Kosovo Crisis Points to Global Realignment

STRATFOR's
Global Intelligence Update
March 29, 1999
http://www.stratfor.com/crisis/kosovo/


Kosovo Crisis Points to Global Realignment

Summary:

Stratfor predicted both the Kosovo crisis and Serb-Iraqi
collaboration in our January 1999 Annual Forecast.  We also said
that the Russians were critical to these situations.  Our
reasoning: the world is in a massive realignment designed to
create an international system that can limit U.S. power.  The
Kosovo crisis is not so much a Russian trap for the Americans as
an American created trap for itself, a gift to those who want to
bring the U.S. down several notches.

Analysis:

On January 4, 1999, our Annual Forecast stated that:  "The Serbs,
supported by the Russians, will test the United States in Kosovo.
There is increasing danger of a simultaneous challenge from
Serbia and Iraq, straining U.S. military capabilities
dramatically."  Then, on January 25, 1999, we wrote the
following:  "Something odd is going on.  The Iraqis are not
allowing the latest crisis to die down, but are challenging U.S.
aircraft with missiles and are deploying forces southward.  Their
newspapers are full of threats directed toward Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia.  At the same time, the Serbs deliberately carried out a
massacre that was intended to be detected, and then intentionally
exacerbated the crisis by trying to expel a senior diplomat.
There is now the real possibility that Baghdad and Belgrade are
coordinating their actions to simultaneously pose challenges that
strain U.S. military capabilities.  At the same time, Russia has
taken on a much more assertive role, demanding that the U.S. not
attack either Iraq or Serbia. The U.S. Post-Cold War coalition
has completely broken down.  Russia, France and China are all
resisting the U.S.  A window of opportunity has opened here for
the Iraqis and Serbs.  We see signs that they are now taking
advantage of it, perhaps in concert."

Today's British Sunday Telegraph is reporting that Yugoslavia and
Iraq in fact signed a secret cooperation treaty.  Under the
agreement, Iraq would provide Yugoslavia oil and money in return
for Yugoslavian help in rebuilding Iraq's air defenses.
According to a British Foreign Ministry spokesman quoted by The
Telegraph: "We are aware of the reports that there is a
connection between the Iraqi and the Serbian regimes.  Obviously
this is a cause for concern and demonstrates the sort of company
that Milosevic is now keeping.  The Prime Minister is aware of
these reports.  Nothing would surprise us about Saddam or
Milosevic."  In other words, the British are confirming the
reports.

The point here is not simply to demonstrate how right we were,
although we don't mind if anybody notices.  Rather, it is to try
to demonstrate that things are not as chaotic as they appear.
There are broad, global forces at work that have led the world to
this current crisis in Yugoslavia and which point the way to
events beyond.  When we consider why Stratfor reached the
conclusions it did in January, it will be easier to understand
what these forces are and what they portend.

Stratfor has been focusing for several years on the
disequilibrium of the international system.  Like everything
else, the international system seeks equilibrium.  Ever since the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the system has been unbalanced.
The United States was not only overwhelmingly powerful, but no
conceivable group of nations could resist the basic thrusts of
U.S. policy.  Given U.S. political and economic supremacy,
virtually all nations, save a small group of "outlaw" nations,
were prepared to collaborate with the United States.  Put
differently, any nation not prepared to collaborate with the
United States was, by definition, an outlaw or rogue state.

Over time, it was inevitable that other nations would seek to
create a counterbalance to the United States designed to create
room for maneuver for themselves.  Creating such a counterbalance
was extremely difficult.  The economic advantages of
collaboration with the United States were so great, that
political or military resistance to American initiatives was
irrational.  Neither Russia nor China, for example, would
collaborate with each other if the consequence of such
collaboration would be American economic retribution.  Thus,
since 1991 an extremely strange and even unnatural disequilibrium
dominated the world.  The United States presided over a global
coalition and isolated any nation that would not participate.

The Asian economic crisis and the Russian economic collapse were
only barely connected economically.  Yet, they were profoundly
connected politically.  As Russia's and China's economies
struggled under the burdens of economic contraction, each began
to experience a degree of internal political instability.  Each,
in its own way, sought to stabilize its economy by reigning in
liberals (those who sought collaboration with the United States)
and increasing dependence on conservatives (those who sought to
pursue a course simultaneously more nationalistic, and more
political and military in nature).  The liberals and economists
grew weaker.  The conservatives, apparatchiks and generals grew
stronger.

For a year now, China and Russia have been cautiously moving
toward entente.  However, the Russian situation, which is both
more grim economically and more powerful militarily, evolved
faster.  Nationalists, conservatives, apparatchiks and generals
essentially seized control of Russia, ousting westernizers,
liberals, technocrats and economists.  The new faction --
realizing that economic help from the West was not forthcoming,
insufficient or actually irrelevant to Russia's economic problems
-- sought to create a political space within which Russia could
reassert its geopolitical interests.

The United States, believing that the events of 1989-1992 had
permanently transformed the world so that only the American
geopolitical understanding was viable, resisted the Russian
attempt to redefine its sphere of influence.  The Russians became
more uneasy and aggressive.  It appeared logical to us that
Russia would find it in its interests to create a new bloc partly
to defend itself, partly to assert itself and partly as a
bargaining chip against the IMF and the United States.  Few
nations would initially collaborate with Russia.  The rogue
states were the exception and three rogue states were of
particular interest: Serbia, North Korea and Iraq.  North Korea
was dangerous to Russia because of proximity, and because of
potential Japanese and Chinese responses.  So the Russians put
that one on the back burner.

Serbia and Iraq, however, were perfect.  What made them perfect
was that they were completely isolated, would rapidly move into a
position of dependency on Russia, were of marginal importance to
Russia so that they could be abandoned if need be, and most
important, their behavior would drive the Americans up a wall,
increasing Russia's leverage.  Given Russia's position, it was
obvious to us that if the Russians were rational, they would
quietly align themselves with Serbia and Iraq and create a
coordinated crisis designed to psychologically stun the United
States and open the door to a redefinition of the international
system.

In examining the options, it seemed clear to us that two things
would happen.  First, the Russians would do everything to
encourage the Iraqis to pin U.S. forces in Iraq.  Second, the
Russians would encourage Serbian intransigence over Kosovo.  By
covertly supplying critical military supplies and providing
public political support, Russia created a space in which both
the Serbs and Iraqis could resist U.S. military pressure.
Ideally, from the Russian point of view, the United States would
find itself in a position where, for the first time since World
War II, it was conducting air campaigns simultaneously in two
widely dispersed theaters.  The ideal for the Russians was an
ineffective, prolonged campaign in Iraq and an intensive one in
Serbia.  Neither can succeed, neither can end, both will together
sap U.S. military strength while straining the American alliance
system.

This should not be thought of as some conspiracy theory.  The
Russians did not create the current situation.  All they did was
provide limited resources and encouragement to two isolated
nations that the United States, of its own volition and inertia,
was committed to redefining.  Russia did not create the American
obsession with Iraq and Serbia.  All that the Russians did was to
provide them with sufficient material and confidence to be
willing to reject American ultimatums.

Therefore, Iraqi-Serbian cooperation is a given in two senses.
First, they would have to be idiots not to cooperate.  And in
spite of the nasty U.S. tendency to underestimate its opponents,
neither Milosevic nor Saddam is even slightly stupid.  Second,
and more important, they now have a sponsor for their
cooperation: the Russians.  The Russians want to bring down the
Americans several notches in order to increase their leverage.
Coordinating two rogue states is a Russian specialty.  They are
doing it well.

This puts the Russians in an excellent position.  The head of the
IMF is in Moscow today. A Russian delegation is in Belgrade,
having first met with Richard Holbrooke, architect of the current
U.S. Serbian policy.  Having demonstrated their willingness to
resist the United States and their ability to do so, the U.S.
must either dramatically escalate the air war and introduce
ground forces, or it must negotiate from a much weaker position
than before.  Now, the U.S. needs the Russians to speak to the
Serbs and possibly to guarantee the peace, a role the Americans
have normally reserved for themselves.  The coincidental presence
of the IMF in Moscow is not really that relevant, because
Russia's economic problems are beyond redemption.  Nevertheless,
there will have to be a payoff.

But the big story now is Russia's relationship with China.  In
1972, China and America ganged up on Russia in order to stop its
tremendous momentum.  Today, the players shift their partners but
the game remains the same.  Russia and China have a joint,
strategic interest in hemming in the United States.  With U.S.-
Russian relations in terrible shape and U.S.-Chinese relations in
nearly as bad disarray, the danger to the American global
position is substantial.  China and the U.S. are having a summit
in a few weeks.  With Russia on the knife's edge of hostility or
cooperation with the U.S., China is an extraordinary position to
demand concessions, and failing to secure them from the U.S. to
then realign itself with the Russians.

These are the fundamental issues facing the U.S.  The Kosovo
issue is and was a side issue.  The key to the lives of the
Kosovars is not in Washington but in Belgrade and Moscow.  Serbia
wants guarantees of a unified, sovereign nation.  Russia wants a
sphere of influence.  So does China.  The real issue is does the
United States know what it wants, and knowing it, is it
achievable and at what cost?  There are far greater stakes on the
table than Kosovo.  That was obvious in January and that is
obvious today.
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