 | 0,8 | 2 | 2,4 | 1960 |
| Mali | 2,7 | -1 | 3 | 2,8 | 1960 |
| Sierra L. | 0,7 | -1,5 | 32,9 | 5 | 1961 |
| Niger | 2,3 | -4,1 | -0,1 | 14,1 | 1960 |
| Country Code | absolute GNP (UNDP, 1996) | economic growth 80-93, pc. and year (UNDP, 1996) | inflation 93 (UNDP, 1996) | FDI per GDP (UNCTAD, 1996; Business Central Europe, 1996) | UN membership years (Weltalmanach, 1996, 1995) |
| Pearson correlation with economic grow | 0,12927925 | -0,17644324 | 0,20367008 | -0,0549929 | |
| Pearson correlation with human development | 0,25746013 | 0,04035197 | 0,09799263 | -0,13877401 |
| Country Code | Years of Commist Rule (Autorenkollektiv; Weltalmanach) | average population growth (UNDP, 1996) | mean years of schooling, population aged >25y | state sector size (gov. expenditures per GDP; UNDP 1996; Weltalmanach, 1995, 1996; World Resources Institute) |
| Canada | 0 | 1,5 | 12,2 | 26 |
| USA | 0 | 1,1 | 12,4 | 24 |
| Japan | 0 | 0,9 | 10,8 | 16 |
| NL | 0 | 0,9 | 11,1 | 54 |
| NOR | 0 | 0,6 | 12,1 | 46 |
| SF | 0 | 0,4 | 10,9 | 45 |
| France | 0 | 0,7 | 12 | 46 |
| Iceland | 0 | 1,2 | 9,2 | 33,4 |
| Swed | 0 | 0,5 | 11,4 | 54 |
| Spain | 0 | 0,8 | 6,9 | 35 |
| Australia | 0 | 1,6 | 12 | 28 |
| Belgium | 0 | 0,3 | 11,2 | 51 |
| Austria | 0 | 0,3 | 11,4 | 40 |
| NZ | 0 | 1,2 | 10,7 | 37 |
| CH | 0 | 0,8 | 11,6 | 35 |
| UK | 0 | 0,3 | 11,7 | 43 |
| DK | 0 | 0,4 | 11 | 46 |
| GER | 0 | 0,3 | 11,6 | 34 |
| IRE | 0 | 0,7 | 8,9 | 47 |
| ITA | 0 | 0,4 | 7,5 | 53 |
| GRE | 0 | 0,7 | 7 | 43 |
| ISR | 0 | 2,8 | 10,2 | 44 |
| LUX | 0 | 0,7 | 10,5 | 45 |
| MAL | 0 | 0,4 | 6,1 | 37,9 |
| POR | 0 | 0,3 | 6,4 | 42 |
| HUNG | 44 | 0,1 | 9,8 | 55 |
| LATV | 46 | 0,6 | 9 | 43 |
| POL | 44 | 0,8 | 8,2 | 38,7 |
| RUS | 74 | 0,6 | 9 | 47 |
| BELR | 74 | 0,7 | 7 | 33 |
| BULG | 44 | 0,4 | 7 | 48 |
| EST | 46 | 0,7 | 9 | 27 |
| KAZ | 74 | 1,6 | 5 | 37 |
| ROM | 44 | 0,7 | 7,1 | 40 |
| UKR | 74 | 0,6 | 6 | 38 |
| LITH | 46 | 0,9 | 9 | 20 |
| ARM | 74 | 1,9 | 5 | 36 |
| UZB | 74 | 2,9 | 5 | 46 |
| AZER | 74 | 2 | 5 | 32 |
| KYR | 74 | 2,3 | 5 | 38 |
| GEO | 74 | 0,8 | 5 | 32 |
| ALB | 46 | 2,3 | 6,2 | 60,5 |
| TAJ | 74 | 3,1 | 5 | 44 |
| Hong Kong | 0 | 1,9 | 7,2 | 20 |
| Cyprus | 0 | 0,7 | 7 | 29,8 |
| Barbados | 0 | 0,4 | 9,4 | 34 |
| Bahamas | 0 | 2,7 | 6,2 | 20 |
| S-Korea | 0 | 1,7 | 9,3 | 17 |
| Argentina | 0 | 1,5 | 9,2 | 15,3 |
| Costa Rica | 0 | 3 | 5,7 | 27 |
| Uruguay | 0 | 0,7 | 8,1 | 29 |
| Chile | 0 | 1,8 | 7,8 | 23 |
| Singapore | 0 | 1,6 | 4 | 20 |
| Trinidad | 0 | 1,3 | 8,4 | 33,4 |
| Bahrein | 0 | 3,8 | 4,3 | 36,4 |
| Antigua | 0 | 0,5 | 4,6 | 20 |
| Panama | 0 | 2,5 | 6,8 | 32 |
| Venezuela | 0 | 3,1 | 6,5 | 19 |
| Saint Kitts | 0 | -0,6 | 6 | 20 |
| Fiji | 0 | 2 | 5,1 | 25,8 |
| Mexico | 0 | 2,7 | 4,9 | 19,8 |
| Colombia | 0 | 2,3 | 7,5 | 15,2 |
| Thailand | 0 | 2,4 | 3,9 | 16 |
| Malaysia | 0 | 2,6 | 5,6 | 27 |
| Mauritius | 0 | 1,5 | 4,1 | 22 |
| Brazil | 0 | 2,4 | 4 | 26 |
| Seychelles | 0 | 1,6 | 4,6 | 25 |
| Dominica | 0 | -1 | 4,7 | 25 |
| Belize | 0 | 2,4 | 4,6 | 29,3 |
| Algeria | 0 | 2,8 | 2,8 | 40,7 |
| Botswana | 0 | 3,3 | 2,5 | 40 |
| Saint Vincent | 0 | 1 | 4,6 | 25 |
| Suriname | 0 | 1,1 | 4,2 | 51,7 |
| Saint Lucia | 0 | 1 | 3,9 | 25 |
| Grenada | 0 | 0,1 | 4,7 | 25 |
| Tunesia | 0 | 2,2 | 2,1 | 33 |
| Oman | 0 | 3,9 | 0,9 | 64 |
| Turkey | 0 | 2,4 | 3,6 | 26 |
| Paraguay | 0 | 3 | 4,9 | 13 |
| Jamaica | 0 | 1,2 | 5,3 | 32,2 |
| Dominican R | 0 | 2,6 | 4,3 | 18,9 |
| Sri Lanka | 0 | 1,8 | 7,2 | 27 |
| Peru | 0 | 2,6 | 6,5 | 14 |
| Philippines | 0 | 2,6 | 7,6 | 18 |
| South Africa | 0 | 2,5 | 3,9 | 33 |
| Indonesia | 0 | 2,1 | 4,1 | 19 |
| Guyana | 0 | 1,1 | 5,1 | 65,7 |
| Egypt | 0 | 2,4 | 3 | 47 |
| Maldives | 0 | 2,7 | 4,5 | 25 |
| China | 48 | 1,8 | 5 | 9 |
| Swaziland | 0 | 2,8 | 3,8 | 25,4 |
| Bolivia | 0 | 2,3 | 4 | 27 |
| Guatemala | 0 | 2,9 | 4,1 | 11,6 |
| Mongolia | 68 | 2,7 | 7,2 | 25 |
| Honduras | 0 | 3,2 | 4 | 19,4 |
| El Salvador | 0 | 2,3 | 4,2 | 11 |
| Namibia | 0 | 2,6 | 1,7 | 40 |
| Nicaragua | 0 | 3,1 | 4,5 | 40 |
| Gabon | 0 | 2,9 | 2,6 | 34 |
| Cape Verde | 0 | 1,9 | 2,2 | 33,1 |
| Morocco | 0 | 2,5 | 3 | 28 |
| Zimbabwe | 0 | 3,2 | 3,1 | 36 |
| Congo | 0 | 2,8 | 2,1 | 26,1 |
| Papua NG | 0 | 2,3 | 1 | 36 |
| Cameroon | 0 | 2,6 | 1,6 | 18 |
| Kenya | 0 | 3,6 | 2,3 | 29 |
| Ghana | 0 | 2,7 | 3,5 | 21 |
| Lesotho | 0 | 2,5 | 3,5 | 32 |
| Equatorial G | 0 | 1,2 | 0,8 | 21,1 |
| Pakistan | 0 | 3 | 1,9 | 24 |
| India | 0 | 2,2 | 2,4 | 17 |
| Zambia | 0 | 3,2 | 2,7 | 38,1 |
| Nigeria | 0 | 2,8 | 1,2 | 23,6 |
| Comoros | 0 | 3,2 | 1 | 43,7 |
| Togo | 0 | 2,9 | 1,6 | 31,3 |
| Bangladesh | 0 | 2,5 | 2 | 12,5 |
| Tanzania | 0 | 3,1 | 2 | 28,7 |
| Cote d'Ivoire | 0 | 3,9 | 1,9 | 31,6 |
| C African R | 0 | 2,2 | 1,1 | 27,6 |
| Mauritania | 0 | 2,4 | 0,4 | 33,4 |
| Madagascar | 0 | 2,9 | 2,2 | 16 |
| Nepal | 0 | 2,4 | 2,1 | 19 |
| Rwanda | 0 | 3,1 | 1,1 | 32 |
| Benin | 0 | 2,5 | 0,7 | 21,7 |
| Malawi | 0 | 3,4 | 1,7 | 26,7 |
| Guinea-Biss. | 0 | 2 | 0,4 | 72,5 |
| Gambia | 0 | 3,3 | 0,6 | 30,6 |
| Chad | 0 | 2,1 | 0,3 | 32 |
| Burundi | 0 | 2,2 | 0,4 | 21,5 |
| Mozambique | 0 | 2,2 | 1,6 | 14,9 |
| Burkina F. | 0 | 2,4 | 0,2 | 15,7 |
| Mali | 0 | 2,6 | 0,4 | 29,8 |
| Sierra L. | 0 | 2 | 0,9 | 23 |
| Niger | 0 | 3,2 | 0,2 | 21,3 |
|
| ||||
| Country Code | Years of Commist Rule (Autorenkollektiv; Weltalmanach) | average population growth (UNDP, 1996) | mean years of schooling, population aged >25y | state sector size (gov. expenditures per GDP; UNDP 1996; Weltalmanach, 1995, 1996; World Resources Institute) |
| -0,294956926 | -0,297536668 | 0,163301612 | -0,133291605 | |
| 0,05070824 | -0,586665524 | 0,839484599 | 0,219984663 |
| Country Code | % labor force participation ratio (UNDP, 1996) | % of the labour force in agriculture (UNDP, 1996; Fischer Weltalmanach, 1996) | % of the labour force in industry (see: labour force agriculture) | agricultural share in GDP (UNDP, 1996; Fischer Weltalmanach, 1996) | structural heterogeneity (labour force share in agriculture divided by product share of agriculture; see labour force data) |
| Canada | 53 | 3 | 25 | 2 | 1,5 |
| USA | 50 | 3 | 26 | 1,4 | 2,14 |
| Japan | 52 | 7 | 34 | 2 | 3,5 |
| NL | 46 | 5 | 26 | 4 | 1,25 |
| NOR | 50 | 6 | 25 | 3 | 2 |
| SF | 52 | 8 | 31 | 5 | 1,6 |
| France | 44 | 5 | 29 | 3 | 1,67 |
| Iceland | 56 | 11 | 27 | 12 | 0,92 |
| Swed | 54 | 4 | 30 | 2 | 2 |
| Spain | 41 | 12 | 33 | 4 | 3 |
| Australia | 50 | 6 | 26 | 3 | 2 |
| Belgium | 41 | 3 | 28 | 2 | 1,5 |
| Austria | 46 | 8 | 38 | 2 | 4 |
| NZ | 48 | 10 | 25 | 9 | 1,11 |
| CH | 53 | 6 | 35 | 3 | 2 |
| UK | 50 | 2 | 29 | 2 | 1 |
| DK | 57 | 6 | 28 | 4 | 1,5 |
| GER | 50 | 4 | 38 | 1 | 4 |
| IRE | 37 | 14 | 29 | 8 | 1,75 |
| ITA | 43 | 9 | 31 | 3 | 3 |
| GRE | 42 | 23 | 27 | 18 | 1,28 |
| ISR | 39 | 4 | 29 | 3 | 1,33 |
| LUX | 43 | 4 | 27 | 1 | 4 |
| MAL | 37 | 3 | 35 | 3 | 1 |
| POR | 49 | 18 | 34 | 6 | 3 |
| HUNG | 46 | 15 | 38 | 6 | 2,5 |
| LATV | 55 | 16 | 40 | 15 | 1,07 |
| POL | 49 | 27 | 36 | 6 | 4,5 |
| RUS | 52 | 14 | 42 | 9 | 1,56 |
| BELR | 52 | 20 | 40 | 17 | 1,18 |
| BULG | 51 | 13 | 48 | 13 | 1 |
| EST | 54 | 14 | 41 | 8 | 1,75 |
| KAZ | 47 | 22 | 32 | 29 | 0,76 |
| ROM | 46 | 24 | 47 | 21 | 1,14 |
| UKR | 50 | 20 | 40 | 35 | 0,57 |
| LITH | 52 | 18 | 41 | 21 | 0,86 |
| ARM | 48 | 18 | 43 | 48 | 0,38 |
| UZB | 39 | 35 | 25 | 23 | 1,52 |
| AZER | 42 | 31 | 29 | 22 | 1,41 |
| KYR | 41 | 32 | 27 | 43 | 0,74 |
| GEO | 49 | 26 | 31 | 58 | 0,45 |
| ALB | 48 | 55 | 23 | 40 | 1,38 |
| TAJ | 36 | 41 | 23 | 33 | 1,24 |
| Hong Kong | 51 | 1 | 37 | 1 | 1 |
| Cyprus | 48 | 14 | 30 | 6 | 2,33 |
| Barbados | 51 | 6 | 23 | 6 | 1 |
| Bahamas | 50 | 7 | 15 | 5 | 1,4 |
| S-Korea | 46 | 18 | 35 | 7 | 2,57 |
| Argentina | 38 | 12 | 32 | 6 | 2 |
| Costa Rica | 38 | 26 | 27 | 15 | 1,73 |
| Uruguay | 44 | 14 | 27 | 9 | 1,56 |
| Chile | 38 | 17 | 25 | 7 | 2,43 |
| Singapore | 49 | 0 | 36 | 0 | 1 |
| Trinidad | 39 | 11 | 32 | 3 | 3,67 |
| Bahrein | 45 | 2 | 30 | 1 | 2 |
| Antigua | 47 | 75 | 8 | 4 | 18,75 |
| Panama | 39 | 26 | 16 | 10 | 2,6 |
| Venezuela | 37 | 12 | 27 | 5 | 2,4 |
| Saint Kitts | 43 | 30 | 24 | 6 | 5 |
| Fiji | 34 | 37 | 15 | 20 | 1,85 |
| Mexico | 37 | 28 | 24 | 8 | 3,5 |
| Colombia | 40 | 27 | 23 | 16 | 1,69 |
| Thailand | 57 | 64 | 14 | 10 | 6,4 |
| Malaysia | 39 | 21 | 23 | 14 | 1,5 |
| Mauritius | 41 | 17 | 43 | 10 | 1,7 |
| Brazil | 44 | 23 | 23 | 11 | 2,09 |
| Seychelles | 40 | 9 | 18 | 4 | 2,25 |
| Dominica | 40 | 26 | 21 | 26 | 1 |
| Belize | 31 | 27 | 21 | 19 | 1,42 |
| Algeria | 28 | 26 | 31 | 13 | 2 |
| Botswana | 44 | 46 | 20 | 6 | 7,67 |
| Saint Vincent | 40 | 42 | 10 | 18 | 2,33 |
| Suriname | 34 | 15 | 18 | 14 | 1,07 |
| Saint Lucia | 40 | 30 | 20 | 11 | 2,73 |
| Grenada | 40 | 20 | 19 | 14 | 1,43 |
| Tunesia | 35 | 28 | 33 | 18 | 1,56 |
| Oman | 26 | 45 | 24 | 3 | 15 |
| Turkey | 45 | 53 | 18 | 15 | 3,53 |
| Paraguay | 37 | 39 | 22 | 26 | 1,5 |
| Jamaica | 49 | 25 | 23 | 8 | 3,13 |
| Dominican R | 40 | 25 | 29 | 15 | 1,67 |
| Sri Lanka | 40 | 48 | 21 | 25 | 1,92 |
| Peru | 35 | 36 | 18 | 11 | 3,27 |
| Philippines | 40 | 46 | 15 | 22 | 2,09 |
| South Africa | 39 | 14 | 32 | 5 | 2,8 |
| Indonesia | 44 | 55 | 14 | 19 | 2,89 |
| Guyana | 40 | 21 | 21 | 41 | 0,51 |
| Egypt | 35 | 40 | 22 | 18 | 2,22 |
| Maldives | 41 | 25 | 22 | 24 | 1,04 |
| China | 59 | 72 | 15 | 19 | 3,79 |
| Swaziland | 34 | 64 | 10 | 12 | 5,33 |
| Bolivia | 40 | 40 | 13 | 16 | 2,5 |
| Guatemala | 35 | 52 | 17 | 25 | 2,08 |
| Mongolia | 47 | 32 | 23 | 21 | 1,52 |
| Honduras | 34 | 41 | 20 | 20 | 2,05 |
| El Salvador | 36 | 36 | 21 | 9 | 4 |
| Namibia | 42 | 49 | 15 | 10 | 4,9 |
| Nicaragua | 34 | 28 | 26 | 30 | 0,93 |
| Gabon | 49 | 52 | 16 | 8 | 6,5 |
| Cape Verde | 37 | 41 | 25 | 27 | 1,52 |
| Morocco | 38 | 45 | 25 | 14 | 3,21 |
| Zimbabwe | 46 | 68 | 8 | 15 | 4,53 |
| Congo | 42 | 49 | 15 | 11 | 4,45 |
| Papua NG | 49 | 79 | 7 | 26 | 3,04 |
| Cameroon | 40 | 70 | 9 | 29 | 2,41 |
| Kenya | 48 | 80 | 7 | 29 | 2,76 |
| Ghana | 47 | 59 | 13 | 48 | 1,23 |
| Lesotho | 40 | 40 | 28 | 10 | 4 |
| Equatorial G | 45 | 52 | 10 | 47 | 1,11 |
| Pakistan | 35 | 52 | 19 | 25 | 2,08 |
| India | 43 | 64 | 16 | 31 | 2,06 |
| Zambia | 42 | 75 | 8 | 34 | 2,21 |
| Nigeria | 40 | 43 | 7 | 34 | 1,26 |
| Comoros | 44 | 78 | 9 | 39 | 2 |
| Togo | 42 | 66 | 10 | 49 | 1,35 |
| Bangladesh | 49 | 65 | 16 | 30 | 2,17 |
| Tanzania | 52 | 84 | 5 | 56 | 1,5 |
| Cote d'Ivoire | 37 | 60 | 10 | 37 | 1,62 |
| C African R | 49 | 80 | 4 | 50 | 1,6 |
| Mauritania | 46 | 55 | 10 | 28 | 1,96 |
| Madagascar | 48 | 78 | 7 | 34 | 2,29 |
| Nepal | 47 | 94 | 0 | 43 | 2,19 |
| Rwanda | 52 | 92 | 3 | 41 | 2,24 |
| Benin | 46 | 64 | 8 | 36 | 1,78 |
| Malawi | 45 | 87 | 5 | 39 | 2,23 |
| Guinea-Biss. | 48 | 85 | 2 | 45 | 1,89 |
| Gambia | 50 | 82 | 8 | 28 | 2,93 |
| Chad | 49 | 83 | 4 | 44 | 1,89 |
| Burundi | 54 | 92 | 3 | 52 | 1,77 |
| Mozambique | 53 | 83 | 8 | 33 | 2,52 |
| Burkina F. | 54 | 92 | 2 | 44 | 2,09 |
| Mali | 50 | 86 | 2 | 42 | 2,05 |
| Sierra L. | 37 | 67 | 15 | 38 | 1,76 |
| Niger | 49 | 90 | 4 | 39 | 2,31 |
| Country Code | % labor force participation ratio (UNDP, 1996) | % of the labour force in agriculture (UNDP, 1996; Fischer Weltalmanach, 1996) | % of the labour force in industry (see: labour force agriculture) | agricultural share in GDP (UNDP, 1996; Fischer Weltalmanach, 1996) | structural heterogeneity (labour force share in agriculture divided by product share of agriculture; see labour force data) |
| Pearson correlation with economic growth | 0,078049962 | -0,164035815 | 0,080401522 | -0,419000724 | 0,267753459 |
| Pearson correlation with human development | 0,003201627 | -0,887533097 | 0,727801195 | -0,805915475 | 0,04077444 |
| human development index (UNDP) | main telephone lines per 100 population (UNDP, 1996) | violation of political rights (1, democracy, to 7, dictatorship) (Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, 1996, based on Freedom House) | violations of civil rights (see political rights) |
| 0,951 | 58,6 | 1 | 1 | Canada |
| 0,94 | 55,3 | 1 | 1 | USA |
| 0,938 | 45,4 | 2 | 2 | Japan |
| 0,938 | 47,7 | 1 | 1 | NL |
| 0,937 | 51,5 | 1 | 1 | NOR |
| 0,935 | 54,4 | 1 | 1 | SF |
| 0,935 | 51,1 | 1 | 2 | France |
| 0,933 | 52,7 | 1 | 1 | Iceland |
| 0,933 | 68,7 | 1 | 1 | Swed |
| 0,933 | 34 | 1 | 2 | Spain |
| 0,929 | 46,4 | 1 | 1 | Australia |
| 0,929 | 41 | 1 | 1 | Belgium |
| 0,928 | 43,2 | 1 | 1 | Austria |
| 0,927 | 43,6 | 1 | 1 | NZ |
| 0,926 | 60,3 | 1 | 1 | CH |
| 0,924 | 44,5 | 1 | 2 | UK |
| 0,924 | 57,7 | 1 | 1 | DK |
| 0,92 | 42 | 1 | 2 | GER |
| 0,919 | 30 | 1 | 2 | IRE |
| 0,914 | 40 | 1 | 3 | ITA |
| 0,909 | 41,3 | 1 | 3 | GRE |
| 0,908 | 34,9 | 1 | 3 | ISR |
| 0,895 | 51,1 | 1 | 1 | LUX |
| 0,886 | 39 | 1 | 1 | MAL |
| 0,878 | 27,3 | 1 | 1 | POR |
| 0,855 | 10,7 | 1 | 2 | HUNG |
| 0,82 | 23,9 | 3 | 3 | LATV |
| 0,819 | 9,3 | 2 | 2 | POL |
| 0,804 | 15 | 3 | 4 | RUS |
| 0,787 | 16,3 | 5 | 4 | BELR |
| 0,773 | 24,6 | 2 | 2 | BULG |
| 0,749 | 21 | 3 | 2 | EST |
| 0,74 | 11,1 | 6 | 4 | KAZ |
| 0,738 | 10,5 | 4 | 4 | ROM |
| 0,719 | 15,6 | 4 | 4 | UKR |
| 0,719 | 21,6 | 1 | 3 | LITH |
| 0,68 | 17,7 | 3 | 4 | ARM |
| 0,679 | 7,1 | 7 | 7 | UZB |
| 0,665 | 9 | 6 | 6 | AZER |
| 0,663 | 7,3 | 5 | 3 | KYR |
| 0,645 | 10,3 | 5 | 5 | GEO |
| 0,633 | 1,3 | 2 | 4 | ALB |
| 0,616 | 4,8 | 7 | 7 | TAJ |
| 0,909 | 45,9 | 5 | 2 | Hong Kong |
| 0,909 | 39,2 | 1 | 1 | Cyprus |
| 0,906 | 30,2 | 1 | 1 | Barbados |
| 0,895 | 23,8 | 1 | 2 | Bahamas |
| 0,886 | 33,3 | 2 | 2 | S-Korea |
| 0,885 | 9,8 | 2 | 3 | Argentina |
| 0,884 | 9,8 | 1 | 2 | Costa Rica |
| 0,883 | 14,5 | 2 | 2 | Uruguay |
| 0,882 | 7,4 | 2 | 2 | Chile |
| 0,881 | 40,2 | 5 | 5 | Singapore |
| 0,872 | 14,1 | 1 | 1 | Trinidad |
| 0,866 | 19,4 | 6 | 6 | Bahrein |
| 0,866 | 28,8 | 4 | 3 | Antigua |
| 0,859 | 9,3 | 3 | 3 | Panama |
| 0,859 | 8,1 | 3 | 3 | Venezuela |
| 0,858 | 11,7 | 1 | 1 | Saint Kitts |
| 0,853 | 6,2 | 4 | 3 | Fiji |
| 0,845 | 7 | 4 | 4 | Mexico |
| 0,84 | 8 | 2 | 4 | Colombia |
| 0,832 | 2,8 | 3 | 5 | Thailand |
| 0,826 | 9,9 | 4 | 5 | Malaysia |
| 0,825 | 6 | 1 | 2 | Mauritius |
| 0,796 | 6,6 | 3 | 4 | Brazil |
| 0,792 | 11,8 | 3 | 4 | Seychelles |
| 0,764 | 19,4 | 2 | 1 | Dominica |
| 0,754 | 10,4 | 1 | 1 | Belize |
| 0,746 | 3,4 | 7 | 6 | Algeria |
| 0,741 | 2,6 | 2 | 3 | Botswana |
| 0,738 | 13,9 | 1 | 1 | Saint Vincent |
| 0,737 | 9,4 | 3 | 3 | Suriname |
| 0,733 | 12,7 | 1 | 2 | Saint Lucia |
| 0,729 | 17,8 | 1 | 2 | Grenada |
| 0,727 | 4,1 | 6 | 5 | Tunesia |
| 0,716 | 7,6 | 6 | 6 | Oman |
| 0,711 | 14,3 | 4 | 4 | Turkey |
| 0,704 | 2,7 | 3 | 3 | Paraguay |
| 0,702 | 4,7 | 2 | 3 | Jamaica |
| 0,701 | 5,6 | 3 | 3 | Dominican R |
| 0,698 | 0,7 | 4 | 5 | Sri Lanka |
| 0,694 | 2,6 | 5 | 5 | Peru |
| 0,665 | 11,1 | 3 | 4 | Philippines |
| 0,649 | 8,8 | 5 | 4 | South Africa |
| 0,641 | 0,7 | 7 | 6 | Indonesia |
| 0,633 | 2 | 2 | 2 | Guyana |
| 0,611 | 3,6 | 6 | 6 | Egypt |
| 0,61 | 3,5 | 6 | 6 | Maldives |
| 0,609 | 0,7 | 7 | 7 | China |
| 0,586 | 1,9 | 6 | 5 | Swaziland |
| 0,584 | 2,5 | 2 | 3 | Bolivia |
| 0,58 | 2,1 | 4 | 5 | Guatemala |
| 0,578 | 3 | 2 | 3 | Mongolia |
| 0,576 | 1,8 | 3 | 3 | Honduras |
| 0,576 | 2,5 | 3 | 3 | El Salvador |
| 0,573 | 3,8 | 2 | 3 | Namibia |
| 0,568 | 1,3 | 4 | 5 | Nicaragua |
| 0,557 | 1,8 | 5 | 4 | Gabon |
| 0,539 | 2,3 | 1 | 2 | Cape Verde |
| 0,534 | 1,9 | 5 | 5 | Morocco |
| 0,534 | 1,2 | 5 | 5 | Zimbabwe |
| 0,517 | 0,7 | 3 | 3 | Congo |
| 0,504 | 0,9 | 2 | 4 | Papua NG |
| 0,481 | 0,3 | 6 | 5 | Cameroon |
| 0,473 | 0,8 | 5 | 6 | Kenya |
| 0,467 | 0,3 | 5 | 4 | Ghana |
| 0,464 | 0,6 | 3 | 4 | Lesotho |
| 0,461 | 0,4 | 7 | 7 | Equatorial G |
| 0,442 | 0,9 | 3 | 5 | Pakistan |
| 0,436 | 0,7 | 4 | 4 | India |
| 0,411 | 0,8 | 3 | 4 | Zambia |
| 0,4 | 0,2 | 7 | 5 | Nigeria |
| 0,399 | 0,7 | 4 | 4 | Comoros |
| 0,385 | 0,3 | 7 | 5 | Togo |
| 0,365 | 0,2 | 2 | 4 | Bangladesh |
| 0,364 | 0,3 | 6 | 5 | Tanzania |
| 0,357 | 0,6 | 6 | 5 | Cote d'Ivoire |
| 0,355 | 0,2 | 3 | 4 | C African R |
| 0,353 | 0,4 | 7 | 6 | Mauritania |
| 0,349 | 0,3 | 2 | 4 | Madagascar |
| 0,332 | 0,3 | 3 | 4 | Nepal |
| 0,332 | 0,2 | 6 | 5 | Rwanda |
| 0,327 | 0,3 | 2 | 3 | Benin |
| 0,321 | 0,3 | 6 | 5 | Malawi |
| 0,297 | 0,6 | 6 | 5 | Guinea-Biss. |
| 0,292 | 1,6 | 2 | 2 | Gambia |
| 0,291 | 0,1 | 6 | 5 | Chad |
| 0,282 | 0,2 | 7 | 7 | Burundi |
| 0,261 | 0,4 | 6 | 5 | Mozambique |
| 0,225 | 0,2 | 5 | 4 | Burkina F. |
| 0,223 | 0,1 | 2 | 3 | Mali |
| 0,219 | 0,4 | 7 | 6 | Sierra L. |
| 0,204 | 0,1 | 3 | 4 | Niger |
| human development index (UNDP) | main telephone lines per 100 population (UNDP, 1996) | violation of political rights (1, democracy, to 7, dictatorship) (Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, 1996, based on Freedom House) | violations of civil rights (see political rights) | Country Code |
| 0,346752081 | 0,288899818 | -0,212719009 | -0,241147216 | Pearson correlation with economic growth |
| 0,737399726 | -0,553989633 | -0,593538789 | Pearson correlation with human development |
| country code | total fertility rate (UNDP, 1996) | military expenditures per GDP (UNDP, 1996) | EU membership years (Fischer Weltalmanach, 1995, 1996 |
| Canada | 1,9 | 1,7 | 0 |
| USA | 2,1 | 4,3 | 0 |
| Japan | 1,5 | 1 | 0 |
| NL | 1,6 | 2,1 | 39 |
| NOR | 1,9 | 3,1 | 0 |
| SF | 1,9 | 2 | 2 |
| France | 1,7 | 3,3 | 39 |
| Iceland | 2,2 | 0 | 0 |
| Swed | 2,1 | 2,5 | 2 |
| Spain | 1,2 | 1,6 | 11 |
| Australia | 1,9 | 2,3 | 0 |
| Belgium | 1,6 | 1,7 | 39 |
| Austria | 1,5 | 0,9 | 2 |
| NZ | 2,2 | 1,1 | 0 |
| CH | 1,6 | 1,6 | 0 |
| UK | 1,8 | 3,4 | 24 |
| DK | 1,7 | 1,9 | 24 |
| GER | 1,3 | 2 | 39 |
| IRE | 2,1 | 1,2 | 24 |
| ITA | 1,3 | 2,1 | 39 |
| GRE | 1,4 | 5,7 | 16 |
| ISR | 2,9 | 9,5 | 0 |
| LUX | 1,7 | 1,2 | 39 |
| MAL | 2,1 | 1 | 0 |
| POR | 1,6 | 2,6 | 11 |
| HUNG | 1,7 | 1,6 | 0 |
| LATV | 1,6 | 3,8 | 0 |
| POL | 1,9 | 2,5 | 0 |
| RUS | 1,5 | 9,6 | 0 |
| BELR | 1,7 | 2,2 | 0 |
| BULG | 1,5 | 2,5 | 0 |
| EST | 1,6 | 3,8 | 0 |
| KAZ | 2,5 | 3,5 | 0 |
| ROM | 1,5 | 2,9 | 0 |
| UKR | 1,6 | 2,1 | 0 |
| LITH | 1,8 | 3,9 | 0 |
| ARM | 2,6 | 3,1 | 0 |
| UZB | 3,9 | 2,4 | 0 |
| AZER | 2,5 | 8,7 | 0 |
| KYR | 3,7 | 1,4 | 0 |
| GEO | 2,1 | 2,4 | 0 |
| ALB | 2,9 | 2,7 | 0 |
| TAJ | 4,9 | 4 | 0 |
| Hong Kong | 1,2 | 2,8 | 0 |
| Cyprus | 2,5 | 5,4 | 0 |
| Barbados | 1,8 | 0,8 | 0 |
| Bahamas | 2 | 0,5 | 0 |
| S-Korea | 1,7 | 3,6 | 0 |
| Argentina | 2,8 | 1,7 | 0 |
| Costa Rica | 3,1 | 0,5 | 0 |
| Uruguay | 2,3 | 2,5 | 0 |
| Chile | 2,5 | 3,5 | 0 |
| Singapore | 1,7 | 4,8 | 0 |
| Trinidad | 2,4 | 1,4 | 0 |
| Bahrein | 3,8 | 5,5 | 0 |
| Antigua | 2,6 | 0,8 | 0 |
| Panama | 2,9 | 1,2 | 0 |
| Venezuela | 3,3 | 1,6 | 0 |
| Saint Kitts | 2,6 | 2,8 | 0 |
| Fiji | 3 | 1,5 | 0 |
| Mexico | 3,2 | 0,7 | 0 |
| Colombia | 2,7 | 2,3 | 0 |
| Thailand | 2,1 | 2,6 | 0 |
| Malaysia | 3,6 | 3,9 | 0 |
| Mauritius | 2,4 | 0,4 | 0 |
| Brazil | 2,9 | 1,6 | 0 |
| Seychelles | 3,6 | 2,9 | 0 |
| Dominica | 3,6 | 3,8 | 0 |
| Belize | 4,2 | 1,9 | 0 |
| Algeria | 3,9 | 2,7 | 0 |
| Botswana | 4,9 | 4,6 | 0 |
| Saint Vincent | 3,6 | 3,8 | 0 |
| Suriname | 2,7 | 2,8 | 0 |
| Saint Lucia | 3,6 | 3,8 | 0 |
| Grenada | 3,6 | 3,8 | 0 |
| Tunesia | 3,2 | 1,4 | 0 |
| Oman | 7,2 | 15,9 | 0 |
| Turkey | 3,4 | 3,2 | 0 |
| Paraguay | 4,3 | 1,4 | 0 |
| Jamaica | 2,4 | 0,9 | 0 |
| Dominican R | 3,1 | 1,1 | 0 |
| Sri Lanka | 2,5 | 4,7 | 0 |
| Peru | 3,4 | 1,8 | 0 |
| Philippines | 3,9 | 1,4 | 0 |
| South Africa | 4,1 | 3,3 | 0 |
| Indonesia | 2,9 | 1,4 | 0 |
| Guyana | 2,6 | 1,4 | 0 |
| Egypt | 3,9 | 5,9 | 0 |
| Maldives | 6,8 | 3,8 | 0 |
| China | 2 | 5,6 | 0 |
| Swaziland | 4,9 | 3,8 | 0 |
| Bolivia | 4,8 | 1,4 | 0 |
| Guatemala | 5,4 | 1,1 | 0 |
| Mongolia | 3,6 | 2,8 | 0 |
| Honduras | 4,9 | 1,3 | 0 |
| El Salvador | 4 | 1,9 | 0 |
| Namibia | 5,3 | 2,2 | 0 |
| Nicaragua | 5 | 2 | 0 |
| Gabon | 5,3 | 2,3 | 0 |
| Cape Verde | 4,3 | 0,9 | 0 |
| Morocco | 3,8 | 4,3 | 0 |
| Zimbabwe | 5 | 3,5 | 0 |
| Congo | 6,3 | 1,7 | 0 |
| Papua NG | 5,1 | 1,1 | 0 |
| Cameroon | 5,7 | 1,4 | 0 |
| Kenya | 6,3 | 2,2 | 0 |
| Ghana | 6 | 0,9 | 0 |
| Lesotho | 5,2 | 3,2 | 0 |
| Equatorial G | 5,9 | 1,4 | 0 |
| Pakistan | 6,2 | 6,9 | 0 |
| India | 3,8 | 2,8 | 0 |
| Zambia | 6 | 1 | 0 |
| Nigeria | 6,5 | 3,1 | 0 |
| Comoros | 7,1 | 3,5 | 0 |
| Togo | 6,6 | 2,7 | 0 |
| Bangladesh | 4,4 | 1,8 | 0 |
| Tanzania | 5,9 | 3,5 | 0 |
| Cote d'Ivoire | 7,4 | 0,8 | 0 |
| C African R | 5,7 | 2 | 0 |
| Mauritania | 5,4 | 2,7 | 0 |
| Madagascar | 6,1 | 0,8 | 0 |
| Nepal | 5,4 | 1,1 | 0 |
| Rwanda | 6,6 | 7,7 | 0 |
| Benin | 7,1 | 1,5 | 0 |
| Malawi | 7,2 | 1,1 | 0 |
| Guinea-Biss. | 5,8 | 3,3 | 0 |
| Gambia | 5,6 | 3,7 | 0 |
| Chad | 5,9 | 2,6 | 0 |
| Burundi | 6,8 | 3 | 0 |
| Mozambique | 6,5 | 7,1 | 0 |
| Burkina F. | 6,5 | 1,6 | 0 |
| Mali | 7,1 | 3 | 0 |
| Sierra L. | 6,5 | 4,4 | 0 |
| Niger | 7,4 | 0,9 | 0 |
| country code | total fertility rate (UNDP, 1996) | military expenditures per GDP (UNDP, 1996) | EU membership years (Fischer Weltalmanach, 1995, 1996 |
| Pearson correlation with economic growth | -0,265786013 | 0,116464865 | 0,141044203 |
| Pearson correlation with human development | -0,874976956 | -0,040516766 | 0,330662276 |
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