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Re: Weber and rationality

by Ricardo Duchesne

26 January 1999 17:44 UTC


Dassbach:
"Interesting - but unfortunately, an understanding of innovation as "action"
has largely disappeared from recent long waves discussions (for which, of
course, innovation is, at least in the Schumpeterian traditions, the central
force in an expansionary phase)."

Ricardo:
Reason it has disappeared is that macro-structures are seen as beyond 
the intentional control of any single group or individual. 
Structures are  believed to produce effects independently of 
the intentions of  any one group. But serious macro theorists know 
that structures can only be produced and reproduced through the 
intentional action of groups or individuals. Giddens's "structuration 
theory" seeks to resolve this very dilemma, by defining structures as 
rules and resourses which people use in their day-to-day 
interactions, actions which in turn  reproduce these rules and 
resources. Conscious interactions and structures are thus implicated 
in one another, for "the structural properties of the social systems 
are both the medium and the outcome of the practices that constitute 
those systems". 

But world-system theory has a rather poor grasp of  
micro-rational action. Gunder Frank's *Re-Orient* does recognize 
rational actors who can calculate their position within 
the world market, who can calculate, for example, that in a high-wage 
region it may be rational to reduce costs by introducing 
labor-saving technology. (Afterall, a crucial claim of  Re-Orient is 
that Asians were just as rational as Europeans in their calculation of 
economic interests). But in the end Re-Orient adopts that old  
structuralist approach which sees actors as pushed or compelled to 
act in accordance with the autonomous logic of the world system: "In 
a global economy, however, even such local and or sectoral 
microeconomic incentives anywhere were related to and indeed derived 
from competitive participation in the macroeconomic world economic 
structure" (297).   

And, as I show below, such microeconomic actions are just that: 
rational *economic* actions, actions which he confuses with Weber's 
concept of  rationality. Before getting into this, however, I should 
mention S.K.Sanderson's *Social Transformations* as  perhaps the 
most serious attempt, by someone who follows world-sytem theory, to 
resolve this problem of  rational agency and macro-structures. But 
Sanderson's solution suffers from two major flaws: 1) it misses, even 
though it knows, Giddens's basic point that structures, if define as 
rules and resources, can be seen as both constraining and  *enabling*. 
So, in the end Sanderson cannot overcome the duality of  the micro 
and macro: "Social evolution is driven by purposive or intended 
human actions, but is to a large extent not itself a purposive or 
intended phenomenon." (13)

In fact, Sanderson's study of  such transformations as the neolithic 
revolution completely dismisses any explanation which relies on 
human intentional action as "idealist in nature" and devoid of any 
"scientific" merit.  Sanderson's venture into micro-rational action, 
then,  is purely gestural. (And it should not surprised us that this 
gestural concession sees human rational action as  merely 
"egoistic and adaptive behavior")    

In an earlier post I wrote:
>One should not however reduce
>Weber's concept of rational action to economic action per se.

Dassbach added:
"Which I don't do or suggest - but I am also unsure about the exact
relationship between "rational action" (by rational action, I mean action
that carefully considers ends, means and unintended consequences before
proceeding and then proceeds on the basis of these consideration) or the
result of rational action, namely, rationalization, and capitalism."

Ricardo:
To understand Weber's concept of rationalization one has to keep in 
mind the distinction he draws between four basic types: practical, 
substantive, theoretical, and formal rationality. Except for the 
theoretical type, each of these types carefully considers the 
relationship between ends and means. But substantive rationality 
adopts only those means which are consistent with the accepted 
values, the way the "man of principles" does. Both practical and 
formal rationality involve calculation of the  best means to a given 
end, with the difference that formal rationality is action guided 
according to "universally applied rules, laws, and regulations".  

Gunder Frank reduces Weber's concept of rationality to mere practical 
rationality - the mere rationality of the merchant who seeks to 
augments his gains. But even Jack Goody's *East in the West*, as I 
explained last month in the world-history list, fails to distinguish 
these four types; the result of  which is that Goody never refutes 
Weber but Polanyi! 

Dassbach:
"We have already debated AGF's "Re-Orient" and the issue of "euro-centrism"
on WSN about a year ago so I won't repeat my observations other than to say
that claiming that something historically different happended in Europe (as
a qualitative break or disconinuity) and, this in turn, transformed the
world - European, capitalist inspired/induced/ social strucures appear to be
emerging all over the world - is not a  euro-centric observation."

Ricardo: I followed the debate in the world history list and what 
struck me was the complete lack of appreciation of Weber. Many of the 
arguments attributed to Weber are really simple neo-classical 
economic ones. Landes is not a Weberian, but like E.L. Jones, 
Douglass North, Rosenberg and Birdzell, he is a follower of standard 
neo-classical economics. The ones who come closer to Weber are 
J.Hall, M.Mann, and R.Collins - keeping in mind that these are 
quite eclectic and belong to a particular school within the Weberian 
tradition. I would even say that they too reduce Weber's concept 
of rationality to mere economic action. Much like Sanderson, 
Mann starts, and *continues*, his argument in *Sources of
Social Power* with a conception of humans as "restless, 
purposive, and rational, striving to increase their enjoyment of the good 
things of life and capable of choosing and pursuing appropriate means 
for doing so" (4).  The same goes for Randall Collins and his 
"conflict" theory.  

Dassbach:
"Rational, at least as far as I can tell, is used in
two senses.  One sense, generally the most common sense is that something is
inherently "logical" or "reasonable" - eg Hegel phenomenology or Leibniz
monadology [...] The other sense, but this far less common, is rational as
being "means" or "zweck" rational.  In German, one would use this term in
the sense of speaking about a "rationalization" of production. Americans
however generally don't use rational in this sense - if anything they
collapse the two sense and assume that things that are "means" rational -
for example, mass production"

Ricardo:
The two senses you are thinking about are Weber's theoretical 
(Leibniz, not Hegel, who has a more inclusive concept of Reason)
and formal (automated production) types. But remember 
that these are ideal types, and that history exhibits many combinatory 
lines of rationalization, so that formal rationalization, when it 
involves the application of science to production, combines 
theoretical scientific rationality. This is one distinction Goody 
misses altogether...I do think, however, that if we are to understand 
the "rise of the West", we need to move beyond Weber (that Marxian 
analysis is also required I take it as given), for ultimately, as 
Habermas has insisted, Weber really examines the rationalization of 
social, political, economic structures of *power* - that is, he 
conceives rationalization only in terms of the one-sided 
institutionalization of instrumental action, not the rationalization 
of values (because, as I said before, for W, the choice of values is not a 
rational one).  

Dassbach:
No, you can't reduce it to Protestantism but you can not, at least in terms
of Weber's thinking, ignore the role of Protestant if you ask Weber's
question - what is the origin of/source for the all prevailing
rationalization of western life.

Ricardo: Protestanism is one important step in a long world historic 
rationalization process (yes world, not just European, except for the 
last key steps) . Perhaps at some point we can examine the 
"Author's Introduction", later added to the Prostestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism, as it is an excellent succinct analysis of this 
process. But enough said for today.

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