Re: the True and the Good and the Rational

The answer to your second question is, yes. For example, there arise
(paradoxical) situations where 1) rationality in terms of individual
interest -- which may be consistent with the preservation of the species
-- conflicts with rationality of collective interest required for the
preservation of the species (e.g., consider a water ban during a drought);
and 2) when a seemingly irrational act closing off options in the short
term to preserve options in the long term (e.g., the famous Ulysses tying
himself to the bow of the ship to keep from bring seduced by the Sirens).
But take any other theory of rationality -- 'maximizing utility,'
'satisficing,' 'have a conscious reason for action,' etc. -- the problem
of morality cannot be resolved, in additional to other logical and
empirical problems (e.g., the 'maximizing utility' theory cannot in fact
be implemented empirically in practice -- some actually attempted during
the Vietnam War, where 'body count' mathematical models influenced
decision making -- and attempted by the old Soviet Union's Politburo,
believing that decision X made by 12 men would maximize utility for the
country.)

Hope this provides greater insight. We are talking about not only the
problem of theoretical consistency but also doability: why have moral or
rational principles of action, if they can't be implemented?

//CJR

On Mon, 5 Jul 1999, Richard N Hutchinson wrote:

> 
> Your conclusion sounds entirely reasonable.
> 
> But doesn't it imply that various definitions of rationality could be
> correct as long as they don't contradict the bedrock a priori assumption?
> (The assumption of preservation of the human species, that is.)
> 
> In other words, "preservation of the species" is so broad, can't it
> contain a myriad of legitimate sub-categories of rationality?
> 
> RH
> 
>