Arno Tausch: scholary and policy documents on the kosovo-crisis on the w

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again, with the usual disclaimer - these documents are all available on =
the Internet, and are indeed absolutely vital reading stuff for anyone =
who wants to reach a scholarly well founded opinion on the present =
events

Arno Tausch (as a scholar of international relations, implying in no way =
my government)

UNDP DOCUMENT

http://www.undp.org/rbec/pubs/nhdc97/summary/yugoslavia.htm





This is the first National Human Development Report for Yugoslavia. It =
describes the inherited structures and policies from the former =
Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, which it argues are =
proclaimed, but not factually compatible with the goals of human =
development, but whose mechanisms and financing requirements proved to =
make them unsustainable.

It discusses the major damage caused to the economy by the period of =
civil war, and the vast cost in terms of the fall in GDP, unemployment, =
loss of incomes, housing, and general trauma for the population. With =
the return of peace, good possibilities exist to build on the positive =
growth rates of the last two years.

3. Overall Trends

The concept of human development is not a new one in Yugoslavia, since =
in theory it was embodied in the socialist ideals of the promotion of =
the welfare of the individual, primarily that of the working class, =
particularly through the principle and the system of "self-management". =
In practice, however, the elements of political freedom and human rights =
were missing, although in Yugoslavia the standard of living and =
communications with the outside world were on a much more advanced level =
than in other countries with "real socialism."

The socialist reality also lacked many other elements inherent to the =
human development concept, such as the rejection of the market economy, =
and the inadequate concern given towards future generations, for =
instance due to excessively high expenditure of the social sector, and =
high indebtedness etc.

4. Governance Trends

After the secession and proclamation of independence of four of the six =
republics of the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia in =
1991 and 1992 (Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina), =
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, made up of the republics of Serbia =
and Montenegro, was proclaimed in April 1992.

The formation of new states in the region of the former Yugoslavia was =
followed by outbreaks of armed conflicts as the Serbs in Croatia and =
Bosnia and Herzegovina believed that they had a right to their own =
choice and that they could continue to live in common state with Serbia =
and Montenegro. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia supported the right =
of Serbs to designate in which country they wished to live, and this led =
to the imposition of sanctions by the UN Security Council. Member states =
of the United Nations were forbidden every economic and trade activity =
with the FR of Yugoslavia, including scientific, technological, =
education, sports and cultural cooperation. The period from when the =
country was established until the end of 1995 was marked by =
international isolationism.

The Dayton Agreement of November 1995 halted the war in the region of =
the former Yugoslavia, and in December, sanctions were suspended, which =
brought about the gradual opening of the economy towards foreign =
markets, and led to an improvement in foreign trade relations. In the =
first half of 1996, the majority of the European countries had =
recognized the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The first multi-party elections were held in December 1992, following by =
parliamentary elections in December 1993. Three new Constitutions were =
adopted for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and for the new =
constitutive Republics of Serbia and Montenegro. These define human =
rights and other principles of action for the process of governance. =
While participation in decision-making was always enshrined in the =
concept of "self-management," the economic viability of this system has =
proven to be unsustainable, and reform is under way.

5. Economic Trends

As a result of the international blockade, the GDP plummeted in the =
space of two years (1991 - 1993) to one third or one half of the GDP =
level of 1990. In 1993, the share of the hidden economy had reached 54%, =
though later fell to 40% in 1995. The hyperinflation in 1992 and 1993 =
dealt a severe blow to the already feeble economy, and by January 1994, =
the country had a devastated monetary and fiscal system. Per capita =
incomes had fallen to $1,000 (to the same levels in 1969), unemployment =
reached 800,000, and several hundred thousand employees were placed on =
paid leave of absence.

Capacity utilization of the economy fell from an already low 60% to 25% =
- 20%. The country was completely isolated; a large proportion of the =
population was impoverished; the social services sector was threatened; =
and legal and economic insecurity reigned. All this forced Yugoslavia =
from the group of medium developed countries into the category of =
underdeveloped nations. All in all, it is estimated that international =
sanctions caused an astonishing loss to the GDP of about $58 billion.

Some of the consequences of the above has been the intensification of =
the brain drain of young, highly educated cadres and the slowdown of the =
privatization process. In 1995, the volume and share of the GDP occupied =
by the private sector was only 50%; in addition, the private sector =
employed 0.5 million people compared with 2.1 million in the state =
sector.

As a result of the implementation of the Programme of Monetary =
Reconstruction and National Economic Recovery in 1994, the monetary and =
fiscal system recovered and external budget support could be resumed. A =
balance was achieved between revenues and expenditure in public =
consumption. For the first time after the above dramatic decline, growth =
rates became positive in 1994 and 1995, although development is still =
sluggish in the aftermath of international sanctions.

The success in the implementation of the Programme is evident in the =
increase of the Yugoslav GDP by 6.6% in 1994 and 6% in 1995; in =
industrial production by 1.7% and 4%; in agricultural production by 5.9% =
and 2.7%; and in retail trade by 65% and 10% respectively. But despite =
the cumulative increase of approximately 13% during the 1994 - 95 =
period, the Yugoslav GDP is still only 50% of the level of the GDP in =
1986.

But major changes will be required to adapt out-dated economic =
structures to the requirements of a market economy. Particularly =
emphasis will be needed to further stimulate the private sector and =
small and medium scale enterprises, as well as private investment and =
domestic savings.

6. Poverty Trends

With the exception of 1994, the population's real income has exhibited a =
continuous downward trend since 1990. In 1994, the real household income =
was on average 40% lower than in 1990, or a fall from $226 in 1990 to =
$103 in 1994.

An analysis of poverty and inequality prepared in 1994 indicates that =
23.5% of the population (approximately 2.3 million people) subsisted at =
the poverty level, and had a monthly purchasing power of under $120. The =
poverty level in 1994 was 3.1 times greater than that in 1990., with an =
increase from 8% to 30% for the urban population compared with from 7.1% =
to 11% for the rural population. Poverty is particularly prevalent among =
urban families with children.

The analysis of poverty by socioeconomic categories indicates that more =
than half of the poor population today are families whom in the normal, =
"pre-crisis" period were not poor. In other words, the economic crisis =
drove these families into poverty. They are still not destitute in the =
true sense of the word since they live in relatively decent conditions; =
their households are equipped with the necessary appliances, and they =
still possess old reserves of clothing and shoes. They are mainly =
households with children, with both parents employed in enterprises =
whose wages are low (textile industry, shoe manufacturing industries, =
construction etc.) Many members of these families, impoverished due to =
extraordinary circumstances, are active in the informal sector. Savings, =
or more precisely the depletion of savings, play a significant role in =
preventing poor families from sinking into greater poverty.

Another category of the poor has been the approximately 700,000 Serb =
refugees from the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia who =
fled to Serbia and Montenegro during the conflict, of which 200,000 fled =
to Belgrade, or 10% of the capital's population.

7. Social Trends

The drastic economic failure experienced by the country led to a sharp =
increase in social problems. There was a large increase in the share of =
households earning below-average incomes. Unemployment rose to 775,000 =
in 1995, or an unemployment rate of 24.6%. This, however, hides a large =
amount of hidden unemployment and paid leave.

Social institutions have occupied an important role in providing a =
social safety net to preserve the standard of living, particularly of =
the most vulnerable groups. But the deterioration of these institutions =
has resulted in a significant drop in the quality of social services.

Prior to the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, the country enjoyed =
relatively well developed systems for health care and health insurance, =
social services and education. But the impoverishment of the country =
during the last few years has caused a decrease in the resources =
available for health, but this has been partially compensated for by a =
significant increase in the role of the private sector in health care.

Another consequence of the disruption of the last few years and the =
economic crisis has been the dynamic increase in the number of all three =
groups of pensioners. Old age pensioners increased from 55,400 in 1960 =
to 461,500 in 1994, those eligible for disability pensions increased =
from 79,600 to 445,500 while "family pensioners" increased from 61,200 =
to 288,200. This has put great strains on state resources, and a major =
process of reform has been approved in principle.

In the education sector, in the 1970s Yugoslavia was, according to the =
relative share of educational expenditure in the GDP, above the level of =
certain West European countries (e.g. FR Germany , France) and most East =
European countries, and on the same level as Japan, as well as =
proportionally higher than in countries of the same level of economic =
development. But the stagnation and decrease in economic activity during =
the 1980s forced Yugoslavia to significantly decrease the level of =
expenditure for education. Thus the share in the GDP also decreased from =
5.4% in 1975 to 3.8% in 1986, before returning to 5% in 1994.

The social security system for providing allowances for unemployment, =
family benefits, has also been under pressure. The value of payments to =
beneficiaries has been eroded, and the state has had difficulty in =
fulfilling its obligations.

8. Women and Gender Trends

>From a formal and legal perspective the civil rights of women in =
Yugoslavia are regulated in a satisfactory manner, and the position of =
women is completely equal to that of men in all areas. However, in many =
areas, there is a gap between the standard and the de facto state of =
affairs. The present economic and social crisis has undoubtedly =
increased this gap.=20

Women in Yugoslavia often carry most of the burden and suffer the =
drastic consequences of the socio- economic crisis. Due to the reduction =
in real income in families, women are forced to spend much of their time =
as home makers. They have also had to seek additional employment and =
engage in trading activities. As a result educational activities have by =
sheer necessity been pushed into the background.

Women have a lower rate of literacy than men (11% illiterate compared to =
2.8% of men), but this is mainly among older women. Women constituted =
47.5% of the working population in 1991, although this had since =
declined to around 40%. In different industries in the socially-owned =
sector, in 1994 the number of women was higher than the corresponding =
number of men; for instance, in trade (52%); hotels, catering and =
tourism (60%); financial organizations (57%); education and culture =
(56); and health and social services (75%). On the other hand, the =
presence of women in management of enterprises and banks is still low =
(16%), as it is in political bodies, the diplomatic services, and =
Ministerial positions. The reasons for this status of women in the =
political arena as well as in key posts in enterprise lie, among others, =
in the ever present traditional prejudice concerning the role and the =
position of women in the family, home and business. The number of =
unemployed women in relation to men is still unfavourable. In 1994, this =
amounted to 56%.

A number of non-governmental organizations, whose main activists are =
women, have become active in the late 1980's and 1990s, to advance the =
position and human rights of women, humanitarian aid, and cooperation =
with similar organizations in other Balkan counties. They have been =
particularly involved in addressing the problems of the victims of =
physical and mental abuse during the period of conflict.

9. Environmental Trends

The state of the environment in Yugoslavia was especially affected in =
the period between 1992 and the present by the international embargo and =
the imposed UN sanctions. Operating under conditions of a closed economy =
coupled with the embargoed procurement of energy, the economy and the =
population of Yugoslavia, were veered towards the utilization for their =
own energy sources, which contained pollutants that negatively affected =
the quality of the environment. In order to satisfy energy needs, wood =
is being used more and more, which leads to an increase in the degree of =
deforestation and to instability in the biological balance of forest =
areas. The increased erosion causes a deluge of all larger types of =
hydro-accumulation and a long-term flange in the hydrological water =
regime.

Since the economic facilities and equipment are obsolete and the =
possibilities for general repair are reduced environment due to the =
embargo on imports of spare parts, there has been an increase in the =
release of pollutants into the environment. There is also an increased =
risk of breakdowns and industrial accidents. Another contribution to =
environmental pollution is the utilization of low grade oil and =
gasoline, as well as obsolete vehicles for transportation. Because of =
the general decrease in the standard of living, products that do not =
meet quality standards, are still being used.

Paradoxically, a special problem in environmental protection has been =
caused by the suspension of international cooperation, and technical and =
financial assistance for resolving environmental protection. This is =
usually quite expensive in countries in transition where it cannot be =
realized without the assistance of international financial =
organizations.

Facilities for waste water treatment are not adequately developed, =
neither in communities, nor in the manufacturing or mining industry, and =
due to high costs, even the existing facilities are seldom used.

The emission of pollutants into the atmosphere in Yugoslavia is =
substantial, due to an irrational energy utilization rate, an =
unqualified management system and the low technical efficiency of =
equipment. The main sources of air pollution are temporal power plants, =
central heating power plants and stations, individual home heating =
systems, motor vehicles, industrial processes and facilities. Following =
the decrease in emissions during 1991 and 1992, there was a new increase =
during the following years.

The most common sources of land damage and degradation in Yugoslavia are =
the energy sector, manufacturing industry, agriculture and =
transportation.

Environmental protection in Yugoslavia is being given increased =
attention by the public in general, and by state institutions at all =
levels. In June 1993, the Federal government established the Integrated =
Policy for the Protection and Enhancement of the Environment, which =
defined the objectives, principles, financial instruments and other =
relevant elements of the environment protection policy as well as the =
priority programmes that should be implemented. But to date, despite the =
ambitiously proclaimed programmes, very little has been achieved in =
terms of introducing the Resolution into practice. The main problems =
lies in the Yugoslav economy's chronic lack of financial resources, for =
which future international assistance will be necessary.

10. Housing and Human Settlements

Over the past 25 years, significant progress has been made in improving =
the quality and size of apartments and enabling citizens to live in a =
satisfactory environment with adequate links to available public =
infrastructure (water, electricity, central heating, sewage, etc.). But =
the progress has been somewhat curtailed due to the economic crisis.

Formerly most people lived in public housing, but now, housing =
construction is almost completely financed by private capital. =
Furthermore, 90% of all socially-owned housing has now been privatized.

A serious deterioration has taken place in the housing sector in recent =
years due to the large inflow of mainly Serbian refugees from Croatia =
and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Currently apartments are occupied with a =
greater number of tenants, especially in the cities, and particularly in =
Belgrade.

Under the current circumstances, resolving the housing needs is =
especially difficult. Company apartment apportionment has almost =
completely stopped. There are no credit or other purchase incentives; =
apartment rents are high; and few people are in a position to purchase =
or rent an apartment by means of their personal income. As a result, the =
existing housing situation has serious consequences on the lives of the =
younger generation, since they are forced to delay marriage and =
establish their own families. Reforms to introduce new banking and =
credit mechanisms and to introduce fiscal and other exemptions are in =
the focus of attention.



UNDP Report Albania 1996



The 1996 Human Development Report for Albania is more than a simple =
update of the first Human Development Report published in 1995. It is a =
continuation. Some topics treated at length in the 1995 report, such as =
primary education, demographics, and health, had not undergone such =
change as to warrant special mention. Other topics, such as civil =
society, the family, and higher education are treated from another point =
of view.=20

Although sustainable human development is based on the concept that =
economic growth is not an end but a means to that development, economic =
factors occupy an important place in this report. As the economy =
continued to grow, the prosperity seemed to be widely distributed, =
changing patterns of behavior, family relationships, consumption, and =
the general ability of individuals to contribute to their own =
well-being. The state also facilitated people-centered development in =
important areas such as infrastructure and legislation in support of =
private initiative.=20

The message of the 1996 report is one of mounting confidence in the face =
of many challenges. Albanians are investing in their future, a future =
based on democratic principles, oriented towards Europe, with widely =
shared prosperity. This report is offered as a contribution to the newly =
elected parliament, that the members thereof may consider legislation in =
the light of sustainable human development, by the people, for the =
people, and of the people.=20

Chapter 1: Working for a Better Standard of Living - Albanians continue =
to be optimistic about their individual economic conditions. More people =
continued to find better paying jobs in the private sector, and state =
salaries increased as did income for farmers. Those with income not only =
enjoyed increased consumption, but also managed to save, adding to their =
sense of security and well-being. Despite general improvements, some 20% =
of the population is still living in difficult economic circumstances =
and receiving modest state assistance.=20

The state continued to play an important supporting role as Albanians =
worked for their own development. In addition to health, education and =
welfare services, sound monetary and fiscal policy kept prices and the =
exchange rate relatively stable. State banks extended more and more =
credit and state and foreign assistance programs promoted the increase =
in small and medium enterprises.=20

Chapter 2: Coping with an Open Economy: Trade and Investment - The =
liberalization of trade has led to an explosion in imports, while =
competition with the outside world has led to a marked decline in =
exports of everything except labor. The private trade sector, which in =
1995 accounted for 75% of international trade, has created unheard of =
opportunities for contact with the rest of the world, especially Europe, =
and particularly Italy.=20

With a few exceptions, the bulk of private sector investment, accounting =
for one third of 1995 investment, went into factories, restaurants and =
housing. In an effort to attract greater private investment, public =
sector investment in 1995 concentrated on infrastructure. Utilizing ever =
increasing amounts of foreign soft loan financing, the state has =
embarked on an ambitious program with 60% of the funds going to improve =
energy supply, transport, communications and water supply.=20

Chapter 3: Integrating Family Well-Being, Social Habitat and Sustainable =
Human Development - Changing economic conditions of families in Albania =
is bringing about profound changes in social status which, in turn, is =
putting pressure on traditional family values. In order to ensure the =
highest level of family well-being, Albanians are engaging in a wide =
variety of work no matter what their level of education or professional =
training.=20

Families are becoming smaller and returning to two generations, parents =
and children. The weakening influence of grandparents has lead to a =
weakening of traditional patriarchal values, leaving room for family =
members to determine their own roles and relationships. Individualism is =
on the rise. Women, especially in urban areas, are socially freer but, =
when unemployed, economically more dependent than before.=20

Although women have organized into non-governmental organizations, the =
number of women in positions of leadership and decision-making is still =
low.=20

Albanian families enjoy a varied level of well-being. Amidst a relative =
abundance of consumer goods, the lack of adequate health and child care =
services as well as basic infrastructure including electricity, heating, =
water, telephones, and roads make life difficult.=20

Chapter 4: Between Information and Politics - Albanians are determined =
to continue on their path towards democracy, maintaining their =
orientation towards the West. The political transformation is =
accompanied by the cultivation of new social values such as respect for =
the rights of the individual, for minorities, tolerance and open social =
dialogue.=20

Albania is gradually entering the global system of information. =
Government policy regarding information has emphasized improvement in =
data processing and the introduction of information in schools. The =
dissemination of information through mass media, television, radio, =
newspapers constitutes an important measure of progress in the =
development of democracy in Albania.=20

Despite the dominant role played by political parties, especially during =
the election year of 1996, surveys indicate that people are more and =
more oriented towards non-governmental organizations. These NGOs offer a =
vehicle not only for special interests, but also as a forum of social =
dialogue.=20

Although Albanian society appears polarized and fragmented as reflected =
in the fierce political struggle and differentiation of splinter groups, =
it has been politically stable since 1992. With the social environment =
favoring both political and economic development, 79% of the population =
think the country is developing in the right way, according to the 1995 =
Eurobarometer.=20

Except for the lack of a new constitution, Albania is rapidly completing =
legislation in accordance with European standards.=20

Chapter 5: Human Infrastructure - Investing in People - Economic factors =
and market realities have greatly effected the school system, especially =
that of vocational secondary and higher education. The number of =
students continuing secondary education after the obligatory eight years =
declined from nearly 80% in 1989 to 35% in 1993 where it has remained. =
Thousands upon thousands of youth have abandoned secondary schools as =
vocational training in certain sectors such as mining and agriculture no =
longer holds the promise of employment and the private, informal sector =
beckons. Significant reform of vocational schools often assisted by =
foreign donors aims to offer these students practical, job-oriented =
skills.=20

Higher education has also adapted as more Albanian youth seek university =
degrees but in markedly different fields than those traditionally =
offered. University trained specialists have profited tremendously from =
donor sponsored exchanges and networking. The 1996 state budget foresees =
a slight increase in resources devoted to education, increasing from =
9.4% in 1995 to 10%.=20

Chapter 6: Habitat and the Quality of Everyday Life - The 1995 Human =
Development Report treated many aspects of the urban habitat as well as =
concerns about the natural environment. The 1996 report focuses on air =
quality concerns due especially to the increasing number of vehicles as =
well as the need to repair and/or maintain public urban areas including =
side roads, sidewalks, and green areas. Air quality in the work place is =
still a concern as respiratory illnesses top the list of occupational =
diseases and legislation in this area lags behind.=20

The egalitarian distribution of agricultural land in 1991 has been =
strengthened by later legislation giving entitlement and the right to =
buy and sell agricultural land. More and more farmers are producing for =
the domestic market with livestock proving especially lucrative, not =
only in the lowlands, but also in the mountainous areas.=20

Human security is central to human development. After two or three years =
of insecurity, order has been restored and men can walk freely even late =
at night, although younger women and girls may face problems. Organized =
crime is minimal as has been political crimes such as vote rigging. One =
fifth of the murders have been revenge killings associated with the =
tradition of blood feuds. Although housing is still in short supply, =
50,000 apartments have been completed. Local government is called upon =
and enabled to play an increasingly important role in resolving problems =
of urban habitat.=20



UNDP Report TURKEY 1996





The 1996 Human Development Report for Turkey explores key problems of =
national and local development in Turkey with special focus on urban =
management and on the eradication of poverty. It provides an overall =
assessment of the country's human development performance and offers an =
analysis of Turkey's comparative standing vis-=E0-vis other countries, =
and within the country through disaggregated analyses of data for =
regions, provinces and for gender.

In-depth analyses and critique of the key components of the human =
development index are also provided by the report with particular =
emphasis placed on education and health services delivery issues and on =
gender disparities. These analyses are followed by the two main themes =
of Habitat II and poverty alleviation.=20

In the section dealing with the themes of Habitat II, human settlements =
and local governance have been selected as the two principal issues for =
review in Turkey with emphasis on participatory processes, collective =
decision-making and civic responsibility in all aspects of urban and =
rural living and development.

A profile of poverty in Turkey is provided and the central elements of =
an anti-poverty strategy are proposed. The approach outlined would help =
enable the pursuit of people-oriented economic growth, increasing =
employment opportunities and targeting public spending on development =
programmes and social services. This is in line with Turkey's keen =
interest in implementing the Declaration of the World Summit on Social =
Development and the Programme of Action directed at the eradication of =
poverty at the national level.

3. Overall Trends

Although figures are not strictly comparable due to changes in the =
components and calculation techniques, a continuous rise is noted in the =
Report of the HDI for Turkey from 1960 (0.333) to 1995 (0.810), with a =
slight decline from 1992 (0.739) to 1993 (0.711), based on HDI values =
given in successive global Human Development Reports.

Thus the present HDI score places Turkey among high human development =
countries. Moreover, according to the 1994 Human Development Report, =
Turkey was one of the top ten performers in human development in the =
period 1960 - 92.

The present report concentrates on examining human development trends =
with respect to four main areas:

Education=20

Health=20

Human Settlements=20

Poverty=20

Moreover, the analysis is broken down in terms of:

Region=20

Province=20

Gender=20

Of Turkey's five geographic regions, the Aegean-Marmara region in the =
west of the country has the highest HDI, followed by Central Anatolia =
and the Mediterranean. Those with the lowest HDI, which nevertheless are =
above the "low human development" threshold, are in the East and =
South-East of the country.

Of the population of 31.5 million people, 51% are living in provinces =
rated as "high human development", while 47.1% live in medium human =
development provinces, with the remainder (about 2% or three out of 79 =
provinces) living in provinces with low human development.

While the gap between the highest and the lowest provinces decreased in =
1996, the difference in absolute numbers is about equal to that between =
the HDI values of Canada (the highest country) on the one hand and =
countries such as Morocco, Maldives, and Vietnam, on the other.

4. Governance Trends

The main governance issues raised in the report relate to municipal and =
local administration, discussed in part 10 below.

5. Economic Trends

The Turkish economy has grown at a rate of 5.5% between 1980 and 1993, =
with per capita GDP growth growing 3.6% between 1960 and 1993. Turkey =
now has a per capita national income of $5881 (in 1993 PPP dollars), =
which places it in an income category comparable to Costa Rica, Panama, =
Colombia, Brazil, Iran, Tunisia, Botswana and Fiji.

There is no specific chapter devoted to examining economic trends in =
Turkey. It is noted however that although on average, Turkey has =
registered significant levels of growth in GNP per capita over the last =
several decades, the rates do not approach the levels reached by =
countries of Southeast Asia. Furthermore, and more importantly, changes =
in per capita GNP in the last few years have been rather unstable with =
impressive gains followed by zero or negative growth.

It is also noted that this pattern can seriously jeopardize Turkey's =
gains in human development. Achieving a reasonable and stable growth =
rate while controlling inflation must be a top priority item on the =
national agenda. It must also be kept in mind that political stability =
is a prerequisite for economic stability. Turkey should thus concentrate =
its efforts on achieving stability and predictability in all spheres - =
economic, political and social.

6. Poverty Trends

Poverty is defined as the inability of a person or a household to =
satisfy their basic economic needs, defined in terms of "income poverty" =
based on the value of goods consumed as measured by expenditures, or in =
terms of human development indicators or social indicators, including =
the human development index (HDI).

In Turkey, there is no official poverty line, although the State =
Planning Organization (SPO) has estimated that a per capita income of =
$27.30 per month (at 1987 prices in the most recent processed survey of =
income distribution and expenditures), is needed to escape poverty. This =
represents the cost of purchasing 75% of 3500 calories of food per day, =
which are required to achieve an adequate nutritional level. Applying =
the SPO poverty line to 1987 data, 14.2% of the Turkish population is =
classified as poor. Furthermore, the poverty rate among rural households =
is 2.4 times higher than among urban households, with the highest =
poverty rates in the east and south-east Anatolia, followed by the =
Mediterranean. The poverty rate would surely be higher for women than =
men. More recent data on poverty will be available when the results of =
the 1994 household income and consumption survey are available.

Available data does however show that at least up to 1987, =
income-poverty has fallen, and that all human development indicators =
have increased markedly since 1960. It also confirms the hypothesis that =
income-poverty falls and human development indicators improve as =
economic growth takes place, and that the more rapid the economic =
growth, the sharper the rate of decrease in poverty.=20

A number of conclusions and policy recommendations are made, based on =
comparative studies of Turkey's economic performance with that of East =
Asian and Latin American countries. These could constitute the core of =
an anti-poverty strategy for Turkey, and would be based on the following =
principles:

The central element of an anti-poverty strategy would be to pursue rapid =
economic growth, increase employment, and target spending on development =
programmes and social services on those who most need them;=20

Economic growth is enhanced when workers enjoy improved labour market =
conditions through, for instance, higher real wages, better jobs (e.g. =
small fraction in agriculture, larger fraction working as paid =
employees, as opposed to self-employed or unpaid family workers), a =
larger fraction working in the professional, managerial technical or =
clerical occupations, and a smaller fraction having primary schooling or =
less;=20

The adoption of policies which (a) stimulate economic growth and hence =
the derived demand for labour; (b) that affect education and hence the =
quality of the supply of labour and (c) which ensure that social safety =
net policies help determine whether people arrive at the work place =
suitably nourished and strong enough to work;=20

The targeting of anti-poverty efforts toward poor people rather than =
poor groups, either through targeted programmes or self-targeting, =
otherwise most of the benefits will accrue to the less-needy segments of =
the population and the poor will get only a small share of the nation's =
development resources.=20

7. Social Trends

The 1995 Human Development Report for Turkey highlighted the fact that =
education is the most significant factor in explaining relative =
development deficiencies in Turkey While there is general agreement on =
the importance of education, its far reaching implications for =
socio-economic development and its inherent value in its own right are =
not always well-recognized.

Education attainments in Turkey have been remarkable as reflected in the =
steady upward trend in literacy rates and greatly enlarged school =
enrollments in keeping with the expanding growth of the school-age =
population. In 1993, there were 12.2 million children and students (ages =
6 - 23) in school taught by 520,000 teachers in 77,000 institutions. One =
of the most important problems is the low numbers of those who have =
completed school. Of Turkey's total labour force, 78.1% have primary =
education or less, 7% have graduated from junior high school, 9.7% from =
high school and 5.2% from university. Of the total population, only =
46.1% have completed primary school. Enrollment in pre-school, for which =
research points to the important role of early childhood education for =
potential development, school achievement and school attainment, was =
only 5.1%. The 1994 Human Development Report estimated that the mean =
years of schooling of the adult population over 25 to be only 3.6 years.

The conclusions drawn from the 1996 NHDR are that:

It is urgent and imperative that Turkey increase its educational =
enrollment rates at all levels. Furthermore it is important to open more =
educational institutions at the secondary and tertiary levels, to =
provide the necessary infrastructure and qualified staff;=20

This in turn will require additional funds, and a much greater =
proportion of the GDP than the current 3.3%, in light of the recommended =
proportion recommended by the 1990 Education for All Summit in Jomtien, =
Thailand;=20

Gender and region-specific programmes will be required to correct the =
disparities observed above;=20

Vocational / technical and non-formal education will need to be =
strengthened to counter for the relatively low level of skills;=20

Compulsory schooling should be extended from 5 to 8 years, to counter =
the drastic reduction in enrollments rates, especially for girls, after =
five years of primary school. The minimum period of compulsory education =
among European Union countries is nine years;=20

Teacher training and conditions of service for teachers need to be =
strengthened, to raise the quality and status of the profession.=20

In the area of health, the main trends seen in Turkey have been a =
dramatic fall in child mortality as indexed by a reduction in the child =
mortality rate from 152 per 1000 in the 1960's to 53 per 1,000 in 1991, =
although it is considered that this is still unacceptably high since =
countries with a GNP equivalent to that of Turkey on the whole had much =
lower mortality rates.

A multitude of causes have been suggested. These will require drastic =
economic and social measures to break the vicious cycle of early =
marriage, high fertility, malnutrition, and high mortality, supported by =
deeply rooted cultural values such as son preference, family =
interdependency, lack of formal old age security, economic value of =
children etc.

It has been observed that the health of the Turkish population is =
dependent, among other things, on the educational experience and =
standard of others who care for children in their most formative years, =
and on the education of professionals in the health services who provide =
support. While both these categories are increasing over time, the =
inequalities in education translate into inequalities in health as well.

8. Women and Gender Trends

The Turkey NHDR is the only one containing a map to illustrate male and =
female HDI by province. These maps show clearly that high male human =
development is present in about two thirds of the country, largely in =
the east, centre, south-west and south of the country, while high female =
human development is concentrated in the more urbanized provinces of =
Ankara, Istanbul/Kocaeli and Izmir, where they have almost the same HDI =
status as men. In the country as a whole, in statistical terms, women =
have lower HDI values than men (0.648 for women and 0.824 for men). The =
male-female HDI is largest in the province of Diyarbakir, in the east of =
the country.

Of the three components of HDI, women are clearly disadvantaged with =
respect to two of them, namely per capita income and educational =
attainment, while enjoying a biological advantage in the third (life =
expectancy).=20

Gender disparities are reviewed in terms of politics, employment, health =
and education. Turkey's ranking in terms of the Gender Development Index =
was 45th out of 130 countries in 1995, and 98th out of 116 for the =
Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM).

With respect to women in public life and politics, women were given the =
suffrage in 1933, and in the following national elections obtained 18 =
seats in the Legislative Assembly or 4.5% of the total. This number was =
unparalleled in Western democracies of the era. In remarkable contrast, =
and despite having a woman as Prime Minister, in1996, there were only 13 =
women parliamentarians, holding only 2.4% of the seats, compared to =
France (5.7%) and the United Kingdom (7.4%), and Norway (39.4%). Women =
have fared even worse in local elections, having won only 1% of seats in =
the 1994 municipal elections, and less than 0.5% of positions as mayors.

The main issues with regard to women and employment relate to unequal =
job opportunities and unequal pay, whereby on average women's =
non-agricultural wage is 84.5% of men's.

Women are well represented in professional occupations, with 29% of all =
lawyers, 32% of all university academic posts, 39% of architects (13% in =
US), 39% of dentists (9% in US), and 35% of all public employees. In the =
medical profession, 70% of all graduating physicians in 1994/95 were =
women. This picture is very different at lower social levels, whereby in =
1990, only 17% of the urban work force were women, including 32% of =
clerical and related workers (compared with over 75% in the US and =
Europe).

With regard to women's health, fertility and family, Turkey still lags =
far behind the industrialized world in these areas. The total fertility =
rate has declined significantly in recent decades from 5.7 in 1965 to =
3.6 in 1989 and 2.7 in 1993, indicating marked progress since the =
introduction of the first Family planning Act in 1965. The transition =
from high to low fertility in Turkey is considered to be unique in the =
Middle East, but once again there is much variation among regions and =
social groups. The total fertility rate for urban centres is 2.4 and 3.1 =
in rural areas. The main contributory factor to declining fertility has =
been and to education and an increase in a women's marriage age, for =
instance from 17.6 years in 1983 too 22 in 1990.

Finally, education is considered to be a major factor underlying gender =
disparities in Turkey. While there is still a gap in literacy between =
males (91.3%) and females (76.1%), (compared with 86.4% and 68% =
respectively in 1985), the gap has been narrowing fast.

A comprehensive set of conclusions and policy suggestions are put =
forward in the Report, which, if implemented, would no doubt go a long =
way to addressing many of the gender issues discussed.

9. Environmental Trends=20

While environmental problems are evident in most areas, particularly the =
urban areas, those of Istanbul are symptomatic of them, in terms of the =
increasing amounts of solid waste; pollution of river basins due to =
unlicensed, illegal settlements and industrial/agricultural activities; =
air pollution due to the continued consumption of low calorie coal of =
some 7 million tons per year (but which should improve with the =
widespread use of natural gas), and the increase in the number of cars.

10. Housing and Human Settlements

The Turkish National Action Plan prepared for Habitat II, and drafted =
with the participation of public agencies and NGOs makes a distinction =
between two sets of principles:

Those to be regarded as ends: sustainability, livability and equity=20

Those to be regarded as means: civic engagement, enablement and =
governance=20

With these two principles in mind, 28 priority areas were identified for =
Turkey.

In terms of the management of human settlements, Turkey has made great =
strides in evolving from a centralized system of local government, =
inherited from the Ottoman empire, to a more decentralized one after =
World War II, albeit managed in a partisan and ad hoc way, still =
dependent on the discretion of central authority for finances, which has =
proved to be irregular. For example, in the 1960's, local governments =
were expected to contribute to national development efforts with their =
own meagre resources.

In the 1970's further devolution of authority was granted, and master =
plans for metropolitan areas were prepared to address the major issues =
of urbanization caused by the massive exodus of people from the rural =
areas. Metropolitan municipalities were established in the 1980s, =
responsible for their own long-term strategic planning and the provision =
of municipal services. Total municipal revenues increased steadily, and =
they contributed to the central government an average of 12% of their =
total. A greater level of consultation with the people in municipal =
decision-making has been observed, although a certain amount of tension =
have emerged between the metropolitan and district municipality =
authorities. This has led to a recognition that Turkey's local =
government system is in need of serious and deep-reaching reforms, and =
that some decentralization and devolution of powers must take place.

Turkey's population has risen from 13.6 million people in 1927, when 76% =
were rural, to 60.5 million in 1994, when the same proportion now lived =
within municipal boundaries. Between 1960 and 1990, the urban population =
living in towns with more than 20,000 people increased from 22% to 51%, =
or from 6 million people to 29 million people. In 1997, the population =
of Istanbul should reach the 10 million mark, and the population in 2000 =
is estimated at 11.5 million.

This situation has exacerbated problems concerning local =
administrations, and which have been addressed in the Seventh Five year =
Development Plan (1996 - 2000), but it is considered that a more =
fundamental transfer of authority and resources from the central to the =
municipal level is required, coupled with greatly increased =
capacity-building and accountability of local authorities, and greater =
citizen participation in local government.

The rapid urban growth, fueled by continual high levels of internal =
migration and natural births, and aggravated by regional differences and =
discrepancies and more recently by security questions, has also placed =
extra strain on the provision of housing as well as on all services and =
public utilities. About half of the housing premises in large cities are =
unlicensed or illegal squatter constructions, and it is estimated that a =
total of 2.5 million new housing units will be required during the =
seventh plan period (1994 - 2000), to complement the existing 7.7 =
million houses, or about 35%. The supply of housing, (of which the =
majority is provided by the private sector [67.7% in 1992], followed by =
the cooperative sector [26.3%] and the public sector [6%]), has clearly =
fallen far short of demand for a wide variety of reasons, be it =
bureaucratic, financial, technical, legal, etc., and for which a =
comprehensive urban renewal and reform programme is called for.

11. Recommendations for SHD Strategy

Elements of an SHD strategy are included in the report's conclusions and =
policy suggestions for the eradication of poverty, and in those relating =
to education, health, gender, and human settlements, summarized above. =
These would need to be integrated into an overall economic growth =
strategy.







US STATE DEPARTMENTS DOCUMENTS





International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1998 Released by the =
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, =
U.S.Department of State Washington, DC, February 1999=20





SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA I. Summary Once part of the =
famous Balkan route for smuggling of heroin and other drugs from Turkey =
and the Middle East to western Europe, the Socialist Federal Republic of =
Yugoslavia (SFRY) remains a transit country for narcotics smuggling. =
During the breakup of Yugoslavia, the emergent Federal Republic of =
Yugoslavia was subject to UN trade sanctions, which greatly reduced the =
opportunities for narcotics trafficking through the country. While =
difficult to determine its extent, narcotics trafficking through the =
SSFRY appears to have increased since UN trade sanctions were suspended =
after the signing of the Dayton accords. The "outer wall" of sanctions =
bars the SFRY from international organizations and financial =
institutions, and prevents normalization of US- diplomatic relations. =
The SFRY holds itself responsible for meeting the standards of the 1988 =
UN Drug Convention. SFRY enforcement officials claim that international =
isolation has reduced their effectiveness in fighting drug trafficking =
and have requested greater cooperation with U.S. and international =
agencies. No U.S. counternarcotics assistance is provided to the SFRY . =
Part II. Status of Country The SFRY was an important part of the primary =
corridor for drug trafficking from Turkey and the Middle East to western =
Europe during the 1970's and 1980's. The events that led to =
international isolation for the SFRY--the disintegration of the former =
Yugoslavia and the resultant UN trade sanctions--disrupted trafficking =
along this route. While information remains difficult to obtain, the =
SFRY does not appear to have major problems with drug production, money =
laundering or precursor chemicals. The climate is not suitable for the =
production of drugs with the possible exception of marijuana. The =
underdeveloped banking sector deters money laundering. Drug transit is =
the main problem area. SFRY authorities admit that heroin trafficking =
has increased since the lifting UN trade sanctions. SFRY customs =
officials noted that marijuana and even cocaine were intercepted in =
1998. Officials point to the Kosovar Albanian community as primarily =
responsible for drug smuggling activities in the SFRY--noting in =
evidence the frequent drug-related arrests of members of this community =
in western Europe and in neighboring countries. The officials also =
pointed to the difficulty in maintaining control of portions of the =
border separating Kosovo from Macedonia and Albania. SFRY authorities =
are concerned by evidence of growing drug use within the country. Part =
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1998 Policy Initiatives. The SFRY =
launched no new policy initiatives in 1998. \ Accomplishments. The SFRY =
's most significant accomplishment was to secure a customs agreement =
with Hungary. Law Enforcement Efforts. SFRY customs authorities report =
that 117 kilograms of cocaine, 26 kilograms of marijuana, and 17 =
kilograms of heroin were seized through the first ten months of 1998. In =
all cases the drugs were tracked to their internal destinations, arrests =
were made, and convictions obtained, according to customs officials. =
Police, the only agency with authority to make arrests in the SFRY , and =
customs work jointly to combat drug smuggling. Corruption. No incidences =
of official involvement in narcotics smuggling activities have surfaced =
in the press. Agreements and Treaties. The SFRY has customs agreements =
Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Macedonia. Customs officials =
anticipate the completion of a similar agreement with Slovakia in the =
near future. Negotiations are also ongoing with Greece and Cyprus. =
Austria recognizes the old Austria-Yugoslavia customs agreement. The =
SFRY adheres to the 1902 US-Yugoslavia extradition treaty. =
Cultivation/Production. Little cultivation or production of narcotics is =
believed to occur in the SFRY. Drug Flow/Transit. SFRY customs =
authorities claim that marijuana has entered the SFRY via smuggling =
boats that operate on Lake Skadar between Albania and Montenegro. These =
boats smuggle a wide variety of consumer goods into the SFRY , but =
customs officials contend the cargoes often contain small quantities of =
marijuana. The two 1998 seizures of cocaine led SFRY customs to believe =
that cocaine has for several years been entering the country in small =
quantities via mail or in larger quantities through via trucks or ships. =
The same officials claimed that heroin interdiction was becoming more =
difficult given the entry of small quantities smuggled across the =
inadequately controlled Kosovo-Albania and Kosovo-Macedonia borders. The =
small quantities are collected in Kosovo for movement forward by any =
means except airplane--a means of conveyance not favored by traffickers =
in the SFRY. Demand Reduction. A hard-hitting anti-drug abuse campaign =
in 1998 has featured television ads, billboards, and other =
advertisements intended to reduce demand. Part IV. U.S. Policy =
Initiatives and Programs. The United States does currently not have any =
bilateral programs with the SFRY. SFRY enforcement authorities complain =
that the SFRY 's international isolation is debilitating and have =
requested restoration of at least some customs/law enforcement =
consultations. [end of document]=20





International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1998 Released by the =
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, =
U.S.Department of State Washington, DC, February 1999=20



ALBANIA I.=20



Summary Organized crime is making increased use of Albania as a transit =
point for drugs being smuggled to Western Europe, due to the strategic =
location of the country and the continued weakness of its police and =
judicial systems. Authorities also believe that the domestic production =
of cannabis is increasing, even though the scale of the problem remains =
comparatively small. Likewise, drug abuse is a problem that continues to =
grow, but which is still small compared to the situation in Western =
Europe. The Government's efforts to deal with these problems have long =
been complicated by the poor level of professional training of the =
police and other officials, by a general lack of resources and by =
widespread corruption. Albania is not a party to any of the UN Narcotics =
Conventions, including the 1988 UN Drug Convention. II. Status of =
Country Despite many obstacles, the Albanian government is continuing =
efforts to interdict drug smugglers, reduce cannabis production and =
provide some form of social safety net for drug abusers. The military =
and police are working closely with Italian police, navy, and coastal =
patrol organizations to stop the activities of the small boats that make =
the smuggling runs to Italy. The Albanian Government permits Italian =
personnel to be based in Albania, and to operate in Albanian territorial =
waters. These efforts are aimed at the full range of contraband that is =
passing through Albania--drugs, illegal immigrants, arms and other =
goods. The response to the new but growing drug abuse problem has been =
very slow, and virtually no special treatment programs for drug abusers =
exist. Some very small programs at particular hospitals have received =
coverage in the press, along with government announcements on plans to =
expand rehabilitation efforts; however, the reality remains grim for =
Albanian addicts and abusers. There is a small anti-drug media campaign =
aimed at young people. The current Albanian Government of Prime Minister =
Pandeli Majko has been in office only since October, and has not yet =
launched any new initiatives aimed specifically at the problems of drug =
trafficking or abuse. The new government does, however, appear to be =
making serious efforts on a broad front to rebuild and reform the =
structures of law and order, which would make further anti-drug efforts =
possible. III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1998 Albania is not a =
party to the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic =
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, or any of the other UN Narcotics =
Conventions. Nevertheless, Albania has made efforts to achieve or =
maintain compliance with the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Drug =
Convention. Illicit Cultivation. Press reports periodically note the =
destruction of small fields of cannabis plants by the police, but while =
still comparatively small, the press reports that cannabis cultivation =
is an increasingly serious problem. Production. Albania is not known as =
a location for the production of significant quantities of illegal =
chemical substances. Distribution. The police consistently arrest of =
individuals caught distributing drugs. In general, however, there is a =
high level of lawlessness in the country and some regions are =
essentially not under government control. Given these circumstances, =
efforts to combat drug distribution are limited and difficult. Sale, =
Transport and Financing. As already noted, Albania is a significant =
transit point for the smuggling of illicit drugs to western Europe. The =
Albanian press reports that international organized crime is involved in =
many of these smuggling operations, and is in control of the sales and =
financial arrangements. The Albanian Government is making genuine =
efforts to combat the smuggling operations, and is doing so in =
cooperation with international law enforcement agencies. The best =
example of this is the arrangement the Government has made with Italian =
authorities to interdict smugglers at sea. Asset Seizure. Asset seizure =
was legalized as an anti-smuggling weapon in 1998 when legislation was =
passed that allows for the seizure and sale of boats used for smuggling. =
The measure was controversial because many Albanians are deeply =
suspicious of any law that allows the government to take property =
without compensation--a legacy of long years of communist rule. =
Extradition. The U.S. has an extradition treaty with Albania that =
entered into force on November 13, 1935. For 1998, there are no known =
cases of other countries requesting that a drug suspect be extradited, =
or of Albania requesting another country to extradite a drug suspect. =
Mutual Legal Assistance. No cases are known. Law Enforcement and Transit =
Cooperation. Albanian authorities cooperated fully with U.S. authorities =
in 1998 on law enforcement and transit issues. Few of these cases =
involved drug issues, but the pattern of cooperation was clear and =
positive. Precursor Chemical Control. Albania is not known as a producer =
of significant quantities of precursor chemicals. Demand Reduction. Drug =
abuse is a comparatively new problem in Albania, and the Government and =
Albanian society have been slow to take actions to combat it. National =
medical resources are too limited to allow for extensive special =
programs for drug abusers. Some small-scale government- funded clinics =
offer special treatment options for heroin addicts, but most abusers =
receive, at most only basic medical assistance. State-operated radio and =
television run occasional anti-drug messages. IV. U.S. Policy =
Initiatives and Programs Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation. The =
Government has welcomed USG and Western European programs to help train =
the police, and has cooperated fully in the implementation of the =
programs. The U.S. Department of Justice is proceeding with training =
programs for mid-level police supervisors and for new special police =
units. The USG is also funding assistance to Albanian Customs and other =
border control agencies through a grant to the European Union. Albania =
has also been active in multilateral border control efforts through the =
Southeast Europe Cooperative Initiative (SECI). These efforts pull =
Albania into closer cooperation with its neighbors, notably the Former =
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Italy. The Road Ahead. The USG will =
continue to work with Albanian authorities to provide law enforcement =
assistance, cognizant of the limitations imposed by the local situation, =
and support for legal reform. Regional assistance through cooperative =
efforts, such as SECI, may be a way for the USG to further assist =
Albania, despite the difficulties imposed by the current security =
situation. [end of document]=20





International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1998 Released by the =
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, =
U.S.Department of State Washington, DC, February 1999=20





TURKEY I.=20



Summary There is no appreciable cultivation of illicit narcotics in =
Turkey, although licit opium poppies are grown. Consumption of narcotics =
within Turkey remains relatively low. Turkey's geographical position =
makes it a major transit route for Southwest Asian opiates moving to =
Europe, and for some synthetic drugs to the Middle East. Turkish =
anti-narcotics efforts are concentrated on stemming transit traffic, and =
on eradicating illicit laboratories within Turkey which process smuggled =
morphine base into heroin. There is no conclusive evidence that illicit =
narcotics produced in Turkey or transiting Turkey enter the United =
States in significant quantities. Turkey is a member of the Financial =
Action Task Force (FATF), and is investigating possible money laundering =
cases. The 1988 UN Drug Convention was signed by Turkey in 1988, and =
formally ratified in 1996. II. Status of Country Opium poppy cultivation =
in Turkey is limited to carefully monitored and controlled production =
for the licit pharmaceutical opiate market, as recognized by the =
International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) and the United States =
Government (USG). There is no indication of diversion to illicit =
channels. Farming inefficiencies and relatively poor alkaloid content =
make poppy crops for opiates only marginally commercial, although poppy =
seeds are a valuable food crop. The U.S. Department of Agriculture =
(USDA) is working with the Turkish authorities to improve the alkaloid =
content of the poppies. Other illicit cultivation of narcotic plants, =
primarily marijuana, is minor and has no significant effect on the =
United States. The amount of heroin and other illicit opiates transiting =
Turkey is unknown, although the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) =
estimates that it remains steady at between four and six tons of heroin =
to Europe each month. As much as 75 percent of the heroin seized in =
Europe has a "Turkish Connection," having either transited Turkey, been =
processed there, or been seized in connection with Turkish criminal =
syndicates. We continue to monitor this route for indications that =
heroin transiting Turkey affects the United States. The discoveries of =
processing labs and seizures of illicit precursor chemicals such as =
acetic anhydride indicate continuing heroin refining in Turkey. Turkish =
anti-narcotics forces are aggressive in interdicting drug traffic and =
closing down illicit laboratories within Turkey. Turkey has continued to =
move forward in its anti-money-laundering campaign. The Turkish =
Financial Crimes Investigative Board (FCIB), with the assistance of the =
U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN), is actively =
investigating more than 80 possible money-laundering cases. Three of the =
cases have been sent to the prosecutor's office for further action. So =
far, the cases have centered primarily on allegations of corruption =
rather than money generated from narcotics trade. None of the cases sent =
to the Turkish prosecutor's office involved narcotics. III. Country =
Action Against Drugs in 1998 Policy Initiatives. Turkey continues to =
emphasize anti-money laundering efforts. The Government of Turkey tried =
to obtain a better estimate on the informal economy by declaring a =
"financial clearance day" on September 30, 1998. All Turks with =
undeclared monetary assets were asked to put these assets in a Turkish =
bank for that one day. A total of $4.3 billion was recorded. Two major =
pieces of legislation are before Parliament, but not expected to pass =
until the formation of the new government: an organized crime bill which =
would better define and more severely punish organized crime, and a =
banking reform bill which would enforce stricter auditing controls on =
banks. Accomplishments. Turkey's anti-money laundering efforts received =
a satisfactory evaluation from FATF in October 1998. In the same month, =
Turkey signed a multilateral agreement within the context of the =
Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) with Romania and =
Bulgaria for cooperation on anti-terrorism, organized crime, narcotics =
smuggling, and money laundering. Law Enforcement Efforts. As of =
mid-December 1998, Turkish law enforcement agencies, including the =
Turkish National Police, the Jandarma (rural police), Customs, and Coast =
Guard, had seized over three tons of heroin and five tons of hashish. =
There were 4,577 drug-related arrests. Turkish officials continue to =
maintain close relationships with anti-narcotic counterparts in the =
United States and many European countries, and hold monthly meetings =
with those countries' drug liaison officers. Corruption. Allegations of =
corruption continue to dominate news headlines. The arrest of alleged =
Turkish mafia boss Alaaddin Cakici in France in 1998 re-opened rumors of =
criminal gang corruption of major political figures in such areas as =
preferential treatment in bidding for privatized state entities. On =
November 25, State Minister Gunes Taner was censured for his apparent =
involvement in corruption and was stripped of his cabinet seat. =
Allegations of corruption were also leveled against Prime Minister =
Yilmaz, whose government lost a vote of confidence the same day. To =
date, the corruption allegations have not involved narcotics =
trafficking. Agreements and Treaties. The United States and Turkey have =
long-standing bilateral treaties covering extradition and mutual legal =
assistance in criminal matters, as well as a narcotics assistance =
protocol. The USG has concluded a Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement =
(CMAA) with the Government of Turkey. In addition, Turkey is a party to =
the World Customs Organization's International Convention on Mutual =
Administrative Assistance for the Prevention, Investigation, and =
Repression of Customs Offenses, Annex X on Assistance in Narcotics =
Cases. Turkey is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and is a member =
of FATF. Cultivation and Production. Opium poppies are grown by licensed =
farmers for pharmaceutical and food products. Licit opium poppy =
cultivation is strictly controlled by the Turkish Grain Board (TMO), =
with no apparent diversion into illicit channels. Culinary poppy seed =
brings farmers more profit than the sale of the low-alkaloid poppy =
straw. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is working with the =
Turkish authorities to improve the alkaloid content of the poppies. =
Other illicit cultivation of narcotic plants, primarily marijuana, is =
minor and has no significant impact on the United States. Drug Flow and =
Transit. Turkey remains one of the major transit routes for the flow of =
Southwest Asian heroin to Europe. There is little evidence that heroin =
from Turkey enters the United States, either directly or through another =
transit state. We continue to monitor the flow of heroin through Turkey =
for indications that it is becoming significant for the United States, =
but no such indications have appeared thus far. Heroin, and to a lesser =
degree, morphine base is smuggled through Turkey's eastern border. =
Morphine base is refined in illicit labs, most often in the rural =
Southeast or near Istanbul. Heroin is most commonly transferred to =
Europe hidden in containers on trucks. Smaller amounts are transported =
by bus or air passengers, or in private vehicles. Of note, in 1998, was =
the seizure of approximately 550 kilograms of cocaine from a ship on =
Turkey's southern coast. This may be an indication of heroin-cocaine =
barter trade, with South American cocaine entering Europe through =
traditional heroin routes. Reports of involvement in drug trafficking by =
the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) continue. The PKK, a terrorist =
separatist group active in the southeast border region of Turkey, =
reportedly is paid protection money by narcotics traffickers and =
refiners. PKK groups based in Europe are also alleged to be involved in =
narcotics trafficking. Demand Reduction. The single drug-prevention and =
substance-abuse facility, the Amatem Clinic, treats drug addiction and =
alcoholism. The incidence of substance abuse remains low, which the =
Turks attribute to a strong family structure and the Muslim proscription =
of mind-altering substances. Amatem Clinic has placed high priority on =
training family doctors, pharmacists, and teachers to recognize the =
signs of drug abuse, and on gathering reliable statistics on drug use. =
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs U.S. Policy Initiatives. USG =
policy is to strengthen Turkey's law enforcement capability to combat =
narcotics trafficking and to control money laundering and financial =
crime. The USG provides anti-narcotics equipment and training assistance =
to the Turkish National Police, training and equipment to Turkish =
Customs aimed at strengthening border interdiction, and training to the =
Turkish Financial Crimes Investigative Board. To assist Turkey's effort =
to keep licit opiate production from moving into illicit channels, the =
U.S. Department of Agriculture is helping Turkey to increase the opiate =
ratio in poppy straw. The USG anti-narcotics programs in Turkey, =
including training, are budgeted at approximately $700,000. Bilateral =
Cooperation. USG anti-narcotics agencies report that while the number of =
interdictions has remained stable, the cooperation and professionalism =
of Turkish law enforcement officials is improving. There were a number =
of successful bilateral investigations in 1998, including the seizure of =
550 kilograms of cocaine. The Road Ahead. Turkey is continuing its =
efforts to curtail drugs entering through its borders, and to disrupt =
the flow of drug trafficking in Turkey. Further legislation is needed to =
crack down on organized crime, improve banking regulations, and limit =
parliamentary immunity to prosecution. Active prosecution of pending =
money laundering cases, expected in the coming year, will be a positive =
sign of Turkey's commitment to fighting drugs and corruption. [end of =
document]=20



U.S. Department of State=20

Turkey Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997

Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, January =
30, 1998.=20


TURKEY

Turkey is a constitutional republic with a multiparty parliament, the =
Grand National Assembly, which elects the President. It elected Suleyman =
Demirel as President in 1993. In June Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the =
Islamist Refah Party, resigned as Prime Minister after an intense =
private and public campaign against his Government led by the military, =
with significant support from other segments of civil society which view =
fundamentalism as a threat to the country's secular republic. In July =
Motherland Party (ANAP) leader Mesut Yilmaz became Prime Minister. He =
formed a coalition government with the Democratic Left Party (DSP) and =
the Democrat Turkey Party (DTP). The Government respects the =
Constitution's provisions for an independent judiciary.=20

For over a decade, Turkey has engaged in armed conflict with the =
terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), whose goal is a separate state =
of Kurdistan in southeastern Turkey. A state of emergency, declared in =
1987, continues in six southeastern provinces facing substantial PKK =
terrorist violence. Parliament voted in October to lift the state of =
emergency in Bingol, Batman, and Bitlis provinces. A regional governor =
for the state of emergency has authority over the ordinary governors in =
the six provinces, and six adjacent ones, for security matters. The =
state of emergency allows him to exercise certain quasi-martial law =
powers, including restrictions on the press and removal from the area of =
persons whose activities are deemed detrimental to public order. The =
state of emergency decree was renewed for 4 months for all provinces in =
November.=20

The Turkish National Police (TNP) have primary responsibility for =
security in urban areas, while the Jandarma (gendarmerie) carry out this =
function in the countryside. The armed forces continued to combat the =
PKK in the state of emergency region, thereby taking on an internal =
security function. Although civilian and military authorities remain =
publicly committed to the rule of law and respect for human rights, some =
members of the security forces, particularly police "special teams," =
Jandarma, village guards, and TNP personnel, committed serious human =
rights abuses.=20

Turkey's primarily market-based economy is driven by an active private =
sector. The agricultural sector employs nearly one-half of the country's =
labor force but contributes only 15 percent of the gross national =
product (GNP) and total exports. A customs union with the European =
Union, in place since 1996, has boosted the trade deficit, but has the =
potential to increase the country's economic efficiency and prosperity =
over time. The principal industrial sectors--textiles, iron, and =
steel--provide the leading exports. Impressive economic growth over the =
past 15 years has translated into an improved standard of living and the =
creation of a growing middle class. Per capita GNP is approximately =
$3,000. Such positive developments, however, have been accompanied by =
substantial macroeconomic imbalances. Successive governments have had =
little success in implementing needed reforms to reduce the budget =
deficit and inflation. Populist economic measures pushed the budget =
deficit to approximately 8 percent of GNP and pushed inflation over 90 =
percent. Persistently high inflation over the past decade has =
exacerbated disparities in income distribution. The conflict in the =
southeast and maintenance of a large national defense establishment =
continue to be a significant drain on the economy. Corruption has taken =
an economic toll and has sapped popular faith in the Government.=20

Despite some reforms and the Government's stated commitment to respect =
human rights, serious human rights abuses continued. Human rights =
nevertheless remained a priority public issue during the year. There is =
a general recognition that the country's human rights performance is =
inadequate and needs to be brought in line, not only with its =
international obligations and commitments, but also with popular =
aspirations and demands, and the Government's own policies.=20

The situation in the southeast remains a serious concern. The Government =
has long denied the Kurdish population, located largely in the =
southeast, basic political, cultural, and linguistic rights. As part of =
its fight against the PKK, the Government forcibly displaced =
noncombatants, failed to resolve extrajudicial killings, tortured =
civilians, and abridged freedom of expression. The PKK committed =
widespread abuses, including the frequent murder of noncombatants, as =
part of its terrorism against the Government and civilians, mostly =
Kurds.=20

Estimates of the total number of villagers forcibly evacuated from their =
homes since the conflict began vary widely from 330,000 to 2 million. A =
credible estimate given by a former Member of Parliament from the region =
is around 560,000. The Government's resettlement and compensation =
program for internally-displaced people remained. During the year, 61 =
villages and 7,608 persons were resettled, according to government =
figures.=20

Human rights abuses were not limited to the southeast. Extrajudicial =
killings, including deaths in detention, from the excessive use of =
force, "mystery killings," and disappearances continued. The Government =
investigated some 185 reported disappearance cases: 40 persons were =
found and reunited with their families, 7 were believed to be abroad, 96 =
relocated to other parts of the country, and 42 were unaccounted for.=20

Torture remained widespread: police and Jandarma antiterror personnel =
often abused detainees and employed torture during incommunicado =
detention and interrogation. The implementation of reforms to address =
these problems was uneven. Lengthy investigations and trials of =
officials suspected of abuses continued to be a problem. Important cases =
dating back to 1995 and 1996 continued without resolution, including: 48 =
police officers charged with the 1996 death of journalist Metin Goktepe; =
10 police officers from Manisa, accused of torturing 15 people, mostly =
teenagers accused of ties to a leftist terrorist organization; and =
police and security personnel charged with beating to death 10 prisoners =
during a prison disturbance in Diyarbakir in 1996.=20

The rarity of convictions of police or other security officials for =
killings and torture fosters a climate of impunity that probably remains =
the single largest obstacle to reducing human rights abuses. The lack of =
immediate access to an attorney by those detained for political crimes =
is also a major factor in torture by police and security forces.=20

Prison conditions are poor. Numerous small-scale disturbances and hunger =
strikes erupted throughout the year. Prolonged pretrial detention and =
lengthy trials continued to be problems.=20

Limits on freedom of speech and of the press remained another serious =
problem. For example, according to the Human Rights Foundation, at =
year's end approximately 60 journalists were under arrest or had been =
convicted; the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) reported that 40 =
journalists were imprisoned at year's end. Authorities banned or =
confiscated numerous publications, and a government decree has led to =
self-censorship of reporting on the southeast. One of the Yilmaz =
Government's first steps was to acknowledge the problem as a priority =
for resolution, when, 3 weeks after assuming office, he received a =
delegation from the CPJ, and subsequently won passage of legislation =
that provided conditional amnesty for several imprisoned editors. =
Nonetheless, the basic laws under which the editors were arrested did =
not change, and all were subject to reimposition of their former =
sentences if tried and convicted for similar offenses. The Government =
continued to use the 1991 Anti-Terror Law, with its broad and ambiguous =
definition of terrorism, to detain both alleged terrorists and others on =
the charge that their acts, words, or ideas constituted dissemination of =
separatist propaganda. Prosecutors also used Article 312 of the Criminal =
Code (incitement to racial or ethnic enmity), Article 159 (insulting the =
Parliament, army, republic, or judiciary), the law to protect Ataturk =
(no. 5816), and Article 16 of the Press Law to limit freedom of =
expression.=20

Kurdish-language broadcasts remained illegal (but not printed material =
in Kurdish). The Sanliurfa branch of the Mesopotamian Cultural Center, a =
corporation established to promote the Kurdish language and culture, was =
banned in October by the Provincial Governor. In Istanbul the Governor's =
office refused the Kurdish Culture and Research Foundation permission to =
offer Kurdish language classes. The translator and publisher of a Human =
Rights Watch report on the conflict in the southeast were convicted =
under Article 159 of the Penal Code (defaming the military). The =
translator received a suspended sentence; both were assessed small fines =
of approximately $12 dollars. They appealed the verdict and are free =
pending its outcome. Private channel television programs and print media =
continued to debate human rights and other issues of freedom of speech =
and the press.=20

The Government imposes limits on freedom of assembly and association. In =
September the police detained and beat Turkish and foreign participants =
in the "Musa Anter peace train" demonstration, named after a well-known =
Kurdish writer. The group was blocked from entering Diyarbakir, where =
its members had intended to demonstrate for a peaceful resolution of the =
conflict in the southeast. Foreign participants were deported, and legal =
proceedings were brought against some of the local organizers. Members =
of the pro-Kurdish People's Democracy Party (HADEP) were sometimes the =
object of arbitrary arrests and mystery killings and often were harassed =
in the southeast for their legal political activities. HADEP, =
sympathetic to the PKK, is under threat of investigation for alleged =
anticonstitutional activities and, depending upon the outcome, faces =
closure (two of its predecessors, HEP and DEP, were closed down).=20

In June the Refah/True Path Party (DYP) coalition, the country's first =
Islamist government, resigned after an intense private and public =
campaign of pressure led by the military with support from several =
segments of society who viewed "fundamentalism" to be a threat to the =
secular republic. In May before the Refah/DYP coalition broke up, the =
chief state prosecutor, in an attempt to close down Refah, charged the =
Party and five of its leaders, including former Prime Minster Erbakan, =
with attempting to undermine the secular nature of the state as defined =
by the Constitution based in part on public statements made by Refah =
leaders. In January 1998 the court ordered the party closed and banned =
several of its leaders, including former Prime Minister Erbakan, from =
political activity for 5 years. The Democratic Mass Party (DKP), a =
moderate Kurdish party, faces the threat of closure in a case before the =
Constitutional Court on the grounds that its charter questions the =
indivisibility of the country and advocates support for a minority, =
namely the Kurds. In November the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) =
found unanimously that the Government had violated Article 5-3 =
(excessive detention of 12 to 14 days) of the European convention on =
human rights in the case of several pro-Kurdish former Democracy Party =
(DEP) Members of Parliament (M.P.'s) and ordered the Government to pay =
the M.P.s' compensation and court costs. The ECHR did not rule on the =
M.P.s' appeal of their convictions on charges of separatism and =
membership in an armed gang.=20

In June the Ankara State Security Court found 32 members of HADEP, =
including party chairman Murat Bozlak, guilty on a variety of charges of =
proscribed political activity. Government officials continued to harass, =
intimidate, indict, and imprison human rights monitors, journalists, and =
lawyers for ideas that they expressed in public forums. Seven regional =
offices of the Human Rights Association were shut down during the year; =
three remain closed. In May Dr. Tufan Kose, a representative of the =
Adana branch of the Human Rights Foundation (HRF), a respected =
nongovernmental organization (NGO), was convicted and fined for not =
turning over to the authorities the names of torture victims treated by =
the HRF's torture treatment center. He is free on appeal. The president =
of the Human Rights Association (HRA), along with other HRA organizers, =
faces charges of promoting separatism or inciting ethnic hatred based on =
speeches. The president of the HRF, the HRA president, and the leaders =
of two small political parties were charged with holding an unauthorized =
demonstration. A prominent Malatya defense attorney, who often defended =
alleged terrorists, was himself held and charged with assisting =
terrorist groups. After incarceration for 3 months, he was freed pending =
the outcome of his case.=20

The Government imposed some restrictions on religious minorities and =
Parliament passed legislation extending compulsory education from 5 to 8 =
years. This law will lead to the closure of grades six to eight of the =
Islamist imam-Hatip religious schools, along with other private schools. =
Spousal abuse, some abuse of children, and child labor remain serious =
problems. Discrimination against women persists.=20

In July Prime Minister Yilmaz appointed an activist State Minister for =
Human Rights, who also is coordinator for the High Council for Human =
Rights. The Council, comprised of undersecretaries from the Justice, =
Interior, Education, Health, and Foreign Affairs Ministries (along with =
representatives of the security forces), meets weekly to review aspects =
of the human rights situation and advise the Government on steps for =
improvement. The Minister and the Council have invited an active =
dialogue with the increasingly important NGO's that work for human =
rights reforms both in the capital and in the southeast.=20

The Government provides human rights training for the police and =
military. The military continued to emphasize human rights training for =
its officers and noncommissioned officers, which human rights NGO's =
reported led to a reduction in human rights violations. Human rights =
education in primary schools is mandatory; it is an elective in high =
schools. Senior military leaders met for the first time with =
international human rights NGO representatives.=20

PKK terrorists murdered noncombatants, targeting village officials, =
village guards, teachers, and other perceived representatives of the =
State. They also committed random murders in their effort to intimidate =
the populace.=20

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS=20

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom =
From:=20

a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing=20

Credible reports of political and extrajudicial killings by government =
authorities continued, although accurate figures were unavailable. The =
Documentation Center of the HRF reported a number of deaths of detainees =
under suspicious circumstances, some as an apparent result of torture. =
At least seven prisoners died in disturbances during which prison =
authorities apparently used excessive force, but one report attributed =
the deaths to the actions of other prisoners.(see Section 1.c.).=20

In response, the Government mounted serious investigations. The Office =
of the Minister for Human Rights reported that out of 41 persons whom =
the HRA alleges died in extrajudicial killings in the first 10 months of =
the year, investigations showed that 11 died in clashes with the police. =
In the cases of another 7 persons, the authorities arrested those =
responsible; 3 others were found to have died of natural, rather than =
violent, causes; 2 others were found to have been executed by =
individuals not connected with the security forces; and 2 more were =
found alive. The remaining allegations are still under investigation.=20

Human rights monitors remain greatly concerned about the 1996 Provincial =
Authority Law, which authorizes security forces to shoot to kill when =
challenging a suspect and grants provincial governors the power to =
declare a "state of emergency" and to call in security forces. This law =
was adopted in the wake of the Government's decision to lift =
incrementally the state of emergency in some provinces in the southeast. =
Many human rights monitors are concerned about the expanded authorities =
that this law extends to provincial governors.=20

Although government prosecution of reported perpetrators has increased, =
punishment remained poor. Police and other law enforcement personnel =
were occasionally arrested in cases of extrajudicial killings, but there =
were few known successful prosecutions. The Office of the Minister of =
Human Rights reports that judicial and administrative investigations =
were started in seven of the cases of extrajudicial killings alleged by =
the HRA for the first 10 months of the year. Little progress occurred in =
the trial of 48 police officers, including 3 senior officers and a =
deputy commissioner, for the 1996 death of Metin Goktepe, a =
correspondent for Evrensel newspaper, who died from wounds inflicted =
while in detention in Istanbul. Police initially denied that he had been =
detained, then later said that he died from a fall. Following large =
public demonstrations and parliamentary criticism over the circumstances =
of his death, an investigation led to the arrest of the officers. In May =
the courts decided to try separately 11 of the police officers for =
premeditated murder. Five officers remain under arrest; the others =
returned to duty pending the outcome of the trial. No progress was made =
in the trial of the other 37, who were charged with excessive use of =
force in controlling the demonstration.=20

The trial of 29 Jandarma soldiers and 36 antiterror police officers =
charged with manslaughter in the 1996 beating deaths of 10 prisoners =
while quelling a prison disturbance in Diyarbakir continued (see Section =
1.c.). An Adana criminal court acquitted 23 antiterror police officers =
of negligence in the killing of 5 people, including children aged 2 and =
4, during a raid on a house in the town of Kucukdikili, outside of =
Adana. The number of prosecutions of security force members, while =
increasing, remained low.=20

The HRA and other human rights NGO's recorded several mystery killings =
in which the assailant's identity was unknown. It is widely alleged in =
the southeast that such killings occur with the complicity of security =
forces. Most of the reports pertain to the southeast, where some of the =
victims were leaders or prominent members of the Kurdish community, =
local politicians, or members of HADEP.=20

In 1996 a fatal car crash--known as the Susurluk incident--occurred =
involving: Abdullah Catli, an ultra rightwing militant wanted by =
Interpol on charges of murdering in 1980 seven university students who =
were members of the left-wing labor party; Huseyin Kocadag, a former =
Istanbul deputy police chief; Gonca Uz, a former beauty queen; and Sedat =
Bucak (the only survivor), an ethnic Kurdish M.P. and clan leader with =
an important stake in the Government's village guard program. Weapons =
and silencers were found in the car. The incident resurrected serious =
concerns about corruption and the abuse of power in the security forces. =
It also led to the resignation of the then-Interior Minister, Mehmet =
Agar, who had been linked to the victims of the accident. In February =
and the first part of March, a popular protest called "a minute of =
darkness" spread across the country as citizens turned off the lights in =
their households to protest the Susurluk incident and corruption. In May =
a parliamentary committee formed to investigate the incident concluded =
that links existed among politicians, police officials, and organized =
crime bosses. Although the Government affirmed its commitment to a full =
investigation, the report's lack of precision in drawing conclusions led =
to public criticism. The Refah Party chairman of the committee =
complained that he was denied access to many government documents on the =
grounds that they contained state secrets; at one point he accused the =
Speaker of the National Assembly of withdrawing documents concerning the =
role of the armed forces. The commander of the Jandarma refused to =
appear before the committee. The parliamentary investigation expired in =
April. In December Parliament lifted the immunity from criminal =
prosecution of now-opposition True Path Party M.P.'s Sedak Bucak and =
Mehmet Agar, an initiative supported by the Yilmaz Government. According =
to press accounts in January 1998, a report prepared by Prime Minister's =
Board of Inspectors linked the state's security forces under recent =
Governments to extrajudicial killings and mafia-like activities. The =
report has not been publicly released. In a television interview, Prime =
Minister Yilmaz committed himself to a full investigation of these =
events.=20

The case of eight police officers charged in the 1995 death of Sinan =
Demirtas, who died while in police custody, continued. The case of =
police officer Abdullah Bozkurt, charged with the 1994 murder of Vedat =
Han Gulsenoglu, also continues; Bozkurt was reassigned from Istanbul to =
Van. The 1993 case of the death in detention of Vakkas Dost continues; =
policeman Nurettin Ozturk, the accused murderer who disappeared after =
being freed, was found and rearrested in September.=20

Eleven police officers were acquitted in May in Adana of the 1992 =
killing of Remzi Basalak while he was under detention. The case =
continues before the Court of Appeals. The following cases remain =
unresolved: the 1992 case of Yucel Ozen, the 1994 killing of HEP party =
official Faik Candan, and the 1993 killing of journalist Ugur Mumcu.=20

The PKK continued to commit political and extrajudicial killings, =
primarily in rural southeast Anatolia. Political killings perpetrated by =
the PKK have included state officials (Jandarma, local mayors, imams, =
and schoolteachers), state-paid paramilitary village guards and their =
family members, young villagers who refused to be recruited, and PKK =
guerrillas-turned-informants. According to government statistics, as of =
November the PKK killed 667 people, including at least 130 unarmed =
civilians. The Government also reported that in 1997, approximately 260 =
soldiers and Jandarma, 12 police officers, 149 village guards, and 2,200 =
PKK members lost their lives.=20

Turkish Hizbullah, an Islamist Turkish terrorist group (not related to =
Lebanese Hizbullah), continued to target civilians in the southeast. =
According to the HRF, Hizbullah reportedly was responsible for at least =
four deaths in 1997. Four trials continued against 89 Hizbullah members =
charged with a total of 113 murders. In 1996 the Foreign Ministry stated =
that a case had been brought against Hizbullah for the 1993 murder of =
DEP parliamentarian Mehmet Sincar; human rights groups consider the case =
a mystery killing. Some human rights activists in the southeast believe =
that Turkish Hizbullah was founded by the Government in the 1980's to =
target the PKK and its sympathizers.=20

According to Human Rights Watch, Far-left armed groups, such as =
Revolutionary Left (Dev Sol/DHKP-C) and the Turkish Workers' and =
Peasants' Liberation Army (TIKKO), continued to commit abusive, violent =
acts. In May TIKKO members reportedly killed four civilians in Tokat. In =
September a radical Islamic group, Vasat, a splinter group of the =
Islamic Great Eastern Raiders Front (IBDA-C), killed 1 person and =
injured 24 others in a grenade attack at a book fair in Gaziantep. A =
total of 25 Vasat members were arrested for the attack. In October in a =
joint operation, PKK, DHKP/C, and TIKKO terrorists kidnapped three =
engineers, killing one and holding two as hostages in Giresun on the =
Black Sea.=20

b. Disappearance=20

Accurate statistics on disappearances of those previously under =
detention are hard to confirm; nonetheless, HRA figures indicate that =
such disappearances appear to have declined from a total of 194 in 1996 =
to 63 in 1997 (as of November). The Government has made a serious effort =
to investigate and explain reported cases of disappearance. Some persons =
disappeared after witnesses reported that security forces or law =
enforcement officials took them into custody. Fikri Ozgen, a =
73-year-old, disappeared in Diyarbakir on February 27 when, according to =
numerous witnesses, he was taken into custody by plainclothes police. =
Later the same week, Ilyas Eren disappeared under similar circumstances =
in Diyarbakir. In a case reported by Amnesty International (AI), Burhan =
Aktus disappeared on October 22 when he was forced into a car by three =
men whom his mother believed were plainclothes police officers. On =
September 16, 1996, at least five bodies were found on the outskirts of =
the village of Baharli, near Diyarbakir. Some of the victims had =
reportedly been in police custody earlier in the month. The =
disappearances and deaths are under investigation; no one has been =
charged.=20

For more than 2 years, mothers who claim that immediate relatives have =
disappeared have gathered weekly in Istanbul. The Ministry of Interior =
operates a Missing Persons Bureau, which is open 24 hours a day and =
handled 185 cases as of November. Most families of the persons who =
disappeared hold the Government and security forces responsible and =
consequently avoided contact with the government office.=20

The Government, human rights organizations, and the media report that =
the PKK routinely kidnaps young men or threatens their families as part =
of its recruiting effort. PKK terrorists continued their abductions of =
local villagers, teachers, journalists, and officials in the southeast.=20

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or =
Punishment=20

Despite the Constitution's ban on torture, the Government's cooperation =
with unscheduled foreign inspection teams, and public pledges by =
successive governments to end the practice, torture continued to be =
widespread. The HRF's torture rehabilitation centers in Ankara, Izmir, =
Istanbul, and Adana reported 530 credible applications for treatment =
during the year. Human rights attorneys and physicians who treat victims =
of torture say that most persons detained for or suspected of political =
crimes usually suffer some torture during periods of incommunicado =
detention in police stations and Jandarma stations before they are =
brought before a court.=20

Government officials admit that torture occurs. Although they deny that =
torture is systematic, they explain its occurrence by stating that it is =
closely tied to the fight against terrorism. Many cases of torture, =
however, occur in western Turkey, outside the zone of conflict. Eight =
complaints of torture or mistreatment were filed with the Parliamentary =
Human Rights Commission during the year. In January the United Nations =
(U.N.) Special Rapporteur on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or =
Degrading Treatment or Punishment reported that he continued to be =
concerned by the apparently widespread practice of torture in Turkey. =
The Government has invited both the Special Rapporteur on torture and =
the working group on disappearances to visit the country.=20

In a particularly egregious case, two police officers were convicted in =
Adana of torturing Songul Yildiz, whom they had questioned on suspicion =
of PKK membership after a demonstration in March. In November the court =
convicted the two policemen of torture, but the judge imposed only a =
1-year suspended sentence, and the two men were allowed to remain on the =
police force. The victim's lawyer has appealed the sentence.=20

According to Amnesty International, in March journalist Hatun Temizalp =
was detained for a week in the anti-terror branch Istanbul Police =
headquarters where she was subjected to various forms of torture and =
abuse (blindfolded interrogation, tied to and suspended from a wooden =
bar, and electric shocks). The State Forensic Medicine Institute issued =
a medical certificate detailing a fractured and dislocated shoulder =
blade, as well as signs of light blows. She was charged in a State =
Security Court where she complained of torture, despite police attempts =
to dissuade her through intimidation. She says that she requested access =
to a lawyer but that the request was denied. In November according to =
the Government, two police officers were convicted and sentenced to over =
5 years in prison for torturing and eventually killing Ali Riza Aydogan =
while the latter was in custody at the Beyoglu police precinct in =
Istanbul in 1992.=20

In Istanbul five police officers from the antiterror division were =
indicted in criminal court, and accused of torturing Gulderen Baran and =
four other detainees in 1995 during an interrogation about their alleged =
membership in a terrorist organization. In May Gulderen Baran and one of =
her colleagues were found guilty as charged and sentenced to life =
imprisonment. Another was acquitted and the remaining two were sentenced =
to 12=BD years in prison. Baran remains incarcerated at Istanbul's =
Bayrampasa prison pending her appeal. The timing of the police and =
Baran's trials precluded consideration that Baran's conviction may have =
been based on torture.=20

Human rights observers report that because the arresting officer is also =
responsible for interrogating the suspect, some officers may resort to =
torture to obtain a confession that would justify the arrest. Many =
detainees state that prosecutors ignore their claims of abuse during =
interrogation. Commonly employed methods of torture alleged by the HRF's =
torture treatment centers include: high-pressure cold water hoses, =
placing large ice blocks on the chest and stomach, electric shocks, =
beating on the soles of the feet, beating of genitalia, hanging by the =
arms, blindfolding, sleep deprivation, deprivation of clothing, =
systematic beatings, and vaginal and anal rape with truncheons and, in =
some instances, gun barrels. Other forms of torture were sexual abuse, =
submersion in cold water, use of truncheons, hanging sandbags on =
detainees' necks, forcing detainees to stand on one foot, releasing =
drops of water on detainees' heads, oxygen deprivation, sitting on =
detainees' laps, riding on their shoulders, and withholding food.=20

The Government maintains that medical examinations occur once during =
detention and a second time before either arraignment or release. =
However, former detainees assert that some medical examinations took =
place too long after the event to reveal any definitive findings of =
torture. Members of security and police forces often stay in the =
examination room when physicians are examining detainees, resulting in =
intimidation of both the detainee and the physician. Physicians =
responded to the coercion by refraining from examining detainees, =
performing cursory examinations and not reporting findings, or reporting =
physical findings but not drawing reasonable medical inferences that =
torture occurred. Turkish Medical Association officials reported that =
some police officers tore up reports that documented torture, demanding =
that a clean report be drawn up instead.=20

Credible sources in the human rights and legal communities estimate that =
judicial authorities investigate very few of the formal complaints =
involving torture and prosecute only a fraction of those. Security =
personnel accused of violating human rights are held to a different =
standard than other citizens. The Anti-Terror Law provides that =
officials accused of torture or other mistreatment may continue to work =
while under investigation.=20

Special provincial administrative boards rather than regular courts =
decide whether to prosecute such cases. Suspects' legal fees are paid by =
their employing agencies. Under the state of emergency, any lawsuit =
directed at government authorities must be approved by the state of =
emergency governor. Approval is rare. These constraints contribute to =
the paucity of convictions for torture.=20

Under the Administrative Adjudication Law, an administrative =
investigation into an alleged torture case is conducted to determine if =
there is enough evidence to bring a law enforcement officer to trial. =
Under the Criminal Trials Procedure Law (CMUK), prosecutors are =
empowered to initiate investigations of police or Jandarma officers =
suspected of torturing or mistreating suspects. In cases where township =
security directors or Jandarma commanders are accused of torture, the =
prosecutor must obtain permission to initiate an investigation from the =
Ministry of Justice, because these officials are deemed to have a status =
equal to that of judges.=20

In March the CMUK was amended to grant immediate access by attorneys to =
those arrested for common crimes, and after 4 days of detention for =
those persons detained under the Anti-Terror Law or for other "security" =
crimes. Private attorneys and human rights monitors reported uneven =
implementation of these reforms, asserting that in some cases police =
officers would postdate the day of detention to comply with the new law =
(see Section 1.d.).=20

The trial continues of 10 police officers, including 2 superintendents, =
from Manisa (western Turkey) for allegedly torturing a group of 15 young =
people, mostly teenagers suspected of belonging to a leftist terrorist =
organization in 1995. The youths' trial ended in January, when the =
courts found 11 teenagers guilty of belonging to a terrorist =
organization, and acquitted 4 others. In May all 15 were acquitted on =
the separate charge of throwing a Moltov cocktail at a barber shop. =
Lawyers appealed the convictions. The timing of the police and =
teenagers' trials precluded consideration that the teenagers' =
confessions may have been based on torture. A judge in the case of the =
police officers--who remain on active duty--relieved them of their =
obligation to personally appear in the court room due to concern that =
such an appearance would compromise their undercover investigative work. =
Human rights attorneys complained that this ruling undermined the =
prosecution's case against the officers.=20

In September the European Court of Human Rights ruled against Turkey in =
the case of a woman from the town of Derik in the southeast, concluding =
that she had been tortured and raped by Jandarma and village guards =
while forcibly detained for 3 days in 1993 (see Section 1.e.). The =
Government was ordered to pay compensation and to reimburse the =
applicant's legal expenses.=20

Prison conditions remain poor. Juveniles and adults are incarcerated =
together and most prisons lack a medical health care program to provide =
routine and even urgent medical care. Families often must supplement the =
poor quality food. Prisons are run on the ward system. Prisoners, often =
those of the same ideological bent, are incarcerated together and =
indoctrinate and punish their own. Government efforts to reform prisons =
by adopting a cell system have been criticized by prisoners, attorneys, =
and human rights activists alike, who view the ward system as a more =
humane form of incarceration. Plagued by overcrowding, underfunding, and =
very poor administration, prisons periodically become the scene of =
explosive situations.=20

A total of at least seven prisoners were killed in two separate prison =
disturbances. In July six prisoners were killed by other inmates during =
a prison disturbance at Istanbul's Metris prison. The disturbance =
reportedly originated with the killing of one prisoner; the other five =
were killed in the actual disturbance during which Jandarma and prison =
officials were videotaped using excessive force. According to a human =
rights NGO, forensic medicine reports revealed that all prisoners had =
been stabbed to death by homemade weapons. In August a disturbance in an =
Adana prison resulted in the death of a prisoner. The HRF noted that the =
prisoner reportedly died at the hands of other inmates.=20

Torture of convicted prisoners decreased, but security personnel =
continued to use excessive force in quieting disturbances. Small-scale =
hunger strikes to protest prison conditions, the proposed transfer to a =
cell system, and poor treatment by guards occurred at many institutions =
throughout the year.=20

Several monitoring groups, both domestic and international, carried out =
prison visits. The Government accepted unannounced visits by the Council =
of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) and is in =
regular dialog with the CPT. The International Committee of the Red =
Cross and the Government are discussing ICRC access to prisoners accused =
of PKK membership.=20

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile=20

Arbitrary arrest and detention remain problems. To take a person into =
custody, a prosecutor must issue a detention order, except in limited =
circumstances such as when a person is caught committing a crime. The =
maximum detention period for those charged with common individual crimes =
is 24 hours. The detention period may be extended by a judge for a =
maximum of 7 days. Under the CMUK, detainees are entitled to immediate =
access to an attorney and may meet and confer with the attorney at any =
time. In practice, this degree of access continued.=20

In March parliament passed new legislation that reduced detention =
periods. Persons detained for individual crimes that fall under the =
Anti-Terror Law must be brought before a judge within 48 hours, while =
those charged with crimes of a collective, political, or conspiratorial =
nature may be detained for an initial period of 48 hours, extended for =
up to 4 days at a prosecutor's discretion and, with a judge's =
permission, for up to 7 days in most of the country and up to 10 days in =
the southeastern provinces under the state of emergency. Attorneys are =
allowed access only after the first 4 days. Private attorneys and human =
rights monitors reported uneven implementation of reforms that shortened =
pretrial detention periods of those charged under the Anti-Terror Law, =
asserting that some police officers postdate the day of detention to =
comply with the new law. Like their colleagues in Batman, defense =
lawyers in Diyarbakir reported that in spite of the new law, access to =
detainees in political cases remains difficult, even after the =
expiration of the initial 4-day detention period. Diyarbakir lawyers =
knew of only one case, as of September, in which access by attorneys to =
detainees was permitted and only then after repeated attempts and =
because of the high profile of the case.=20

No immediate access to an attorney is provided under the law for persons =
whose cases fall under the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts; =
these include those charged with smuggling and with crimes under the =
Anti-Terror Law. This lack of early access to an attorney is a major =
factor in the use of torture by police and security forces. The decision =
concerning early access to counsel in such cases is left to the public =
prosecutor, who often denies access on the grounds that it would =
prejudice an ongoing investigation. Although the Constitution specifies =
the right of detainees to request speedy arraignment and trial, judges =
have ordered that a significant number of suspects be detained =
indefinitely, sometimes for years. Many cases involve persons accused of =
violent crimes, but it is not uncommon for those accused of nonviolent =
political crimes to be kept in custody until the conclusion of their =
trials.=20

By law a detainee's next of kin must be notified "in the shortest time" =
after arrest, a requirement observed in practice in criminal and civil =
cases. Once formally charged by the prosecutor, a detainee is arraigned =
by a judge and allowed to retain a lawyer. After arraignment, the judge =
may release the accused upon receipt of an appropriate assurance, such =
as bail, or order him detained if the court determines that he is likely =
to flee the jurisdiction or destroy evidence.=20

The Government does not use forced external exile, but the Government =
retains the authority to authorize internal exile (see Section 2.d.).=20

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial=20

The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, and in practice =
the courts generally act independently of the executive. The =
Constitution stipulates that judges be independent of the executive in =
the discharge of their duties and provides for security of tenure. The =
High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, which is appointed by the =
President and includes the Minister of Justice, selects judges and =
prosecutors for the higher courts and is responsible for oversight of =
those in the lower courts. The Constitution also prohibits state =
authorities from issuing orders or recommendations concerning the =
exercise of judicial power.=20

The judicial system is composed of general law courts, State Security =
Courts, and military courts. There is also a Constitutional Court. Most =
cases are prosecuted in the general law courts, which include the civil, =
administrative, and criminal courts. Appeals are heard either by the =
High Court of Appeals or the Council of State. Provincial administrative =
boards established under the Anti-Terror Law decide whether cases in =
which state officials are accused of misconduct should be heard in =
criminal court. Military courts, with their own appeals system, hear =
cases involving military law and members of the armed forces, and cases =
in which civilians are alleged to have impugned the honor of the armed =
forces or undermined compliance with the draft.=20

The Constitutional Court examines the constitutionality of laws, =
decrees, and parliamentary procedural rules. However, it may not =
consider "decrees with the force of law" issued under a state of =
emergency, martial law, or in time of war.=20

State Security Courts (SSC's) sit in eight cities. They are composed of =
panels of five members--two civilian judges, one military judge, and two =
prosecutors--and try defendants accused of crimes such as terrorism, =
drug smuggling, membership in illegal organizations, and espousing or =
disseminating ideas prohibited by law such as "damaging the indivisible =
unity of the state." SSC verdicts may be appealed only to a specialized =
department of the High Court of Appeals dealing with crimes against =
state security. Prosecutors and judges vested with responsibility for =
SSC cases are often housed in military barracks in the southeast, =
expressly for their personal protection. According to a human rights =
monitor this arrangement subjects them to significant pressure in =
reviewing cases. The law gives prosecutors far-reaching authority to =
supervise the police during an investigation. However, according to =
Human Rights Watch, prosecutors seems to make little use of this power, =
especially in cases of security detainees.=20

In 1997 SSC's predominantly handled cases under the Anti-Terror Law and =
Section 312 of the Criminal Code. The Government claims that these =
courts were established to try efficiently those suspected of certain =
crimes. These courts may hold closed hearings and may admit testimony =
obtained during police interrogation in the absence of counsel. The =
trial of 20 Diyarbakir lawyers charged in 1993 with acting as couriers =
for the PKK continues at the Diyarbakir SSC. All of the defendants =
remain free. In September nine Erzurum lawyers charged with similar =
crimes were acquitted.=20

Under the Constitution, defendants have the right to a public trial in a =
court of law. By law the bar association must provide free counsel to =
indigents who make a request to the court. Bar associations in large =
cities, such as Istanbul, have attorneys on call 24 hours a day. Costs =
are borne by the Association. There is no jury system; all cases are =
decided by a judge or a panel of judges. Trials may last for months or =
years, with one or two hearings scheduled each month.=20

Defense lawyers generally have access to the public prosecutor's files =
after arraignment and prior to trial (a period of several weeks). In =
cases involving violations of the Anti-Terror Law and a few others, such =
as insulting the president or "defaming Turkish citizenship," defense =
attorneys may be denied access to files that the state asserts deal with =
national intelligence or security matters. Attorneys defending =
controversial cases occasionally face legal harassment. Hasan Dogan, a =
respected Malatya attorney, who frequently defends persons in SSC cases, =
was himself detained. He was charged in May under Article 169 of the =
Criminal Code for membership in an illegal organization on the basis of =
evidence supplied by a convicted prisoner cooperating with the =
authorities in the hope of receiving more favorable treatment. Dogan is =
free pending trial. Many lawyers who practice before SSC's contend that =
cases in which testimony provided by informers is used are difficult to =
challenge.=20

In law and in practice, the legal system does not discriminate against =
minorities. However, since legal proceedings are conducted solely in =
Turkish, and the quality of interpreters varies, some defendants whose =
native language is not Turkish may be seriously disadvantaged. There are =
still some laws in effect that discriminate against women.=20

Turkey recognizes the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights =
and the European Commission of Human Rights. Citizens may file =
applications alleging violations of the European Convention for the =
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms with the Commission. =
According to the Government, as of November a total of 29 cases have =
been brought before the Court, 13 of which remain pending. An amicable =
resolution was reached in 6 cases, the court ruled in Turkey's favor in =
2 cases and against Turkey in 8 cases (see also Section 1.f.).=20

There is no reliable estimate of the number of political prisoners. The =
Government claims that most alleged political prisoners are in fact =
security detainees, convicted of being members of, or assisting, the PKK =
or other terrorist organizations. The number of people charged, =
suspected, or convicted of offenses under the Anti-Terror Law, according =
to government statistics, was as follows: during the first 10 months of =
1996, 1,024 persons were in custody and an additional 1,943 were =
suspects not in custody related to offenses under the Anti-Terror Law =
(latest available statistics). Eighty were convicted through October =
1996.=20

According to AI, Sevil Dalkilic, a lawyer, was detained in her hometown =
of Karman in March 1994, held in public custody in Ankara for 15 days, =
and severely tortured until she signed a statement implicating her in =
several bombing incidents. Convicted in the Ankara SSC of membership in =
a terrorist organization, employing explosives, and separatism based on =
"confessions extracted by the police," she was sentenced to 30 years in =
prison in 1995, even though she recanted her confession in court. A =
subsequent appeal confirmed the verdict.=20

f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence=20

The Constitution provides for the inviolability of a person's domicile =
and the privacy of correspondence and communication. With some =
exceptions, Government officials may enter a private residence or =
intercept or monitor private correspondence only upon issuance of a =
judicial warrant. These provisions are generally respected in practice =
outside the state of emergency region. A judge must decide whether to =
issue a search warrant for a residence. If delay may cause harm to the =
case, prosecutors and municipal officers authorized to carry out =
prosecutors' instructions may conduct a search. Searches of private =
premises may not be carried out at night, unless the delay would be =
damaging to the case or the search is expected to result in the capture =
of a prisoner at large. Other exceptions include persons under special =
observation by the Security Directorate General, places anyone can enter =
at night, places where criminals gather, places where materials obtained =
through the commission of crimes are kept, gambling establishments, and =
brothels.=20

In the six provinces under emergency rule, the regional state of =
emergency governor empowers security authorities to search without a =
warrant residences or the premises of political parties, businesses, =
associations, or other organizations. The Bar Association asserts that =
it is not constitutional for security authorities in these provinces to =
search, hold, or seize without warrant persons or documents. A total of =
six provinces remain under "adjacent province" status, which authorizes =
the Jandarma to retain security responsibility for municipalities as =
well as rural areas and grants the provincial governor several =
extraordinary powers. Due to an improved security situation, the use of =
roadblocks in the southeast decreased; security officials periodically =
still search vehicles and travelers. Over the past 5 to 6 years security =
forces have evacuated thousands of villages and hamlets in the southeast =
to prevent villagers from giving aid and comfort to the PKK (see Section =
1.g.). The Government claims that village evacuations occur as the =
consequence of pressures by and fear of the PKK and because security =
operations against the PKK in the region make continued occupancy =
unsafe. Security forces have confiscated citizens' satellite dishes in =
some parts of the southeast to prevent them from viewing pro-PKK =
broadcasts (see Section 2.a.).=20

g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law In Internal =
Conflicts=20

Since 1984 the separatist PKK has waged a violent terrorist insurgency =
in southeast Turkey, directed against both security forces and =
civilians, almost all of them Kurds, whom the PKK accuses of cooperating =
with the State. The TNP, Jandarma, village guards and the armed forces, =
in turn, have waged an intense campaign to suppress PKK terrorism, =
targeting active PKK units as well as persons they believe support or =
sympathize with the PKK. In the process, both government forces and PKK =
terrorists have committed human rights abuses against each other and =
noncombatants. According to the Government, from 1984 through November =
1997, 26,532 PKK members, 5,185 security force members, and 5,209 =
civilians lost their lives in the fighting.=20

In an effort to deny the PKK logistical support, the Government rationed =
food and other essentials in the province of Tunceli, the village of =
Tepe, near Lice in Diyarbakir Province, and parts of Bingol Province, =
causing severe shortages and hardship among the population. Other than =
in Tunceli where the rationing has been ongoing for some time, =
implementation of food rationing elsewhere is sporadic or localized. =
According to local human rights monitors, Tepe was blockaded by the =
military for 2 months in reprisal for the PKK murder of a village guard. =


In November the European Court of Human Rights found Turkey in violation =
of Article 8 (right to respect for home) in the case of three applicants =
whose homes were burned down by security forces in 1993. The Court =
attached particular weight to the fact that the public prosecutor did =
not carry out any meaningful investigation into the matter. The =
applicants were awarded court costs and expenses with damages to be =
determined at a future date.=20

Because so many villages have already been evacuated and because the =
fighting has now moved to mountains, government security forces =
evacuated and destroyed fewer villages than in previous years. According =
to the Government, only 4 villages and hamlets (settlements of 3 or 4 =
houses) and 970 persons were evacuated during the year. The Government's =
stated purpose was to protect civilians or prevent PKK guerrillas from =
obtaining logistical support from the inhabitants. Some villagers =
alleged that the security forces evacuated them for refusing to =
participate in the paramilitary village guard system. Journalists and =
human rights monitors were not permitted to enter the village of Lice =
where there were reports of large-scale detentions of villagers by the =
Jandarma for refusal to become village guards.=20

The exact number of persons forcibly displaced from villages in the =
southeast since 1984 is unknown. Most estimates agree that 2,600 to =
3,000 villages and hamlets have been depopulated. A few NGO's put the =
number of people forcibly displaced as high as 2 million. Official =
census figures for 1990--before large-scale forced evacuations =
began--indicate that the total population for the 10 southeastern =
provinces then under emergency rule was 4 to 4.5 million people, half of =
them in rural areas. Since all rural areas in the southeast have not =
been depopulated, the estimate of 2 million evacuees is probably too =
high. On the low end, the Government reports that through 1997 the total =
number of evacuees was 336,717. Rapidly growing demands for social =
services in the cities indicate that migration from the countryside has =
been higher than this figure. Although this urbanization is also =
accounted for in part by voluntary migration for economic or educational =
reasons also related to the conflict, the figure given by a former M.P. =
from the region--560,000--appears to be the most credible estimate of =
those forcibly evacuated. At the request of Republican Peoples' Party =
(CHP) M.P. Algan Hacaloglu, a former human rights monitor, a =
parliamentary committee was formed to investigate the causes of =
displacement and status of the displaced. It began work in July.=20

Government programs to deal with and compensate the forcibly evacuated =
villagers remain inadequate. Local and provincial officials are =
nevertheless making efforts to address the basic needs of some migrants. =
The governor of Diyarbakir, for example, opened a newly constructed =
neighborhood of 500 houses to resettlement by migrant families. The =
governor of Van resettled 257 migrant families in a new neighborhood in =
the provincial capital. A free "restaurant" run by the Van governor's =
office feeds nearly 1,000 migrants daily. In several provinces, =
officials provided looms for use by unemployed women. The rugs produced =
are then purchased by the Government for resale on the open market. =
Officials overseeing some of these programs acknowledge that funding is =
inadequate, and that much more needs to be done. Many migrants continue =
to live in overcrowded, unhealthful conditions with little opportunity =
for employment.=20

According to the Government, 7,608 persons were returned to 61 villages =
in the southeast during the year. The Foreign Ministry noted that some =
displaced persons chose to resettle in urban areas and are receiving =
assistance there. The Government initiated in 1996 an "emergency support =
program" to expedite resettlement in the southeast. The funds are used =
for rebuilding homes and roads, as well as for animal husbandry and =
beekeeping programs. Human rights activists criticize government efforts =
as inadequate in relation to the number of forcibly displaced persons.=20

There are credible allegations that serious abuses by security forces =
during the course of operations against the PKK continue. The Government =
organizes, arms, and pays for a civil defense force in the region known =
as the village guards. Local villagers' participation in this =
paramilitary militia is theoretically voluntary, but they are sometimes =
caught between the two sides. If the villagers agree to serve, the PKK =
may target them and their village. If the villagers refuse to =
participate, government security forces may retaliate against them and =
their village. The village guards have a reputation for being the least =
trained and disciplined of the Government's security forces and have =
been accused repeatedly of corruption, common crimes, and human rights =
abuses. In addition to the village guards, the Jandarma and police =
"special teams" are viewed as those most responsible for abuses.=20

The Government state of emergency, modified and most recently renewed =
for 4 months in November, imposes stringent security measures in six =
provinces in the southeast. The regional governor for the state of =
emergency may censor news, ban strikes or lockouts, and impose internal =
exile. The decree also provides for doubling the sentences of those =
convicted of cooperating with separatists. Informants and convicted =
persons who cooperate with the state are eligible for rewards and =
reduced sentences. Only limited judicial review of the state of =
emergency governor's administrative decisions is permitted.=20

Although schools have remained open in most urban centers in the =
southeast, rapid migration has led to severe overcrowding of schools and =
chronic teacher shortages. The PKK policy of murdering teachers =
exacerbated the situation (see Section 1.a.). Government officials claim =
that a significant effort is being made both to reopen schools and to =
build new schools in regions faced with acute overcrowding. According to =
government figures, 3,223 primary schools remain closed in 22 provinces =
in the east and southeast for security reasons or because of a teacher =
shortage. No secondary schools are closed. Although the Government =
continues to build boarding schools in the region's larger towns, these =
new schools have failed to fill the gap. A total of 88 boarding schools =
were completed with a total capacity of 49,614 students. Additional =
boarding schools numbering 38 are under construction. Some ethnic =
Kurdish leaders expressed concern that the government favored building =
boarding schools, rather than rebuilding local schools, as a way to =
accelerate the process of Kurdish assimilation.=20

Turkish ground forces with air support conducted several operations =
during the year in northern Iraq against the PKK. According to press =
reports, in May the Government sent between 25,000 and 50,000 troops =
into northern Iraq, and in September sent an estimated 8,000 to 15,000 =
ground troops and warplanes. In November Turkish forces joined local =
Iraqi Kurd forces of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in pitched =
battle against the PKK and forces of another Iraqi Kurd group, the =
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). During all these operations, PKK =
forces were reported by several sources to have attacked local civilians =
and damaged civilian property. Additional details are in the Iraq =
country report. The Turkish military strictly limited press access to =
the region during these operations. A report filed by a group granted =
controlled access to the Zap Valley area in northern Iraq, along with =
reports obtained from Kurdish and U.N. sources, suggest that the =
security forces minimized civilian causalities. The Patriotic Union of =
Kurdistan (PUK), charged that the Turkish military targeted villages in =
several of these operations, but these charges were not confirmed by =
other observers on the scene. The Turkish Government maintained that it =
targeted only the PKK in northern Iraq, not any other groups or =
civilians.=20

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:=20

a. Freedom of Speech and Press=20

The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and the press; however, =
the Government continued to limit these freedoms. The Criminal Code =
provides penalties for those who "insult the President, the Parliament, =
and the army." Numerous other provisions in various laws restrict =
freedom of expression to one degree or another; those most frequently =
employed include Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law and Article 312 of the =
Criminal Code. Judges generally examine evidence rigorously and dismiss =
many charges brought under these laws.=20

Domestic and foreign periodicals providing a broad spectrum of views and =
opinions are widely available. Government censorship of foreign =
periodicals is very rare. While overall readership of the local press is =
not large for a country of 60 million, the newspaper business is =
intensely competitive.=20

Electronic media reach nearly every adult, and their influence is =
correspondingly great. Radio and television have experienced explosive =
growth in the 6 years since privately owned broadcasting has been =
allowed: as of October, over 230 local, 15 regional, and 15 national =
television stations--the majority private--were registered, along with =
1,056 local, 108 regional, and 36 national radio stations. Other =
television and radio stations broadcast without an official license. In =
1994 Parliament passed regulatory legislation making it illegal for =
broadcasters to threaten the country's unity or national security and =
limiting the private broadcast of television programs in languages other =
than Turkish. The increasing availability of satellite dishes and cable =
television allows access to foreign broadcasts, including several =
Turkish-language private channels. In some areas of the southeast, =
security forces have systematically confiscated private satellite dishes =
in order to prevent viewing of pro-PKK MED-TV. This policy was applied =
selectively in migrant neighborhoods of Adana. Internet use is growing =
and faces no government restrictions.=20

Despite the Government's restrictions, the media daily criticize =
government leaders and policies. Media coverage of the situation in the =
southeast tended to be unreliable, underreporting it in some instances =
and sensationalizing it in others. Government Decree 430 gives the =
Interior Ministry upon the request of the regional governor the =
authority to ban distribution of any news viewed as misrepresenting =
events in the region, leading to self-censorship of news reporting from =
or about the southeast. In the event that such a government warning is =
not obeyed, the decree provides for a 10-day suspension of operations =
for a first offense and 30 days for subsequent offenses.=20

Two weeks after assuming office, to signal the new Government's =
commitment to freedom of expression, the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime =
Minister, Foreign Minister, and President Demirel each received a =
delegation from the CPJ. Immediately thereafter, the Government won =
passage of a law granting probationary amnesty to editors imprisoned =
under a press law still in existence that permits prosecutors to seek a =
court order for the confiscation of a newspaper or magazine and requires =
that each publication's "responsible editors" bear legal responsibility =
for the publication's content. The new law granted a full pardon to the =
responsible editors if they did not commit the same crime within 3 =
years. If they are convicted of the same crime during this probationary =
period, then they must serve sentences for both convictions. Under the =
August law, six imprisoned editors received a provisional amnesty; =
however, many others remain imprisoned.=20

Ismail Besikci served 10 years in prison between 1971 and 1987 for his =
publications on the Kurdish situation in Turkey. He has been in prison =
since 1993 on a variety of new charges based upon his ongoing articles =
on Kurdish issues. SSC prosecutors ordered the confiscation of numerous =
issues of leftist, Kurdish nationalist, and pro-PKK periodicals, =
although many continue to circulate. The pro-PKK newspaper Ozgur Ulke, =
and its successors Yeni Politika and Demokrasi, resumed publication in =
June as Ulkede Gundem. The newspaper has been increasingly difficult to =
find on newsstands in the southeast; the newspaper's distributor in =
Diyarbakir has been detained repeatedly, and copies have been =
confiscated by the Jandarma. In Adana, however, the newspaper appears =
regularly. Offices of small leftist publications are frequently raided =
by the police in the southeast.=20

Individual journalists are subject to harassment and police violence. In =
December the Committee to Protect Journalists listed 40 journalists =
under imprisonment.=20

In April Sanar Yurdatapan, a well-known musician and spokesman for =
freedom of expression, was arrested at the Istanbul airport with false =
passports destined for two former PKK members. According to Yurdatapan, =
after these two individuals served their sentences for ties to the PKK, =
they became agents for the Turkish security forces and later contacted =
Yurdatapan to give him information about acts including political murder =
that they had carried out on behalf of the State. Yurdatapan claimed to =
have videotapes of interviews and photographs of the men in military =
uniforms to substantiate his charges. He remains free pending the =
outcome of his SSC trial in Istanbul on charges of harboring members of =
an illegal organization.=20

According to Human Rights Watch, the case of three journalists arrested =
in June exemplified the arbitrary and contradictory nature of the =
repression of free expression. Two journalists from the now-defunct =
Demokrasi newspaper and the Diyarbakir correspondent from the ATV =
television station were arrested in June for interviewing two former PKK =
members alleged to have taken part in killings and illegal activities on =
behalf of the State. The three journalists were charged with forcing the =
pair to make the statements "in accord with the goals of the PKK." The =
men, however, made the same statements without incident to two other =
newspapers, two television programs, including Mehmet Ali Birand's "32nd =
Day," and to a parliamentary commission investigating the 1993 =
death-squad style killing of journalist Ugur Mumcu. A similar case =
occurred with the Turkish-language edition of Leo Muller's book, =
"Gladio: The Legacy of the Cold War," originally published in Germany. =
While Pencere publishing, a small Istanbul publishing house, released =
the first edition without incident, the second edition of the book =
published in February was confiscated, and both the publisher and =
translator were tried under Article 312 and the Anti-Terror Law. In =
September they were given a suspended sentence on the Article 12 charge =
and fined under the Anti-Terror Law. Both sentences have been appealed.=20

The authorities have suspended for a period of 3 years the case against =
some 1,080 writers and others for their support for novelist Yasar =
Kemal. In 1995 Kemal wrote an article entitled "Black Sky Over Turkey," =
which was published in a German news magazine and later reprinted in =
Turkey in a book entitled "Freedom of Expression," in which he =
ironically criticized the Government for its censorship relating to the =
Kurdish question. His appeal continues. In March Ertugrul Kurkcu and =
Ayse Nur Zarakolu, respectively the translator and publisher of a 1995 =
report by the Human Rights Watch Arms Project, "Weapons Transfers and =
Violations of the Laws of War in Turkey," were found guilty under =
Article 159 of the Penal Code of "defaming the state's security and =
military forces." Zarakolu and Kurkcu were both fined approximately $12, =
while Kurkcu received a 10-month suspended sentence

1997 IDCS US DEP STATE Report

TURKEY I.=20

Summary Although Turkey is not an opium producing country for the =
illicit market, it does play an increasingly significant role in =
processing opiate raw material into heroin, and is a major transit route =
for Southwest Asian narcotics (especially heroin) for the Western =
European market, and to a lesser extent the US. As much as 75 percent of =
heroin seized in Europe has been processed in or smuggled through =
Turkey. Turkey signed the 1988 UN Convention in 1988. The Convention was =
passed by Turkish Parliament in November 1995 and formally ratified in =
February 1996. A member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), =
Turkey passed anti-money laundering legislation in late 1996 that =
conforms to FATF recommendations. Consumption of narcotics in Turkey is =
low, but Turks recognize an increase in the use of opiates and cannabis. =
II. Status of Country Turkey is not, and is not likely to become, a =
major illicit opium growing country or a producer of precursor =
chemicals. It does play a significant role in processing opiate raw =
material into heroin. Turkey is recognized as a "traditional" poppy =
growing country by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) and =
by the USG for the licit opiate market. As such, there is licit =
cultivation of opium poppy to meet legitimate world demand for cooking =
and pharmaceutical uses. This production is confined to certain areas =
and carefully monitored. There is no evidence that licit production =
moves into illicit channels. The surge in seizures of acetic anhydride =
(AA) imports in 1995 continued in 1996. Between October 1995 and July =
1996, Turkish law enforcement officers intercepted more than 51 mt of =
AA, an essential precursor chemical for heroin production. One kilo of =
AA plus one kilo of morphine base produce one kilo of heroin and some =
by-products. Thus, 51 mt of AA could produce 51 mt of heroin. This =
confirms that Turkey is an important processing center for illicit =
opiate products, as well as a traditional narcotics transit route. While =
the total amount of heroin and morphine base smuggled into Turkey is =
unknown, DEA estimates that four to six mt of heroin a month leave =
Turkey for Western Europe. Turkey has in place anti-money laundering =
legislation in conformance with FATF recommendations. Implementing =
regulations are in process. Corruption and money laundering have become =
major topics on Turkey's political agenda. For example, the government =
is considering restricting access to or closing all casinos; part of the =
justification is that casinos are used to launder proceeds from =
narcotics trafficking. III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1996 Policy =
Initiatives. In November, the Turkish Parliament passed anti-money =
laundering legislation which formally criminalized the laundering of =
proceeds from trafficking in narcotics, illegal arms, historical =
artifacts, organized prostitution or the illegal trade in human organs. =
Other provisions include controlled delivery, and asset seizure. The law =
calls for the Finance Ministry to set up a Financial Crimes =
Investigation Board (FCIB) that will conduct studies for the prevention =
of money laundering, exchange information with international =
organizations, and investigate money laundering cases. In February, =
Turkey ratified the 1988 UN Convention, which had been passed by the =
Turkish Parliament in 1995. Accomplishments. The major significant =
development during 1996 in achieving the goals and objectives of the =
1988 Convention was the passing of anti-money laundering legislation in =
November, described above. Implementing rules and regulations are still =
in process. The FCIB is expected to be named within the next few weeks. =
The structure of the money laundering legislation meets FATF =
recommendations, including controlled delivery. Law Enforcement Efforts. =
Turkish enforcement agencies--the Turkish National Police (TNP), =
Jandarma (rural Police), Customs and Coast Guard)--work closely with the =
US and other countries in pursuing narcotics investigations and =
prosecuting traffickers. Spain, the UK, Nordic Countries, Germany, Italy =
and France have narcotics liaison officers posted in Turkey. According =
to Turkish Press reports, the Turkish Police (TNP) seized seven mt of =
hashish, three tons of heroin, and 12 kgs of cocaine during the year. A =
total of 4,060 suspects, including 136 foreigners, were detained on =
drug-related charges. Authorities destroyed seven heroin laboratories. =
Corruption. There is no Government of Turkey (GOT) policy encouraging or =
facilitating the illicit production or distribution of drug, or money =
laundering. However, alleged corruption of state officials--including =
strong ties between state officials and drug traffickers--recently =
became a major topic in Turkey with the "Susurluk" scandal. In November, =
a Mercedes carrying a member of Parliament, a former Deputy Police =
Chief, and a wanted Interpol murder suspect (alleged to be a hit man for =
Turkish drug traffickers) crashed into a truck, killing the occupants. =
According to press reports, police found numerous weapons, false =
identification, and bags of an unspecified white powder in the car. The =
subsequent flood of allegations linking the Turkish drug mafia to =
Turkish politicians and state police officials led to the resignation of =
Interior Minister (and former Security Director in Istanbul) Mehmet =
Agar, and the establishment of a Parliamentary committee of inquiry to =
investigate possible government corruption. This scandal was quickly =
followed by another, as an arrested money courier coming from Europe on =
her fiftieth trip in 1996 identified senior Turkish Police officers as =
her conduit for the drug money she carried. Police corruption in drug =
investigations, long kept just under the surface, appears to be finally =
coming to light. The public outrage of the disclosures bodes well for =
needed changes in anti-corruption efforts. Agreements and Treaties. The =
USG and the GOT have longstanding bilateral treaties covering =
extradition and mutual assistance in criminal matters, and a narcotics =
assistance protocol. Turkey ratified the 1988 UN Convention, and is a =
member of the Financial Action Task Force for the prevention of money =
laundering. Cultivation/Production. A small amount of cannabis is =
illicitly grown in Turkey. It is used locally and occasionally exported =
as hashish. Opium poppies are legally grown by licensed farmers. Licit =
opium production is strictly controlled, and there has been no known =
diversion into illicit channels. Drug Flow/Transit. Turkey's geographic =
position as a land bridge between Europe and Southwestern Asia makes it =
a significant transit country for illicit narcotics. Morphine base, =
heroin base, and heroin from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran are smuggled =
into Turkey across the Turkish/Iranian border or through Turkish ports. =
These drugs transit Turkey to Western Europe, most commonly in TIR =
(sealed Transport Internationale Routier) trucks. Morphine base arriving =
from Southwest Asia is also processed into heroin in Turkey, as =
evidenced by AA seizures and TNP crackdowns on heroin processing plants. =
Based on statistics from all sources, including European addict =
statistics, DEA estimates that 4-6 mt of heroin leave Turkey monthly. =
According to Turkish sources, smuggling narcotics through Turkey to =
Western Europe has become a major revenue source for the Kurdish =
Workers' Party (PKK), a terrorist organization. European law enforcement =
officials in six countries conducted raids on PKK-linked Kurdish drug =
distribution networks. Demand Reduction. There is only one drug =
rehabilitation center in Turkey; it treats alcoholics as well as drug =
addicts. Consumption of narcotics is not perceived to be a major =
problem, although there is general awareness about the need for drug =
education. The Turkish security department has drug prevention programs =
in schools, especially aimed at 11- to 15-year-olds, who are considered =
to be at greatest risk of addiction. IV. US Policy Initiatives and =
Programs USG antinarcotics goals in Turkey are to: -- Disrupt and =
diminish the transit of narcotics through Turkey, by providing narcotics =
control commodity and training assistance to the Turkish National =
Police, the primary Turkish narcotics interdiction and enforcement =
agency. The mission also provides training and equipment to Turkish =
Customs aimed at strengthening interdiction at Turkey's border gates. =
With the passage of anti-money laundering legislation in November, the =
US plans to start training in the detection of financial crimes related =
to narcotics trafficking. -- Prevent leakage from licit poppy =
production. Turkey has successfully prevented opium leaks into illicit =
channels by controlling processing and monitoring growing areas. The USG =
proposed a project to enhance the opiate content of the poppy straw, =
which will enable the Turkish Government to further raise prices to the =
farmer, and diminish the area under cultivation. Reduction of the area =
under cultivation will lower security monitoring expenses. -- Help =
address Turkey's small but growing drug abuse problem, by contributing =
funds to the Anatem Clinic, Turkey's only drug abuse and research =
center. Some FY-96 funds were used to purchase of automation equipment =
for the clinic. Bilateral Cooperation. After a series of years of =
increasing interdiction operations, 1996 saw a leveling off. There were =
no major arrests based on bilateral cooperation between the USG and GOT. =
The Road Ahead. Turkey will continue its anti-narcotics efforts. New =
legislation on corruption, and full enforcement of money laundering =
legislation, would be positive developments.=20



U.S. Department of State=20

Serbia-Montenegro Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997

Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, January =
30, 1998.=20


SERBIA-MONTENEGRO

Serbia-Montenegro, a constitutional republic, is dominated by Slobodan =
Milosevic who, after two terms as President of Serbia, became Federal =
President in July. President Milosevic continues to control the country =
through his role as President of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS)--a =
dual role arrangement proscribed by the federal Constitution--and his =
domination of other formal and informal institutions. Although the SPS =
lacks majorities in both the Federal and Serbian Parliaments, it =
controls governing coalitions and holds the key administrative =
positions. Serbia abolished the political autonomy of Kosovo and =
Vojvodina in 1990, and all significant decisionmaking since that time =
has been centralized under Milosevic in Belgrade. The Milosevic regime =
effectively controls the judiciary and has used this power to manipulate =
the election process, most notably to reverse opposition victories in =
Serbian municipal elections over the winter of 1996-97--an effort that =
the regime abandoned in February after sustained domestic and =
international pressure.=20

During 1997 the international community continued to work intensively =
with the Milosevic regime to implement the Dayton Accords, a =
step-by-step process designed to end the war in Bosnia and secure the =
peace. United Nations (U.N.) sanctions against the "Federal Republic of =
Yugoslavia" (FRY) were formally lifted in 1996. The FRY is still not =
permitted to participate in the United Nations (U.N.), the Organization =
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or other international =
organizations and financial organizations. The United States and the =
international community do not recognize Serbia-Montenegro as the =
successor state to the former Yugoslavia.=20

As a key element of his hold on power, President Milosevic effectively =
controls the Serbian police, a heavily armed force of over 100,000 that =
is responsible for internal security. After his move to the Federal =
presidency, Milosevic precipitated a crisis when he tried to wrest =
control of the Montenegrin police from Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo =
Djukanovic. Serbian police committed extensive and systematic human =
rights abuses.=20

Despite the suspension of U.N. sanctions, economic performance has been =
anemic. Unemployment and underemployment remained high as the Government =
was unable or unwilling to introduce necessary restructuring measures. =
The Government has not implemented sweeping economic reforms, including =
privatization, which could undermine the regime's crony system. Largely =
as a result of the central bank's tight monetary policy and the partial =
selloff of the state telecommunications entity, inflationary pressures =
were kept relatively in check.=20

The Government's human rights record continued to be poor. The police =
committed numerous, serious abuses including extrajudicial killings, =
torture, brutal beatings, and arbitrary arrests. Police repression =
continued to be directed against ethnic minorities, and police committed =
the most widespread and worst abuses against Kosovo's 90-percent ethnic =
Albanian population. Police repression was also directed against the =
Muslims of Sandzak and detainees and citizens who protested against the =
Government. While under the Constitution citizens have a right to stage =
peaceful demonstrations, the police seriously beat scores of protesters =
throughout the country, sending many to hospitals. The Government used =
its continued domination of Parliament and the media to enact =
legislation to manipulate the electoral process. In practice citizens =
cannot exercise the right to change their government. The judicial =
system is not independent of the Government and does not ensure fair =
trials. The authorities infringe on citizens' right to privacy. The =
Government used police and economic pressure against the independent =
press and media and restricted freedom of assembly and association. The =
Government infringed on freedom to worship by minority religions and on =
freedom of movement. The Government continues to hinder international =
and local human rights groups and reject their findings. Discrimination =
and violence against women remained serious problems. Discrimination =
against ethnic Albanian, Muslim, and Romani minorities continues. The =
regime limits unions not affiliated with the Government in their =
attempts to advance worker rights.=20

Montenegro was the only relatively bright spot, although Milosevic's =
influence threatens to complicate the republic's as yet unproven efforts =
at democratization. In July Montenegro's increasingly reformist Prime =
Minister, Milo Djukanovic, successfully fought off an attempt by =
Milosevic to change the Federal Constitution and boost the powers of the =
Federal presidency. Djukanovic appears to be resisting attempts by =
Milosevic to consolidate Montenegro's security apparatus-with its =
relatively clean human rights record since 1995-under the Belgrade =
regime. The results of the October presidential election, in which Milo =
Djukanovic defeated the incumbent, Momir Bulatovic, were questioned by =
the central authorities despite being endorsed as free and fair by the =
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).=20

As a signatory of the Dayton Accords, Serbia-Montenegro is obliged to =
cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former =
Yugoslavia by turning over to the Tribunal the five persons on its =
territory who were indicted for war crimes. The Government has so far =
been uncooperative. According to credible reports, some of those =
indicted live in Serbia, and others freely travel in and out of Serbia. =
Over the summer, suspected war criminal Ratko Mladic vacationed in =
Montenegro and earlier, according to press reports, attended his son's =
well-publicized wedding ceremony in Belgrade.=20

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS=20

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom =
from:=20

a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing=20

Political violence, including killings by police, resulted mostly from =
efforts by Serbian authorities to suppress and intimidate ethnic =
minority groups. Xhafer Hajdari of Mitrovica died in January, apparently =
from injuries sustained during police torture several weeks earlier. The =
victim had committed no crime, but police alleged that his son had =
killed a Serbian hunter in 1992.=20

On June 20, along the FRY border with the Republika Srpska at Priboj, =
the police killed one Muslim Bosniak and seriously mistreated another. =
Serbian security forces shot and killed several ethnic Albanians, =
identified by police as terrorists, including Adrian Krasniqi, a =
21-year-old ethnic Albanian shot and killed by Serbian police on October =
14.=20

At least two ethnic Albanians died while in jail awaiting trials. On =
February 23, Serbian police revealed that Besnik Restelica, an engineer =
from Podujevo, was killed while in police custody. Police claim that =
Restelica committed suicide, but according to reports of the Council for =
the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms, a monitoring organization =
based in Pristina, Kosovo, he had bruises on his legs, hands, and =
fingers and showed signs of having been strangled. He was abducted by =
police in late January. On October 17, another ethnic Albanian, Junus =
Zeneli, died while in police custody in Belgrade under suspicious =
circumstances. In both cases, legal requirements that family and legal =
counsel of the detainee contacted immediately were ignored.=20

Several violent clashes in Kosovo in late November between the police =
and Kosovar ethnic Albanians apparently resulted in fatalities on both =
sides.=20

Crimes against citizens of ethnic minority groups appear to have been =
rarely investigated, nor were police generally held accountable for =
their excesses.=20

b. Disappearance=20

There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances. An ethnic =
Albanian, Nait Hasani, of Pristina was seized by police on January 28, =
brutally beaten, and then disappeared for 32 days before police =
acknowledged that he was in their custody and charged him with =
terrorist-related activities.=20

The trial of Dusan Ranisavljevic began in April; he is an admitted =
participant in the 1993 Strpci incident, in which 19 Muslims and 1 Croat =
were taken off a train as it passed through Bosnian territory and =
disappeared (see Section 4). The fate of the men remains a mystery, and =
the Government is clearly reluctant to investigate fully the incident, =
as well as other disappearances. The trial started in April but was =
interrupted for procedural reasons when Montenegrin authorities sought =
to move the venue to a Serbian court in Jagodina, the defendant's =
hometown.=20

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or =
Punishment=20

Torture and other cruel forms of punishment, which are prohibited by =
law, continue to be a problem, particularly in Kosovo directed against =
ethnic Albanians. Police routinely beat people severely when holding =
them in detention. There were several police roundups in Kosovo during =
the early part of the year of ethnic Albanians charged with supporting a =
separatist agenda and terrorist-related activities. Police beat and =
tortured many of over 60 male and female suspects held in custody. It is =
during the 3 to 4 day period of incommunicado detention allowed by law =
that the worst police brutality takes place. These excesses are now =
primarily concentrated in Kosovo, and to a lesser extent in Sandzak. =
Serbian police inflicted some abuse on=20

prodemocracy demonstrators early in the year and again in the fall (see =
Section 2.b.).=20

Ethnic Albanians continue to suffer at the hands of security forces =
conducting searches for weapons and explosives. The police, without =
following proper legal procedures, frequently extract "confessions" =
during interrogations that routinely include the beating of suspects' =
feet, hands, genital areas, and sometimes heads. The police use their =
fists, nightsticks, and occasionally electric shocks. Apparently =
confident that there would be no reprisals, and, in an attempt to =
intimidate the wider community, police often beat persons in front of =
their families. According to various sources, ethnic Albanians are =
frequently too terrified to ask police to follow proper legal =
procedures--such as having the police provide written notification of =
witness interrogation.=20

According to Human Rights Watch, police beat at least 24 journalists =
during prodemocracy demonstrations over the winter of 1996-97 in =
Belgrade alone. Human Rights Watch cited an incident in which police =
using truncheons brutally beat the head of a 21-year-old student =
journalist, Rastko Kostic. The police stopped only when another passerby =
became involved, and they started beating him. In February the =
Humanitarian Law Center filed criminal charges on behalf of 21 =
journalists who had been beaten, but no action had been taken by the =
state prosecutor by year's end.=20

Police also used threats and violence against family members of suspects =
and have held them as hostages. According to Albanian and foreign =
observers, the worst abuses against ethnic Albanians took place not in =
big towns but in rural enclaves. Continuing a longstanding practice, the =
military conducted exercises using live ammunition next to an inhabited =
village in Sandzak during the summer on the Pester plain. No one was =
killed, but the practice showed insensitivity and served to intimidate =
the local Muslim population and encourage residents to leave.=20

Prison conditions meet minimum international standards. There were no =
confirmed reports of the abuse of prisoners, once they were sentenced =
and serving time.=20

The Government generally permits prison visits by human rights monitors. =
An important exception was the case of the ethnic Albanians arrested in =
a police sweep over the winter. The International Committee for the Red =
Cross was, except for one visit, denied access to the prisoners prior to =
the beginning of their trials in May.=20

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile=20

Police use of arbitrary arrest and detention was concentrated primarily =
in Kosovo and, to a lesser degree, in Sandzak. Police often apply =
certain laws only against ethnic minorities, using force with relative =
impunity. During Belgrade student protests in late September and early =
October, police arbitrarily arrested dozens of citizens, including some =
who were not even participating in the protests. Police also beat =
several journalists, photographers, and television camera people. Laws =
regarding conspiracy, threats to the integrity of the government, and =
state secrets are so vague as to allow easy abuse by the regime.=20

Federal statutes permit police to detain criminal suspects without a =
warrant and hold them incommunicado for up to 3 days without charging =
them or granting them access to an attorney. Serbian law separately =
provides for a 24-hour detention period. Police often combine the two =
for a total 4-day detention period. After this period, police must turn =
a suspect over to an investigative judge, who may order a 30-day =
extension and, under certain legal procedures, subsequent extensions of =
investigative detention up to 6 months. In Kosovo police often beat =
people without ever officially charging them and routinely hold suspects =
well beyond the 3-day statutory period. However, observers report that =
the problem is not as pronounced in the rest of Serbia-Montenegro as in =
the past.=20

Defense lawyers and human rights workers complained of excessive delays =
in filing formal charges and opening investigations. The ability of =
defense attorneys to challenge the legal basis of their clients' =
detention often was further hampered by difficulties in gaining access =
to detainees or acquiring copies of official indictments and decisions =
to remand defendants into custody. In some cases, judges prevented =
defense attorneys from reading the court file. The investigative judges =
often delegated responsibility to the police or state security service =
and rarely questioned their accounts of the investigation even when it =
was obvious that confessions were coerced. According to human rights =
observers, many of these problems were in evidence with respect to the =
ethnic Albanians arrested over the winter and convicted in the late =
spring in Pristina.=20

In a country where many if not most of the adult males in the Serbian =
population are armed, the police, according to some members of =
minorities, selectively enforced the laws regulating the possession and =
registration of firearms so as to harass and intimidate ethnic =
minorities, particularly Albanian Kosovars and Bosniak Muslims. The most =
frequent justification given for searches of homes and arrests was =
illegal possession of weapons. Observers allege that in Kosovo the =
police are known to use the pretext of searching for weapons when in =
fact they are also searching for hard currency. Local police authorities =
more easily approve the registration of legal weapons for Kosovo Serbs =
and frequently turn a blind eye to Serbs' possession of illegal weapons. =


Exile is not legally permitted, and no instances of its use are known to =
have occurred. However, the practical effect of police repression in =
Kosovo and Sandzak has been to accentuate political instability, which =
in turn has limited economic opportunity. As a result, many ethnic =
Albanians and Bosniak Muslims go abroad to escape persecution, although =
only in a few cases could direct links to police actions be identified.=20

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial=20

The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but in practice =
the courts are largely controlled by the Government and rarely challenge =
the will of the state security apparatus. While judges are elected for =
fixed terms, they may be subjected to governmental pressure. The =
authorities frequently deny fair public trial to non-Serbs and to =
persons they believe oppose the regime. The fraud that followed the =
November 1996 municipal elections was perpetrated mainly through the =
regime's misuse of the judicial system.=20

The court system comprises local, district, and supreme courts at the =
republic level, as well as a Federal Court and Federal Constitutional =
Court to which republic supreme court decisions, depending on the =
subject, may be appealed. There is also a military court system. =
According to the Federal Constitution, the Federal Constitutional Court =
rules on the constitutionality of laws and regulations, relying on =
republic authorities to enforce its rulings.=20

The Federal Criminal Code of the former Socialist Federal Republic of =
Yugoslavia still remains in force. Considerable confusion and room for =
abuse remain in the legal system because the 1990 Constitution of Serbia =
has not yet been brought into conformity with the 1992 Constitution of =
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Under Federal law, defendants have =
the right to be present at their trial and to have an attorney, at =
public expense if needed. The courts must also provide interpreters. The =
presiding judge decides what is read into the record of the proceedings. =
Either the defendant or the prosecutor may appeal the verdict.=20

Although generally respected in form, defense lawyers in Kosovo and =
Sandzak have filed numerous complaints about flagrant breaches of =
standard procedure which they believed undermined their clients' rights. =
Even when individual judges have admitted that the lawyers are correct, =
courts have ignored or dismissed the complaints.=20

The Government continues to pursue cases brought previously against =
targeted minority groups under the Yugoslav Criminal Code for =
jeopardizing the territorial integrity of the country and for conspiring =
or forming a group with intent to commit subversive activities--that is, =
undermining the "constitutional order."=20

Three questionable trials took place in Pristina over the summer and =
fall involving 60 ethnic Albanians. In the first trial, 20 individuals, =
including one woman, were charged mainly with preparing to conspire to =
participate in activities endangering the territorial integrity of the =
FRY. The evidence was inadequate and the defendants were largely denied =
timely access to their attorneys. U.N. Special Rapporteur Rehn noted =
that several defendants met their defense attorneys for the first time =
only after the investigative judge had already concluded the crucial =
stage of investigation, while other defendants had defense counsel =
assigned after they entered the courtroom.=20

Much evidence appeared to have been obtained by authorities through =
forced confessions of defendants under duress. Other evidence was kept =
from defense attorneys until right before the trial. Similar problems =
prevailed during the second and third trials, in which suspects were =
either accused of forming a terrorist organization with the aim of =
endangering the constitutional order or of killing police officers. A =
total of 52 defendants received prison sentences of up to 20 years.=20

Another aspect of the FRY'S ineffective judicial system is the impunity =
that exists for certain criminal behavior. For example, the bodyguard =
for Vojislav Seselj, the Serbian radical party leader and candidate for =
Serbian president, beat up a respected human rights lawyer, Nikola =
Barovic, after a television interview debate in which Seselj and Barovic =
disagreed vehemently. Barovic received serious injuries to the face, =
which Seselj dismissed glibly as being the result of the human rights =
lawyer having "slipped on a banana peel." The courts ignored the case =
for several weeks until after Serbian elections. When the case did go to =
trial, the judge accepted a banana peel into evidence. The case was =
suspended. In a case that demonstrated relative impunity, on October 13 =
the first municipal court of Belgrade found Zivko Sandic guilty only of =
criminal negligence for pulling out a gun and shooting a prodemocracy =
demonstrator in the head during a December 1996 protest. Sandic was =
sentenced to only 2 years in prison, close to the legal minimum. In one =
case with a rare just ending, Zlatibor Jovanovic, an ethnic Serb from =
Kosovo, was sentenced to 11 years in prison for murdering an ethnic =
Albanian student in 1996.=20

The Government continues to hold some ethnic Albanians as political =
prisoners.=20

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence=20

Federal law gives republic ministries of the interior sole control over =
the decision to monitor potential criminal activities, a power that is =
routinely abused. It is widely believed that authorities monitor =
opposition and dissident activity, eavesdrop on conversations, read =
mail, and wiretap telephones. Although illegal under provisions of =
Federal and Serbian law, the Federal post office registers all mail from =
abroad, ostensibly to protect mail carriers from charges of theft.=20

Although the law includes restrictions on searches, officials often =
ignored them. In Kosovo and Sandzak, police have systematically =
subjected ethnic Albanians and Bosniak Muslims to random searches of =
their homes, vehicles, shops, and offices, asserting that they were =
searching for weapons. According to the Council for the Defense of Human =
Rights and Freedoms, the police carried out scores of raids on homes. =
Police also used threats and violence against family members of suspects =
and have held them as hostages (see Section 1.c.).=20

Ultranationalist local officials in Zemun encouraged the illegal =
eviction of ethnic Croats from their apartments, after which they were =
replaced by ethnic Serb refugees (see Section 5).=20

The Government's law requiring universal military service is enforced =
only sporadically. It was not vigorously enforced in 1997. The informal =
practice of the military has been not to call up ethnic Albanians. Of =
approximately 100,000 draft evaders living abroad to avoid punishment, =
40 percent were estimated to be ethnic Albanian. This number in part =
reflects the large number of conscription-age men in the FRY's Albanian =
community. The climate appears to be moderating, due to the cessation of =
hostilities in Bosnia. Nevertheless, leaders of Kosovo's Albanian and =
Sandzak's Muslim communities have maintained that forced compliance of =
these ethnic groups with universal military service was an attempt to =
induce young men to flee the country. According to an amnesty bill =
passed in 1996, young men for whom criminal prosecution for draft =
evasion had already started were granted amnesty.=20

In a related development, under a 1996 agreement with Germany, ethnic =
Albanian refugees repatriated to the FRY were not supposed to be =
prosecuted for fleeing the draft. According to the Humanitarian Law =
Center (HLC), however, many returning ethnic Albanians have faced =
irregular procedures on returning to the FRY. The HLC reported many =
violations by authorities against returned asylum seekers, including =
physical abuse, threats of imprisonment, deportation, confiscation of ID =
cards, and obliging persons to report to their local police stations on =
a daily basis. Returning ethnic Albanians and Sandzak Muslims are =
routinely detained on their arrival at local airports. In many cases FRY =
officials have refused to issue proper travel documents to children born =
to asylum seekers.=20

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:=20

a. Freedom of Speech and the Press=20

Federal law provides for freedom of speech and of the press, but in =
practice the Government strongly influences much of the media. In July =
several weeks before the Serbian elections, the Milosevic regime =
temporarily closed scores of private radio and television stations =
throughout Serbia. The FRY Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications, =
which controls broadcast frequencies, worked in concert with the =
criminal and financial police to pressure independent media outlets that =
had not been able to regularize their legal status. Many broadcasters =
applied for frequencies but were left in a state of limbo by the regime. =
Serbia's broadcast laws remain murky, and licenses are not issued in any =
fashion that can remotely be described as transparent.=20

While the regime harassed the independent media, an HLC study showed =
that the Government violated the agreement on the presentation of =
political parties, signed before the election season. During the =
campaign season in August, state-controlled Radio and Television Serbia =
(RTS) openly campaigned for Milosevic's ruling coalition. According to =
HLC monitoring, all the other political parties received only =
one-quarter of the broadcast time allocated for political parties, while =
the RTS regularly opened the evening news broadcasts with campaign =
promotion pieces for the regime.=20

The regime lost one of its most important media outlets when it was =
forced to reverse the theft of the Belgrade municipal elections in =
February and consent to the naming of Democratic Party Leader Zoran =
Djindic as the city's mayor. Control of Belgrade's Studio B radio went =
from the regime to the opposition, and the management immediately =
started broadcasting generally balanced news programming. The regime, =
however, reversed the setback when the Zajedno coalition of the =
political opposition fell apart. Studio B's independent management was =
dismissed a week after the first round of Serbian elections on September =
21, and the news board's commitment to journalistic independence is =
suspect at best. In effect, Studio B is now under SPO censorship.=20

The most striking example of media bias came in reaction to the mass =
demonstrations from November 1996 to February 1997 that followed =
widespread government theft of the municipal elections. The =
government-controlled media downplayed the size of crowds, sometimes =
ignoring demonstrations altogether--despite numbers of demonstrators in =
the tens of thousands. When state-run television did cover =
demonstrations, it was in an effort to label protesters as "hooligans" =
and "traitors" determined to destroy Serbia.=20

The same media tack was used when ethnic Albanian students staged a =
peaceful protest march in Pristina on October 1 only to be accused by =
the state-controlled media of instigating violence in a clash that saw =
police move in with truncheons, tear gas, and water cannons. The =
state-controlled media, moreover, took advantage of the protests to =
accuse the Belgrade opposition of being in league with "Albanian =
separatists."=20

Economic pressure was the usual weapon of the regime against the free =
press. For example, state-owned enterprises were dissuaded from =
advertising in independent media. One of Serbia's leading opposition =
papers, Nasa Borba, had its bank accounts blocked by the regime. =
Although no longer the persistent problem it was during the period of =
sanctions, the availability of newsprint continued to pose difficulties, =
especially for the independent media. Also, while the state-controlled =
press obtained newsprint at subsidized prices, independent publications =
paid substantially higher market prices.=20

Academic freedom exists in a limited fashion. Many leading academicians =
are active members of the political opposition and human rights groups, =
and the espousal of antiregime positions would likely limit their =
advancement. At the prestigious University of Belgrade, half the =
membership of the governing council that controls the university is =
appointed by the regime and half by the various faculties.=20

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association=20

The Federal and republic-level Constitutions provide for freedom of =
peaceful assembly and association; however, the Government restricted =
this right. During the early part of 1997, citizens were prevented from =
staging protest marches on numerous occasions before the regime finally =
restored the opposition's victories in several Serbian municipalities. =
In Kosovo the regime cracked down on peaceful demonstrators during their =
October 1 and late December protests, when police used tear gas and =
clubs, injuring several passersby. The regime cited the student =
protesters' unwillingness to apply for a permit from Serbian =
authorities. In Sandzak the Milosevic regime banned all outdoor rallies, =
even for election campaigning.=20

The federal and republic level Constitutions provide for freedom of =
association, but the Government restricted this right. Prior to the =
Serbian elections in the fall, officials blocked the coalition =
Sandzak-Dr. Rasim Ljajic from forming an alliance with the Kosovo-based =
Democratic Reform Party of Muslims, a move that protected regime =
candidates from extra competition.=20

c. Freedom of Religion=20

There is no state religion, but the Government gives preferential =
treatment, including access to state-run television for major religious =
events, to the Serbian Orthodox Church to which the majority of Serbs =
belong. The regime has subjected religious communities in Kosovo to =
harassment. For example, a Roman Catholic parish in Klina has the money, =
property, and permission (including up to the Supreme Court of Serbia) =
to build a church for its 6,000 member parish. However, the local =
chapter of Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia has continued to block =
construction. Other Catholic and Muslim communities in the province had =
similar experiences.=20

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, =
and Repatriation=20

The Constitution provides for freedom of movement, and the Government =
makes passports available to most citizens. However, many inhabitants of =
Serbia-Montenegro who were born in other parts of the former Yugoslavia, =
as well as large numbers of refugees, have not been able to establish =
their citizenship in the FRY, leaving them in a stateless limbo.=20

According to a report by the Humanitarian Law Center, authorities on =
several different occasions barred FRY citizens from reentering the =
country. The regime also continues to restrict the right of Albanian =
Kosovars and Sandzak Muslims to travel by holding up issuance or renewal =
of passports for an unusually long period of time and has reserved the =
option of prosecuting individuals charged previously with violating exit =
visa requirements.=20

FRY citizens reported difficulties at borders and occasional =
confiscation of their passports. Ethnic Albanians, Sandzak Muslims, and =
Vojvodina Croats frequently complained of harassment at border =
crossings. There were numerous reports that border guards confiscated =
foreign currency or passports from travelers as well as occasional =
complaints of physical mistreatment. The authorities generally allowed =
political opposition leaders to leave the country and return.=20

The Government has been very slow to issue passports to refugees. =
Albanian Kosovars also have problems with the issuance and renewal of =
passports and are sometimes called in for interrogation by state =
security officers before passports are issued. In January a new =
citizenship law entered into force, which, when fully implemented, is =
expected to affect adversely the rights of many inhabitants, including =
those born in other parts of the former Yugoslavia, refugees, and =
citizens who had migrated to other countries to work or seek asylum. The =
U.N. Special Rapporteur for the former Yugoslavia noted that the new law =
would give the Ministry of Interior almost complete control over the =
granting of citizenship. The Government served notice that it plans to =
limit severely the granting of citizenship to refugees from the =
conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia. The Government also plans to revise the =
eligibility status of a large number of people; refugees who have been =
granted citizenship since 1992 may stand to lose their FRY citizenship =
if they have acquired the citizenship of an ex-Yugoslav republic.=20

Observers in the Sandzak region also note that Muslim residents who were =
forced to flee to Bosnia from Sandzak in 1992 and 1993 may not be =
permitted to return to Serbia, particularly if they have obtained =
Bosnian passports in the interim. In violation of the Dayton Accords, =
Bosniak Muslims and Muslims from Sandzak frequently have been harassed =
on attempting to reenter Serbia after visits to Sarajevo or the =
federation.=20

Government policy toward refugee and asylum seekers continued to be =
uneven. Refugees, mostly ethnic Serbs who fled Bosnia and Croatia, are =
often treated as citizens of Serbia-Montenegro for labor and military =
purposes but are denied other rights such as employment and travel (see =
Section l.f.). Refugees were not allowed to vote in the 1997 elections =
in Serbia, although they did vote in some previous elections. The =
Government has cooperated with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees =
to provide help for the more than 500,000 refugees in Serbia-Montenegro. =


Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change =
Their Government=20

The three constitutions--Federal, Serbian, and Montenegrin =
Republic--provide for this right, but in practice citizens are prevented =
from exercising it by the Government's domination of the mass media and =
manipulation of the electoral process. Only Montenegro's electoral =
system has shown marked improvement, with the Government of Prime =
Minister Djukanovic holding a roundtable with the political opposition, =
including ethnic minorities, in September and welcoming observers from =
the OSCE well ahead of Milosevic's grudging invitation to outside =
monitors shortly before Serbian presidential and parliamentary elections =
in September.=20

Serbian elections were seriously flawed. In July the regime repeated its =
machinations before 1996 Federal elections and gerrymandered electoral =
districts to smooth the way for candidates in the ruling coalition, =
expanding the number of districts in Serbia from 9 to 29. Most =
opposition politicians charged that changes in the election law =
implemented since the last election, including the redrawing of =
districts, were designed specifically to favor the ruling party. The =
redistricting was one factor that compelled a number of opposition =
parties to boycott the elections.=20

Slobodan Milosevic dominates the country's political system and is =
attempting to reconsolidate institutional power at the Federal level as =
a result of his move to the Federal presidency. This precipitated a =
clash with authorities in Montenegro who are intent on protecting that =
republic's autonomy. Manipulating power within the federation based on =
the comparative size of the Serbian and Montenegrin populations and =
economies, Milosevic has been able to circumscribe the Montenegrin =
Government's capacity for independent action. As a result of Serbia's =
political crisis during the winter of 1996-97, Montenegro's then Prime =
Minister, Milo Djukanovic, began to take a steadily more assertive, =
reformist course. His victory in October presidential elections over =
incumbent Montenegrin president and Milosevic crony, Momir Bulatovic, =
threatened Milosevic's complete control over institutions of power and =
prompted a standoff as the internationally endorsed results were not =
validated.=20

No legal restrictions exist on women's participation in government and =
politics, and women are active in political organizations. However, they =
are greatly underrepresented in party and government offices, holding =
less than 10 percent of ministerial-level positions in the Serbian and =
Federal governments. An exception is the controversial Mira Markovic, =
wife of Serbian President Milosevic. She is the leading force in the =
neo-Communist United Yugoslav Left Party, through which she exerts =
considerable influence on policymakers.=20

No legal restrictions affect the role of minorities in government and =
politics, but ethnic Serbs and Montenegrins dominate the country's =
political leadership. Few members of other ethnic groups play any role =
at the top levels of government or the state-run economy. Ethnic =
Albanians in Serbia's Kosovo province have refused to take part in the =
electoral process, including Serbian elections in the fall. They have =
virtually no representation.=20

Ethnic Albanians' refusal to participate in FRY Federal and Serbian =
elections has the practical effect of increasing the political influence =
of President Milosevic and his supporters. Ultranationalist parties, =
which in the past were occasional Milosevic allies, have also taken =
advantage of the ethnic Albanian boycott to garner representation beyond =
their numbers. Ethnic Albanians in Montenegro do participate in the =
political process, and several towns in Montenegro have Albanian mayors. =


Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and =
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights=20

The Governments of Serbia and Montenegro formally maintain that they =
have no objection to international organizations conducting human rights =
investigations on their territories. It was the report of the OSCE on =
the fraud that characterized the municipal elections that the regime =
cited in reversing the results and ultimately recognizing the final =
results in February, some 3 months after the vote. The Serbian regime =
sporadically hindered activities and regularly rejected the findings of =
human rights groups. The Montenegrin Government's record toward outside =
investigations was much better, with the Prime Minister taking the =
initiative to invite OSCE observers well in advance of the October =
presidential election in the Republic.=20

A number of independent human rights organizations exist in =
Serbia-Montenegro, researching and gathering information on abuses, and =
publicizing such cases. The Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Center and =
Center for Antiwar Action researches human rights abuses throughout =
Serbia-Montenegro and, on occasion, elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. =
The Belgrade-based Helsinki Committee publishes studies on human rights =
issues and cooperates with the Pristina-based Helsinki Committee in =
monitoring human rights abuses in Kosovo. In Kosovo the Council for the =
Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms collects and collates data on human =
rights abuses and publishes newsletters. In the Sandzak region, two =
similar committees monitor abuses against the local Muslim population =
and produce comprehensive reports. Most of these organizations offer =
advice and help to victims of abuse.=20

Local human rights monitors (Serbs as well as members of ethnic =
minorities) and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) worked under =
difficult circumstances. Sefko Alomerovic, chairman of the Helsinki =
Committee for Human Rights in Sandzak, was formally charged with libel =
by former FRY President Dobrica Cosic and his advisor Vladimir Matovic. =
Alomerovic had publicly accused Cosic and Matovic of direct complicity =
in the 1993 Strpci incident, in which some 20 men, including 19 Muslims, =
disappeared (see Section 1.f.). Alomerovic believes that the Government, =
and Cosic, were responsible for their disappearance. The case continued =
at year's end.=20

Overall, however, most observers say that the situation improved in =
1997, with slightly less overt obstruction by the Government of human =
rights NGO's. One problem continues to be government foot-dragging in =
issuing visas to people coming to Yugoslavia on human rights matters. =
After past problems obtaining a visa, the U.N. Special Rapporteur for =
the former Yugoslavia visited Serbia-Montenegro, including Pristina, =
twice in 1997. During the year, the International Committee of the Red =
Cross was allowed to conduct prison visits in Kosovo, but its work was =
seriously obstructed with respect to visiting the ethnic Albanians =
charged with terrorist-related activities who went on trial beginning in =
the spring.=20

However, the authorities also refused numerous approaches by OSCE =
representatives to allow the reintroduction of the OSCE long-duration =
missions into Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Sandzak, maintaining that the FRY =
must first be "reinstated" in the OSCE.=20

Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, =
Language, or Social Status=20

While Federal and republic laws provide for equal rights for all =
citizens, regardless of ethnic group, religion, language, or social =
status, and prohibit discrimination against women, in reality the legal =
system provides little protection to such groups.=20

Women=20

The traditionally high level of domestic violence persisted. The few =
official agencies dedicated to coping with family violence have =
inadequate resources and are limited in their options by social pressure =
to keep families together at all costs. Few victims of spousal abuse =
ever file complaints with authorities. The Center for Autonomous Women's =
Rights offers a rape crisis and spousal abuse hot line, as well as =
sponsoring a number of self-help groups. The Center also offered help to =
refugee women, many of whom experienced extreme abuse or rape during the =
conflict in the former Yugoslavia.=20

Women do not enjoy status equal to men in the FRY, and relatively few =
women obtain upper level management positions in commerce.=20

Traditional patriarchal ideas of gender roles, which hold that women =
should be subservient to the male members of their family, have long =
subjected women to discrimination. In some rural areas, particularly =
among minority communities, women are little more than serfs without the =
ability to exercise their right to control property and children. Women =
in the FRY, however, legally are entitled to equal pay for equal work =
and are granted maternity leave for 1 year, with an additional 6 months =
available. Women are active in political and human rights organizations. =
Women's rights groups continue to operate with little or no official =
acknowledgment.=20

Children=20

The state attempts to meet the health and educational needs of children. =
The educational system provides 8 years of mandatory schooling.=20

The current division of Kosovo into parallel administrative systems has =
resulted in Serb and Albanian Kosovar elementary age children being =
taught in separate areas of divided schools, or attending classes in =
shifts. Older Albanian Kosovar children attend school in private homes. =
The quality of the education is thus uneven, and the tension and =
division of society in general has been replicated to the detriment of =
the children.=20

An agreement negotiated under the auspices of the Rome-based Sant-Egidio =
community and signed in 1996 by President Milosevic and Dr. Ibrahim =
Rugova, the leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo, seeks to resolve =
the division of the educational system and lend impetus to efforts to =
normalize the situation within Kosovo. No progress was apparent on =
implementation of the accord over a year later, however, prompting a =
student protest movement in Kosovo (see Section 2.b.). Intransigence in =
implementing the agreement was detected on both sides.=20

Economic distress, due primarily to the Government's total =
mismanagement, has spilled over into the health care system, adversely =
affecting children. In Kosovo the health situation for children remained =
particularly poor. Humanitarian aid officials blamed the high rate of =
infant and childhood mortality, as well as increasing epidemics of =
preventable diseases, primarily on poverty that led to malnutrition and =
poor hygiene and to the deterioration of public sanitation. Ethnic =
minorities in some cases fear Serb state-run medical facilities, which =
results in a low rate of immunization and a reluctance to seek timely =
medical attention. Significant cooperation between Serbian medical =
authorities and ethnic Albanian-run clinics in Kosovo on a polio =
vaccination campaign represented a hopeful development. A similar drive =
took place in Sandzak for Muslim children.=20

There is no societal pattern of abuse against children.=20

People With Disabilities=20

Facilities for people with disabilities are inadequate, but the =
Government has made some effort to address the problem. The law =
prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in =
employment, education, or in the provision of other state services. The =
law mandates access to new official buildings, and the Government =
enforces these provisions in practice.=20

Religious Minorities=20

Religion and ethnicity are so closely intertwined as to be inseparable. =
Serious discrimination against, and harassment of, religious minorities =
continued, especially in the Kosovo and Sandzak regions. Violence =
against the Catholic minority in Vojvodina, largely made up of ethnic =
Hungarians and Croats, has also been reported.=20

National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities=20

There were credible reports that Muslims and ethnic Albanians continued =
to be driven from their homes or fired from their jobs on the basis of =
religion or ethnicity. Other ethnic minorities, including ethnic =
Hungarians in Vojvodina, also allege discrimination. In Zemun the =
Belgrade Helsinki Committee office identified at least three instances =
where the city government, under ultranationalist mayor Vojislav Seselj, =
encouraged the illegal eviction of ethnic Croats from their apartments, =
after which they were replaced by ethnic Serb refugees.=20

The Romani population is generally tolerated, and there is no official =
discrimination. Roma have the right to vote, and there are two small =
Romani parties. However, prejudice against Roma is widespread. Skinheads =
murdered a Roma boy in Belgrade in October. Local authorities often =
ignore or condone societal intimidation of the Roma community.=20

Section 6 Worker Rights=20

a. The Right of Association=20

All workers except military and police personnel have the legal right to =
join or form unions. Unions are either official (government affiliated) =
or independent. The total labor force is approximately 2.3 million. The =
Government-controlled Alliance of Independent Labor Unions =
(Samostalnost) claims 1.8 million members but probably numbers closer to =
1 million. The largest independent union is the United Branch =
Independent Labor Unions (Nezavisnost), which numbers 157,000 members. =
Most other independent unions are sector-specific, for example, the =
Independent Union of Bank Employees (12,000 members). Due to the poor =
state of the economy, over one-half of union workers are on long-term =
mandatory leave from their firms pending increases in production. The =
independent unions, while active in recruiting new members, have not yet =
reached the size needed to enable countrywide strikes that would force =
employers to provide concessions on workers' rights. The independent =
unions also claim that the Government has managed to prevent effective =
recruiting through a number of tactics, including preventing the busing =
of workers to strikes, threatening the job security of members, and =
failing to grant visas to foreign visitors supporting independent =
unions. Some foreign union organizers managed to secure visas during the =
year after long delays











Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - Consular Information Sheet US =
State Department

October 23, 1998=20

COUNTRY DESCRIPTION: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYR of =
Macedonia) is a developing nation undergoing economic change. Conditions =
in tourist facilities vary considerably, and many are not up to Western =
standards.=20

ENTRY AND EXIT REQUIREMENTS: U.S. citizens need a passport and visa. =
Although travelers may be able to obtain visas at the border, it is =
recommended that they obtain their visas in their country of residence =
prior to travel. Additional information may be obtained from the Embassy =
of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 3050 K Street N.W., Suite =
210, Washington, D.C., 20007, telephone (202) 337-3063. Travelers will =
be required to complete an entry/exit document when they enter the FYR =
of Macedonia. The exit portion of this document must be retained for =
presentation to Immigration officials upon departure. Loss of this form =
may result in departure delays.=20

U.S. citizens who plan to travel to Serbia-Montenegro should obtain =
visas before arriving in Skopje. It is not possible to get a visa for =
Serbia-Montenegro at the border. In recent months, U.S. citizens have =
found it increasingly difficult to obtain visas at the Embassy of the =
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) in Skopje, and many =
visitors have faced long waits.=20

AREAS OF INSTABILITY: To date, while the conflicts in the Balkan Region =
have had no significant direct impact on the FYR of Macedonia, visitors =
to border areas near Albania and Serbia-Montenegro, or visitors planning =
to travel to those countries from FYR of Macedonia, should consult the =
travel warnings for those countries. Because of continuing tensions =
along the borders with Albania and Serbia-Montenegro, visitors should =
cross only at recognized border crossings.=20

There have been a number of minor explosions, always detonated at night, =
and usually near police stations or other government facilities. But to =
date there have been no casualties. Additionally, there have been a few =
street demonstrations in support of freedom in Kosovo by ethnic-Albanian =
citizens of FYR of Macedonia. These demonstrations have been generally =
peaceful, with only individual acts of minor vandalism associated with =
them. To minimize risk, visitors should not approach demonstrations.=20

MEDICAL FACILITIES: Health facilities are limited. Medicines are in =
short supply. Doctors and hospitals expect immediate cash payment for =
health services. U.S. medical coverage is not always valid outside the =
United States. The Medicare/Medicaid program does not provide payment =
for medical services outside the United States.=20

Check with your own insurance company to confirm whether your policy =
applies overseas, including provision for medical evacuation. Ascertain =
whether payment will be made to the overseas hospital or doctor or =
whether you will be reimbursed later for expenses you incur. Some =
insurance policies also include coverage for psychiatric treatment or =
disposition of remains in the event of death. Useful information on =
medical emergencies abroad, including overseas insurance programs, is =
provided in the Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs brochure =
Medical Information for Americans Traveling Abroad, available via its =
home page and autofax service.=20

The international travelers hotline of the Centers for Disease Control =
and Prevention may be reached from the United States at 1-877-394-8747, =
via their autofax service at 1-888-232-3229, or their Internet site at =
http://www.cdc.gov.=20

CRIME INFORMATION: Theft and other petty crimes occur in the FYR of =
Macedonia. The loss or theft of a U.S. passport should be reported =
immediately to the local police and the nearest U.S. embassy or =
consulate. Useful information on safeguarding valuables and protecting =
personal safety while traveling abroad is provided in the Department of =
State's pamphlet A Safe Trip Abroad. It is available from the =
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, =
Washington, D.C. 20402, via the Internet at =
http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs, or http://travel.state.gov.=20

DRUG PENALTIES: U.S. citizens are subject to the laws of the country in =
which they are traveling. Penalties for possession, use, or trafficking =
in illegal drugs are strict, and convicted offenders can expect jail =
sentences and fines.=20

ROAD SAFETY/CONDITIONS: Most major highways are in good repair, but =
secondary roads are poorly maintained and lighted, and frequently they =
are used by horse-drawn carts and livestock. Many vehicles are old and =
lack standard front or rear lights. Mountain roads can lack guard rails, =
be narrow, or be poorly marked, and they quickly become dangerous in =
inclement weather.=20

AVIATION SAFETY OVERSIGHT: As there is no direct commercial air service =
by local carriers at present, nor economic authority to operate such =
service between the United States and the FYR of Macedonia, the U.S. =
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has not assessed the FYR of =
Macedonia's civil aviation authority for compliance with international =
aviation safety standards for oversight of the FYR of Macedonia's air =
carrier operations. For further information, travelers may contact the =
Department of Transportation within the U.S. at 1-800-322-7873, or visit =
the FAA Internet home page at http://www.faa.gov/avr/iasa.htm. The U.S. =
Department of Defense (DOD) separately assesses some foreign air =
carriers for suitability as official providers of air services. For =
information regarding the DOD policy on specific carriers, travelers may =
contact the Pentagon at 1-703-697-7288.=20

EMBASSY LOCATION/REGISTRATION: U.S. citizens are encouraged to register =
at the U.S. Embassy in Skopje and obtain updated information on travel =
and security in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The U.S. =
Embassy is located at Ilindenska BB, 91000 Skopje, telephone (389) 91 =
116-180, fax (389) (91) 117-103.=20

* * * *=20

This replaces the Consular Information Sheet dated March 12, 1997, to =
update information on entry/exit requirements, areas of instability, =
medical facilities, crime information, road safety conditions, and =
aviation safety oversight.=20

Consular Information Sheets and Travel Warnings US State Department



Albania - Consular Information Sheet US State Department

December 29, 1998=20

WARNING: The Department of State warns against all travel to Albania =
because the overall security situation remains unstable. U.S. citizens =
are urged to consider their personal security situations, and, if =
appropriate, to leave Albania.=20

Given the possibility that the U.S. Embassy's personnel and facilities =
could be the targets of a terrorist attack, on August 14, 1998, the =
Department of State ordered the departure of U.S. Embassy personnel in =
non-emergency positions and families of U.S. Embassy personnel, and =
later further reduced its staff. As a result of the continued reduction =
in staff, the U.S. Embassy has suspended normal operations and is able =
to offer only emergency services to American citizens.=20

Following incidents of violence in Tirana in September 1998, in the wake =
of the assassination of a political leader, the situation in Albania =
remains volatile and the possibility exists that there may be further =
incidents of violence. American citizens resident in Albania are =
strongly advised to avoid crowds and demonstrations at all costs and =
exercise extreme caution at all times. The northeastern area of Albania, =
including the towns of Tropoja and Bajram Curri and the area near the =
Kosovo border, remains outside effective government control. Travel to =
this area is exceedingly dangerous. Even persons traveling to this area =
solely to render humanitarian assistance to refugees have been attacked =
by bandits.=20

COUNTRY DESCRIPTION: Albania continues to undergo profound social, =
political, and economic change. Facilities for tourism are not well =
developed, and many of the goods and services taken for granted in other =
European countries are not yet available. Hotel accommodations are =
limited outside the capital city of Tirana.=20

ENTRY/EXIT REQUIREMENTS: A passport is required, but a visa is not =
necessary for a tourist stay up to 30 days. An extension up to 180 days =
may be granted by applying at the local police station. After 180 days, =
the Ministry of Interior accepts extension requests. There is a =
departure fee of $10, payable in U.S. dollars or local currency (the =
lek). For additional information, please contact the Embassy of the =
Republic of Albania at 2100 S Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20008, =
telephone (202) 223-4942.=20

MEDICAL FACILITIES: Medical facilities are limited, and medicine is in =
short supply. There are periodic outbreaks of polio, cholera, and =
dysentery. Doctors and hospitals generally expect immediate cash payment =
for health services. U.S. medical insurance is not always valid outside =
the United States. The Medicare/Medicaid program does not provide =
payment for medical services outside the United States.=20

Please check with your own insurance company to confirm whether your =
policy applies overseas, including provision for medical evacuation. =
Please ascertain whether payment will be made to the overseas hospital =
or doctor or whether you will be reimbursed later for expenses that you =
incur. Some insurance policies also include coverage for psychiatric =
treatment and for disposition of remains in the event of death. Useful =
information on medical emergencies abroad, including overseas insurance =
programs, is provided in the Department of State, Bureau of Consular =
Affairs brochure, Medical Information for Americans Traveling Abroad, =
available via its home page and autofax service.=20

Information on vaccinations and other health precautions may be obtained =
from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's international =
travelers hotline at 1-877-FYI-TRIP (1-877-394-8747), via their autofax =
service at 1-888-CDC-FAXX (1-888-232-3299), or its Internet home page at =
http://www.cdc.gov.=20

CRIME INFORMATION: Albania has a high rate of violent crime. Street =
crime is fairly common and occurs particularly at night. Crime is =
generally directed at targets of opportunity, not at Americans =
specifically. Armed carjackings are a matter of considerable concern, =
especially for drivers of four-wheel drive and sport-utility vehicles, =
which criminals covet. Persons who are carjacked should surrender their =
vehicles without resistance. Those resisting carjackings or attempting =
to run roadblocks have been shot and wounded. Some have been seriously =
wounded.=20

The loss or theft of a U.S. passport should be reported immediately to =
the local police and the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate. Useful =
information on safeguarding valuables and protecting personal safety =
while traveling abroad is provided in the Department of State's =
pamphlet, A Safe Trip Abroad. It is available from the Superintendent of =
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, via =
the Internet at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su docs, or =
http://travel.state.gov.=20

ROAD SAFETY/TRAVEL CONDITIONS: Major roads are passable, but they are =
often in poor repair. Buses travel between most major cities almost =
exclusively during the day, but they may be unreliable and =
uncomfortable. Travelers have reported attacks by bands of thieves in =
all parts of the country at all times of day and night. There are no =
commercial domestic flights and few rail connections.=20

Safety of Public Transportation: Poor

Urban Road Condition/Maintenance: Poor

Rural Road Condition/Maintenance: Poor

Availability of Roadside Assistance: Poor=20

AVIATION SAFETY OVERSIGHT: As there is no direct commercial air service =
at present, nor economic authority to operate such service between the =
United States and Albania, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration =
(FAA) has not assessed Albania's Civil Aviation Authority for compliance =
with international aviation safety standards for oversight of Albania's =
air carrier operations. For further information, travelers may contact =
the Department of Transportation within the U.S. at telephone =
1-800-322-7873, or visit the FAA Internet home page at =
http://www.faa.gov/avr/iasa.htm. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) =
separately assesses some foreign air carriers for suitability as =
official providers of air services. For information regarding the DOD =
policy on specific carriers, travelers may contact the Pentagon at =
telephone 1-703-697-7288.=20

CRIMINAL PENALTIES: U.S. citizens are subject to the laws of the country =
in which they are traveling. Penalties for possession, use and dealing =
of illegal drugs in Albania are severe, and convicted offenders can =
expect jail sentences and fines.






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<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>again, with the usual disclaimer - =
these documents=20
are all available on the Internet, and are indeed absolutely vital =
reading stuff=20
for anyone who wants to reach a scholarly well founded opinion on the =
present=20
events</FONT></DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Arno Tausch (as a scholar of =
international=20
relations, implying in no way my government)</FONT></DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3D"Courier New" size=3D2>
<P>UNDP DOCUMENT</P>
<P>http://www.undp.org/rbec/pubs/nhdc97/summary/yugoslavia.htm</P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>This is the first National Human Development Report for Yugoslavia. =
It=20
describes the inherited structures and policies from the former =
Socialist=20
Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, which it argues are proclaimed, but =
not=20
factually compatible with the goals of human development, but whose =
mechanisms=20
and financing requirements proved to make them unsustainable.</P>
<P>It discusses the major damage caused to the economy by the period of =
civil=20
war, and the vast cost in terms of the fall in GDP, unemployment, loss =
of=20
incomes, housing, and general trauma for the population. With the return =
of=20
peace, good possibilities exist to build on the positive growth rates of =
the=20
last two years.</P>
<P>3. Overall Trends</P>
<P>The concept of human development is not a new one in Yugoslavia, =
since in=20
theory it was embodied in the socialist ideals of the promotion of the =
welfare=20
of the individual, primarily that of the working class, particularly =
through the=20
principle and the system of &quot;self-management&quot;. In practice, =
however,=20
the elements of political freedom and human rights were missing, =
although in=20
Yugoslavia the standard of living and communications with the outside =
world were=20
on a much more advanced level than in other countries with &quot;real=20
socialism.&quot;</P>
<P>The socialist reality also lacked many other elements inherent to the =
human=20
development concept, such as the rejection of the market economy, and =
the=20
inadequate concern given towards future generations, for instance due to =

excessively high expenditure of the social sector, and high indebtedness =

etc.</P>
<P>4. Governance Trends</P>
<P>After the secession and proclamation of independence of four of the =
six=20
republics of the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia in =
1991 and=20
1992 (Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina), the =
Federal=20
Republic of Yugoslavia, made up of the republics of Serbia and =
Montenegro, was=20
proclaimed in April 1992.</P>
<P>The formation of new states in the region of the former Yugoslavia =
was=20
followed by outbreaks of armed conflicts as the Serbs in Croatia and =
Bosnia and=20
Herzegovina believed that they had a right to their own choice and that =
they=20
could continue to live in common state with Serbia and Montenegro. The =
Federal=20
Republic of Yugoslavia supported the right of Serbs to designate in =
which=20
country they wished to live, and this led to the imposition of sanctions =
by the=20
UN Security Council. Member states of the United Nations were forbidden =
every=20
economic and trade activity with the FR of Yugoslavia, including =
scientific,=20
technological, education, sports and cultural cooperation. The period =
from when=20
the country was established until the end of 1995 was marked by =
international=20
isolationism.</P>
<P>The Dayton Agreement of November 1995 halted the war in the region of =
the=20
former Yugoslavia, and in December, sanctions were suspended, which =
brought=20
about the gradual opening of the economy towards foreign markets, and =
led to an=20
improvement in foreign trade relations. In the first half of 1996, the =
majority=20
of the European countries had recognized the Federal Republic of =
Yugoslavia.</P>
<P>The first multi-party elections were held in December 1992, following =
by=20
parliamentary elections in December 1993. Three new Constitutions were =
adopted=20
for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and for the new constitutive =
Republics=20
of Serbia and Montenegro. These define human rights and other principles =
of=20
action for the process of governance. While participation in =
decision-making was=20
always enshrined in the concept of &quot;self-management,&quot; the =
economic=20
viability of this system has proven to be unsustainable, and reform is =
under=20
way.</P>
<P>5. Economic Trends</P>
<P>As a result of the international blockade, the GDP plummeted in the =
space of=20
two years (1991 - 1993) to one third or one half of the GDP level of =
1990. In=20
1993, the share of the hidden economy had reached 54%, though later fell =
to 40%=20
in 1995. The hyperinflation in 1992 and 1993 dealt a severe blow to the =
already=20
feeble economy, and by January 1994, the country had a devastated =
monetary and=20
fiscal system. Per capita incomes had fallen to $1,000 (to the same =
levels in=20
1969), unemployment reached 800,000, and several hundred thousand =
employees were=20
placed on paid leave of absence.</P>
<P>Capacity utilization of the economy fell from an already low 60% to =
25% -=20
20%. The country was completely isolated; a large proportion of the =
population=20
was impoverished; the social services sector was threatened; and legal =
and=20
economic insecurity reigned. All this forced Yugoslavia from the group =
of medium=20
developed countries into the category of underdeveloped nations. All in =
all, it=20
is estimated that international sanctions caused an astonishing loss to =
the GDP=20
of about $58 billion.</P>
<P>Some of the consequences of the above has been the intensification of =
the=20
brain drain of young, highly educated cadres and the slowdown of the=20
privatization process. In 1995, the volume and share of the GDP occupied =
by the=20
private sector was only 50%; in addition, the private sector employed =
0.5=20
million people compared with 2.1 million in the state sector.</P>
<P>As a result of the implementation of the Programme of Monetary =
Reconstruction=20
and National Economic Recovery in 1994, the monetary and fiscal system =
recovered=20
and external budget support could be resumed. A balance was achieved =
between=20
revenues and expenditure in public consumption. For the first time after =
the=20
above dramatic decline, growth rates became positive in 1994 and 1995, =
although=20
development is still sluggish in the aftermath of international =
sanctions.</P>
<P>The success in the implementation of the Programme is evident in the =
increase=20
of the Yugoslav GDP by 6.6% in 1994 and 6% in 1995; in industrial =
production by=20
1.7% and 4%; in agricultural production by 5.9% and 2.7%; and in retail =
trade by=20
65% and 10% respectively. But despite the cumulative increase of =
approximately=20
13% during the 1994 - 95 period, the Yugoslav GDP is still only 50% of =
the level=20
of the GDP in 1986.</P>
<P>But major changes will be required to adapt out-dated economic =
structures to=20
the requirements of a market economy. Particularly emphasis will be =
needed to=20
further stimulate the private sector and small and medium scale =
enterprises, as=20
well as private investment and domestic savings.</P>
<P>6. Poverty Trends</P>
<P>With the exception of 1994, the population's real income has =
exhibited a=20
continuous downward trend since 1990. In 1994, the real household income =
was on=20
average 40% lower than in 1990, or a fall from $226 in 1990 to $103 in =
1994.</P>
<P>An analysis of poverty and inequality prepared in 1994 indicates that =
23.5%=20
of the population (approximately 2.3 million people) subsisted at the =
poverty=20
level, and had a monthly purchasing power of under $120. The poverty =
level in=20
1994 was 3.1 times greater than that in 1990., with an increase from 8% =
to 30%=20
for the urban population compared with from 7.1% to 11% for the rural=20
population. Poverty is particularly prevalent among urban families with=20
children.</P>
<P>The analysis of poverty by socioeconomic categories indicates that =
more than=20
half of the poor population today are families whom in the normal,=20
&quot;pre-crisis&quot; period were not poor. In other words, the =
economic crisis=20
drove these families into poverty. They are still not destitute in the =
true=20
sense of the word since they live in relatively decent conditions; their =

households are equipped with the necessary appliances, and they still =
possess=20
old reserves of clothing and shoes. They are mainly households with =
children,=20
with both parents employed in enterprises whose wages are low (textile =
industry,=20
shoe manufacturing industries, construction etc.) Many members of these=20
families, impoverished due to extraordinary circumstances, are active in =
the=20
informal sector. Savings, or more precisely the depletion of savings, =
play a=20
significant role in preventing poor families from sinking into greater=20
poverty.</P>
<P>Another category of the poor has been the approximately 700,000 Serb =
refugees=20
from the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia who fled to =
Serbia and=20
Montenegro during the conflict, of which 200,000 fled to Belgrade, or =
10% of the=20
capital's population.</P>
<P>7. Social Trends</P>
<P>The drastic economic failure experienced by the country led to a =
sharp=20
increase in social problems. There was a large increase in the share of=20
households earning below-average incomes. Unemployment rose to 775,000 =
in 1995,=20
or an unemployment rate of 24.6%. This, however, hides a large amount of =
hidden=20
unemployment and paid leave.</P>
<P>Social institutions have occupied an important role in providing a =
social=20
safety net to preserve the standard of living, particularly of the most=20
vulnerable groups. But the deterioration of these institutions has =
resulted in a=20
significant drop in the quality of social services.</P>
<P>Prior to the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, the country enjoyed=20
relatively well developed systems for health care and health insurance, =
social=20
services and education. But the impoverishment of the country during the =
last=20
few years has caused a decrease in the resources available for health, =
but this=20
has been partially compensated for by a significant increase in the role =
of the=20
private sector in health care.</P>
<P>Another consequence of the disruption of the last few years and the =
economic=20
crisis has been the dynamic increase in the number of all three groups =
of=20
pensioners. Old age pensioners increased from 55,400 in 1960 to 461,500 =
in 1994,=20
those eligible for disability pensions increased from 79,600 to 445,500 =
while=20
&quot;family pensioners&quot; increased from 61,200 to 288,200. This has =
put=20
great strains on state resources, and a major process of reform has been =

approved in principle.</P>
<P>In the education sector, in the 1970s Yugoslavia was, according to =
the=20
relative share of educational expenditure in the GDP, above the level of =
certain=20
West European countries (e.g. FR Germany , France) and most East =
European=20
countries, and on the same level as Japan, as well as proportionally =
higher than=20
in countries of the same level of economic development. But the =
stagnation and=20
decrease in economic activity during the 1980s forced Yugoslavia to=20
significantly decrease the level of expenditure for education. Thus the =
share in=20
the GDP also decreased from 5.4% in 1975 to 3.8% in 1986, before =
returning to 5%=20
in 1994.</P>
<P>The social security system for providing allowances for unemployment, =
family=20
benefits, has also been under pressure. The value of payments to =
beneficiaries=20
has been eroded, and the state has had difficulty in fulfilling its=20
obligations.</P>
<P>8. Women and Gender Trends</P>
<P>From a formal and legal perspective the civil rights of women in =
Yugoslavia=20
are regulated in a satisfactory manner, and the position of women is =
completely=20
equal to that of men in all areas. However, in many areas, there is a =
gap=20
between the standard and the de facto state of affairs. The present =
economic and=20
social crisis has undoubtedly increased this gap. </P>
<P>Women in Yugoslavia often carry most of the burden and suffer the =
drastic=20
consequences of the socio- economic crisis. Due to the reduction in real =
income=20
in families, women are forced to spend much of their time as home =
makers. They=20
have also had to seek additional employment and engage in trading =
activities. As=20
a result educational activities have by sheer necessity been pushed into =
the=20
background.</P>
<P>Women have a lower rate of literacy than men (11% illiterate compared =
to 2.8%=20
of men), but this is mainly among older women. Women constituted 47.5% =
of the=20
working population in 1991, although this had since declined to around =
40%. In=20
different industries in the socially-owned sector, in 1994 the number of =
women=20
was higher than the corresponding number of men; for instance, in trade =
(52%);=20
hotels, catering and tourism (60%); financial organizations (57%); =
education and=20
culture (56); and health and social services (75%). On the other hand, =
the=20
presence of women in management of enterprises and banks is still low =
(16%), as=20
it is in political bodies, the diplomatic services, and Ministerial =
positions.=20
The reasons for this status of women in the political arena as well as =
in key=20
posts in enterprise lie, among others, in the ever present traditional =
prejudice=20
concerning the role and the position of women in the family, home and =
business.=20
The number of unemployed women in relation to men is still unfavourable. =
In=20
1994, this amounted to 56%.</P>
<P>A number of non-governmental organizations, whose main activists are =
women,=20
have become active in the late 1980's and 1990s, to advance the position =
and=20
human rights of women, humanitarian aid, and cooperation with similar=20
organizations in other Balkan counties. They have been particularly =
involved in=20
addressing the problems of the victims of physical and mental abuse =
during the=20
period of conflict.</P>
<P>9. Environmental Trends</P>
<P>The state of the environment in Yugoslavia was especially affected in =
the=20
period between 1992 and the present by the international embargo and the =
imposed=20
UN sanctions. Operating under conditions of a closed economy coupled =
with the=20
embargoed procurement of energy, the economy and the population of =
Yugoslavia,=20
were veered towards the utilization for their own energy sources, which=20
contained pollutants that negatively affected the quality of the =
environment. In=20
order to satisfy energy needs, wood is being used more and more, which =
leads to=20
an increase in the degree of deforestation and to instability in the =
biological=20
balance of forest areas. The increased erosion causes a deluge of all =
larger=20
types of hydro-accumulation and a long-term flange in the hydrological =
water=20
regime.</P>
<P>Since the economic facilities and equipment are obsolete and the=20
possibilities for general repair are reduced environment due to the =
embargo on=20
imports of spare parts, there has been an increase in the release of =
pollutants=20
into the environment. There is also an increased risk of breakdowns and=20
industrial accidents. Another contribution to environmental pollution is =
the=20
utilization of low grade oil and gasoline, as well as obsolete vehicles =
for=20
transportation. Because of the general decrease in the standard of =
living,=20
products that do not meet quality standards, are still being used.</P>
<P>Paradoxically, a special problem in environmental protection has been =
caused=20
by the suspension of international cooperation, and technical and =
financial=20
assistance for resolving environmental protection. This is usually quite =

expensive in countries in transition where it cannot be realized without =
the=20
assistance of international financial organizations.</P>
<P>Facilities for waste water treatment are not adequately developed, =
neither in=20
communities, nor in the manufacturing or mining industry, and due to =
high costs,=20
even the existing facilities are seldom used.</P>
<P>The emission of pollutants into the atmosphere in Yugoslavia is =
substantial,=20
due to an irrational energy utilization rate, an unqualified management =
system=20
and the low technical efficiency of equipment. The main sources of air =
pollution=20
are temporal power plants, central heating power plants and stations, =
individual=20
home heating systems, motor vehicles, industrial processes and =
facilities.=20
Following the decrease in emissions during 1991 and 1992, there was a =
new=20
increase during the following years.</P>
<P>The most common sources of land damage and degradation in Yugoslavia =
are the=20
energy sector, manufacturing industry, agriculture and =
transportation.</P>
<P>Environmental protection in Yugoslavia is being given increased =
attention by=20
the public in general, and by state institutions at all levels. In June =
1993,=20
the Federal government established the Integrated Policy for the =
Protection and=20
Enhancement of the Environment, which defined the objectives, =
principles,=20
financial instruments and other relevant elements of the environment =
protection=20
policy as well as the priority programmes that should be implemented. =
But to=20
date, despite the ambitiously proclaimed programmes, very little has =
been=20
achieved in terms of introducing the Resolution into practice. The main =
problems=20
lies in the Yugoslav economy's chronic lack of financial resources, for =
which=20
future international assistance will be necessary.</P>
<P>10. Housing and Human Settlements</P>
<P>Over the past 25 years, significant progress has been made in =
improving the=20
quality and size of apartments and enabling citizens to live in a =
satisfactory=20
environment with adequate links to available public infrastructure =
(water,=20
electricity, central heating, sewage, etc.). But the progress has been =
somewhat=20
curtailed due to the economic crisis.</P>
<P>Formerly most people lived in public housing, but now, housing =
construction=20
is almost completely financed by private capital. Furthermore, 90% of =
all=20
socially-owned housing has now been privatized.</P>
<P>A serious deterioration has taken place in the housing sector in =
recent years=20
due to the large inflow of mainly Serbian refugees from Croatia and =
Bosnia and=20
Herzegovina. Currently apartments are occupied with a greater number of =
tenants,=20
especially in the cities, and particularly in Belgrade.</P>
<P>Under the current circumstances, resolving the housing needs is =
especially=20
difficult. Company apartment apportionment has almost completely =
stopped. There=20
are no credit or other purchase incentives; apartment rents are high; =
and few=20
people are in a position to purchase or rent an apartment by means of =
their=20
personal income. As a result, the existing housing situation has serious =

consequences on the lives of the younger generation, since they are =
forced to=20
delay marriage and establish their own families. Reforms to introduce =
new=20
banking and credit mechanisms and to introduce fiscal and other =
exemptions are=20
in the focus of attention.</P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>UNDP Report Albania 1996</P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>The 1996 Human Development Report for Albania is more than a simple =
update of=20
the first Human Development Report published in 1995. It is a =
continuation. Some=20
topics treated at length in the 1995 report, such as primary education,=20
demographics, and health, had not undergone such change as to warrant =
special=20
mention. Other topics, such as civil society, the family, and higher =
education=20
are treated from another point of view. </P>
<P>Although sustainable human development is based on the concept that =
economic=20
growth is not an end but a means to that development, economic factors =
occupy an=20
important place in this report. As the economy continued to grow, the =
prosperity=20
seemed to be widely distributed, changing patterns of behavior, family=20
relationships, consumption, and the general ability of individuals to =
contribute=20
to their own well-being. The state also facilitated people-centered =
development=20
in important areas such as infrastructure and legislation in support of =
private=20
initiative. </P>
<P>The message of the 1996 report is one of mounting confidence in the =
face of=20
many challenges. Albanians are investing in their future, a future based =
on=20
democratic principles, oriented towards Europe, with widely shared =
prosperity.=20
This report is offered as a contribution to the newly elected =
parliament, that=20
the members thereof may consider legislation in the light of sustainable =
human=20
development, by the people, for the people, and of the people. </P>
<P>Chapter 1: Working for a Better Standard of Living - Albanians =
continue to be=20
optimistic about their individual economic conditions. More people =
continued to=20
find better paying jobs in the private sector, and state salaries =
increased as=20
did income for farmers. Those with income not only enjoyed increased=20
consumption, but also managed to save, adding to their sense of security =
and=20
well-being. Despite general improvements, some 20% of the population is =
still=20
living in difficult economic circumstances and receiving modest state=20
assistance. </P>
<P>The state continued to play an important supporting role as Albanians =
worked=20
for their own development. In addition to health, education and welfare=20
services, sound monetary and fiscal policy kept prices and the exchange =
rate=20
relatively stable. State banks extended more and more credit and state =
and=20
foreign assistance programs promoted the increase in small and medium=20
enterprises. </P>
<P>Chapter 2: Coping with an Open Economy: Trade and Investment - The=20
liberalization of trade has led to an explosion in imports, while =
competition=20
with the outside world has led to a marked decline in exports of =
everything=20
except labor. The private trade sector, which in 1995 accounted for 75% =
of=20
international trade, has created unheard of opportunities for contact =
with the=20
rest of the world, especially Europe, and particularly Italy. </P>
<P>With a few exceptions, the bulk of private sector investment, =
accounting for=20
one third of 1995 investment, went into factories, restaurants and =
housing. In=20
an effort to attract greater private investment, public sector =
investment in=20
1995 concentrated on infrastructure. Utilizing ever increasing amounts =
of=20
foreign soft loan financing, the state has embarked on an ambitious =
program with=20
60% of the funds going to improve energy supply, transport, =
communications and=20
water supply. </P>
<P>Chapter 3: Integrating Family Well-Being, Social Habitat and =
Sustainable=20
Human Development - Changing economic conditions of families in Albania =
is=20
bringing about profound changes in social status which, in turn, is =
putting=20
pressure on traditional family values. In order to ensure the highest =
level of=20
family well-being, Albanians are engaging in a wide variety of work no =
matter=20
what their level of education or professional training. </P>
<P>Families are becoming smaller and returning to two generations, =
parents and=20
children. The weakening influence of grandparents has lead to a =
weakening of=20
traditional patriarchal values, leaving room for family members to =
determine=20
their own roles and relationships. Individualism is on the rise. Women,=20
especially in urban areas, are socially freer but, when unemployed, =
economically=20
more dependent than before. </P>
<P>Although women have organized into non-governmental organizations, =
the number=20
of women in positions of leadership and decision-making is still low. =
</P>
<P>Albanian families enjoy a varied level of well-being. Amidst a =
relative=20
abundance of consumer goods, the lack of adequate health and child care =
services=20
as well as basic infrastructure including electricity, heating, water,=20
telephones, and roads make life difficult. </P>
<P>Chapter 4: Between Information and Politics - Albanians are =
determined to=20
continue on their path towards democracy, maintaining their orientation =
towards=20
the West. The political transformation is accompanied by the cultivation =
of new=20
social values such as respect for the rights of the individual, for =
minorities,=20
tolerance and open social dialogue. </P>
<P>Albania is gradually entering the global system of information. =
Government=20
policy regarding information has emphasized improvement in data =
processing and=20
the introduction of information in schools. The dissemination of =
information=20
through mass media, television, radio, newspapers constitutes an =
important=20
measure of progress in the development of democracy in Albania. </P>
<P>Despite the dominant role played by political parties, especially =
during the=20
election year of 1996, surveys indicate that people are more and more =
oriented=20
towards non-governmental organizations. These NGOs offer a vehicle not =
only for=20
special interests, but also as a forum of social dialogue. </P>
<P>Although Albanian society appears polarized and fragmented as =
reflected in=20
the fierce political struggle and differentiation of splinter groups, it =
has=20
been politically stable since 1992. With the social environment favoring =
both=20
political and economic development, 79% of the population think the =
country is=20
developing in the right way, according to the 1995 Eurobarometer. </P>
<P>Except for the lack of a new constitution, Albania is rapidly =
completing=20
legislation in accordance with European standards. </P>
<P>Chapter 5: Human Infrastructure - Investing in People - Economic =
factors and=20
market realities have greatly effected the school system, especially =
that of=20
vocational secondary and higher education. The number of students =
continuing=20
secondary education after the obligatory eight years declined from =
nearly 80% in=20
1989 to 35% in 1993 where it has remained. Thousands upon thousands of =
youth=20
have abandoned secondary schools as vocational training in certain =
sectors such=20
as mining and agriculture no longer holds the promise of employment and =
the=20
private, informal sector beckons. Significant reform of vocational =
schools often=20
assisted by foreign donors aims to offer these students practical, =
job-oriented=20
skills. </P>
<P>Higher education has also adapted as more Albanian youth seek =
university=20
degrees but in markedly different fields than those traditionally =
offered.=20
University trained specialists have profited tremendously from donor =
sponsored=20
exchanges and networking. The 1996 state budget foresees a slight =
increase in=20
resources devoted to education, increasing from 9.4% in 1995 to 10%. =
</P>
<P>Chapter 6: Habitat and the Quality of Everyday Life - The 1995 Human=20
Development Report treated many aspects of the urban habitat as well as =
concerns=20
about the natural environment. The 1996 report focuses on air quality =
concerns=20
due especially to the increasing number of vehicles as well as the need =
to=20
repair and/or maintain public urban areas including side roads, =
sidewalks, and=20
green areas. Air quality in the work place is still a concern as =
respiratory=20
illnesses top the list of occupational diseases and legislation in this =
area=20
lags behind. </P>
<P>The egalitarian distribution of agricultural land in 1991 has been=20
strengthened by later legislation giving entitlement and the right to =
buy and=20
sell agricultural land. More and more farmers are producing for the =
domestic=20
market with livestock proving especially lucrative, not only in the =
lowlands,=20
but also in the mountainous areas. </P>
<P>Human security is central to human development. After two or three =
years of=20
insecurity, order has been restored and men can walk freely even late at =
night,=20
although younger women and girls may face problems. Organized crime is =
minimal=20
as has been political crimes such as vote rigging. One fifth of the =
murders have=20
been revenge killings associated with the tradition of blood feuds. =
Although=20
housing is still in short supply, 50,000 apartments have been completed. =
Local=20
government is called upon and enabled to play an increasingly important =
role in=20
resolving problems of urban habitat. </P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>UNDP Report TURKEY 1996</P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>The 1996 Human Development Report for Turkey explores key problems of =

national and local development in Turkey with special focus on urban =
management=20
and on the eradication of poverty. It provides an overall assessment of =
the=20
country&#8217;s human development performance and offers an analysis of =
Turkey&#8217;s=20
comparative standing vis-=E0-vis other countries, and within the country =
through=20
disaggregated analyses of data for regions, provinces and for =
gender.</P>
<P>In-depth analyses and critique of the key components of the human =
development=20
index are also provided by the report with particular emphasis placed on =

education and health services delivery issues and on gender disparities. =
These=20
analyses are followed by the two main themes of Habitat II and poverty=20
alleviation. </P>
<P>In the section dealing with the themes of Habitat II, human =
settlements and=20
local governance have been selected as the two principal issues for =
review in=20
Turkey with emphasis on participatory processes, collective =
decision-making and=20
civic responsibility in all aspects of urban and rural living and=20
development.</P>
<P>A profile of poverty in Turkey is provided and the central elements =
of an=20
anti-poverty strategy are proposed. The approach outlined would help =
enable the=20
pursuit of people-oriented economic growth, increasing employment =
opportunities=20
and targeting public spending on development programmes and social =
services.=20
This is in line with Turkey&#8217;s keen interest in implementing the =
Declaration of=20
the World Summit on Social Development and the Programme of Action =
directed at=20
the eradication of poverty at the national level.</P>
<P>3. Overall Trends</P>
<P>Although figures are not strictly comparable due to changes in the =
components=20
and calculation techniques, a continuous rise is noted in the Report of =
the HDI=20
for Turkey from 1960 (0.333) to 1995 (0.810), with a slight decline from =
1992=20
(0.739) to 1993 (0.711), based on HDI values given in successive global =
Human=20
Development Reports.</P>
<P>Thus the present HDI score places Turkey among high human development =

countries. Moreover, according to the 1994 Human Development Report, =
Turkey was=20
one of the top ten performers in human development in the period 1960 - =
92.</P>
<P>The present report concentrates on examining human development trends =
with=20
respect to four main areas:</P>
<P>Education </P>
<P>Health </P>
<P>Human Settlements </P>
<P>Poverty </P>
<P>Moreover, the analysis is broken down in terms of:</P>
<P>Region </P>
<P>Province </P>
<P>Gender </P>
<P>Of Turkey&#8217;s five geographic regions, the Aegean-Marmara region =
in the west of=20
the country has the highest HDI, followed by Central Anatolia and the=20
Mediterranean. Those with the lowest HDI, which nevertheless are above =
the=20
&quot;low human development&quot; threshold, are in the East and =
South-East of=20
the country.</P>
<P>Of the population of 31.5 million people, 51% are living in provinces =
rated=20
as &quot;high human development&quot;, while 47.1% live in medium human=20
development provinces, with the remainder (about 2% or three out of 79=20
provinces) living in provinces with low human development.</P>
<P>While the gap between the highest and the lowest provinces decreased =
in 1996,=20
the difference in absolute numbers is about equal to that between the =
HDI values=20
of Canada (the highest country) on the one hand and countries such as =
Morocco,=20
Maldives, and Vietnam, on the other.</P>
<P>4. Governance Trends</P>
<P>The main governance issues raised in the report relate to municipal =
and local=20
administration, discussed in part 10 below.</P>
<P>5. Economic Trends</P>
<P>The Turkish economy has grown at a rate of 5.5% between 1980 and =
1993, with=20
per capita GDP growth growing 3.6% between 1960 and 1993. Turkey now has =
a per=20
capita national income of $5881 (in 1993 PPP dollars), which places it =
in an=20
income category comparable to Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Brazil, =
Iran,=20
Tunisia, Botswana and Fiji.</P>
<P>There is no specific chapter devoted to examining economic trends in =
Turkey.=20
It is noted however that although on average, Turkey has registered =
significant=20
levels of growth in GNP per capita over the last several decades, the =
rates do=20
not approach the levels reached by countries of Southeast Asia. =
Furthermore, and=20
more importantly, changes in per capita GNP in the last few years have =
been=20
rather unstable with impressive gains followed by zero or negative =
growth.</P>
<P>It is also noted that this pattern can seriously jeopardize =
Turkey&#8217;s gains in=20
human development. Achieving a reasonable and stable growth rate while=20
controlling inflation must be a top priority item on the national =
agenda. It=20
must also be kept in mind that political stability is a prerequisite for =

economic stability. Turkey should thus concentrate its efforts on =
achieving=20
stability and predictability in all spheres - economic, political and=20
social.</P>
<P>6. Poverty Trends</P>
<P>Poverty is defined as the inability of a person or a household to =
satisfy=20
their basic economic needs, defined in terms of &quot;income =
poverty&quot; based=20
on the value of goods consumed as measured by expenditures, or in terms =
of human=20
development indicators or social indicators, including the human =
development=20
index (HDI).</P>
<P>In Turkey, there is no official poverty line, although the State =
Planning=20
Organization (SPO) has estimated that a per capita income of $27.30 per =
month=20
(at 1987 prices in the most recent processed survey of income =
distribution and=20
expenditures), is needed to escape poverty. This represents the cost of=20
purchasing 75% of 3500 calories of food per day, which are required to =
achieve=20
an adequate nutritional level. Applying the SPO poverty line to 1987 =
data, 14.2%=20
of the Turkish population is classified as poor. Furthermore, the =
poverty rate=20
among rural households is 2.4 times higher than among urban households, =
with the=20
highest poverty rates in the east and south-east Anatolia, followed by =
the=20
Mediterranean. The poverty rate would surely be higher for women than =
men. More=20
recent data on poverty will be available when the results of the 1994 =
household=20
income and consumption survey are available.</P>
<P>Available data does however show that at least up to 1987, =
income-poverty has=20
fallen, and that all human development indicators have increased =
markedly since=20
1960. It also confirms the hypothesis that income-poverty falls and =
human=20
development indicators improve as economic growth takes place, and that =
the more=20
rapid the economic growth, the sharper the rate of decrease in poverty. =
</P>
<P>A number of conclusions and policy recommendations are made, based on =

comparative studies of Turkey&#8217;s economic performance with that of =
East Asian and=20
Latin American countries. These could constitute the core of an =
anti-poverty=20
strategy for Turkey, and would be based on the following principles:</P>
<P>The central element of an anti-poverty strategy would be to pursue =
rapid=20
economic growth, increase employment, and target spending on development =

programmes and social services on those who most need them; </P>
<P>Economic growth is enhanced when workers enjoy improved labour market =

conditions through, for instance, higher real wages, better jobs (e.g. =
small=20
fraction in agriculture, larger fraction working as paid employees, as =
opposed=20
to self-employed or unpaid family workers), a larger fraction working in =
the=20
professional, managerial technical or clerical occupations, and a =
smaller=20
fraction having primary schooling or less; </P>
<P>The adoption of policies which (a) stimulate economic growth and =
hence the=20
derived demand for labour; (b) that affect education and hence the =
quality of=20
the supply of labour and (c) which ensure that social safety net =
policies help=20
determine whether people arrive at the work place suitably nourished and =
strong=20
enough to work; </P>
<P>The targeting of anti-poverty efforts toward poor people rather than =
poor=20
groups, either through targeted programmes or self-targeting, otherwise =
most of=20
the benefits will accrue to the less-needy segments of the population =
and the=20
poor will get only a small share of the nation&#8217;s development =
resources. </P>
<P>7. Social Trends</P>
<P>The 1995 Human Development Report for Turkey highlighted the fact =
that=20
education is the most significant factor in explaining relative =
development=20
deficiencies in Turkey While there is general agreement on the =
importance of=20
education, its far reaching implications for socio-economic development =
and its=20
inherent value in its own right are not always well-recognized.</P>
<P>Education attainments in Turkey have been remarkable as reflected in =
the=20
steady upward trend in literacy rates and greatly enlarged school =
enrollments in=20
keeping with the expanding growth of the school-age population. In 1993, =
there=20
were 12.2 million children and students (ages 6 - 23) in school taught =
by=20
520,000 teachers in 77,000 institutions. One of the most important =
problems is=20
the low numbers of those who have completed school. Of Turkey&#8217;s =
total labour=20
force, 78.1% have primary education or less, 7% have graduated from =
junior high=20
school, 9.7% from high school and 5.2% from university. Of the total =
population,=20
only 46.1% have completed primary school. Enrollment in pre-school, for =
which=20
research points to the important role of early childhood education for =
potential=20
development, school achievement and school attainment, was only 5.1%. =
The 1994=20
Human Development Report estimated that the mean years of schooling of =
the adult=20
population over 25 to be only 3.6 years.</P>
<P>The conclusions drawn from the 1996 NHDR are that:</P>
<P>It is urgent and imperative that Turkey increase its educational =
enrollment=20
rates at all levels. Furthermore it is important to open more =
educational=20
institutions at the secondary and tertiary levels, to provide the =
necessary=20
infrastructure and qualified staff; </P>
<P>This in turn will require additional funds, and a much greater =
proportion of=20
the GDP than the current 3.3%, in light of the recommended proportion=20
recommended by the 1990 Education for All Summit in Jomtien, Thailand; =
</P>
<P>Gender and region-specific programmes will be required to correct the =

disparities observed above; </P>
<P>Vocational / technical and non-formal education will need to be =
strengthened=20
to counter for the relatively low level of skills; </P>
<P>Compulsory schooling should be extended from 5 to 8 years, to counter =
the=20
drastic reduction in enrollments rates, especially for girls, after five =
years=20
of primary school. The minimum period of compulsory education among =
European=20
Union countries is nine years; </P>
<P>Teacher training and conditions of service for teachers need to be=20
strengthened, to raise the quality and status of the profession. </P>
<P>In the area of health, the main trends seen in Turkey have been a =
dramatic=20
fall in child mortality as indexed by a reduction in the child mortality =
rate=20
from 152 per 1000 in the 1960&#8217;s to 53 per 1,000 in 1991, although =
it is=20
considered that this is still unacceptably high since countries with a =
GNP=20
equivalent to that of Turkey on the whole had much lower mortality =
rates.</P>
<P>A multitude of causes have been suggested. These will require drastic =

economic and social measures to break the vicious cycle of early =
marriage, high=20
fertility, malnutrition, and high mortality, supported by deeply rooted =
cultural=20
values such as son preference, family interdependency, lack of formal =
old age=20
security, economic value of children etc.</P>
<P>It has been observed that the health of the Turkish population is =
dependent,=20
among other things, on the educational experience and standard of others =
who=20
care for children in their most formative years, and on the education of =

professionals in the health services who provide support. While both =
these=20
categories are increasing over time, the inequalities in education =
translate=20
into inequalities in health as well.</P>
<P>8. Women and Gender Trends</P>
<P>The Turkey NHDR is the only one containing a map to illustrate male =
and=20
female HDI by province. These maps show clearly that high male human =
development=20
is present in about two thirds of the country, largely in the east, =
centre,=20
south-west and south of the country, while high female human development =
is=20
concentrated in the more urbanized provinces of Ankara, Istanbul/Kocaeli =
and=20
Izmir, where they have almost the same HDI status as men. In the country =
as a=20
whole, in statistical terms, women have lower HDI values than men (0.648 =
for=20
women and 0.824 for men). The male-female HDI is largest in the province =
of=20
Diyarbakir, in the east of the country.</P>
<P>Of the three components of HDI, women are clearly disadvantaged with =
respect=20
to two of them, namely per capita income and educational attainment, =
while=20
enjoying a biological advantage in the third (life expectancy). </P>
<P>Gender disparities are reviewed in terms of politics, employment, =
health and=20
education. Turkey&#8217;s ranking in terms of the Gender Development =
Index was 45th=20
out of 130 countries in 1995, and 98th out of 116 for the Gender =
Empowerment=20
Measure (GEM).</P>
<P>With respect to women in public life and politics, women were given =
the=20
suffrage in 1933, and in the following national elections obtained 18 =
seats in=20
the Legislative Assembly or 4.5% of the total. This number was =
unparalleled in=20
Western democracies of the era. In remarkable contrast, and despite =
having a=20
woman as Prime Minister, in1996, there were only 13 women =
parliamentarians,=20
holding only 2.4% of the seats, compared to France (5.7%) and the United =
Kingdom=20
(7.4%), and Norway (39.4%). Women have fared even worse in local =
elections,=20
having won only 1% of seats in the 1994 municipal elections, and less =
than 0.5%=20
of positions as mayors.</P>
<P>The main issues with regard to women and employment relate to unequal =
job=20
opportunities and unequal pay, whereby on average women&#8217;s =
non-agricultural wage=20
is 84.5% of men&#8217;s.</P>
<P>Women are well represented in professional occupations, with 29% of =
all=20
lawyers, 32% of all university academic posts, 39% of architects (13% in =
US),=20
39% of dentists (9% in US), and 35% of all public employees. In the =
medical=20
profession, 70% of all graduating physicians in 1994/95 were women. This =
picture=20
is very different at lower social levels, whereby in 1990, only 17% of =
the urban=20
work force were women, including 32% of clerical and related workers =
(compared=20
with over 75% in the US and Europe).</P>
<P>With regard to women&#8217;s health, fertility and family, Turkey =
still lags far=20
behind the industrialized world in these areas. The total fertility rate =
has=20
declined significantly in recent decades from 5.7 in 1965 to 3.6 in 1989 =
and 2.7=20
in 1993, indicating marked progress since the introduction of the first =
Family=20
planning Act in 1965. The transition from high to low fertility in =
Turkey is=20
considered to be unique in the Middle East, but once again there is much =

variation among regions and social groups. The total fertility rate for =
urban=20
centres is 2.4 and 3.1 in rural areas. The main contributory factor to =
declining=20
fertility has been and to education and an increase in a women&#8217;s =
marriage age,=20
for instance from 17.6 years in 1983 too 22 in 1990.</P>
<P>Finally, education is considered to be a major factor underlying =
gender=20
disparities in Turkey. While there is still a gap in literacy between =
males=20
(91.3%) and females (76.1%), (compared with 86.4% and 68% respectively =
in 1985),=20
the gap has been narrowing fast.</P>
<P>A comprehensive set of conclusions and policy suggestions are put =
forward in=20
the Report, which, if implemented, would no doubt go a long way to =
addressing=20
many of the gender issues discussed.</P>
<P>9. Environmental Trends </P>
<P>While environmental problems are evident in most areas, particularly =
the=20
urban areas, those of Istanbul are symptomatic of them, in terms of the=20
increasing amounts of solid waste; pollution of river basins due to =
unlicensed,=20
illegal settlements and industrial/agricultural activities; air =
pollution due to=20
the continued consumption of low calorie coal of some 7 million tons per =
year=20
(but which should improve with the widespread use of natural gas), and =
the=20
increase in the number of cars.</P>
<P>10. Housing and Human Settlements</P>
<P>The Turkish National Action Plan prepared for Habitat II, and drafted =
with=20
the participation of public agencies and NGOs makes a distinction =
between two=20
sets of principles:</P>
<P>Those to be regarded as ends: sustainability, livability and equity =
</P>
<P>Those to be regarded as means: civic engagement, enablement and =
governance=20
</P>
<P>With these two principles in mind, 28 priority areas were identified =
for=20
Turkey.</P>
<P>In terms of the management of human settlements, Turkey has made =
great=20
strides in evolving from a centralized system of local government, =
inherited=20
from the Ottoman empire, to a more decentralized one after World War II, =
albeit=20
managed in a partisan and ad hoc way, still dependent on the discretion =
of=20
central authority for finances, which has proved to be irregular. For =
example,=20
in the 1960&#8217;s, local governments were expected to contribute to =
national=20
development efforts with their own meagre resources.</P>
<P>In the 1970&#8217;s further devolution of authority was granted, and =
master plans=20
for metropolitan areas were prepared to address the major issues of =
urbanization=20
caused by the massive exodus of people from the rural areas. =
Metropolitan=20
municipalities were established in the 1980s, responsible for their own=20
long-term strategic planning and the provision of municipal services. =
Total=20
municipal revenues increased steadily, and they contributed to the =
central=20
government an average of 12% of their total. A greater level of =
consultation=20
with the people in municipal decision-making has been observed, although =
a=20
certain amount of tension have emerged between the metropolitan and =
district=20
municipality authorities. This has led to a recognition that =
Turkey&#8217;s local=20
government system is in need of serious and deep-reaching reforms, and =
that some=20
decentralization and devolution of powers must take place.</P>
<P>Turkey&#8217;s population has risen from 13.6 million people in 1927, =
when 76% were=20
rural, to 60.5 million in 1994, when the same proportion now lived =
within=20
municipal boundaries. Between 1960 and 1990, the urban population living =
in=20
towns with more than 20,000 people increased from 22% to 51%, or from 6 =
million=20
people to 29 million people. In 1997, the population of Istanbul should =
reach=20
the 10 million mark, and the population in 2000 is estimated at 11.5=20
million.</P>
<P>This situation has exacerbated problems concerning local =
administrations, and=20
which have been addressed in the Seventh Five year Development Plan =
(1996 -=20
2000), but it is considered that a more fundamental transfer of =
authority and=20
resources from the central to the municipal level is required, coupled =
with=20
greatly increased capacity-building and accountability of local =
authorities, and=20
greater citizen participation in local government.</P>
<P>The rapid urban growth, fueled by continual high levels of internal =
migration=20
and natural births, and aggravated by regional differences and =
discrepancies and=20
more recently by security questions, has also placed extra strain on the =

provision of housing as well as on all services and public utilities. =
About half=20
of the housing premises in large cities are unlicensed or illegal =
squatter=20
constructions, and it is estimated that a total of 2.5 million new =
housing units=20
will be required during the seventh plan period (1994 - 2000), to =
complement the=20
existing 7.7 million houses, or about 35%. The supply of housing, (of =
which the=20
majority is provided by the private sector [67.7% in 1992], followed by =
the=20
cooperative sector [26.3%] and the public sector [6%]), has clearly =
fallen far=20
short of demand for a wide variety of reasons, be it bureaucratic, =
financial,=20
technical, legal, etc., and for which a comprehensive urban renewal and =
reform=20
programme is called for.</P>
<P>11. Recommendations for SHD Strategy</P>
<P>Elements of an SHD strategy are included in the report&#8217;s =
conclusions and=20
policy suggestions for the eradication of poverty, and in those relating =
to=20
education, health, gender, and human settlements, summarized above. =
These would=20
need to be integrated into an overall economic growth strategy.</P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>US STATE DEPARTMENTS DOCUMENTS</P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1998 Released by the =
Bureau=20
for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S.Department =
of State=20
Washington, DC, February 1999 </P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA I. Summary Once part of the =
famous=20
Balkan route for smuggling of heroin and other drugs from Turkey and the =
Middle=20
East to western Europe, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia =
(SFRY)=20
remains a transit country for narcotics smuggling. During the breakup of =

Yugoslavia, the emergent Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was subject to =
UN trade=20
sanctions, which greatly reduced the opportunities for narcotics =
trafficking=20
through the country. While difficult to determine its extent, narcotics=20
trafficking through the SSFRY appears to have increased since UN trade =
sanctions=20
were suspended after the signing of the Dayton accords. The &quot;outer=20
wall&quot; of sanctions bars the SFRY from international organizations =
and=20
financial institutions, and prevents normalization of US- diplomatic =
relations.=20
The SFRY holds itself responsible for meeting the standards of the 1988 =
UN Drug=20
Convention. SFRY enforcement officials claim that international =
isolation has=20
reduced their effectiveness in fighting drug trafficking and have =
requested=20
greater cooperation with U.S. and international agencies. No U.S.=20
counternarcotics assistance is provided to the SFRY . Part II. Status of =
Country=20
The SFRY was an important part of the primary corridor for drug =
trafficking from=20
Turkey and the Middle East to western Europe during the 1970's and =
1980's. The=20
events that led to international isolation for the SFRY--the =
disintegration of=20
the former Yugoslavia and the resultant UN trade sanctions--disrupted=20
trafficking along this route. While information remains difficult to =
obtain, the=20
SFRY does not appear to have major problems with drug production, money=20
laundering or precursor chemicals. The climate is not suitable for the=20
production of drugs with the possible exception of marijuana. The =
underdeveloped=20
banking sector deters money laundering. Drug transit is the main problem =
area.=20
SFRY authorities admit that heroin trafficking has increased since the =
lifting=20
UN trade sanctions. SFRY customs officials noted that marijuana and even =
cocaine=20
were intercepted in 1998. Officials point to the Kosovar Albanian =
community as=20
primarily responsible for drug smuggling activities in the SFRY--noting =
in=20
evidence the frequent drug-related arrests of members of this community =
in=20
western Europe and in neighboring countries. The officials also pointed =
to the=20
difficulty in maintaining control of portions of the border separating =
Kosovo=20
from Macedonia and Albania. SFRY authorities are concerned by evidence =
of=20
growing drug use within the country. Part III. Country Actions Against =
Drugs in=20
1998 Policy Initiatives. The SFRY launched no new policy initiatives in =
1998. \=20
Accomplishments. The SFRY 's most significant accomplishment was to =
secure a=20
customs agreement with Hungary. Law Enforcement Efforts. SFRY customs=20
authorities report that 117 kilograms of cocaine, 26 kilograms of =
marijuana, and=20
17 kilograms of heroin were seized through the first ten months of 1998. =
In all=20
cases the drugs were tracked to their internal destinations, arrests =
were made,=20
and convictions obtained, according to customs officials. Police, the =
only=20
agency with authority to make arrests in the SFRY , and customs work =
jointly to=20
combat drug smuggling. Corruption. No incidences of official involvement =
in=20
narcotics smuggling activities have surfaced in the press. Agreements =
and=20
Treaties. The SFRY has customs agreements Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, =
Hungary,=20
and Macedonia. Customs officials anticipate the completion of a similar=20
agreement with Slovakia in the near future. Negotiations are also =
ongoing with=20
Greece and Cyprus. Austria recognizes the old Austria-Yugoslavia customs =

agreement. The SFRY adheres to the 1902 US-Yugoslavia extradition =
treaty.=20
Cultivation/Production. Little cultivation or production of narcotics is =

believed to occur in the SFRY. Drug Flow/Transit. SFRY customs =
authorities claim=20
that marijuana has entered the SFRY via smuggling boats that operate on =
Lake=20
Skadar between Albania and Montenegro. These boats smuggle a wide =
variety of=20
consumer goods into the SFRY , but customs officials contend the cargoes =
often=20
contain small quantities of marijuana. The two 1998 seizures of cocaine =
led SFRY=20
customs to believe that cocaine has for several years been entering the =
country=20
in small quantities via mail or in larger quantities through via trucks =
or=20
ships. The same officials claimed that heroin interdiction was becoming =
more=20
difficult given the entry of small quantities smuggled across the =
inadequately=20
controlled Kosovo-Albania and Kosovo-Macedonia borders. The small =
quantities are=20
collected in Kosovo for movement forward by any means except airplane--a =
means=20
of conveyance not favored by traffickers in the SFRY. Demand Reduction. =
A=20
hard-hitting anti-drug abuse campaign in 1998 has featured television =
ads,=20
billboards, and other advertisements intended to reduce demand. Part IV. =
U.S.=20
Policy Initiatives and Programs. The United States does currently not =
have any=20
bilateral programs with the SFRY. SFRY enforcement authorities complain =
that the=20
SFRY 's international isolation is debilitating and have requested =
restoration=20
of at least some customs/law enforcement consultations. [end of =
document] </P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1998 Released by the =
Bureau=20
for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S.Department =
of State=20
Washington, DC, February 1999 </P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>ALBANIA I. </P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>Summary Organized crime is making increased use of Albania as a =
transit point=20
for drugs being smuggled to Western Europe, due to the strategic =
location of the=20
country and the continued weakness of its police and judicial systems.=20
Authorities also believe that the domestic production of cannabis is =
increasing,=20
even though the scale of the problem remains comparatively small. =
Likewise, drug=20
abuse is a problem that continues to grow, but which is still small =
compared to=20
the situation in Western Europe. The Government's efforts to deal with =
these=20
problems have long been complicated by the poor level of professional =
training=20
of the police and other officials, by a general lack of resources and by =

widespread corruption. Albania is not a party to any of the UN Narcotics =

Conventions, including the 1988 UN Drug Convention. II. Status of =
Country=20
Despite many obstacles, the Albanian government is continuing efforts to =

interdict drug smugglers, reduce cannabis production and provide some =
form of=20
social safety net for drug abusers. The military and police are working =
closely=20
with Italian police, navy, and coastal patrol organizations to stop the=20
activities of the small boats that make the smuggling runs to Italy. The =

Albanian Government permits Italian personnel to be based in Albania, =
and to=20
operate in Albanian territorial waters. These efforts are aimed at the =
full=20
range of contraband that is passing through Albania--drugs, illegal =
immigrants,=20
arms and other goods. The response to the new but growing drug abuse =
problem has=20
been very slow, and virtually no special treatment programs for drug =
abusers=20
exist. Some very small programs at particular hospitals have received =
coverage=20
in the press, along with government announcements on plans to expand=20
rehabilitation efforts; however, the reality remains grim for Albanian =
addicts=20
and abusers. There is a small anti-drug media campaign aimed at young =
people.=20
The current Albanian Government of Prime Minister Pandeli Majko has been =
in=20
office only since October, and has not yet launched any new initiatives =
aimed=20
specifically at the problems of drug trafficking or abuse. The new =
government=20
does, however, appear to be making serious efforts on a broad front to =
rebuild=20
and reform the structures of law and order, which would make further =
anti-drug=20
efforts possible. III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1998 Albania is =
not a=20
party to the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic =
Drugs and=20
Psychotropic Substances, or any of the other UN Narcotics Conventions.=20
Nevertheless, Albania has made efforts to achieve or maintain compliance =
with=20
the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Illicit =
Cultivation.=20
Press reports periodically note the destruction of small fields of =
cannabis=20
plants by the police, but while still comparatively small, the press =
reports=20
that cannabis cultivation is an increasingly serious problem. =
Production.=20
Albania is not known as a location for the production of significant =
quantities=20
of illegal chemical substances. Distribution. The police consistently =
arrest of=20
individuals caught distributing drugs. In general, however, there is a =
high=20
level of lawlessness in the country and some regions are essentially not =
under=20
government control. Given these circumstances, efforts to combat drug=20
distribution are limited and difficult. Sale, Transport and Financing. =
As=20
already noted, Albania is a significant transit point for the smuggling =
of=20
illicit drugs to western Europe. The Albanian press reports that =
international=20
organized crime is involved in many of these smuggling operations, and =
is in=20
control of the sales and financial arrangements. The Albanian Government =
is=20
making genuine efforts to combat the smuggling operations, and is doing =
so in=20
cooperation with international law enforcement agencies. The best =
example of=20
this is the arrangement the Government has made with Italian authorities =
to=20
interdict smugglers at sea. Asset Seizure. Asset seizure was legalized =
as an=20
anti-smuggling weapon in 1998 when legislation was passed that allows =
for the=20
seizure and sale of boats used for smuggling. The measure was =
controversial=20
because many Albanians are deeply suspicious of any law that allows the=20
government to take property without compensation--a legacy of long years =
of=20
communist rule. Extradition. The U.S. has an extradition treaty with =
Albania=20
that entered into force on November 13, 1935. For 1998, there are no =
known cases=20
of other countries requesting that a drug suspect be extradited, or of =
Albania=20
requesting another country to extradite a drug suspect. Mutual Legal =
Assistance.=20
No cases are known. Law Enforcement and Transit Cooperation. Albanian=20
authorities cooperated fully with U.S. authorities in 1998 on law =
enforcement=20
and transit issues. Few of these cases involved drug issues, but the =
pattern of=20
cooperation was clear and positive. Precursor Chemical Control. Albania =
is not=20
known as a producer of significant quantities of precursor chemicals. =
Demand=20
Reduction. Drug abuse is a comparatively new problem in Albania, and the =

Government and Albanian society have been slow to take actions to combat =
it.=20
National medical resources are too limited to allow for extensive =
special=20
programs for drug abusers. Some small-scale government- funded clinics =
offer=20
special treatment options for heroin addicts, but most abusers receive, =
at most=20
only basic medical assistance. State-operated radio and television run=20
occasional anti-drug messages. IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs=20
Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation. The Government has welcomed USG =
and=20
Western European programs to help train the police, and has cooperated =
fully in=20
the implementation of the programs. The U.S. Department of Justice is =
proceeding=20
with training programs for mid-level police supervisors and for new =
special=20
police units. The USG is also funding assistance to Albanian Customs and =
other=20
border control agencies through a grant to the European Union. Albania =
has also=20
been active in multilateral border control efforts through the Southeast =
Europe=20
Cooperative Initiative (SECI). These efforts pull Albania into closer=20
cooperation with its neighbors, notably the Former Yugoslav Republic of=20
Macedonia and Italy. The Road Ahead. The USG will continue to work with =
Albanian=20
authorities to provide law enforcement assistance, cognizant of the =
limitations=20
imposed by the local situation, and support for legal reform. Regional=20
assistance through cooperative efforts, such as SECI, may be a way for =
the USG=20
to further assist Albania, despite the difficulties imposed by the =
current=20
security situation. [end of document] </P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1998 Released by the =
Bureau=20
for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S.Department =
of State=20
Washington, DC, February 1999 </P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>TURKEY I. </P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>Summary There is no appreciable cultivation of illicit narcotics in =
Turkey,=20
although licit opium poppies are grown. Consumption of narcotics within =
Turkey=20
remains relatively low. Turkey's geographical position makes it a major =
transit=20
route for Southwest Asian opiates moving to Europe, and for some =
synthetic drugs=20
to the Middle East. Turkish anti-narcotics efforts are concentrated on =
stemming=20
transit traffic, and on eradicating illicit laboratories within Turkey =
which=20
process smuggled morphine base into heroin. There is no conclusive =
evidence that=20
illicit narcotics produced in Turkey or transiting Turkey enter the =
United=20
States in significant quantities. Turkey is a member of the Financial =
Action=20
Task Force (FATF), and is investigating possible money laundering cases. =
The=20
1988 UN Drug Convention was signed by Turkey in 1988, and formally =
ratified in=20
1996. II. Status of Country Opium poppy cultivation in Turkey is limited =
to=20
carefully monitored and controlled production for the licit =
pharmaceutical=20
opiate market, as recognized by the International Narcotics Control =
Board (INCB)=20
and the United States Government (USG). There is no indication of =
diversion to=20
illicit channels. Farming inefficiencies and relatively poor alkaloid =
content=20
make poppy crops for opiates only marginally commercial, although poppy =
seeds=20
are a valuable food crop. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is =
working=20
with the Turkish authorities to improve the alkaloid content of the =
poppies.=20
Other illicit cultivation of narcotic plants, primarily marijuana, is =
minor and=20
has no significant effect on the United States. The amount of heroin and =
other=20
illicit opiates transiting Turkey is unknown, although the U.S. Drug =
Enforcement=20
Agency (DEA) estimates that it remains steady at between four and six =
tons of=20
heroin to Europe each month. As much as 75 percent of the heroin seized =
in=20
Europe has a &quot;Turkish Connection,&quot; having either transited =
Turkey,=20
been processed there, or been seized in connection with Turkish criminal =

syndicates. We continue to monitor this route for indications that =
heroin=20
transiting Turkey affects the United States. The discoveries of =
processing labs=20
and seizures of illicit precursor chemicals such as acetic anhydride =
indicate=20
continuing heroin refining in Turkey. Turkish anti-narcotics forces are=20
aggressive in interdicting drug traffic and closing down illicit =
laboratories=20
within Turkey. Turkey has continued to move forward in its =
anti-money-laundering=20
campaign. The Turkish Financial Crimes Investigative Board (FCIB), with =
the=20
assistance of the U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN), is =

actively investigating more than 80 possible money-laundering cases. =
Three of=20
the cases have been sent to the prosecutor's office for further action. =
So far,=20
the cases have centered primarily on allegations of corruption rather =
than money=20
generated from narcotics trade. None of the cases sent to the Turkish=20
prosecutor's office involved narcotics. III. Country Action Against =
Drugs in=20
1998 Policy Initiatives. Turkey continues to emphasize anti-money =
laundering=20
efforts. The Government of Turkey tried to obtain a better estimate on =
the=20
informal economy by declaring a &quot;financial clearance day&quot; on =
September=20
30, 1998. All Turks with undeclared monetary assets were asked to put =
these=20
assets in a Turkish bank for that one day. A total of $4.3 billion was =
recorded.=20
Two major pieces of legislation are before Parliament, but not expected =
to pass=20
until the formation of the new government: an organized crime bill which =
would=20
better define and more severely punish organized crime, and a banking =
reform=20
bill which would enforce stricter auditing controls on banks. =
Accomplishments.=20
Turkey's anti-money laundering efforts received a satisfactory =
evaluation from=20
FATF in October 1998. In the same month, Turkey signed a multilateral =
agreement=20
within the context of the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative =
(SECI) with=20
Romania and Bulgaria for cooperation on anti-terrorism, organized crime, =

narcotics smuggling, and money laundering. Law Enforcement Efforts. As =
of=20
mid-December 1998, Turkish law enforcement agencies, including the =
Turkish=20
National Police, the Jandarma (rural police), Customs, and Coast Guard, =
had=20
seized over three tons of heroin and five tons of hashish. There were =
4,577=20
drug-related arrests. Turkish officials continue to maintain close =
relationships=20
with anti-narcotic counterparts in the United States and many European=20
countries, and hold monthly meetings with those countries' drug liaison=20
officers. Corruption. Allegations of corruption continue to dominate =
news=20
headlines. The arrest of alleged Turkish mafia boss Alaaddin Cakici in =
France in=20
1998 re-opened rumors of criminal gang corruption of major political =
figures in=20
such areas as preferential treatment in bidding for privatized state =
entities.=20
On November 25, State Minister Gunes Taner was censured for his apparent =

involvement in corruption and was stripped of his cabinet seat. =
Allegations of=20
corruption were also leveled against Prime Minister Yilmaz, whose =
government=20
lost a vote of confidence the same day. To date, the corruption =
allegations have=20
not involved narcotics trafficking. Agreements and Treaties. The United =
States=20
and Turkey have long-standing bilateral treaties covering extradition =
and mutual=20
legal assistance in criminal matters, as well as a narcotics assistance=20
protocol. The USG has concluded a Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement =
(CMAA)=20
with the Government of Turkey. In addition, Turkey is a party to the =
World=20
Customs Organization's International Convention on Mutual Administrative =

Assistance for the Prevention, Investigation, and Repression of Customs=20
Offenses, Annex X on Assistance in Narcotics Cases. Turkey is a party to =
the=20
1988 UN Drug Convention, and is a member of FATF. Cultivation and =
Production.=20
Opium poppies are grown by licensed farmers for pharmaceutical and food=20
products. Licit opium poppy cultivation is strictly controlled by the =
Turkish=20
Grain Board (TMO), with no apparent diversion into illicit channels. =
Culinary=20
poppy seed brings farmers more profit than the sale of the low-alkaloid =
poppy=20
straw. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is working with the =
Turkish=20
authorities to improve the alkaloid content of the poppies. Other =
illicit=20
cultivation of narcotic plants, primarily marijuana, is minor and has no =

significant impact on the United States. Drug Flow and Transit. Turkey =
remains=20
one of the major transit routes for the flow of Southwest Asian heroin =
to=20
Europe. There is little evidence that heroin from Turkey enters the =
United=20
States, either directly or through another transit state. We continue to =
monitor=20
the flow of heroin through Turkey for indications that it is becoming=20
significant for the United States, but no such indications have appeared =
thus=20
far. Heroin, and to a lesser degree, morphine base is smuggled through =
Turkey's=20
eastern border. Morphine base is refined in illicit labs, most often in =
the=20
rural Southeast or near Istanbul. Heroin is most commonly transferred to =
Europe=20
hidden in containers on trucks. Smaller amounts are transported by bus =
or air=20
passengers, or in private vehicles. Of note, in 1998, was the seizure of =

approximately 550 kilograms of cocaine from a ship on Turkey's southern =
coast.=20
This may be an indication of heroin-cocaine barter trade, with South =
American=20
cocaine entering Europe through traditional heroin routes. Reports of=20
involvement in drug trafficking by the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) =
continue.=20
The PKK, a terrorist separatist group active in the southeast border =
region of=20
Turkey, reportedly is paid protection money by narcotics traffickers and =

refiners. PKK groups based in Europe are also alleged to be involved in=20
narcotics trafficking. Demand Reduction. The single drug-prevention and=20
substance-abuse facility, the Amatem Clinic, treats drug addiction and=20
alcoholism. The incidence of substance abuse remains low, which the =
Turks=20
attribute to a strong family structure and the Muslim proscription of=20
mind-altering substances. Amatem Clinic has placed high priority on =
training=20
family doctors, pharmacists, and teachers to recognize the signs of drug =
abuse,=20
and on gathering reliable statistics on drug use. IV. U.S. Policy =
Initiatives=20
and Programs U.S. Policy Initiatives. USG policy is to strengthen =
Turkey's law=20
enforcement capability to combat narcotics trafficking and to control =
money=20
laundering and financial crime. The USG provides anti-narcotics =
equipment and=20
training assistance to the Turkish National Police, training and =
equipment to=20
Turkish Customs aimed at strengthening border interdiction, and training =
to the=20
Turkish Financial Crimes Investigative Board. To assist Turkey's effort =
to keep=20
licit opiate production from moving into illicit channels, the U.S. =
Department=20
of Agriculture is helping Turkey to increase the opiate ratio in poppy =
straw.=20
The USG anti-narcotics programs in Turkey, including training, are =
budgeted at=20
approximately $700,000. Bilateral Cooperation. USG anti-narcotics =
agencies=20
report that while the number of interdictions has remained stable, the=20
cooperation and professionalism of Turkish law enforcement officials is=20
improving. There were a number of successful bilateral investigations in =
1998,=20
including the seizure of 550 kilograms of cocaine. The Road Ahead. =
Turkey is=20
continuing its efforts to curtail drugs entering through its borders, =
and to=20
disrupt the flow of drug trafficking in Turkey. Further legislation is =
needed to=20
crack down on organized crime, improve banking regulations, and limit=20
parliamentary immunity to prosecution. Active prosecution of pending =
money=20
laundering cases, expected in the coming year, will be a positive sign =
of=20
Turkey's commitment to fighting drugs and corruption. [end of document] =
</P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>U.S. Department of State </P>
<P>Turkey Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997</P>
<P>Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, January =
30,=20
1998. </P>
<P></P>
<P>TURKEY</P>
<P>Turkey is a constitutional republic with a multiparty parliament, the =
Grand=20
National Assembly, which elects the President. It elected Suleyman =
Demirel as=20
President in 1993. In June Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the Islamist =
Refah=20
Party, resigned as Prime Minister after an intense private and public =
campaign=20
against his Government led by the military, with significant support =
from other=20
segments of civil society which view fundamentalism as a threat to the =
country's=20
secular republic. In July Motherland Party (ANAP) leader Mesut Yilmaz =
became=20
Prime Minister. He formed a coalition government with the Democratic =
Left Party=20
(DSP) and the Democrat Turkey Party (DTP). The Government respects the=20
Constitution's provisions for an independent judiciary. </P>
<P>For over a decade, Turkey has engaged in armed conflict with the =
terrorist=20
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), whose goal is a separate state of =
Kurdistan in=20
southeastern Turkey. A state of emergency, declared in 1987, continues =
in six=20
southeastern provinces facing substantial PKK terrorist violence. =
Parliament=20
voted in October to lift the state of emergency in Bingol, Batman, and =
Bitlis=20
provinces. A regional governor for the state of emergency has authority =
over the=20
ordinary governors in the six provinces, and six adjacent ones, for =
security=20
matters. The state of emergency allows him to exercise certain =
quasi-martial law=20
powers, including restrictions on the press and removal from the area of =
persons=20
whose activities are deemed detrimental to public order. The state of =
emergency=20
decree was renewed for 4 months for all provinces in November. </P>
<P>The Turkish National Police (TNP) have primary responsibility for =
security in=20
urban areas, while the Jandarma (gendarmerie) carry out this function in =
the=20
countryside. The armed forces continued to combat the PKK in the state =
of=20
emergency region, thereby taking on an internal security function. =
Although=20
civilian and military authorities remain publicly committed to the rule =
of law=20
and respect for human rights, some members of the security forces, =
particularly=20
police &quot;special teams,&quot; Jandarma, village guards, and TNP =
personnel,=20
committed serious human rights abuses. </P>
<P>Turkey's primarily market-based economy is driven by an active =
private=20
sector. The agricultural sector employs nearly one-half of the country's =
labor=20
force but contributes only 15 percent of the gross national product =
(GNP) and=20
total exports. A customs union with the European Union, in place since =
1996, has=20
boosted the trade deficit, but has the potential to increase the =
country's=20
economic efficiency and prosperity over time. The principal industrial=20
sectors--textiles, iron, and steel--provide the leading exports. =
Impressive=20
economic growth over the past 15 years has translated into an improved =
standard=20
of living and the creation of a growing middle class. Per capita GNP is=20
approximately $3,000. Such positive developments, however, have been =
accompanied=20
by substantial macroeconomic imbalances. Successive governments have had =
little=20
success in implementing needed reforms to reduce the budget deficit and=20
inflation. Populist economic measures pushed the budget deficit to =
approximately=20
8 percent of GNP and pushed inflation over 90 percent. Persistently high =

inflation over the past decade has exacerbated disparities in income=20
distribution. The conflict in the southeast and maintenance of a large =
national=20
defense establishment continue to be a significant drain on the economy. =

Corruption has taken an economic toll and has sapped popular faith in =
the=20
Government. </P>
<P>Despite some reforms and the Government's stated commitment to =
respect human=20
rights, serious human rights abuses continued. Human rights nevertheless =

remained a priority public issue during the year. There is a general =
recognition=20
that the country's human rights performance is inadequate and needs to =
be=20
brought in line, not only with its international obligations and =
commitments,=20
but also with popular aspirations and demands, and the Government's own=20
policies. </P>
<P>The situation in the southeast remains a serious concern. The =
Government has=20
long denied the Kurdish population, located largely in the southeast, =
basic=20
political, cultural, and linguistic rights. As part of its fight against =
the=20
PKK, the Government forcibly displaced noncombatants, failed to resolve=20
extrajudicial killings, tortured civilians, and abridged freedom of =
expression.=20
The PKK committed widespread abuses, including the frequent murder of=20
noncombatants, as part of its terrorism against the Government and =
civilians,=20
mostly Kurds. </P>
<P>Estimates of the total number of villagers forcibly evacuated from =
their=20
homes since the conflict began vary widely from 330,000 to 2 million. A =
credible=20
estimate given by a former Member of Parliament from the region is =
around=20
560,000. The Government's resettlement and compensation program for=20
internally-displaced people remained. During the year, 61 villages and =
7,608=20
persons were resettled, according to government figures. </P>
<P>Human rights abuses were not limited to the southeast. Extrajudicial=20
killings, including deaths in detention, from the excessive use of =
force,=20
&quot;mystery killings,&quot; and disappearances continued. The =
Government=20
investigated some 185 reported disappearance cases: 40 persons were =
found and=20
reunited with their families, 7 were believed to be abroad, 96 relocated =
to=20
other parts of the country, and 42 were unaccounted for. </P>
<P>Torture remained widespread: police and Jandarma antiterror personnel =
often=20
abused detainees and employed torture during incommunicado detention and =

interrogation. The implementation of reforms to address these problems =
was=20
uneven. Lengthy investigations and trials of officials suspected of =
abuses=20
continued to be a problem. Important cases dating back to 1995 and 1996=20
continued without resolution, including: 48 police officers charged with =
the=20
1996 death of journalist Metin Goktepe; 10 police officers from Manisa, =
accused=20
of torturing 15 people, mostly teenagers accused of ties to a leftist =
terrorist=20
organization; and police and security personnel charged with beating to =
death 10=20
prisoners during a prison disturbance in Diyarbakir in 1996. </P>
<P>The rarity of convictions of police or other security officials for =
killings=20
and torture fosters a climate of impunity that probably remains the =
single=20
largest obstacle to reducing human rights abuses. The lack of immediate =
access=20
to an attorney by those detained for political crimes is also a major =
factor in=20
torture by police and security forces. </P>
<P>Prison conditions are poor. Numerous small-scale disturbances and =
hunger=20
strikes erupted throughout the year. Prolonged pretrial detention and =
lengthy=20
trials continued to be problems. </P>
<P>Limits on freedom of speech and of the press remained another serious =

problem. For example, according to the Human Rights Foundation, at =
year's end=20
approximately 60 journalists were under arrest or had been convicted; =
the=20
Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) reported that 40 journalists were =

imprisoned at year's end. Authorities banned or confiscated numerous=20
publications, and a government decree has led to self-censorship of =
reporting on=20
the southeast. One of the Yilmaz Government's first steps was to =
acknowledge the=20
problem as a priority for resolution, when, 3 weeks after assuming =
office, he=20
received a delegation from the CPJ, and subsequently won passage of =
legislation=20
that provided conditional amnesty for several imprisoned editors. =
Nonetheless,=20
the basic laws under which the editors were arrested did not change, and =
all=20
were subject to reimposition of their former sentences if tried and =
convicted=20
for similar offenses. The Government continued to use the 1991 =
Anti-Terror Law,=20
with its broad and ambiguous definition of terrorism, to detain both =
alleged=20
terrorists and others on the charge that their acts, words, or ideas =
constituted=20
dissemination of separatist propaganda. Prosecutors also used Article =
312 of the=20
Criminal Code (incitement to racial or ethnic enmity), Article 159 =
(insulting=20
the Parliament, army, republic, or judiciary), the law to protect =
Ataturk (no.=20
5816), and Article 16 of the Press Law to limit freedom of expression. =
</P>
<P>Kurdish-language broadcasts remained illegal (but not printed =
material in=20
Kurdish). The Sanliurfa branch of the Mesopotamian Cultural Center, a=20
corporation established to promote the Kurdish language and culture, was =
banned=20
in October by the Provincial Governor. In Istanbul the Governor's office =
refused=20
the Kurdish Culture and Research Foundation permission to offer Kurdish =
language=20
classes. The translator and publisher of a Human Rights Watch report on =
the=20
conflict in the southeast were convicted under Article 159 of the Penal =
Code=20
(defaming the military). The translator received a suspended sentence; =
both were=20
assessed small fines of approximately $12 dollars. They appealed the =
verdict and=20
are free pending its outcome. Private channel television programs and =
print=20
media continued to debate human rights and other issues of freedom of =
speech and=20
the press. </P>
<P>The Government imposes limits on freedom of assembly and association. =
In=20
September the police detained and beat Turkish and foreign participants =
in the=20
&quot;Musa Anter peace train&quot; demonstration, named after a =
well-known=20
Kurdish writer. The group was blocked from entering Diyarbakir, where =
its=20
members had intended to demonstrate for a peaceful resolution of the =
conflict in=20
the southeast. Foreign participants were deported, and legal proceedings =
were=20
brought against some of the local organizers. Members of the pro-Kurdish =

People's Democracy Party (HADEP) were sometimes the object of arbitrary =
arrests=20
and mystery killings and often were harassed in the southeast for their =
legal=20
political activities. HADEP, sympathetic to the PKK, is under threat of=20
investigation for alleged anticonstitutional activities and, depending =
upon the=20
outcome, faces closure (two of its predecessors, HEP and DEP, were =
closed down).=20
</P>
<P>In June the Refah/True Path Party (DYP) coalition, the country's =
first=20
Islamist government, resigned after an intense private and public =
campaign of=20
pressure led by the military with support from several segments of =
society who=20
viewed &quot;fundamentalism&quot; to be a threat to the secular =
republic. In May=20
before the Refah/DYP coalition broke up, the chief state prosecutor, in =
an=20
attempt to close down Refah, charged the Party and five of its leaders,=20
including former Prime Minster Erbakan, with attempting to undermine the =
secular=20
nature of the state as defined by the Constitution based in part on =
public=20
statements made by Refah leaders. In January 1998 the court ordered the =
party=20
closed and banned several of its leaders, including former Prime =
Minister=20
Erbakan, from political activity for 5 years. The Democratic Mass Party =
(DKP), a=20
moderate Kurdish party, faces the threat of closure in a case before the =

Constitutional Court on the grounds that its charter questions the=20
indivisibility of the country and advocates support for a minority, =
namely the=20
Kurds. In November the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found =
unanimously=20
that the Government had violated Article 5-3 (excessive detention of 12 =
to 14=20
days) of the European convention on human rights in the case of several=20
pro-Kurdish former Democracy Party (DEP) Members of Parliament (M.P.'s) =
and=20
ordered the Government to pay the M.P.s' compensation and court costs. =
The ECHR=20
did not rule on the M.P.s' appeal of their convictions on charges of =
separatism=20
and membership in an armed gang. </P>
<P>In June the Ankara State Security Court found 32 members of HADEP, =
including=20
party chairman Murat Bozlak, guilty on a variety of charges of =
proscribed=20
political activity. Government officials continued to harass, =
intimidate,=20
indict, and imprison human rights monitors, journalists, and lawyers for =
ideas=20
that they expressed in public forums. Seven regional offices of the =
Human Rights=20
Association were shut down during the year; three remain closed. In May =
Dr.=20
Tufan Kose, a representative of the Adana branch of the Human Rights =
Foundation=20
(HRF), a respected nongovernmental organization (NGO), was convicted and =
fined=20
for not turning over to the authorities the names of torture victims =
treated by=20
the HRF's torture treatment center. He is free on appeal. The president =
of the=20
Human Rights Association (HRA), along with other HRA organizers, faces =
charges=20
of promoting separatism or inciting ethnic hatred based on speeches. The =

president of the HRF, the HRA president, and the leaders of two small =
political=20
parties were charged with holding an unauthorized demonstration. A =
prominent=20
Malatya defense attorney, who often defended alleged terrorists, was =
himself=20
held and charged with assisting terrorist groups. After incarceration =
for 3=20
months, he was freed pending the outcome of his case. </P>
<P>The Government imposed some restrictions on religious minorities and=20
Parliament passed legislation extending compulsory education from 5 to 8 =
years.=20
This law will lead to the closure of grades six to eight of the Islamist =

imam-Hatip religious schools, along with other private schools. Spousal =
abuse,=20
some abuse of children, and child labor remain serious problems. =
Discrimination=20
against women persists. </P>
<P>In July Prime Minister Yilmaz appointed an activist State Minister =
for Human=20
Rights, who also is coordinator for the High Council for Human Rights. =
The=20
Council, comprised of undersecretaries from the Justice, Interior, =
Education,=20
Health, and Foreign Affairs Ministries (along with representatives of =
the=20
security forces), meets weekly to review aspects of the human rights =
situation=20
and advise the Government on steps for improvement. The Minister and the =
Council=20
have invited an active dialogue with the increasingly important NGO's =
that work=20
for human rights reforms both in the capital and in the southeast. </P>
<P>The Government provides human rights training for the police and =
military.=20
The military continued to emphasize human rights training for its =
officers and=20
noncommissioned officers, which human rights NGO's reported led to a =
reduction=20
in human rights violations. Human rights education in primary schools is =

mandatory; it is an elective in high schools. Senior military leaders =
met for=20
the first time with international human rights NGO representatives. </P>
<P>PKK terrorists murdered noncombatants, targeting village officials, =
village=20
guards, teachers, and other perceived representatives of the State. They =
also=20
committed random murders in their effort to intimidate the populace. =
</P>
<P>RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS </P>
<P>Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom =
From:=20
</P>
<P>a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing </P>
<P>Credible reports of political and extrajudicial killings by =
government=20
authorities continued, although accurate figures were unavailable. The=20
Documentation Center of the HRF reported a number of deaths of detainees =
under=20
suspicious circumstances, some as an apparent result of torture. At =
least seven=20
prisoners died in disturbances during which prison authorities =
apparently used=20
excessive force, but one report attributed the deaths to the actions of =
other=20
prisoners.(see Section 1.c.). </P>
<P>In response, the Government mounted serious investigations. The =
Office of the=20
Minister for Human Rights reported that out of 41 persons whom the HRA =
alleges=20
died in extrajudicial killings in the first 10 months of the year,=20
investigations showed that 11 died in clashes with the police. In the =
cases of=20
another 7 persons, the authorities arrested those responsible; 3 others =
were=20
found to have died of natural, rather than violent, causes; 2 others =
were found=20
to have been executed by individuals not connected with the security =
forces; and=20
2 more were found alive. The remaining allegations are still under=20
investigation. </P>
<P>Human rights monitors remain greatly concerned about the 1996 =
Provincial=20
Authority Law, which authorizes security forces to shoot to kill when=20
challenging a suspect and grants provincial governors the power to =
declare a=20
&quot;state of emergency&quot; and to call in security forces. This law =
was=20
adopted in the wake of the Government's decision to lift incrementally =
the state=20
of emergency in some provinces in the southeast. Many human rights =
monitors are=20
concerned about the expanded authorities that this law extends to =
provincial=20
governors. </P>
<P>Although government prosecution of reported perpetrators has =
increased,=20
punishment remained poor. Police and other law enforcement personnel =
were=20
occasionally arrested in cases of extrajudicial killings, but there were =
few=20
known successful prosecutions. The Office of the Minister of Human =
Rights=20
reports that judicial and administrative investigations were started in =
seven of=20
the cases of extrajudicial killings alleged by the HRA for the first 10 =
months=20
of the year. Little progress occurred in the trial of 48 police =
officers,=20
including 3 senior officers and a deputy commissioner, for the 1996 =
death of=20
Metin Goktepe, a correspondent for Evrensel newspaper, who died from =
wounds=20
inflicted while in detention in Istanbul. Police initially denied that =
he had=20
been detained, then later said that he died from a fall. Following large =
public=20
demonstrations and parliamentary criticism over the circumstances of his =
death,=20
an investigation led to the arrest of the officers. In May the courts =
decided to=20
try separately 11 of the police officers for premeditated murder. Five =
officers=20
remain under arrest; the others returned to duty pending the outcome of =
the=20
trial. No progress was made in the trial of the other 37, who were =
charged with=20
excessive use of force in controlling the demonstration. </P>
<P>The trial of 29 Jandarma soldiers and 36 antiterror police officers =
charged=20
with manslaughter in the 1996 beating deaths of 10 prisoners while =
quelling a=20
prison disturbance in Diyarbakir continued (see Section 1.c.). An Adana =
criminal=20
court acquitted 23 antiterror police officers of negligence in the =
killing of 5=20
people, including children aged 2 and 4, during a raid on a house in the =
town of=20
Kucukdikili, outside of Adana. The number of prosecutions of security =
force=20
members, while increasing, remained low. </P>
<P>The HRA and other human rights NGO's recorded several mystery =
killings in=20
which the assailant's identity was unknown. It is widely alleged in the=20
southeast that such killings occur with the complicity of security =
forces. Most=20
of the reports pertain to the southeast, where some of the victims were =
leaders=20
or prominent members of the Kurdish community, local politicians, or =
members of=20
HADEP. </P>
<P>In 1996 a fatal car crash--known as the Susurluk incident--occurred=20
involving: Abdullah Catli, an ultra rightwing militant wanted by =
Interpol on=20
charges of murdering in 1980 seven university students who were members =
of the=20
left-wing labor party; Huseyin Kocadag, a former Istanbul deputy police =
chief;=20
Gonca Uz, a former beauty queen; and Sedat Bucak (the only survivor), an =
ethnic=20
Kurdish M.P. and clan leader with an important stake in the Government's =
village=20
guard program. Weapons and silencers were found in the car. The incident =

resurrected serious concerns about corruption and the abuse of power in =
the=20
security forces. It also led to the resignation of the then-Interior =
Minister,=20
Mehmet Agar, who had been linked to the victims of the accident. In =
February and=20
the first part of March, a popular protest called &quot;a minute of=20
darkness&quot; spread across the country as citizens turned off the =
lights in=20
their households to protest the Susurluk incident and corruption. In May =
a=20
parliamentary committee formed to investigate the incident concluded =
that links=20
existed among politicians, police officials, and organized crime bosses. =

Although the Government affirmed its commitment to a full investigation, =
the=20
report's lack of precision in drawing conclusions led to public =
criticism. The=20
Refah Party chairman of the committee complained that he was denied =
access to=20
many government documents on the grounds that they contained state =
secrets; at=20
one point he accused the Speaker of the National Assembly of withdrawing =

documents concerning the role of the armed forces. The commander of the =
Jandarma=20
refused to appear before the committee. The parliamentary investigation =
expired=20
in April. In December Parliament lifted the immunity from criminal =
prosecution=20
of now-opposition True Path Party M.P.'s Sedak Bucak and Mehmet Agar, an =

initiative supported by the Yilmaz Government. According to press =
accounts in=20
January 1998, a report prepared by Prime Minister's Board of Inspectors =
linked=20
the state's security forces under recent Governments to extrajudicial =
killings=20
and mafia-like activities. The report has not been publicly released. In =
a=20
television interview, Prime Minister Yilmaz committed himself to a full=20
investigation of these events. </P>
<P>The case of eight police officers charged in the 1995 death of Sinan=20
Demirtas, who died while in police custody, continued. The case of =
police=20
officer Abdullah Bozkurt, charged with the 1994 murder of Vedat Han =
Gulsenoglu,=20
also continues; Bozkurt was reassigned from Istanbul to Van. The 1993 =
case of=20
the death in detention of Vakkas Dost continues; policeman Nurettin =
Ozturk, the=20
accused murderer who disappeared after being freed, was found and =
rearrested in=20
September. </P>
<P>Eleven police officers were acquitted in May in Adana of the 1992 =
killing of=20
Remzi Basalak while he was under detention. The case continues before =
the Court=20
of Appeals. The following cases remain unresolved: the 1992 case of =
Yucel Ozen,=20
the 1994 killing of HEP party official Faik Candan, and the 1993 killing =
of=20
journalist Ugur Mumcu. </P>
<P>The PKK continued to commit political and extrajudicial killings, =
primarily=20
in rural southeast Anatolia. Political killings perpetrated by the PKK =
have=20
included state officials (Jandarma, local mayors, imams, and =
schoolteachers),=20
state-paid paramilitary village guards and their family members, young =
villagers=20
who refused to be recruited, and PKK guerrillas-turned-informants. =
According to=20
government statistics, as of November the PKK killed 667 people, =
including at=20
least 130 unarmed civilians. The Government also reported that in 1997,=20
approximately 260 soldiers and Jandarma, 12 police officers, 149 village =
guards,=20
and 2,200 PKK members lost their lives. </P>
<P>Turkish Hizbullah, an Islamist Turkish terrorist group (not related =
to=20
Lebanese Hizbullah), continued to target civilians in the southeast. =
According=20
to the HRF, Hizbullah reportedly was responsible for at least four =
deaths in=20
1997. Four trials continued against 89 Hizbullah members charged with a =
total of=20
113 murders. In 1996 the Foreign Ministry stated that a case had been =
brought=20
against Hizbullah for the 1993 murder of DEP parliamentarian Mehmet =
Sincar;=20
human rights groups consider the case a mystery killing. Some human =
rights=20
activists in the southeast believe that Turkish Hizbullah was founded by =
the=20
Government in the 1980's to target the PKK and its sympathizers. </P>
<P>According to Human Rights Watch, Far-left armed groups, such as =
Revolutionary=20
Left (Dev Sol/DHKP-C) and the Turkish Workers' and Peasants' Liberation =
Army=20
(TIKKO), continued to commit abusive, violent acts. In May TIKKO members =

reportedly killed four civilians in Tokat. In September a radical =
Islamic group,=20
Vasat, a splinter group of the Islamic Great Eastern Raiders Front =
(IBDA-C),=20
killed 1 person and injured 24 others in a grenade attack at a book fair =
in=20
Gaziantep. A total of 25 Vasat members were arrested for the attack. In =
October=20
in a joint operation, PKK, DHKP/C, and TIKKO terrorists kidnapped three=20
engineers, killing one and holding two as hostages in Giresun on the =
Black Sea.=20
</P>
<P>b. Disappearance </P>
<P>Accurate statistics on disappearances of those previously under =
detention are=20
hard to confirm; nonetheless, HRA figures indicate that such =
disappearances=20
appear to have declined from a total of 194 in 1996 to 63 in 1997 (as of =

November). The Government has made a serious effort to investigate and =
explain=20
reported cases of disappearance. Some persons disappeared after =
witnesses=20
reported that security forces or law enforcement officials took them =
into=20
custody. Fikri Ozgen, a 73-year-old, disappeared in Diyarbakir on =
February 27=20
when, according to numerous witnesses, he was taken into custody by =
plainclothes=20
police. Later the same week, Ilyas Eren disappeared under similar =
circumstances=20
in Diyarbakir. In a case reported by Amnesty International (AI), Burhan =
Aktus=20
disappeared on October 22 when he was forced into a car by three men =
whom his=20
mother believed were plainclothes police officers. On September 16, =
1996, at=20
least five bodies were found on the outskirts of the village of Baharli, =
near=20
Diyarbakir. Some of the victims had reportedly been in police custody =
earlier in=20
the month. The disappearances and deaths are under investigation; no one =
has=20
been charged. </P>
<P>For more than 2 years, mothers who claim that immediate relatives =
have=20
disappeared have gathered weekly in Istanbul. The Ministry of Interior =
operates=20
a Missing Persons Bureau, which is open 24 hours a day and handled 185 =
cases as=20
of November. Most families of the persons who disappeared hold the =
Government=20
and security forces responsible and consequently avoided contact with =
the=20
government office. </P>
<P>The Government, human rights organizations, and the media report that =
the PKK=20
routinely kidnaps young men or threatens their families as part of its=20
recruiting effort. PKK terrorists continued their abductions of local =
villagers,=20
teachers, journalists, and officials in the southeast. </P>
<P>c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or =
Punishment=20
</P>
<P>Despite the Constitution's ban on torture, the Government's =
cooperation with=20
unscheduled foreign inspection teams, and public pledges by successive=20
governments to end the practice, torture continued to be widespread. The =
HRF's=20
torture rehabilitation centers in Ankara, Izmir, Istanbul, and Adana =
reported=20
530 credible applications for treatment during the year. Human rights =
attorneys=20
and physicians who treat victims of torture say that most persons =
detained for=20
or suspected of political crimes usually suffer some torture during =
periods of=20
incommunicado detention in police stations and Jandarma stations before =
they are=20
brought before a court. </P>
<P>Government officials admit that torture occurs. Although they deny =
that=20
torture is systematic, they explain its occurrence by stating that it is =
closely=20
tied to the fight against terrorism. Many cases of torture, however, =
occur in=20
western Turkey, outside the zone of conflict. Eight complaints of =
torture or=20
mistreatment were filed with the Parliamentary Human Rights Commission =
during=20
the year. In January the United Nations (U.N.) Special Rapporteur on =
Torture and=20
other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment reported that =
he=20
continued to be concerned by the apparently widespread practice of =
torture in=20
Turkey. The Government has invited both the Special Rapporteur on =
torture and=20
the working group on disappearances to visit the country. </P>
<P>In a particularly egregious case, two police officers were convicted =
in Adana=20
of torturing Songul Yildiz, whom they had questioned on suspicion of PKK =

membership after a demonstration in March. In November the court =
convicted the=20
two policemen of torture, but the judge imposed only a 1-year suspended=20
sentence, and the two men were allowed to remain on the police force. =
The=20
victim's lawyer has appealed the sentence. </P>
<P>According to Amnesty International, in March journalist Hatun =
Temizalp was=20
detained for a week in the anti-terror branch Istanbul Police =
headquarters where=20
she was subjected to various forms of torture and abuse (blindfolded=20
interrogation, tied to and suspended from a wooden bar, and electric =
shocks).=20
The State Forensic Medicine Institute issued a medical certificate =
detailing a=20
fractured and dislocated shoulder blade, as well as signs of light =
blows. She=20
was charged in a State Security Court where she complained of torture, =
despite=20
police attempts to dissuade her through intimidation. She says that she=20
requested access to a lawyer but that the request was denied. In =
November=20
according to the Government, two police officers were convicted and =
sentenced to=20
over 5 years in prison for torturing and eventually killing Ali Riza =
Aydogan=20
while the latter was in custody at the Beyoglu police precinct in =
Istanbul in=20
1992. </P>
<P>In Istanbul five police officers from the antiterror division were =
indicted=20
in criminal court, and accused of torturing Gulderen Baran and four =
other=20
detainees in 1995 during an interrogation about their alleged membership =
in a=20
terrorist organization. In May Gulderen Baran and one of her colleagues =
were=20
found guilty as charged and sentenced to life imprisonment. Another was=20
acquitted and the remaining two were sentenced to 12=BD years in prison. =
Baran=20
remains incarcerated at Istanbul's Bayrampasa prison pending her appeal. =
The=20
timing of the police and Baran's trials precluded consideration that =
Baran's=20
conviction may have been based on torture. </P>
<P>Human rights observers report that because the arresting officer is =
also=20
responsible for interrogating the suspect, some officers may resort to =
torture=20
to obtain a confession that would justify the arrest. Many detainees =
state that=20
prosecutors ignore their claims of abuse during interrogation. Commonly =
employed=20
methods of torture alleged by the HRF's torture treatment centers =
include:=20
high-pressure cold water hoses, placing large ice blocks on the chest =
and=20
stomach, electric shocks, beating on the soles of the feet, beating of=20
genitalia, hanging by the arms, blindfolding, sleep deprivation, =
deprivation of=20
clothing, systematic beatings, and vaginal and anal rape with truncheons =
and, in=20
some instances, gun barrels. Other forms of torture were sexual abuse,=20
submersion in cold water, use of truncheons, hanging sandbags on =
detainees'=20
necks, forcing detainees to stand on one foot, releasing drops of water =
on=20
detainees' heads, oxygen deprivation, sitting on detainees' laps, riding =
on=20
their shoulders, and withholding food. </P>
<P>The Government maintains that medical examinations occur once during=20
detention and a second time before either arraignment or release. =
However,=20
former detainees assert that some medical examinations took place too =
long after=20
the event to reveal any definitive findings of torture. Members of =
security and=20
police forces often stay in the examination room when physicians are =
examining=20
detainees, resulting in intimidation of both the detainee and the =
physician.=20
Physicians responded to the coercion by refraining from examining =
detainees,=20
performing cursory examinations and not reporting findings, or reporting =

physical findings but not drawing reasonable medical inferences that =
torture=20
occurred. Turkish Medical Association officials reported that some =
police=20
officers tore up reports that documented torture, demanding that a clean =
report=20
be drawn up instead. </P>
<P>Credible sources in the human rights and legal communities estimate =
that=20
judicial authorities investigate very few of the formal complaints =
involving=20
torture and prosecute only a fraction of those. Security personnel =
accused of=20
violating human rights are held to a different standard than other =
citizens. The=20
Anti-Terror Law provides that officials accused of torture or other =
mistreatment=20
may continue to work while under investigation. </P>
<P>Special provincial administrative boards rather than regular courts =
decide=20
whether to prosecute such cases. Suspects' legal fees are paid by their=20
employing agencies. Under the state of emergency, any lawsuit directed =
at=20
government authorities must be approved by the state of emergency =
governor.=20
Approval is rare. These constraints contribute to the paucity of =
convictions for=20
torture. </P>
<P>Under the Administrative Adjudication Law, an administrative =
investigation=20
into an alleged torture case is conducted to determine if there is =
enough=20
evidence to bring a law enforcement officer to trial. Under the Criminal =
Trials=20
Procedure Law (CMUK), prosecutors are empowered to initiate =
investigations of=20
police or Jandarma officers suspected of torturing or mistreating =
suspects. In=20
cases where township security directors or Jandarma commanders are =
accused of=20
torture, the prosecutor must obtain permission to initiate an =
investigation from=20
the Ministry of Justice, because these officials are deemed to have a =
status=20
equal to that of judges. </P>
<P>In March the CMUK was amended to grant immediate access by attorneys =
to those=20
arrested for common crimes, and after 4 days of detention for those =
persons=20
detained under the Anti-Terror Law or for other &quot;security&quot; =
crimes.=20
Private attorneys and human rights monitors reported uneven =
implementation of=20
these reforms, asserting that in some cases police officers would =
postdate the=20
day of detention to comply with the new law (see Section 1.d.). </P>
<P>The trial continues of 10 police officers, including 2 =
superintendents, from=20
Manisa (western Turkey) for allegedly torturing a group of 15 young =
people,=20
mostly teenagers suspected of belonging to a leftist terrorist =
organization in=20
1995. The youths' trial ended in January, when the courts found 11 =
teenagers=20
guilty of belonging to a terrorist organization, and acquitted 4 others. =
In May=20
all 15 were acquitted on the separate charge of throwing a Moltov =
cocktail at a=20
barber shop. Lawyers appealed the convictions. The timing of the police =
and=20
teenagers' trials precluded consideration that the teenagers' =
confessions may=20
have been based on torture. A judge in the case of the police =
officers--who=20
remain on active duty--relieved them of their obligation to personally =
appear in=20
the court room due to concern that such an appearance would compromise =
their=20
undercover investigative work. Human rights attorneys complained that =
this=20
ruling undermined the prosecution's case against the officers. </P>
<P>In September the European Court of Human Rights ruled against Turkey =
in the=20
case of a woman from the town of Derik in the southeast, concluding that =
she had=20
been tortured and raped by Jandarma and village guards while forcibly =
detained=20
for 3 days in 1993 (see Section 1.e.). The Government was ordered to pay =

compensation and to reimburse the applicant's legal expenses. </P>
<P>Prison conditions remain poor. Juveniles and adults are incarcerated =
together=20
and most prisons lack a medical health care program to provide routine =
and even=20
urgent medical care. Families often must supplement the poor quality =
food.=20
Prisons are run on the ward system. Prisoners, often those of the same=20
ideological bent, are incarcerated together and indoctrinate and punish =
their=20
own. Government efforts to reform prisons by adopting a cell system have =
been=20
criticized by prisoners, attorneys, and human rights activists alike, =
who view=20
the ward system as a more humane form of incarceration. Plagued by =
overcrowding,=20
underfunding, and very poor administration, prisons periodically become =
the=20
scene of explosive situations. </P>
<P>A total of at least seven prisoners were killed in two separate =
prison=20
disturbances. In July six prisoners were killed by other inmates during =
a prison=20
disturbance at Istanbul's Metris prison. The disturbance reportedly =
originated=20
with the killing of one prisoner; the other five were killed in the =
actual=20
disturbance during which Jandarma and prison officials were videotaped =
using=20
excessive force. According to a human rights NGO, forensic medicine =
reports=20
revealed that all prisoners had been stabbed to death by homemade =
weapons. In=20
August a disturbance in an Adana prison resulted in the death of a =
prisoner. The=20
HRF noted that the prisoner reportedly died at the hands of other =
inmates. </P>
<P>Torture of convicted prisoners decreased, but security personnel =
continued to=20
use excessive force in quieting disturbances. Small-scale hunger strikes =
to=20
protest prison conditions, the proposed transfer to a cell system, and =
poor=20
treatment by guards occurred at many institutions throughout the year. =
</P>
<P>Several monitoring groups, both domestic and international, carried =
out=20
prison visits. The Government accepted unannounced visits by the Council =
of=20
Europe's Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) and is in regular =
dialog=20
with the CPT. The International Committee of the Red Cross and the =
Government=20
are discussing ICRC access to prisoners accused of PKK membership. </P>
<P>d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile </P>
<P>Arbitrary arrest and detention remain problems. To take a person into =

custody, a prosecutor must issue a detention order, except in limited=20
circumstances such as when a person is caught committing a crime. The =
maximum=20
detention period for those charged with common individual crimes is 24 =
hours.=20
The detention period may be extended by a judge for a maximum of 7 days. =
Under=20
the CMUK, detainees are entitled to immediate access to an attorney and =
may meet=20
and confer with the attorney at any time. In practice, this degree of =
access=20
continued. </P>
<P>In March parliament passed new legislation that reduced detention =
periods.=20
Persons detained for individual crimes that fall under the Anti-Terror =
Law must=20
be brought before a judge within 48 hours, while those charged with =
crimes of a=20
collective, political, or conspiratorial nature may be detained for an =
initial=20
period of 48 hours, extended for up to 4 days at a prosecutor's =
discretion and,=20
with a judge's permission, for up to 7 days in most of the country and =
up to 10=20
days in the southeastern provinces under the state of emergency. =
Attorneys are=20
allowed access only after the first 4 days. Private attorneys and human =
rights=20
monitors reported uneven implementation of reforms that shortened =
pretrial=20
detention periods of those charged under the Anti-Terror Law, asserting =
that=20
some police officers postdate the day of detention to comply with the =
new law.=20
Like their colleagues in Batman, defense lawyers in Diyarbakir reported =
that in=20
spite of the new law, access to detainees in political cases remains =
difficult,=20
even after the expiration of the initial 4-day detention period. =
Diyarbakir=20
lawyers knew of only one case, as of September, in which access by =
attorneys to=20
detainees was permitted and only then after repeated attempts and =
because of the=20
high profile of the case. </P>
<P>No immediate access to an attorney is provided under the law for =
persons=20
whose cases fall under the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts; =
these=20
include those charged with smuggling and with crimes under the =
Anti-Terror Law.=20
This lack of early access to an attorney is a major factor in the use of =
torture=20
by police and security forces. The decision concerning early access to =
counsel=20
in such cases is left to the public prosecutor, who often denies access =
on the=20
grounds that it would prejudice an ongoing investigation. Although the=20
Constitution specifies the right of detainees to request speedy =
arraignment and=20
trial, judges have ordered that a significant number of suspects be =
detained=20
indefinitely, sometimes for years. Many cases involve persons accused of =
violent=20
crimes, but it is not uncommon for those accused of nonviolent political =
crimes=20
to be kept in custody until the conclusion of their trials. </P>
<P>By law a detainee's next of kin must be notified &quot;in the =
shortest=20
time&quot; after arrest, a requirement observed in practice in criminal =
and=20
civil cases. Once formally charged by the prosecutor, a detainee is =
arraigned by=20
a judge and allowed to retain a lawyer. After arraignment, the judge may =
release=20
the accused upon receipt of an appropriate assurance, such as bail, or =
order him=20
detained if the court determines that he is likely to flee the =
jurisdiction or=20
destroy evidence. </P>
<P>The Government does not use forced external exile, but the Government =
retains=20
the authority to authorize internal exile (see Section 2.d.). </P>
<P>e. Denial of Fair Public Trial </P>
<P>The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, and in =
practice the=20
courts generally act independently of the executive. The Constitution =
stipulates=20
that judges be independent of the executive in the discharge of their =
duties and=20
provides for security of tenure. The High Council of Judges and =
Prosecutors,=20
which is appointed by the President and includes the Minister of =
Justice,=20
selects judges and prosecutors for the higher courts and is responsible =
for=20
oversight of those in the lower courts. The Constitution also prohibits =
state=20
authorities from issuing orders or recommendations concerning the =
exercise of=20
judicial power. </P>
<P>The judicial system is composed of general law courts, State Security =
Courts,=20
and military courts. There is also a Constitutional Court. Most cases =
are=20
prosecuted in the general law courts, which include the civil, =
administrative,=20
and criminal courts. Appeals are heard either by the High Court of =
Appeals or=20
the Council of State. Provincial administrative boards established under =
the=20
Anti-Terror Law decide whether cases in which state officials are =
accused of=20
misconduct should be heard in criminal court. Military courts, with =
their own=20
appeals system, hear cases involving military law and members of the =
armed=20
forces, and cases in which civilians are alleged to have impugned the =
honor of=20
the armed forces or undermined compliance with the draft. </P>
<P>The Constitutional Court examines the constitutionality of laws, =
decrees, and=20
parliamentary procedural rules. However, it may not consider =
&quot;decrees with=20
the force of law&quot; issued under a state of emergency, martial law, =
or in=20
time of war. </P>
<P>State Security Courts (SSC's) sit in eight cities. They are composed =
of=20
panels of five members--two civilian judges, one military judge, and two =

prosecutors--and try defendants accused of crimes such as terrorism, =
drug=20
smuggling, membership in illegal organizations, and espousing or =
disseminating=20
ideas prohibited by law such as &quot;damaging the indivisible unity of =
the=20
state.&quot; SSC verdicts may be appealed only to a specialized =
department of=20
the High Court of Appeals dealing with crimes against state security.=20
Prosecutors and judges vested with responsibility for SSC cases are =
often housed=20
in military barracks in the southeast, expressly for their personal =
protection.=20
According to a human rights monitor this arrangement subjects them to=20
significant pressure in reviewing cases. The law gives prosecutors =
far-reaching=20
authority to supervise the police during an investigation. However, =
according to=20
Human Rights Watch, prosecutors seems to make little use of this power,=20
especially in cases of security detainees. </P>
<P>In 1997 SSC's predominantly handled cases under the Anti-Terror Law =
and=20
Section 312 of the Criminal Code. The Government claims that these =
courts were=20
established to try efficiently those suspected of certain crimes. These =
courts=20
may hold closed hearings and may admit testimony obtained during police=20
interrogation in the absence of counsel. The trial of 20 Diyarbakir =
lawyers=20
charged in 1993 with acting as couriers for the PKK continues at the =
Diyarbakir=20
SSC. All of the defendants remain free. In September nine Erzurum =
lawyers=20
charged with similar crimes were acquitted. </P>
<P>Under the Constitution, defendants have the right to a public trial =
in a=20
court of law. By law the bar association must provide free counsel to =
indigents=20
who make a request to the court. Bar associations in large cities, such =
as=20
Istanbul, have attorneys on call 24 hours a day. Costs are borne by the=20
Association. There is no jury system; all cases are decided by a judge =
or a=20
panel of judges. Trials may last for months or years, with one or two =
hearings=20
scheduled each month. </P>
<P>Defense lawyers generally have access to the public prosecutor's =
files after=20
arraignment and prior to trial (a period of several weeks). In cases =
involving=20
violations of the Anti-Terror Law and a few others, such as insulting =
the=20
president or &quot;defaming Turkish citizenship,&quot; defense attorneys =
may be=20
denied access to files that the state asserts deal with national =
intelligence or=20
security matters. Attorneys defending controversial cases occasionally =
face=20
legal harassment. Hasan Dogan, a respected Malatya attorney, who =
frequently=20
defends persons in SSC cases, was himself detained. He was charged in =
May under=20
Article 169 of the Criminal Code for membership in an illegal =
organization on=20
the basis of evidence supplied by a convicted prisoner cooperating with =
the=20
authorities in the hope of receiving more favorable treatment. Dogan is =
free=20
pending trial. Many lawyers who practice before SSC's contend that cases =
in=20
which testimony provided by informers is used are difficult to =
challenge. </P>
<P>In law and in practice, the legal system does not discriminate =
against=20
minorities. However, since legal proceedings are conducted solely in =
Turkish,=20
and the quality of interpreters varies, some defendants whose native =
language is=20
not Turkish may be seriously disadvantaged. There are still some laws in =
effect=20
that discriminate against women. </P>
<P>Turkey recognizes the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human =
Rights and=20
the European Commission of Human Rights. Citizens may file applications =
alleging=20
violations of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights =
and=20
Fundamental Freedoms with the Commission. According to the Government, =
as of=20
November a total of 29 cases have been brought before the Court, 13 of =
which=20
remain pending. An amicable resolution was reached in 6 cases, the court =
ruled=20
in Turkey's favor in 2 cases and against Turkey in 8 cases (see also =
Section=20
1.f.). </P>
<P>There is no reliable estimate of the number of political prisoners. =
The=20
Government claims that most alleged political prisoners are in fact =
security=20
detainees, convicted of being members of, or assisting, the PKK or other =

terrorist organizations. The number of people charged, suspected, or =
convicted=20
of offenses under the Anti-Terror Law, according to government =
statistics, was=20
as follows: during the first 10 months of 1996, 1,024 persons were in =
custody=20
and an additional 1,943 were suspects not in custody related to offenses =
under=20
the Anti-Terror Law (latest available statistics). Eighty were convicted =
through=20
October 1996. </P>
<P>According to AI, Sevil Dalkilic, a lawyer, was detained in her =
hometown of=20
Karman in March 1994, held in public custody in Ankara for 15 days, and =
severely=20
tortured until she signed a statement implicating her in several bombing =

incidents. Convicted in the Ankara SSC of membership in a terrorist=20
organization, employing explosives, and separatism based on =
&quot;confessions=20
extracted by the police,&quot; she was sentenced to 30 years in prison =
in 1995,=20
even though she recanted her confession in court. A subsequent appeal =
confirmed=20
the verdict. </P>
<P>f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or =
Correspondence </P>
<P>The Constitution provides for the inviolability of a person's =
domicile and=20
the privacy of correspondence and communication. With some exceptions,=20
Government officials may enter a private residence or intercept or =
monitor=20
private correspondence only upon issuance of a judicial warrant. These=20
provisions are generally respected in practice outside the state of =
emergency=20
region. A judge must decide whether to issue a search warrant for a =
residence.=20
If delay may cause harm to the case, prosecutors and municipal officers=20
authorized to carry out prosecutors' instructions may conduct a search. =
Searches=20
of private premises may not be carried out at night, unless the delay =
would be=20
damaging to the case or the search is expected to result in the capture =
of a=20
prisoner at large. Other exceptions include persons under special =
observation by=20
the Security Directorate General, places anyone can enter at night, =
places where=20
criminals gather, places where materials obtained through the commission =
of=20
crimes are kept, gambling establishments, and brothels. </P>
<P>In the six provinces under emergency rule, the regional state of =
emergency=20
governor empowers security authorities to search without a warrant =
residences or=20
the premises of political parties, businesses, associations, or other=20
organizations. The Bar Association asserts that it is not constitutional =
for=20
security authorities in these provinces to search, hold, or seize =
without=20
warrant persons or documents. A total of six provinces remain under=20
&quot;adjacent province&quot; status, which authorizes the Jandarma to =
retain=20
security responsibility for municipalities as well as rural areas and =
grants the=20
provincial governor several extraordinary powers. Due to an improved =
security=20
situation, the use of roadblocks in the southeast decreased; security =
officials=20
periodically still search vehicles and travelers. Over the past 5 to 6 =
years=20
security forces have evacuated thousands of villages and hamlets in the=20
southeast to prevent villagers from giving aid and comfort to the PKK =
(see=20
Section 1.g.). The Government claims that village evacuations occur as =
the=20
consequence of pressures by and fear of the PKK and because security =
operations=20
against the PKK in the region make continued occupancy unsafe. Security =
forces=20
have confiscated citizens' satellite dishes in some parts of the =
southeast to=20
prevent them from viewing pro-PKK broadcasts (see Section 2.a.). </P>
<P>g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law In =
Internal=20
Conflicts </P>
<P>Since 1984 the separatist PKK has waged a violent terrorist =
insurgency in=20
southeast Turkey, directed against both security forces and civilians, =
almost=20
all of them Kurds, whom the PKK accuses of cooperating with the State. =
The TNP,=20
Jandarma, village guards and the armed forces, in turn, have waged an =
intense=20
campaign to suppress PKK terrorism, targeting active PKK units as well =
as=20
persons they believe support or sympathize with the PKK. In the process, =
both=20
government forces and PKK terrorists have committed human rights abuses =
against=20
each other and noncombatants. According to the Government, from 1984 =
through=20
November 1997, 26,532 PKK members, 5,185 security force members, and =
5,209=20
civilians lost their lives in the fighting. </P>
<P>In an effort to deny the PKK logistical support, the Government =
rationed food=20
and other essentials in the province of Tunceli, the village of Tepe, =
near Lice=20
in Diyarbakir Province, and parts of Bingol Province, causing severe =
shortages=20
and hardship among the population. Other than in Tunceli where the =
rationing has=20
been ongoing for some time, implementation of food rationing elsewhere =
is=20
sporadic or localized. According to local human rights monitors, Tepe =
was=20
blockaded by the military for 2 months in reprisal for the PKK murder of =
a=20
village guard. </P>
<P>In November the European Court of Human Rights found Turkey in =
violation of=20
Article 8 (right to respect for home) in the case of three applicants =
whose=20
homes were burned down by security forces in 1993. The Court attached =
particular=20
weight to the fact that the public prosecutor did not carry out any =
meaningful=20
investigation into the matter. The applicants were awarded court costs =
and=20
expenses with damages to be determined at a future date. </P>
<P>Because so many villages have already been evacuated and because the =
fighting=20
has now moved to mountains, government security forces evacuated and =
destroyed=20
fewer villages than in previous years. According to the Government, only =
4=20
villages and hamlets (settlements of 3 or 4 houses) and 970 persons were =

evacuated during the year. The Government's stated purpose was to =
protect=20
civilians or prevent PKK guerrillas from obtaining logistical support =
from the=20
inhabitants. Some villagers alleged that the security forces evacuated =
them for=20
refusing to participate in the paramilitary village guard system. =
Journalists=20
and human rights monitors were not permitted to enter the village of =
Lice where=20
there were reports of large-scale detentions of villagers by the =
Jandarma for=20
refusal to become village guards. </P>
<P>The exact number of persons forcibly displaced from villages in the =
southeast=20
since 1984 is unknown. Most estimates agree that 2,600 to 3,000 villages =
and=20
hamlets have been depopulated. A few NGO's put the number of people =
forcibly=20
displaced as high as 2 million. Official census figures for 1990--before =

large-scale forced evacuations began--indicate that the total population =
for the=20
10 southeastern provinces then under emergency rule was 4 to 4.5 million =
people,=20
half of them in rural areas. Since all rural areas in the southeast have =
not=20
been depopulated, the estimate of 2 million evacuees is probably too =
high. On=20
the low end, the Government reports that through 1997 the total number =
of=20
evacuees was 336,717. Rapidly growing demands for social services in the =
cities=20
indicate that migration from the countryside has been higher than this =
figure.=20
Although this urbanization is also accounted for in part by voluntary =
migration=20
for economic or educational reasons also related to the conflict, the =
figure=20
given by a former M.P. from the region--560,000--appears to be the most =
credible=20
estimate of those forcibly evacuated. At the request of Republican =
Peoples'=20
Party (CHP) M.P. Algan Hacaloglu, a former human rights monitor, a =
parliamentary=20
committee was formed to investigate the causes of displacement and =
status of the=20
displaced. It began work in July. </P>
<P>Government programs to deal with and compensate the forcibly =
evacuated=20
villagers remain inadequate. Local and provincial officials are =
nevertheless=20
making efforts to address the basic needs of some migrants. The governor =
of=20
Diyarbakir, for example, opened a newly constructed neighborhood of 500 =
houses=20
to resettlement by migrant families. The governor of Van resettled 257 =
migrant=20
families in a new neighborhood in the provincial capital. A free=20
&quot;restaurant&quot; run by the Van governor's office feeds nearly =
1,000=20
migrants daily. In several provinces, officials provided looms for use =
by=20
unemployed women. The rugs produced are then purchased by the Government =
for=20
resale on the open market. Officials overseeing some of these programs=20
acknowledge that funding is inadequate, and that much more needs to be =
done.=20
Many migrants continue to live in overcrowded, unhealthful conditions =
with=20
little opportunity for employment. </P>
<P>According to the Government, 7,608 persons were returned to 61 =
villages in=20
the southeast during the year. The Foreign Ministry noted that some =
displaced=20
persons chose to resettle in urban areas and are receiving assistance =
there. The=20
Government initiated in 1996 an &quot;emergency support program&quot; to =

expedite resettlement in the southeast. The funds are used for =
rebuilding homes=20
and roads, as well as for animal husbandry and beekeeping programs. =
Human rights=20
activists criticize government efforts as inadequate in relation to the =
number=20
of forcibly displaced persons. </P>
<P>There are credible allegations that serious abuses by security forces =
during=20
the course of operations against the PKK continue. The Government =
organizes,=20
arms, and pays for a civil defense force in the region known as the =
village=20
guards. Local villagers' participation in this paramilitary militia is=20
theoretically voluntary, but they are sometimes caught between the two =
sides. If=20
the villagers agree to serve, the PKK may target them and their village. =
If the=20
villagers refuse to participate, government security forces may =
retaliate=20
against them and their village. The village guards have a reputation for =
being=20
the least trained and disciplined of the Government's security forces =
and have=20
been accused repeatedly of corruption, common crimes, and human rights =
abuses.=20
In addition to the village guards, the Jandarma and police &quot;special =

teams&quot; are viewed as those most responsible for abuses. </P>
<P>The Government state of emergency, modified and most recently renewed =
for 4=20
months in November, imposes stringent security measures in six provinces =
in the=20
southeast. The regional governor for the state of emergency may censor =
news, ban=20
strikes or lockouts, and impose internal exile. The decree also provides =
for=20
doubling the sentences of those convicted of cooperating with =
separatists.=20
Informants and convicted persons who cooperate with the state are =
eligible for=20
rewards and reduced sentences. Only limited judicial review of the state =
of=20
emergency governor's administrative decisions is permitted. </P>
<P>Although schools have remained open in most urban centers in the =
southeast,=20
rapid migration has led to severe overcrowding of schools and chronic =
teacher=20
shortages. The PKK policy of murdering teachers exacerbated the =
situation (see=20
Section 1.a.). Government officials claim that a significant effort is =
being=20
made both to reopen schools and to build new schools in regions faced =
with acute=20
overcrowding. According to government figures, 3,223 primary schools =
remain=20
closed in 22 provinces in the east and southeast for security reasons or =
because=20
of a teacher shortage. No secondary schools are closed. Although the =
Government=20
continues to build boarding schools in the region's larger towns, these =
new=20
schools have failed to fill the gap. A total of 88 boarding schools were =

completed with a total capacity of 49,614 students. Additional boarding =
schools=20
numbering 38 are under construction. Some ethnic Kurdish leaders =
expressed=20
concern that the government favored building boarding schools, rather =
than=20
rebuilding local schools, as a way to accelerate the process of Kurdish=20
assimilation. </P>
<P>Turkish ground forces with air support conducted several operations =
during=20
the year in northern Iraq against the PKK. According to press reports, =
in May=20
the Government sent between 25,000 and 50,000 troops into northern Iraq, =
and in=20
September sent an estimated 8,000 to 15,000 ground troops and warplanes. =
In=20
November Turkish forces joined local Iraqi Kurd forces of the Kurdistan=20
Democratic Party (KDP) in pitched battle against the PKK and forces of =
another=20
Iraqi Kurd group, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). During all =
these=20
operations, PKK forces were reported by several sources to have attacked =
local=20
civilians and damaged civilian property. Additional details are in the =
Iraq=20
country report. The Turkish military strictly limited press access to =
the region=20
during these operations. A report filed by a group granted controlled =
access to=20
the Zap Valley area in northern Iraq, along with reports obtained from =
Kurdish=20
and U.N. sources, suggest that the security forces minimized civilian=20
causalities. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), charged that the =
Turkish=20
military targeted villages in several of these operations, but these =
charges=20
were not confirmed by other observers on the scene. The Turkish =
Government=20
maintained that it targeted only the PKK in northern Iraq, not any other =
groups=20
or civilians. </P>
<P>Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including: </P>
<P>a. Freedom of Speech and Press </P>
<P>The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and the press; =
however, the=20
Government continued to limit these freedoms. The Criminal Code provides =

penalties for those who &quot;insult the President, the Parliament, and =
the=20
army.&quot; Numerous other provisions in various laws restrict freedom =
of=20
expression to one degree or another; those most frequently employed =
include=20
Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law and Article 312 of the Criminal Code. =
Judges=20
generally examine evidence rigorously and dismiss many charges brought =
under=20
these laws. </P>
<P>Domestic and foreign periodicals providing a broad spectrum of views =
and=20
opinions are widely available. Government censorship of foreign =
periodicals is=20
very rare. While overall readership of the local press is not large for =
a=20
country of 60 million, the newspaper business is intensely competitive. =
</P>
<P>Electronic media reach nearly every adult, and their influence is=20
correspondingly great. Radio and television have experienced explosive =
growth in=20
the 6 years since privately owned broadcasting has been allowed: as of =
October,=20
over 230 local, 15 regional, and 15 national television stations--the =
majority=20
private--were registered, along with 1,056 local, 108 regional, and 36 =
national=20
radio stations. Other television and radio stations broadcast without an =

official license. In 1994 Parliament passed regulatory legislation =
making it=20
illegal for broadcasters to threaten the country's unity or national =
security=20
and limiting the private broadcast of television programs in languages =
other=20
than Turkish. The increasing availability of satellite dishes and cable=20
television allows access to foreign broadcasts, including several=20
Turkish-language private channels. In some areas of the southeast, =
security=20
forces have systematically confiscated private satellite dishes in order =
to=20
prevent viewing of pro-PKK MED-TV. This policy was applied selectively =
in=20
migrant neighborhoods of Adana. Internet use is growing and faces no =
government=20
restrictions. </P>
<P>Despite the Government's restrictions, the media daily criticize =
government=20
leaders and policies. Media coverage of the situation in the southeast =
tended to=20
be unreliable, underreporting it in some instances and sensationalizing =
it in=20
others. Government Decree 430 gives the Interior Ministry upon the =
request of=20
the regional governor the authority to ban distribution of any news =
viewed as=20
misrepresenting events in the region, leading to self-censorship of news =

reporting from or about the southeast. In the event that such a =
government=20
warning is not obeyed, the decree provides for a 10-day suspension of =
operations=20
for a first offense and 30 days for subsequent offenses. </P>
<P>Two weeks after assuming office, to signal the new Government's =
commitment to=20
freedom of expression, the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, =
Foreign=20
Minister, and President Demirel each received a delegation from the CPJ. =

Immediately thereafter, the Government won passage of a law granting=20
probationary amnesty to editors imprisoned under a press law still in =
existence=20
that permits prosecutors to seek a court order for the confiscation of a =

newspaper or magazine and requires that each publication's =
&quot;responsible=20
editors&quot; bear legal responsibility for the publication's content. =
The new=20
law granted a full pardon to the responsible editors if they did not =
commit the=20
same crime within 3 years. If they are convicted of the same crime =
during this=20
probationary period, then they must serve sentences for both =
convictions. Under=20
the August law, six imprisoned editors received a provisional amnesty; =
however,=20
many others remain imprisoned. </P>
<P>Ismail Besikci served 10 years in prison between 1971 and 1987 for =
his=20
publications on the Kurdish situation in Turkey. He has been in prison =
since=20
1993 on a variety of new charges based upon his ongoing articles on =
Kurdish=20
issues. SSC prosecutors ordered the confiscation of numerous issues of =
leftist,=20
Kurdish nationalist, and pro-PKK periodicals, although many continue to=20
circulate. The pro-PKK newspaper Ozgur Ulke, and its successors Yeni =
Politika=20
and Demokrasi, resumed publication in June as Ulkede Gundem. The =
newspaper has=20
been increasingly difficult to find on newsstands in the southeast; the=20
newspaper's distributor in Diyarbakir has been detained repeatedly, and =
copies=20
have been confiscated by the Jandarma. In Adana, however, the newspaper =
appears=20
regularly. Offices of small leftist publications are frequently raided =
by the=20
police in the southeast. </P>
<P>Individual journalists are subject to harassment and police violence. =
In=20
December the Committee to Protect Journalists listed 40 journalists =
under=20
imprisonment. </P>
<P>In April Sanar Yurdatapan, a well-known musician and spokesman for =
freedom of=20
expression, was arrested at the Istanbul airport with false passports =
destined=20
for two former PKK members. According to Yurdatapan, after these two =
individuals=20
served their sentences for ties to the PKK, they became agents for the =
Turkish=20
security forces and later contacted Yurdatapan to give him information =
about=20
acts including political murder that they had carried out on behalf of =
the=20
State. Yurdatapan claimed to have videotapes of interviews and =
photographs of=20
the men in military uniforms to substantiate his charges. He remains =
free=20
pending the outcome of his SSC trial in Istanbul on charges of harboring =
members=20
of an illegal organization. </P>
<P>According to Human Rights Watch, the case of three journalists =
arrested in=20
June exemplified the arbitrary and contradictory nature of the =
repression of=20
free expression. Two journalists from the now-defunct Demokrasi =
newspaper and=20
the Diyarbakir correspondent from the ATV television station were =
arrested in=20
June for interviewing two former PKK members alleged to have taken part =
in=20
killings and illegal activities on behalf of the State. The three =
journalists=20
were charged with forcing the pair to make the statements &quot;in =
accord with=20
the goals of the PKK.&quot; The men, however, made the same statements =
without=20
incident to two other newspapers, two television programs, including =
Mehmet Ali=20
Birand's &quot;32nd Day,&quot; and to a parliamentary commission =
investigating=20
the 1993 death-squad style killing of journalist Ugur Mumcu. A similar =
case=20
occurred with the Turkish-language edition of Leo Muller's book, =
&quot;Gladio:=20
The Legacy of the Cold War,&quot; originally published in Germany. While =
Pencere=20
publishing, a small Istanbul publishing house, released the first =
edition=20
without incident, the second edition of the book published in February =
was=20
confiscated, and both the publisher and translator were tried under =
Article 312=20
and the Anti-Terror Law. In September they were given a suspended =
sentence on=20
the Article 12 charge and fined under the Anti-Terror Law. Both =
sentences have=20
been appealed. </P>
<P>The authorities have suspended for a period of 3 years the case =
against some=20
1,080 writers and others for their support for novelist Yasar Kemal. In =
1995=20
Kemal wrote an article entitled &quot;Black Sky Over Turkey,&quot; which =
was=20
published in a German news magazine and later reprinted in Turkey in a =
book=20
entitled &quot;Freedom of Expression,&quot; in which he ironically =
criticized=20
the Government for its censorship relating to the Kurdish question. His =
appeal=20
continues. In March Ertugrul Kurkcu and Ayse Nur Zarakolu, respectively =
the=20
translator and publisher of a 1995 report by the Human Rights Watch Arms =

Project, &quot;Weapons Transfers and Violations of the Laws of War in=20
Turkey,&quot; were found guilty under Article 159 of the Penal Code of=20
&quot;defaming the state's security and military forces.&quot; Zarakolu =
and=20
Kurkcu were both fined approximately $12, while Kurkcu received a =
10-month=20
suspended sentence</P>
<P>1997 IDCS US DEP STATE Report</P>
<P>TURKEY I. </P>
<P>Summary Although Turkey is not an opium producing country for the =
illicit=20
market, it does play an increasingly significant role in processing =
opiate raw=20
material into heroin, and is a major transit route for Southwest Asian =
narcotics=20
(especially heroin) for the Western European market, and to a lesser =
extent the=20
US. As much as 75 percent of heroin seized in Europe has been processed =
in or=20
smuggled through Turkey. Turkey signed the 1988 UN Convention in 1988. =
The=20
Convention was passed by Turkish Parliament in November 1995 and =
formally=20
ratified in February 1996. A member of the Financial Action Task Force =
(FATF),=20
Turkey passed anti-money laundering legislation in late 1996 that =
conforms to=20
FATF recommendations. Consumption of narcotics in Turkey is low, but =
Turks=20
recognize an increase in the use of opiates and cannabis. II. Status of =
Country=20
Turkey is not, and is not likely to become, a major illicit opium =
growing=20
country or a producer of precursor chemicals. It does play a significant =
role in=20
processing opiate raw material into heroin. Turkey is recognized as a=20
&quot;traditional&quot; poppy growing country by the International =
Narcotics=20
Control Board (INCB) and by the USG for the licit opiate market. As =
such, there=20
is licit cultivation of opium poppy to meet legitimate world demand for =
cooking=20
and pharmaceutical uses. This production is confined to certain areas =
and=20
carefully monitored. There is no evidence that licit production moves =
into=20
illicit channels. The surge in seizures of acetic anhydride (AA) imports =
in 1995=20
continued in 1996. Between October 1995 and July 1996, Turkish law =
enforcement=20
officers intercepted more than 51 mt of AA, an essential precursor =
chemical for=20
heroin production. One kilo of AA plus one kilo of morphine base produce =
one=20
kilo of heroin and some by-products. Thus, 51 mt of AA could produce 51 =
mt of=20
heroin. This confirms that Turkey is an important processing center for =
illicit=20
opiate products, as well as a traditional narcotics transit route. While =
the=20
total amount of heroin and morphine base smuggled into Turkey is =
unknown, DEA=20
estimates that four to six mt of heroin a month leave Turkey for Western =
Europe.=20
Turkey has in place anti-money laundering legislation in conformance =
with FATF=20
recommendations. Implementing regulations are in process. Corruption and =
money=20
laundering have become major topics on Turkey's political agenda. For =
example,=20
the government is considering restricting access to or closing all =
casinos; part=20
of the justification is that casinos are used to launder proceeds from =
narcotics=20
trafficking. III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1996 Policy =
Initiatives. In=20
November, the Turkish Parliament passed anti-money laundering =
legislation which=20
formally criminalized the laundering of proceeds from trafficking in =
narcotics,=20
illegal arms, historical artifacts, organized prostitution or the =
illegal trade=20
in human organs. Other provisions include controlled delivery, and asset =

seizure. The law calls for the Finance Ministry to set up a Financial =
Crimes=20
Investigation Board (FCIB) that will conduct studies for the prevention =
of money=20
laundering, exchange information with international organizations, and=20
investigate money laundering cases. In February, Turkey ratified the =
1988 UN=20
Convention, which had been passed by the Turkish Parliament in 1995.=20
Accomplishments. The major significant development during 1996 in =
achieving the=20
goals and objectives of the 1988 Convention was the passing of =
anti-money=20
laundering legislation in November, described above. Implementing rules =
and=20
regulations are still in process. The FCIB is expected to be named =
within the=20
next few weeks. The structure of the money laundering legislation meets =
FATF=20
recommendations, including controlled delivery. Law Enforcement Efforts. =
Turkish=20
enforcement agencies--the Turkish National Police (TNP), Jandarma (rural =

Police), Customs and Coast Guard)--work closely with the US and other =
countries=20
in pursuing narcotics investigations and prosecuting traffickers. Spain, =
the UK,=20
Nordic Countries, Germany, Italy and France have narcotics liaison =
officers=20
posted in Turkey. According to Turkish Press reports, the Turkish Police =
(TNP)=20
seized seven mt of hashish, three tons of heroin, and 12 kgs of cocaine =
during=20
the year. A total of 4,060 suspects, including 136 foreigners, were =
detained on=20
drug-related charges. Authorities destroyed seven heroin laboratories.=20
Corruption. There is no Government of Turkey (GOT) policy encouraging or =

facilitating the illicit production or distribution of drug, or money=20
laundering. However, alleged corruption of state officials--including =
strong=20
ties between state officials and drug traffickers--recently became a =
major topic=20
in Turkey with the &quot;Susurluk&quot; scandal. In November, a Mercedes =

carrying a member of Parliament, a former Deputy Police Chief, and a =
wanted=20
Interpol murder suspect (alleged to be a hit man for Turkish drug =
traffickers)=20
crashed into a truck, killing the occupants. According to press reports, =
police=20
found numerous weapons, false identification, and bags of an unspecified =
white=20
powder in the car. The subsequent flood of allegations linking the =
Turkish drug=20
mafia to Turkish politicians and state police officials led to the =
resignation=20
of Interior Minister (and former Security Director in Istanbul) Mehmet =
Agar, and=20
the establishment of a Parliamentary committee of inquiry to investigate =

possible government corruption. This scandal was quickly followed by =
another, as=20
an arrested money courier coming from Europe on her fiftieth trip in =
1996=20
identified senior Turkish Police officers as her conduit for the drug =
money she=20
carried. Police corruption in drug investigations, long kept just under =
the=20
surface, appears to be finally coming to light. The public outrage of =
the=20
disclosures bodes well for needed changes in anti-corruption efforts. =
Agreements=20
and Treaties. The USG and the GOT have longstanding bilateral treaties =
covering=20
extradition and mutual assistance in criminal matters, and a narcotics=20
assistance protocol. Turkey ratified the 1988 UN Convention, and is a =
member of=20
the Financial Action Task Force for the prevention of money laundering.=20
Cultivation/Production. A small amount of cannabis is illicitly grown in =
Turkey.=20
It is used locally and occasionally exported as hashish. Opium poppies =
are=20
legally grown by licensed farmers. Licit opium production is strictly=20
controlled, and there has been no known diversion into illicit channels. =
Drug=20
Flow/Transit. Turkey's geographic position as a land bridge between =
Europe and=20
Southwestern Asia makes it a significant transit country for illicit =
narcotics.=20
Morphine base, heroin base, and heroin from Pakistan, Afghanistan and =
Iran are=20
smuggled into Turkey across the Turkish/Iranian border or through =
Turkish ports.=20
These drugs transit Turkey to Western Europe, most commonly in TIR =
(sealed=20
Transport Internationale Routier) trucks. Morphine base arriving from =
Southwest=20
Asia is also processed into heroin in Turkey, as evidenced by AA =
seizures and=20
TNP crackdowns on heroin processing plants. Based on statistics from all =

sources, including European addict statistics, DEA estimates that 4-6 mt =
of=20
heroin leave Turkey monthly. According to Turkish sources, smuggling =
narcotics=20
through Turkey to Western Europe has become a major revenue source for =
the=20
Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), a terrorist organization. European law =
enforcement=20
officials in six countries conducted raids on PKK-linked Kurdish drug=20
distribution networks. Demand Reduction. There is only one drug =
rehabilitation=20
center in Turkey; it treats alcoholics as well as drug addicts. =
Consumption of=20
narcotics is not perceived to be a major problem, although there is =
general=20
awareness about the need for drug education. The Turkish security =
department has=20
drug prevention programs in schools, especially aimed at 11- to =
15-year-olds,=20
who are considered to be at greatest risk of addiction. IV. US Policy=20
Initiatives and Programs USG antinarcotics goals in Turkey are to: -- =
Disrupt=20
and diminish the transit of narcotics through Turkey, by providing =
narcotics=20
control commodity and training assistance to the Turkish National =
Police, the=20
primary Turkish narcotics interdiction and enforcement agency. The =
mission also=20
provides training and equipment to Turkish Customs aimed at =
strengthening=20
interdiction at Turkey's border gates. With the passage of anti-money =
laundering=20
legislation in November, the US plans to start training in the detection =
of=20
financial crimes related to narcotics trafficking. -- Prevent leakage =
from licit=20
poppy production. Turkey has successfully prevented opium leaks into =
illicit=20
channels by controlling processing and monitoring growing areas. The USG =

proposed a project to enhance the opiate content of the poppy straw, =
which will=20
enable the Turkish Government to further raise prices to the farmer, and =

diminish the area under cultivation. Reduction of the area under =
cultivation=20
will lower security monitoring expenses. -- Help address Turkey's small =
but=20
growing drug abuse problem, by contributing funds to the Anatem Clinic, =
Turkey's=20
only drug abuse and research center. Some FY-96 funds were used to =
purchase of=20
automation equipment for the clinic. Bilateral Cooperation. After a =
series of=20
years of increasing interdiction operations, 1996 saw a leveling off. =
There were=20
no major arrests based on bilateral cooperation between the USG and GOT. =
The=20
Road Ahead. Turkey will continue its anti-narcotics efforts. New =
legislation on=20
corruption, and full enforcement of money laundering legislation, would =
be=20
positive developments. </P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>U.S. Department of State </P>
<P>Serbia-Montenegro Country Report on Human Rights Practices for =
1997</P>
<P>Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, January =
30,=20
1998. </P>
<P></P>
<P>SERBIA-MONTENEGRO</P>
<P>Serbia-Montenegro, a constitutional republic, is dominated by =
Slobodan=20
Milosevic who, after two terms as President of Serbia, became Federal =
President=20
in July. President Milosevic continues to control the country through =
his role=20
as President of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS)--a dual role =
arrangement=20
proscribed by the federal Constitution--and his domination of other =
formal and=20
informal institutions. Although the SPS lacks majorities in both the =
Federal and=20
Serbian Parliaments, it controls governing coalitions and holds the key=20
administrative positions. Serbia abolished the political autonomy of =
Kosovo and=20
Vojvodina in 1990, and all significant decisionmaking since that time =
has been=20
centralized under Milosevic in Belgrade. The Milosevic regime =
effectively=20
controls the judiciary and has used this power to manipulate the =
election=20
process, most notably to reverse opposition victories in Serbian =
municipal=20
elections over the winter of 1996-97--an effort that the regime =
abandoned in=20
February after sustained domestic and international pressure. </P>
<P>During 1997 the international community continued to work intensively =
with=20
the Milosevic regime to implement the Dayton Accords, a step-by-step =
process=20
designed to end the war in Bosnia and secure the peace. United Nations =
(U.N.)=20
sanctions against the &quot;Federal Republic of Yugoslavia&quot; (FRY) =
were=20
formally lifted in 1996. The FRY is still not permitted to participate =
in the=20
United Nations (U.N.), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in =
Europe,=20
or other international organizations and financial organizations. The =
United=20
States and the international community do not recognize =
Serbia-Montenegro as the=20
successor state to the former Yugoslavia. </P>
<P>As a key element of his hold on power, President Milosevic =
effectively=20
controls the Serbian police, a heavily armed force of over 100,000 that =
is=20
responsible for internal security. After his move to the Federal =
presidency,=20
Milosevic precipitated a crisis when he tried to wrest control of the=20
Montenegrin police from Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic. =
Serbian=20
police committed extensive and systematic human rights abuses. </P>
<P>Despite the suspension of U.N. sanctions, economic performance has =
been=20
anemic. Unemployment and underemployment remained high as the Government =
was=20
unable or unwilling to introduce necessary restructuring measures. The=20
Government has not implemented sweeping economic reforms, including=20
privatization, which could undermine the regime's crony system. Largely =
as a=20
result of the central bank's tight monetary policy and the partial =
selloff of=20
the state telecommunications entity, inflationary pressures were kept =
relatively=20
in check. </P>
<P>The Government's human rights record continued to be poor. The police =

committed numerous, serious abuses including extrajudicial killings, =
torture,=20
brutal beatings, and arbitrary arrests. Police repression continued to =
be=20
directed against ethnic minorities, and police committed the most =
widespread and=20
worst abuses against Kosovo's 90-percent ethnic Albanian population. =
Police=20
repression was also directed against the Muslims of Sandzak and =
detainees and=20
citizens who protested against the Government. While under the =
Constitution=20
citizens have a right to stage peaceful demonstrations, the police =
seriously=20
beat scores of protesters throughout the country, sending many to =
hospitals. The=20
Government used its continued domination of Parliament and the media to =
enact=20
legislation to manipulate the electoral process. In practice citizens =
cannot=20
exercise the right to change their government. The judicial system is =
not=20
independent of the Government and does not ensure fair trials. The =
authorities=20
infringe on citizens' right to privacy. The Government used police and =
economic=20
pressure against the independent press and media and restricted freedom =
of=20
assembly and association. The Government infringed on freedom to worship =
by=20
minority religions and on freedom of movement. The Government continues =
to=20
hinder international and local human rights groups and reject their =
findings.=20
Discrimination and violence against women remained serious problems.=20
Discrimination against ethnic Albanian, Muslim, and Romani minorities =
continues.=20
The regime limits unions not affiliated with the Government in their =
attempts to=20
advance worker rights. </P>
<P>Montenegro was the only relatively bright spot, although Milosevic's=20
influence threatens to complicate the republic's as yet unproven efforts =
at=20
democratization. In July Montenegro's increasingly reformist Prime =
Minister,=20
Milo Djukanovic, successfully fought off an attempt by Milosevic to =
change the=20
Federal Constitution and boost the powers of the Federal presidency. =
Djukanovic=20
appears to be resisting attempts by Milosevic to consolidate =
Montenegro's=20
security apparatus-with its relatively clean human rights record since=20
1995-under the Belgrade regime. The results of the October presidential=20
election, in which Milo Djukanovic defeated the incumbent, Momir =
Bulatovic, were=20
questioned by the central authorities despite being endorsed as free and =
fair by=20
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). </P>
<P>As a signatory of the Dayton Accords, Serbia-Montenegro is obliged to =

cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former=20
Yugoslavia by turning over to the Tribunal the five persons on its =
territory who=20
were indicted for war crimes. The Government has so far been =
uncooperative.=20
According to credible reports, some of those indicted live in Serbia, =
and others=20
freely travel in and out of Serbia. Over the summer, suspected war =
criminal=20
Ratko Mladic vacationed in Montenegro and earlier, according to press =
reports,=20
attended his son's well-publicized wedding ceremony in Belgrade. </P>
<P>RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS </P>
<P>Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom =
from:=20
</P>
<P>a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing </P>
<P>Political violence, including killings by police, resulted mostly =
from=20
efforts by Serbian authorities to suppress and intimidate ethnic =
minority=20
groups. Xhafer Hajdari of Mitrovica died in January, apparently from =
injuries=20
sustained during police torture several weeks earlier. The victim had =
committed=20
no crime, but police alleged that his son had killed a Serbian hunter in =
1992.=20
</P>
<P>On June 20, along the FRY border with the Republika Srpska at Priboj, =
the=20
police killed one Muslim Bosniak and seriously mistreated another. =
Serbian=20
security forces shot and killed several ethnic Albanians, identified by =
police=20
as terrorists, including Adrian Krasniqi, a 21-year-old ethnic Albanian =
shot and=20
killed by Serbian police on October 14. </P>
<P>At least two ethnic Albanians died while in jail awaiting trials. On =
February=20
23, Serbian police revealed that Besnik Restelica, an engineer from =
Podujevo,=20
was killed while in police custody. Police claim that Restelica =
committed=20
suicide, but according to reports of the Council for the Defense of =
Human Rights=20
and Freedoms, a monitoring organization based in Pristina, Kosovo, he =
had=20
bruises on his legs, hands, and fingers and showed signs of having been=20
strangled. He was abducted by police in late January. On October 17, =
another=20
ethnic Albanian, Junus Zeneli, died while in police custody in Belgrade =
under=20
suspicious circumstances. In both cases, legal requirements that family =
and=20
legal counsel of the detainee contacted immediately were ignored. </P>
<P>Several violent clashes in Kosovo in late November between the police =
and=20
Kosovar ethnic Albanians apparently resulted in fatalities on both =
sides. </P>
<P>Crimes against citizens of ethnic minority groups appear to have been =
rarely=20
investigated, nor were police generally held accountable for their =
excesses.=20
</P>
<P>b. Disappearance </P>
<P>There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances. An =
ethnic=20
Albanian, Nait Hasani, of Pristina was seized by police on January 28, =
brutally=20
beaten, and then disappeared for 32 days before police acknowledged that =
he was=20
in their custody and charged him with terrorist-related activities. </P>
<P>The trial of Dusan Ranisavljevic began in April; he is an admitted=20
participant in the 1993 Strpci incident, in which 19 Muslims and 1 Croat =
were=20
taken off a train as it passed through Bosnian territory and disappeared =
(see=20
Section 4). The fate of the men remains a mystery, and the Government is =
clearly=20
reluctant to investigate fully the incident, as well as other =
disappearances.=20
The trial started in April but was interrupted for procedural reasons =
when=20
Montenegrin authorities sought to move the venue to a Serbian court in =
Jagodina,=20
the defendant's hometown. </P>
<P>c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or =
Punishment=20
</P>
<P>Torture and other cruel forms of punishment, which are prohibited by =
law,=20
continue to be a problem, particularly in Kosovo directed against ethnic =

Albanians. Police routinely beat people severely when holding them in =
detention.=20
There were several police roundups in Kosovo during the early part of =
the year=20
of ethnic Albanians charged with supporting a separatist agenda and=20
terrorist-related activities. Police beat and tortured many of over 60 =
male and=20
female suspects held in custody. It is during the 3 to 4 day period of=20
incommunicado detention allowed by law that the worst police brutality =
takes=20
place. These excesses are now primarily concentrated in Kosovo, and to a =
lesser=20
extent in Sandzak. Serbian police inflicted some abuse on </P>
<P>prodemocracy demonstrators early in the year and again in the fall =
(see=20
Section 2.b.). </P>
<P>Ethnic Albanians continue to suffer at the hands of security forces=20
conducting searches for weapons and explosives. The police, without =
following=20
proper legal procedures, frequently extract &quot;confessions&quot; =
during=20
interrogations that routinely include the beating of suspects' feet, =
hands,=20
genital areas, and sometimes heads. The police use their fists, =
nightsticks, and=20
occasionally electric shocks. Apparently confident that there would be =
no=20
reprisals, and, in an attempt to intimidate the wider community, police =
often=20
beat persons in front of their families. According to various sources, =
ethnic=20
Albanians are frequently too terrified to ask police to follow proper =
legal=20
procedures--such as having the police provide written notification of =
witness=20
interrogation. </P>
<P>According to Human Rights Watch, police beat at least 24 journalists =
during=20
prodemocracy demonstrations over the winter of 1996-97 in Belgrade =
alone. Human=20
Rights Watch cited an incident in which police using truncheons brutally =
beat=20
the head of a 21-year-old student journalist, Rastko Kostic. The police =
stopped=20
only when another passerby became involved, and they started beating =
him. In=20
February the Humanitarian Law Center filed criminal charges on behalf of =
21=20
journalists who had been beaten, but no action had been taken by the =
state=20
prosecutor by year's end. </P>
<P>Police also used threats and violence against family members of =
suspects and=20
have held them as hostages. According to Albanian and foreign observers, =
the=20
worst abuses against ethnic Albanians took place not in big towns but in =
rural=20
enclaves. Continuing a longstanding practice, the military conducted =
exercises=20
using live ammunition next to an inhabited village in Sandzak during the =
summer=20
on the Pester plain. No one was killed, but the practice showed =
insensitivity=20
and served to intimidate the local Muslim population and encourage =
residents to=20
leave. </P>
<P>Prison conditions meet minimum international standards. There were no =

confirmed reports of the abuse of prisoners, once they were sentenced =
and=20
serving time. </P>
<P>The Government generally permits prison visits by human rights =
monitors. An=20
important exception was the case of the ethnic Albanians arrested in a =
police=20
sweep over the winter. The International Committee for the Red Cross =
was, except=20
for one visit, denied access to the prisoners prior to the beginning of =
their=20
trials in May. </P>
<P>d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile </P>
<P>Police use of arbitrary arrest and detention was concentrated =
primarily in=20
Kosovo and, to a lesser degree, in Sandzak. Police often apply certain =
laws only=20
against ethnic minorities, using force with relative impunity. During =
Belgrade=20
student protests in late September and early October, police arbitrarily =

arrested dozens of citizens, including some who were not even =
participating in=20
the protests. Police also beat several journalists, photographers, and=20
television camera people. Laws regarding conspiracy, threats to the =
integrity of=20
the government, and state secrets are so vague as to allow easy abuse by =
the=20
regime. </P>
<P>Federal statutes permit police to detain criminal suspects without a =
warrant=20
and hold them incommunicado for up to 3 days without charging them or =
granting=20
them access to an attorney. Serbian law separately provides for a =
24-hour=20
detention period. Police often combine the two for a total 4-day =
detention=20
period. After this period, police must turn a suspect over to an =
investigative=20
judge, who may order a 30-day extension and, under certain legal =
procedures,=20
subsequent extensions of investigative detention up to 6 months. In =
Kosovo=20
police often beat people without ever officially charging them and =
routinely=20
hold suspects well beyond the 3-day statutory period. However, observers =
report=20
that the problem is not as pronounced in the rest of Serbia-Montenegro =
as in the=20
past. </P>
<P>Defense lawyers and human rights workers complained of excessive =
delays in=20
filing formal charges and opening investigations. The ability of defense =

attorneys to challenge the legal basis of their clients' detention often =
was=20
further hampered by difficulties in gaining access to detainees or =
acquiring=20
copies of official indictments and decisions to remand defendants into =
custody.=20
In some cases, judges prevented defense attorneys from reading the court =
file.=20
The investigative judges often delegated responsibility to the police or =
state=20
security service and rarely questioned their accounts of the =
investigation even=20
when it was obvious that confessions were coerced. According to human =
rights=20
observers, many of these problems were in evidence with respect to the =
ethnic=20
Albanians arrested over the winter and convicted in the late spring in =
Pristina.=20
</P>
<P>In a country where many if not most of the adult males in the Serbian =

population are armed, the police, according to some members of =
minorities,=20
selectively enforced the laws regulating the possession and registration =
of=20
firearms so as to harass and intimidate ethnic minorities, particularly =
Albanian=20
Kosovars and Bosniak Muslims. The most frequent justification given for =
searches=20
of homes and arrests was illegal possession of weapons. Observers allege =
that in=20
Kosovo the police are known to use the pretext of searching for weapons =
when in=20
fact they are also searching for hard currency. Local police authorities =
more=20
easily approve the registration of legal weapons for Kosovo Serbs and =
frequently=20
turn a blind eye to Serbs' possession of illegal weapons. </P>
<P>Exile is not legally permitted, and no instances of its use are known =
to have=20
occurred. However, the practical effect of police repression in Kosovo =
and=20
Sandzak has been to accentuate political instability, which in turn has =
limited=20
economic opportunity. As a result, many ethnic Albanians and Bosniak =
Muslims go=20
abroad to escape persecution, although only in a few cases could direct =
links to=20
police actions be identified. </P>
<P>e. Denial of Fair Public Trial </P>
<P>The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but in =
practice the=20
courts are largely controlled by the Government and rarely challenge the =
will of=20
the state security apparatus. While judges are elected for fixed terms, =
they may=20
be subjected to governmental pressure. The authorities frequently deny =
fair=20
public trial to non-Serbs and to persons they believe oppose the regime. =
The=20
fraud that followed the November 1996 municipal elections was =
perpetrated mainly=20
through the regime's misuse of the judicial system. </P>
<P>The court system comprises local, district, and supreme courts at the =

republic level, as well as a Federal Court and Federal Constitutional =
Court to=20
which republic supreme court decisions, depending on the subject, may be =

appealed. There is also a military court system. According to the =
Federal=20
Constitution, the Federal Constitutional Court rules on the =
constitutionality of=20
laws and regulations, relying on republic authorities to enforce its =
rulings.=20
</P>
<P>The Federal Criminal Code of the former Socialist Federal Republic of =

Yugoslavia still remains in force. Considerable confusion and room for =
abuse=20
remain in the legal system because the 1990 Constitution of Serbia has =
not yet=20
been brought into conformity with the 1992 Constitution of the Federal =
Republic=20
of Yugoslavia. Under Federal law, defendants have the right to be =
present at=20
their trial and to have an attorney, at public expense if needed. The =
courts=20
must also provide interpreters. The presiding judge decides what is read =
into=20
the record of the proceedings. Either the defendant or the prosecutor =
may appeal=20
the verdict. </P>
<P>Although generally respected in form, defense lawyers in Kosovo and =
Sandzak=20
have filed numerous complaints about flagrant breaches of standard =
procedure=20
which they believed undermined their clients' rights. Even when =
individual=20
judges have admitted that the lawyers are correct, courts have ignored =
or=20
dismissed the complaints. </P>
<P>The Government continues to pursue cases brought previously against =
targeted=20
minority groups under the Yugoslav Criminal Code for jeopardizing the=20
territorial integrity of the country and for conspiring or forming a =
group with=20
intent to commit subversive activities--that is, undermining the=20
&quot;constitutional order.&quot; </P>
<P>Three questionable trials took place in Pristina over the summer and =
fall=20
involving 60 ethnic Albanians. In the first trial, 20 individuals, =
including one=20
woman, were charged mainly with preparing to conspire to participate in=20
activities endangering the territorial integrity of the FRY. The =
evidence was=20
inadequate and the defendants were largely denied timely access to their =

attorneys. U.N. Special Rapporteur Rehn noted that several defendants =
met their=20
defense attorneys for the first time only after the investigative judge =
had=20
already concluded the crucial stage of investigation, while other =
defendants had=20
defense counsel assigned after they entered the courtroom. </P>
<P>Much evidence appeared to have been obtained by authorities through =
forced=20
confessions of defendants under duress. Other evidence was kept from =
defense=20
attorneys until right before the trial. Similar problems prevailed =
during the=20
second and third trials, in which suspects were either accused of =
forming a=20
terrorist organization with the aim of endangering the constitutional =
order or=20
of killing police officers. A total of 52 defendants received prison =
sentences=20
of up to 20 years. </P>
<P>Another aspect of the FRY'S ineffective judicial system is the =
impunity that=20
exists for certain criminal behavior. For example, the bodyguard for =
Vojislav=20
Seselj, the Serbian radical party leader and candidate for Serbian =
president,=20
beat up a respected human rights lawyer, Nikola Barovic, after a =
television=20
interview debate in which Seselj and Barovic disagreed vehemently. =
Barovic=20
received serious injuries to the face, which Seselj dismissed glibly as =
being=20
the result of the human rights lawyer having &quot;slipped on a banana=20
peel.&quot; The courts ignored the case for several weeks until after =
Serbian=20
elections. When the case did go to trial, the judge accepted a banana =
peel into=20
evidence. The case was suspended. In a case that demonstrated relative =
impunity,=20
on October 13 the first municipal court of Belgrade found Zivko Sandic =
guilty=20
only of criminal negligence for pulling out a gun and shooting a =
prodemocracy=20
demonstrator in the head during a December 1996 protest. Sandic was =
sentenced to=20
only 2 years in prison, close to the legal minimum. In one case with a =
rare just=20
ending, Zlatibor Jovanovic, an ethnic Serb from Kosovo, was sentenced to =
11=20
years in prison for murdering an ethnic Albanian student in 1996. </P>
<P>The Government continues to hold some ethnic Albanians as political=20
prisoners. </P>
<P>f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or =
Correspondence </P>
<P>Federal law gives republic ministries of the interior sole control =
over the=20
decision to monitor potential criminal activities, a power that is =
routinely=20
abused. It is widely believed that authorities monitor opposition and =
dissident=20
activity, eavesdrop on conversations, read mail, and wiretap telephones. =

Although illegal under provisions of Federal and Serbian law, the =
Federal post=20
office registers all mail from abroad, ostensibly to protect mail =
carriers from=20
charges of theft. </P>
<P>Although the law includes restrictions on searches, officials often =
ignored=20
them. In Kosovo and Sandzak, police have systematically subjected ethnic =

Albanians and Bosniak Muslims to random searches of their homes, =
vehicles,=20
shops, and offices, asserting that they were searching for weapons. =
According to=20
the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms, the police =
carried out=20
scores of raids on homes. Police also used threats and violence against =
family=20
members of suspects and have held them as hostages (see Section 1.c.). =
</P>
<P>Ultranationalist local officials in Zemun encouraged the illegal =
eviction of=20
ethnic Croats from their apartments, after which they were replaced by =
ethnic=20
Serb refugees (see Section 5). </P>
<P>The Government's law requiring universal military service is enforced =
only=20
sporadically. It was not vigorously enforced in 1997. The informal =
practice of=20
the military has been not to call up ethnic Albanians. Of approximately =
100,000=20
draft evaders living abroad to avoid punishment, 40 percent were =
estimated to be=20
ethnic Albanian. This number in part reflects the large number of=20
conscription-age men in the FRY's Albanian community. The climate =
appears to be=20
moderating, due to the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia. Nevertheless, =
leaders=20
of Kosovo's Albanian and Sandzak's Muslim communities have maintained =
that=20
forced compliance of these ethnic groups with universal military service =
was an=20
attempt to induce young men to flee the country. According to an amnesty =
bill=20
passed in 1996, young men for whom criminal prosecution for draft =
evasion had=20
already started were granted amnesty. </P>
<P>In a related development, under a 1996 agreement with Germany, ethnic =

Albanian refugees repatriated to the FRY were not supposed to be =
prosecuted for=20
fleeing the draft. According to the Humanitarian Law Center (HLC), =
however, many=20
returning ethnic Albanians have faced irregular procedures on returning =
to the=20
FRY. The HLC reported many violations by authorities against returned =
asylum=20
seekers, including physical abuse, threats of imprisonment, deportation, =

confiscation of ID cards, and obliging persons to report to their local =
police=20
stations on a daily basis. Returning ethnic Albanians and Sandzak =
Muslims are=20
routinely detained on their arrival at local airports. In many cases FRY =

officials have refused to issue proper travel documents to children born =
to=20
asylum seekers. </P>
<P>Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including: </P>
<P>a. Freedom of Speech and the Press </P>
<P>Federal law provides for freedom of speech and of the press, but in =
practice=20
the Government strongly influences much of the media. In July several =
weeks=20
before the Serbian elections, the Milosevic regime temporarily closed =
scores of=20
private radio and television stations throughout Serbia. The FRY =
Ministry of=20
Transport and Telecommunications, which controls broadcast frequencies, =
worked=20
in concert with the criminal and financial police to pressure =
independent media=20
outlets that had not been able to regularize their legal status. Many=20
broadcasters applied for frequencies but were left in a state of limbo =
by the=20
regime. Serbia's broadcast laws remain murky, and licenses are not =
issued in any=20
fashion that can remotely be described as transparent. </P>
<P>While the regime harassed the independent media, an HLC study showed =
that the=20
Government violated the agreement on the presentation of political =
parties,=20
signed before the election season. During the campaign season in August, =

state-controlled Radio and Television Serbia (RTS) openly campaigned for =

Milosevic's ruling coalition. According to HLC monitoring, all the other =

political parties received only one-quarter of the broadcast time =
allocated for=20
political parties, while the RTS regularly opened the evening news =
broadcasts=20
with campaign promotion pieces for the regime. </P>
<P>The regime lost one of its most important media outlets when it was =
forced to=20
reverse the theft of the Belgrade municipal elections in February and =
consent to=20
the naming of Democratic Party Leader Zoran Djindic as the city's mayor. =
Control=20
of Belgrade's Studio B radio went from the regime to the opposition, and =
the=20
management immediately started broadcasting generally balanced news =
programming.=20
The regime, however, reversed the setback when the Zajedno coalition of =
the=20
political opposition fell apart. Studio B's independent management was =
dismissed=20
a week after the first round of Serbian elections on September 21, and =
the news=20
board's commitment to journalistic independence is suspect at best. In =
effect,=20
Studio B is now under SPO censorship. </P>
<P>The most striking example of media bias came in reaction to the mass=20
demonstrations from November 1996 to February 1997 that followed =
widespread=20
government theft of the municipal elections. The government-controlled =
media=20
downplayed the size of crowds, sometimes ignoring demonstrations=20
altogether--despite numbers of demonstrators in the tens of thousands. =
When=20
state-run television did cover demonstrations, it was in an effort to =
label=20
protesters as &quot;hooligans&quot; and &quot;traitors&quot; determined =
to=20
destroy Serbia. </P>
<P>The same media tack was used when ethnic Albanian students staged a =
peaceful=20
protest march in Pristina on October 1 only to be accused by the=20
state-controlled media of instigating violence in a clash that saw =
police move=20
in with truncheons, tear gas, and water cannons. The state-controlled =
media,=20
moreover, took advantage of the protests to accuse the Belgrade =
opposition of=20
being in league with &quot;Albanian separatists.&quot; </P>
<P>Economic pressure was the usual weapon of the regime against the free =
press.=20
For example, state-owned enterprises were dissuaded from advertising in=20
independent media. One of Serbia's leading opposition papers, Nasa =
Borba, had=20
its bank accounts blocked by the regime. Although no longer the =
persistent=20
problem it was during the period of sanctions, the availability of =
newsprint=20
continued to pose difficulties, especially for the independent media. =
Also,=20
while the state-controlled press obtained newsprint at subsidized =
prices,=20
independent publications paid substantially higher market prices. </P>
<P>Academic freedom exists in a limited fashion. Many leading =
academicians are=20
active members of the political opposition and human rights groups, and =
the=20
espousal of antiregime positions would likely limit their advancement. =
At the=20
prestigious University of Belgrade, half the membership of the governing =
council=20
that controls the university is appointed by the regime and half by the =
various=20
faculties. </P>
<P>b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association </P>
<P>The Federal and republic-level Constitutions provide for freedom of =
peaceful=20
assembly and association; however, the Government restricted this right. =
During=20
the early part of 1997, citizens were prevented from staging protest =
marches on=20
numerous occasions before the regime finally restored the opposition's =
victories=20
in several Serbian municipalities. In Kosovo the regime cracked down on =
peaceful=20
demonstrators during their October 1 and late December protests, when =
police=20
used tear gas and clubs, injuring several passersby. The regime cited =
the=20
student protesters' unwillingness to apply for a permit from Serbian=20
authorities. In Sandzak the Milosevic regime banned all outdoor rallies, =
even=20
for election campaigning. </P>
<P>The federal and republic level Constitutions provide for freedom of=20
association, but the Government restricted this right. Prior to the =
Serbian=20
elections in the fall, officials blocked the coalition Sandzak-Dr. Rasim =
Ljajic=20
from forming an alliance with the Kosovo-based Democratic Reform Party =
of=20
Muslims, a move that protected regime candidates from extra competition. =
</P>
<P>c. Freedom of Religion </P>
<P>There is no state religion, but the Government gives preferential =
treatment,=20
including access to state-run television for major religious events, to =
the=20
Serbian Orthodox Church to which the majority of Serbs belong. The =
regime has=20
subjected religious communities in Kosovo to harassment. For example, a =
Roman=20
Catholic parish in Klina has the money, property, and permission =
(including up=20
to the Supreme Court of Serbia) to build a church for its 6,000 member =
parish.=20
However, the local chapter of Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia has=20
continued to block construction. Other Catholic and Muslim communities =
in the=20
province had similar experiences. </P>
<P>d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, =
Emigration, and=20
Repatriation </P>
<P>The Constitution provides for freedom of movement, and the Government =
makes=20
passports available to most citizens. However, many inhabitants of=20
Serbia-Montenegro who were born in other parts of the former Yugoslavia, =
as well=20
as large numbers of refugees, have not been able to establish their =
citizenship=20
in the FRY, leaving them in a stateless limbo. </P>
<P>According to a report by the Humanitarian Law Center, authorities on =
several=20
different occasions barred FRY citizens from reentering the country. The =
regime=20
also continues to restrict the right of Albanian Kosovars and Sandzak =
Muslims to=20
travel by holding up issuance or renewal of passports for an unusually =
long=20
period of time and has reserved the option of prosecuting individuals =
charged=20
previously with violating exit visa requirements. </P>
<P>FRY citizens reported difficulties at borders and occasional =
confiscation of=20
their passports. Ethnic Albanians, Sandzak Muslims, and Vojvodina Croats =

frequently complained of harassment at border crossings. There were =
numerous=20
reports that border guards confiscated foreign currency or passports =
from=20
travelers as well as occasional complaints of physical mistreatment. The =

authorities generally allowed political opposition leaders to leave the =
country=20
and return. </P>
<P>The Government has been very slow to issue passports to refugees. =
Albanian=20
Kosovars also have problems with the issuance and renewal of passports =
and are=20
sometimes called in for interrogation by state security officers before=20
passports are issued. In January a new citizenship law entered into =
force,=20
which, when fully implemented, is expected to affect adversely the =
rights of=20
many inhabitants, including those born in other parts of the former =
Yugoslavia,=20
refugees, and citizens who had migrated to other countries to work or =
seek=20
asylum. The U.N. Special Rapporteur for the former Yugoslavia noted that =
the new=20
law would give the Ministry of Interior almost complete control over the =

granting of citizenship. The Government served notice that it plans to =
limit=20
severely the granting of citizenship to refugees from the conflicts in =
Bosnia=20
and Croatia. The Government also plans to revise the eligibility status =
of a=20
large number of people; refugees who have been granted citizenship since =
1992=20
may stand to lose their FRY citizenship if they have acquired the =
citizenship of=20
an ex-Yugoslav republic. </P>
<P>Observers in the Sandzak region also note that Muslim residents who =
were=20
forced to flee to Bosnia from Sandzak in 1992 and 1993 may not be =
permitted to=20
return to Serbia, particularly if they have obtained Bosnian passports =
in the=20
interim. In violation of the Dayton Accords, Bosniak Muslims and Muslims =
from=20
Sandzak frequently have been harassed on attempting to reenter Serbia =
after=20
visits to Sarajevo or the federation. </P>
<P>Government policy toward refugee and asylum seekers continued to be =
uneven.=20
Refugees, mostly ethnic Serbs who fled Bosnia and Croatia, are often =
treated as=20
citizens of Serbia-Montenegro for labor and military purposes but are =
denied=20
other rights such as employment and travel (see Section l.f.). Refugees =
were not=20
allowed to vote in the 1997 elections in Serbia, although they did vote =
in some=20
previous elections. The Government has cooperated with the U.N. High=20
Commissioner for Refugees to provide help for the more than 500,000 =
refugees in=20
Serbia-Montenegro. </P>
<P>Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to =
Change Their=20
Government </P>
<P>The three constitutions--Federal, Serbian, and Montenegrin =
Republic--provide=20
for this right, but in practice citizens are prevented from exercising =
it by the=20
Government's domination of the mass media and manipulation of the =
electoral=20
process. Only Montenegro's electoral system has shown marked =
improvement, with=20
the Government of Prime Minister Djukanovic holding a roundtable with =
the=20
political opposition, including ethnic minorities, in September and =
welcoming=20
observers from the OSCE well ahead of Milosevic's grudging invitation to =
outside=20
monitors shortly before Serbian presidential and parliamentary elections =
in=20
September. </P>
<P>Serbian elections were seriously flawed. In July the regime repeated =
its=20
machinations before 1996 Federal elections and gerrymandered electoral =
districts=20
to smooth the way for candidates in the ruling coalition, expanding the =
number=20
of districts in Serbia from 9 to 29. Most opposition politicians charged =
that=20
changes in the election law implemented since the last election, =
including the=20
redrawing of districts, were designed specifically to favor the ruling =
party.=20
The redistricting was one factor that compelled a number of opposition =
parties=20
to boycott the elections. </P>
<P>Slobodan Milosevic dominates the country's political system and is =
attempting=20
to reconsolidate institutional power at the Federal level as a result of =
his=20
move to the Federal presidency. This precipitated a clash with =
authorities in=20
Montenegro who are intent on protecting that republic's autonomy. =
Manipulating=20
power within the federation based on the comparative size of the Serbian =
and=20
Montenegrin populations and economies, Milosevic has been able to =
circumscribe=20
the Montenegrin Government's capacity for independent action. As a =
result of=20
Serbia's political crisis during the winter of 1996-97, Montenegro's =
then Prime=20
Minister, Milo Djukanovic, began to take a steadily more assertive, =
reformist=20
course. His victory in October presidential elections over incumbent =
Montenegrin=20
president and Milosevic crony, Momir Bulatovic, threatened Milosevic's =
complete=20
control over institutions of power and prompted a standoff as the=20
internationally endorsed results were not validated. </P>
<P>No legal restrictions exist on women's participation in government =
and=20
politics, and women are active in political organizations. However, they =
are=20
greatly underrepresented in party and government offices, holding less =
than 10=20
percent of ministerial-level positions in the Serbian and Federal =
governments.=20
An exception is the controversial Mira Markovic, wife of Serbian =
President=20
Milosevic. She is the leading force in the neo-Communist United Yugoslav =
Left=20
Party, through which she exerts considerable influence on policymakers. =
</P>
<P>No legal restrictions affect the role of minorities in government and =

politics, but ethnic Serbs and Montenegrins dominate the country's =
political=20
leadership. Few members of other ethnic groups play any role at the top =
levels=20
of government or the state-run economy. Ethnic Albanians in Serbia's =
Kosovo=20
province have refused to take part in the electoral process, including =
Serbian=20
elections in the fall. They have virtually no representation. </P>
<P>Ethnic Albanians' refusal to participate in FRY Federal and Serbian =
elections=20
has the practical effect of increasing the political influence of =
President=20
Milosevic and his supporters. Ultranationalist parties, which in the =
past were=20
occasional Milosevic allies, have also taken advantage of the ethnic =
Albanian=20
boycott to garner representation beyond their numbers. Ethnic Albanians =
in=20
Montenegro do participate in the political process, and several towns in =

Montenegro have Albanian mayors. </P>
<P>Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and =
Nongovernmental=20
Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights </P>
<P>The Governments of Serbia and Montenegro formally maintain that they =
have no=20
objection to international organizations conducting human rights =
investigations=20
on their territories. It was the report of the OSCE on the fraud that=20
characterized the municipal elections that the regime cited in reversing =
the=20
results and ultimately recognizing the final results in February, some 3 =
months=20
after the vote. The Serbian regime sporadically hindered activities and=20
regularly rejected the findings of human rights groups. The Montenegrin=20
Government's record toward outside investigations was much better, with =
the=20
Prime Minister taking the initiative to invite OSCE observers well in =
advance of=20
the October presidential election in the Republic. </P>
<P>A number of independent human rights organizations exist in=20
Serbia-Montenegro, researching and gathering information on abuses, and=20
publicizing such cases. The Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Center and =
Center=20
for Antiwar Action researches human rights abuses throughout =
Serbia-Montenegro=20
and, on occasion, elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. The Belgrade-based =

Helsinki Committee publishes studies on human rights issues and =
cooperates with=20
the Pristina-based Helsinki Committee in monitoring human rights abuses =
in=20
Kosovo. In Kosovo the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and =
Freedoms=20
collects and collates data on human rights abuses and publishes =
newsletters. In=20
the Sandzak region, two similar committees monitor abuses against the =
local=20
Muslim population and produce comprehensive reports. Most of these =
organizations=20
offer advice and help to victims of abuse. </P>
<P>Local human rights monitors (Serbs as well as members of ethnic =
minorities)=20
and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) worked under difficult =
circumstances.=20
Sefko Alomerovic, chairman of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in =

Sandzak, was formally charged with libel by former FRY President Dobrica =
Cosic=20
and his advisor Vladimir Matovic. Alomerovic had publicly accused Cosic =
and=20
Matovic of direct complicity in the 1993 Strpci incident, in which some =
20 men,=20
including 19 Muslims, disappeared (see Section 1.f.). Alomerovic =
believes that=20
the Government, and Cosic, were responsible for their disappearance. The =
case=20
continued at year's end. </P>
<P>Overall, however, most observers say that the situation improved in =
1997,=20
with slightly less overt obstruction by the Government of human rights =
NGO's.=20
One problem continues to be government foot-dragging in issuing visas to =
people=20
coming to Yugoslavia on human rights matters. After past problems =
obtaining a=20
visa, the U.N. Special Rapporteur for the former Yugoslavia visited=20
Serbia-Montenegro, including Pristina, twice in 1997. During the year, =
the=20
International Committee of the Red Cross was allowed to conduct prison =
visits in=20
Kosovo, but its work was seriously obstructed with respect to visiting =
the=20
ethnic Albanians charged with terrorist-related activities who went on =
trial=20
beginning in the spring. </P>
<P>However, the authorities also refused numerous approaches by OSCE=20
representatives to allow the reintroduction of the OSCE long-duration =
missions=20
into Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Sandzak, maintaining that the FRY must first =
be=20
&quot;reinstated&quot; in the OSCE. </P>
<P>Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, =
Language,=20
or Social Status </P>
<P>While Federal and republic laws provide for equal rights for all =
citizens,=20
regardless of ethnic group, religion, language, or social status, and =
prohibit=20
discrimination against women, in reality the legal system provides =
little=20
protection to such groups. </P>
<P>Women </P>
<P>The traditionally high level of domestic violence persisted. The few =
official=20
agencies dedicated to coping with family violence have inadequate =
resources and=20
are limited in their options by social pressure to keep families =
together at all=20
costs. Few victims of spousal abuse ever file complaints with =
authorities. The=20
Center for Autonomous Women's Rights offers a rape crisis and spousal =
abuse hot=20
line, as well as sponsoring a number of self-help groups. The Center =
also=20
offered help to refugee women, many of whom experienced extreme abuse or =
rape=20
during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. </P>
<P>Women do not enjoy status equal to men in the FRY, and relatively few =
women=20
obtain upper level management positions in commerce. </P>
<P>Traditional patriarchal ideas of gender roles, which hold that women =
should=20
be subservient to the male members of their family, have long subjected =
women to=20
discrimination. In some rural areas, particularly among minority =
communities,=20
women are little more than serfs without the ability to exercise their =
right to=20
control property and children. Women in the FRY, however, legally are =
entitled=20
to equal pay for equal work and are granted maternity leave for 1 year, =
with an=20
additional 6 months available. Women are active in political and human =
rights=20
organizations. Women's rights groups continue to operate with little or =
no=20
official acknowledgment. </P>
<P>Children </P>
<P>The state attempts to meet the health and educational needs of =
children. The=20
educational system provides 8 years of mandatory schooling. </P>
<P>The current division of Kosovo into parallel administrative systems =
has=20
resulted in Serb and Albanian Kosovar elementary age children being =
taught in=20
separate areas of divided schools, or attending classes in shifts. Older =

Albanian Kosovar children attend school in private homes. The quality of =
the=20
education is thus uneven, and the tension and division of society in =
general has=20
been replicated to the detriment of the children. </P>
<P>An agreement negotiated under the auspices of the Rome-based =
Sant-Egidio=20
community and signed in 1996 by President Milosevic and Dr. Ibrahim =
Rugova, the=20
leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo, seeks to resolve the division =
of the=20
educational system and lend impetus to efforts to normalize the =
situation within=20
Kosovo. No progress was apparent on implementation of the accord over a =
year=20
later, however, prompting a student protest movement in Kosovo (see =
Section=20
2.b.). Intransigence in implementing the agreement was detected on both =
sides.=20
</P>
<P>Economic distress, due primarily to the Government's total =
mismanagement, has=20
spilled over into the health care system, adversely affecting children. =
In=20
Kosovo the health situation for children remained particularly poor.=20
Humanitarian aid officials blamed the high rate of infant and childhood=20
mortality, as well as increasing epidemics of preventable diseases, =
primarily on=20
poverty that led to malnutrition and poor hygiene and to the =
deterioration of=20
public sanitation. Ethnic minorities in some cases fear Serb state-run =
medical=20
facilities, which results in a low rate of immunization and a reluctance =
to seek=20
timely medical attention. Significant cooperation between Serbian =
medical=20
authorities and ethnic Albanian-run clinics in Kosovo on a polio =
vaccination=20
campaign represented a hopeful development. A similar drive took place =
in=20
Sandzak for Muslim children. </P>
<P>There is no societal pattern of abuse against children. </P>
<P>People With Disabilities </P>
<P>Facilities for people with disabilities are inadequate, but the =
Government=20
has made some effort to address the problem. The law prohibits =
discrimination=20
against persons with disabilities in employment, education, or in the =
provision=20
of other state services. The law mandates access to new official =
buildings, and=20
the Government enforces these provisions in practice. </P>
<P>Religious Minorities </P>
<P>Religion and ethnicity are so closely intertwined as to be =
inseparable.=20
Serious discrimination against, and harassment of, religious minorities=20
continued, especially in the Kosovo and Sandzak regions. Violence =
against the=20
Catholic minority in Vojvodina, largely made up of ethnic Hungarians and =
Croats,=20
has also been reported. </P>
<P>National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities </P>
<P>There were credible reports that Muslims and ethnic Albanians =
continued to be=20
driven from their homes or fired from their jobs on the basis of =
religion or=20
ethnicity. Other ethnic minorities, including ethnic Hungarians in =
Vojvodina,=20
also allege discrimination. In Zemun the Belgrade Helsinki Committee =
office=20
identified at least three instances where the city government, under=20
ultranationalist mayor Vojislav Seselj, encouraged the illegal eviction =
of=20
ethnic Croats from their apartments, after which they were replaced by =
ethnic=20
Serb refugees. </P>
<P>The Romani population is generally tolerated, and there is no =
official=20
discrimination. Roma have the right to vote, and there are two small =
Romani=20
parties. However, prejudice against Roma is widespread. Skinheads =
murdered a=20
Roma boy in Belgrade in October. Local authorities often ignore or =
condone=20
societal intimidation of the Roma community. </P>
<P>Section 6 Worker Rights </P>
<P>a. The Right of Association </P>
<P>All workers except military and police personnel have the legal right =
to join=20
or form unions. Unions are either official (government affiliated) or=20
independent. The total labor force is approximately 2.3 million. The=20
Government-controlled Alliance of Independent Labor Unions =
(Samostalnost) claims=20
1.8 million members but probably numbers closer to 1 million. The =
largest=20
independent union is the United Branch Independent Labor Unions =
(Nezavisnost),=20
which numbers 157,000 members. Most other independent unions are=20
sector-specific, for example, the Independent Union of Bank Employees =
(12,000=20
members). Due to the poor state of the economy, over one-half of union =
workers=20
are on long-term mandatory leave from their firms pending increases in=20
production. The independent unions, while active in recruiting new =
members, have=20
not yet reached the size needed to enable countrywide strikes that would =
force=20
employers to provide concessions on workers' rights. The independent =
unions also=20
claim that the Government has managed to prevent effective recruiting =
through a=20
number of tactics, including preventing the busing of workers to =
strikes,=20
threatening the job security of members, and failing to grant visas to =
foreign=20
visitors supporting independent unions. Some foreign union organizers =
managed to=20
secure visas during the year after long delays</P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - Consular Information Sheet US =
State=20
Department</P>
<P>October 23, 1998 </P>
<P>COUNTRY DESCRIPTION: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYR =
of=20
Macedonia) is a developing nation undergoing economic change. Conditions =
in=20
tourist facilities vary considerably, and many are not up to Western =
standards.=20
</P>
<P>ENTRY AND EXIT REQUIREMENTS: U.S. citizens need a passport and visa. =
Although=20
travelers may be able to obtain visas at the border, it is recommended =
that they=20
obtain their visas in their country of residence prior to travel. =
Additional=20
information may be obtained from the Embassy of the Former Yugoslav =
Republic of=20
Macedonia, 3050 K Street N.W., Suite 210, Washington, D.C., 20007, =
telephone=20
(202) 337-3063. Travelers will be required to complete an entry/exit =
document=20
when they enter the FYR of Macedonia. The exit portion of this document =
must be=20
retained for presentation to Immigration officials upon departure. Loss =
of this=20
form may result in departure delays. </P>
<P>U.S. citizens who plan to travel to Serbia-Montenegro should obtain =
visas=20
before arriving in Skopje. It is not possible to get a visa for=20
Serbia-Montenegro at the border. In recent months, U.S. citizens have =
found it=20
increasingly difficult to obtain visas at the Embassy of the Federal =
Republic of=20
Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) in Skopje, and many visitors have faced =
long=20
waits. </P>
<P>AREAS OF INSTABILITY: To date, while the conflicts in the Balkan =
Region have=20
had no significant direct impact on the FYR of Macedonia, visitors to =
border=20
areas near Albania and Serbia-Montenegro, or visitors planning to travel =
to=20
those countries from FYR of Macedonia, should consult the travel =
warnings for=20
those countries. Because of continuing tensions along the borders with =
Albania=20
and Serbia-Montenegro, visitors should cross only at recognized border=20
crossings. </P>
<P>There have been a number of minor explosions, always detonated at =
night, and=20
usually near police stations or other government facilities. But to date =
there=20
have been no casualties. Additionally, there have been a few street=20
demonstrations in support of freedom in Kosovo by ethnic-Albanian =
citizens of=20
FYR of Macedonia. These demonstrations have been generally peaceful, =
with only=20
individual acts of minor vandalism associated with them. To minimize =
risk,=20
visitors should not approach demonstrations. </P>
<P>MEDICAL FACILITIES: Health facilities are limited. Medicines are in =
short=20
supply. Doctors and hospitals expect immediate cash payment for health =
services.=20
U.S. medical coverage is not always valid outside the United States. The =

Medicare/Medicaid program does not provide payment for medical services =
outside=20
the United States. </P>
<P>Check with your own insurance company to confirm whether your policy =
applies=20
overseas, including provision for medical evacuation. Ascertain whether =
payment=20
will be made to the overseas hospital or doctor or whether you will be=20
reimbursed later for expenses you incur. Some insurance policies also =
include=20
coverage for psychiatric treatment or disposition of remains in the =
event of=20
death. Useful information on medical emergencies abroad, including =
overseas=20
insurance programs, is provided in the Department of State, Bureau of =
Consular=20
Affairs brochure Medical Information for Americans Traveling Abroad, =
available=20
via its home page and autofax service. </P>
<P>The international travelers hotline of the Centers for Disease =
Control and=20
Prevention may be reached from the United States at 1-877-394-8747, via =
their=20
autofax service at 1-888-232-3229, or their Internet site at =
http://www.cdc.gov.=20
</P>
<P>CRIME INFORMATION: Theft and other petty crimes occur in the FYR of=20
Macedonia. The loss or theft of a U.S. passport should be reported =
immediately=20
to the local police and the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate. Useful=20
information on safeguarding valuables and protecting personal safety =
while=20
traveling abroad is provided in the Department of State's pamphlet A =
Safe Trip=20
Abroad. It is available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. =
Government=20
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, via the Internet at=20
http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs, or http://travel.state.gov. </P>
<P>DRUG PENALTIES: U.S. citizens are subject to the laws of the country =
in which=20
they are traveling. Penalties for possession, use, or trafficking in =
illegal=20
drugs are strict, and convicted offenders can expect jail sentences and =
fines.=20
</P>
<P>ROAD SAFETY/CONDITIONS: Most major highways are in good repair, but =
secondary=20
roads are poorly maintained and lighted, and frequently they are used by =

horse-drawn carts and livestock. Many vehicles are old and lack standard =
front=20
or rear lights. Mountain roads can lack guard rails, be narrow, or be =
poorly=20
marked, and they quickly become dangerous in inclement weather. </P>
<P>AVIATION SAFETY OVERSIGHT: As there is no direct commercial air =
service by=20
local carriers at present, nor economic authority to operate such =
service=20
between the United States and the FYR of Macedonia, the U.S. Federal =
Aviation=20
Administration (FAA) has not assessed the FYR of Macedonia's civil =
aviation=20
authority for compliance with international aviation safety standards =
for=20
oversight of the FYR of Macedonia's air carrier operations. For further=20
information, travelers may contact the Department of Transportation =
within the=20
U.S. at 1-800-322-7873, or visit the FAA Internet home page at=20
http://www.faa.gov/avr/iasa.htm. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) =
separately=20
assesses some foreign air carriers for suitability as official providers =
of air=20
services. For information regarding the DOD policy on specific carriers, =

travelers may contact the Pentagon at 1-703-697-7288. </P>
<P>EMBASSY LOCATION/REGISTRATION: U.S. citizens are encouraged to =
register at=20
the U.S. Embassy in Skopje and obtain updated information on travel and =
security=20
in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The U.S. Embassy is =
located at=20
Ilindenska BB, 91000 Skopje, telephone (389) 91 116-180, fax (389) (91) =
117-103.=20
</P>
<P>* * * * </P>
<P>This replaces the Consular Information Sheet dated March 12, 1997, to =
update=20
information on entry/exit requirements, areas of instability, medical=20
facilities, crime information, road safety conditions, and aviation =
safety=20
oversight. </P>
<P>Consular Information Sheets and Travel Warnings US State =
Department</P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
<P>Albania - Consular Information Sheet US State Department</P>
<P>December 29, 1998 </P>
<P>WARNING: The Department of State warns against all travel to Albania =
because=20
the overall security situation remains unstable. U.S. citizens are urged =
to=20
consider their personal security situations, and, if appropriate, to =
leave=20
Albania. </P>
<P>Given the possibility that the U.S. Embassy's personnel and =
facilities could=20
be the targets of a terrorist attack, on August 14, 1998, the Department =
of=20
State ordered the departure of U.S. Embassy personnel in non-emergency =
positions=20
and families of U.S. Embassy personnel, and later further reduced its =
staff. As=20
a result of the continued reduction in staff, the U.S. Embassy has =
suspended=20
normal operations and is able to offer only emergency services to =
American=20
citizens. </P>
<P>Following incidents of violence in Tirana in September 1998, in the =
wake of=20
the assassination of a political leader, the situation in Albania =
remains=20
volatile and the possibility exists that there may be further incidents =
of=20
violence. American citizens resident in Albania are strongly advised to =
avoid=20
crowds and demonstrations at all costs and exercise extreme caution at =
all=20
times. The northeastern area of Albania, including the towns of Tropoja =
and=20
Bajram Curri and the area near the Kosovo border, remains outside =
effective=20
government control. Travel to this area is exceedingly dangerous. Even =
persons=20
traveling to this area solely to render humanitarian assistance to =
refugees have=20
been attacked by bandits. </P>
<P>COUNTRY DESCRIPTION: Albania continues to undergo profound social, =
political,=20
and economic change. Facilities for tourism are not well developed, and =
many of=20
the goods and services taken for granted in other European countries are =
not yet=20
available. Hotel accommodations are limited outside the capital city of =
Tirana.=20
</P>
<P>ENTRY/EXIT REQUIREMENTS: A passport is required, but a visa is not =
necessary=20
for a tourist stay up to 30 days. An extension up to 180 days may be =
granted by=20
applying at the local police station. After 180 days, the Ministry of =
Interior=20
accepts extension requests. There is a departure fee of $10, payable in =
U.S.=20
dollars or local currency (the lek). For additional information, please =
contact=20
the Embassy of the Republic of Albania at 2100 S Street, N.W., =
Washington, D.C.=20
20008, telephone (202) 223-4942. </P>
<P>MEDICAL FACILITIES: Medical facilities are limited, and medicine is =
in short=20
supply. There are periodic outbreaks of polio, cholera, and dysentery. =
Doctors=20
and hospitals generally expect immediate cash payment for health =
services. U.S.=20
medical insurance is not always valid outside the United States. The=20
Medicare/Medicaid program does not provide payment for medical services =
outside=20
the United States. </P>
<P>Please check with your own insurance company to confirm whether your =
policy=20
applies overseas, including provision for medical evacuation. Please =
ascertain=20
whether payment will be made to the overseas hospital or doctor or =
whether you=20
will be reimbursed later for expenses that you incur. Some insurance =
policies=20
also include coverage for psychiatric treatment and for disposition of =
remains=20
in the event of death. Useful information on medical emergencies abroad, =

including overseas insurance programs, is provided in the Department of =
State,=20
Bureau of Consular Affairs brochure, Medical Information for Americans =
Traveling=20
Abroad, available via its home page and autofax service. </P>
<P>Information on vaccinations and other health precautions may be =
obtained from=20
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's international travelers =
hotline=20
at 1-877-FYI-TRIP (1-877-394-8747), via their autofax service at =
1-888-CDC-FAXX=20
(1-888-232-3299), or its Internet home page at http://www.cdc.gov. </P>
<P>CRIME INFORMATION: Albania has a high rate of violent crime. Street =
crime is=20
fairly common and occurs particularly at night. Crime is generally =
directed at=20
targets of opportunity, not at Americans specifically. Armed carjackings =
are a=20
matter of considerable concern, especially for drivers of four-wheel =
drive and=20
sport-utility vehicles, which criminals covet. Persons who are carjacked =
should=20
surrender their vehicles without resistance. Those resisting carjackings =
or=20
attempting to run roadblocks have been shot and wounded. Some have been=20
seriously wounded. </P>
<P>The loss or theft of a U.S. passport should be reported immediately =
to the=20
local police and the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate. Useful =
information on=20
safeguarding valuables and protecting personal safety while traveling =
abroad is=20
provided in the Department of State's pamphlet, A Safe Trip Abroad. It =
is=20
available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing =
Office,=20
Washington, D.C. 20402, via the Internet at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su =
docs,=20
or http://travel.state.gov. </P>
<P>ROAD SAFETY/TRAVEL CONDITIONS: Major roads are passable, but they are =
often=20
in poor repair. Buses travel between most major cities almost =
exclusively during=20
the day, but they may be unreliable and uncomfortable. Travelers have =
reported=20
attacks by bands of thieves in all parts of the country at all times of =
day and=20
night. There are no commercial domestic flights and few rail =
connections. </P>
<P>Safety of Public Transportation: Poor</P>
<P>Urban Road Condition/Maintenance: Poor</P>
<P>Rural Road Condition/Maintenance: Poor</P>
<P>Availability of Roadside Assistance: Poor </P>
<P>AVIATION SAFETY OVERSIGHT: As there is no direct commercial air =
service at=20
present, nor economic authority to operate such service between the =
United=20
States and Albania, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has =
not=20
assessed Albania's Civil Aviation Authority for compliance with =
international=20
aviation safety standards for oversight of Albania's air carrier =
operations. For=20
further information, travelers may contact the Department of =
Transportation=20
within the U.S. at telephone 1-800-322-7873, or visit the FAA Internet =
home page=20
at http://www.faa.gov/avr/iasa.htm. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) =

separately assesses some foreign air carriers for suitability as =
official=20
providers of air services. For information regarding the DOD policy on =
specific=20
carriers, travelers may contact the Pentagon at telephone =
1-703-697-7288. </P>
<P>CRIMINAL PENALTIES: U.S. citizens are subject to the laws of the =
country in=20
which they are traveling. Penalties for possession, use and dealing of =
illegal=20
drugs in Albania are severe, and convicted offenders can expect jail =
sentences=20
and fines.</P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>
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